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ABSTRACT 
 
COLLABORATIVE JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF ―JUSTICE‖ IN THE 
WRITINGS OF LISA SOWLE CAHILL 
 
 
 
By 
Dennis Feltwell 
May 2013 
 
Dissertation supervised by Elizabeth A. Cochran, Ph.D. 
 This dissertation explores the role of justice in the writings of Catholic ethicist 
Lisa Sowle Cahill. Since 1990, Cahill has supported theological voices participating in 
the public forum, which she describes as a meeting ground for diverse intellectual and 
religious traditions. Good argumentation is necessary but not sufficient to resolve ethical 
dilemmas within the politically liberal context in which Cahill makes her claims. Instead, 
her commitment to justice underwrites those narratives and practices which demand 
one‘s fullest possible participation in contributing toward the common good. Cahill‘s 
notion of justice develops correlatively to the degree that she integrates the principles of 
Catholic Social Teaching into her project. The dissertation describes this expansion in 
Cahill‘s later essays as ―collaborative justice.‖ The dissertation concludes with an 
examination of her writings on human genetic engineering as a potential application of 
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collaborative justice. Cahill‘s strong arguments can be helpful in steering the process 
toward less-harmful outcomes. In doing so, Cahill‘s principles of collaborative justice 
look beyond act-focused considerations of Catholic ethics or the procedural justice of 
liberal traditions, and leaves open the possibility of reconciliation should such future 
genetic intervention prove undesirable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The American Jesuit ethicist James Keenan recently wrote that the nature of 
contemporary Catholic moral theology is constantly shifting. These transformations refer 
to moral theology‘s methodologies, interlocutors, and even purposes.1 What remains 
constant is the church‘s search to conform itself to the call of Christ. This pursuit also 
presents a challenge: to dialogue with those outside of the tradition in a way that is at 
once faithful to itself and intelligible to others. On the one hand, if Catholicism‘s public 
voice employs an exclusively theological vocabulary, then we end up speaking largely to 
ourselves. While this strategy might bolster the church‘s internal workings, especially its 
institutional agenda, it becomes difficult to evangelize the world in a manner that honors 
Jesus Christ‘s Great Commission to his disciples (Matt 28: 16-20 – NRSV). On the other 
hand, if the church surrenders too much of its foundational symbols and guiding 
practices, then it can be asked: what is distinctively ―Catholic‖ about the Catholic voice 
in the public forum? 
 Since the Second Vatican Council (hereafter Vatican II), the Catholic Church has 
sounded a clarion call: Christians must engage the world. Since then, it has not offered 
detailed solutions to specific problems in the world, but instead has insisted on basic 
                                                     
 
1
 James F. Keenan, A History of Moral Theology in the Twentieth Century: From 
Confessing Sins to Liberating Consciences (New York: Continuum, 2010), 5. 
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human dignity and the concomitant rights that follow from it.
2
 This human rights 
approach has evolved as part of the century-old tradition of Catholic Social Teaching 
(hereafter CST). Over the years, CST has aimed toward the goal of ―social justice,‖ 
which describes an ideal condition where human dignity is found in every corner of the 
world.
3
 While recent papal social encyclicals have become increasingly grounded in 
Sacred Scripture, they have also retained their roots in the natural law, which is knowable 
in principle to all reasonable persons. As such, it is always possible in a pluralistic society 
to improve the conditions of justice, though as believers we work in hope of its perfection 
in the future, when the Kingdom of God becomes fully realized. 
Located within the context of this diverse engagement, this dissertation will study 
the usage and meaning of the term ―justice‖ in the writings of Roman Catholic ethicist 
Lisa Sowle Cahill, who is one prominent and influential voice in the aforementioned 
public moral discourse. Over a venerable career that has spanned five decades, her notion 
of justice has developed in direct correlation to her integration of the Catholic social 
tradition into her scholarly work. Sometimes, Cahill refers to ―justice‖ as a personal 
virtue (i.e., giving persons their due). One can find this characterization of justice 
especially at the early part of her scholarship. At other points, she employs the word as an 
overarching philosophical principle, often (but not always or consistently) implying 
egalitarianism. Still other times, justice refers to an increasing participatory role in public 
life and larger society, especially for the marginalized. In undertaking this study, it is 
necessary to examine Cahill‘s work in light of the two distinct intellectual traditions from 
                                                     
2
 Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes (December 7, 1965), paragraph 41. 
3
 Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno (May 15, 1931), 57-58. 
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which she writes: the Roman Catholic moral tradition and contemporary American 
philosophical context. 
 While elucidating an understanding of ―justice‖ from Cahill‘s writings is the 
ultimate aim of this dissertation, I am also interested in how her conception of ―justice‖ 
might be applied to a reasoned public debate about bioethics, and especially about human 
genetic enhancement at the germline level. It may seem strange to discuss an essentially 
futuristic mode of enhancement, but I am prepared to argue that now is the ideal time to 
undertake such a discussion. This claim is partly due to the church‘s expressed desire to 
remain relevant in the public forum. For over two decades, Cahill has argued – 
convincingly, I think – in support of theological voices to assert their right to participate 
in public moral debate. Her claims about public policy discourse, coupled with her 
writings on what constitutes justice, offers Christian voices (and others that speak from 
theological contexts) an opportunity to earn leading roles in future conversations about 
this technological possibility -- or inevitability, as some have argued.
4
 Thus, this 
dissertation explores the concept of justice in Cahill‘s work with a special focus on her 
bioethical writings. This dissertation‘s epilogue describes Cahill‘s negative assessment of 
germline enhancement and engineering as a direct function of her focus upon justice, 
which is a hallmark of her later writings. 
 The impetus driving this study is that justice is a fundamental concept when 
approaching bioethical questions in theological and philosophical contexts alike. The 
                                                     
 
4
 William Gardner, "Can Human Genetic Enhancement Be Prohibited?" The 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 20, no. 1 (February 1995): 65-84. See also Francis 
Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2002), especially 72-102; and Françoise Baylis and 
Jason Scott Robert, ―The Inevitability of Genetic Enhancement Technologies,‖ Bioethics 
18, no.1 (2004), 1-27. 
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development of new forms of technology raises familiar questions which are ultimately 
rooted in justice: What does this do for humanity? What does this do to our humanity? 
What does this do for me, and at what cost? Can it even be regulated? Such questions 
affect all interested persons, who bring diverse intellectual, philosophical and religious 
claims to discussions about contemporary technological developments. In other words, it 
is a public moral issue. Although many nations regulate these new technologies through 
strict legal guidelines, it is feasible that willing would-be parents, reproductive clinicians, 
and research scientists can easily circumvent the law by pursuing experimental 
interventions in a nation where reproductive technology is less well-regulated.
5
 I contend 
that Cahill, a prolific and influential scholar, offers a fresh perspective in helping to 
resolve such bioethical dilemmas. While affirming her commitment to Christian tradition, 
Cahill develops a compelling argument to give theological voices a role in public debate 
over bioethical issues.
6
 
My thesis is that it is not so much Cahill‘s strong philosophical and theological 
argumentation, which is necessary but not sufficient in her pluralist and democratic 
context. Instead, it is her firm commitment to justice that undergirds her calls for 
participation. This appeal to justice is also foundational to her negative, at times even 
                                                     
 
5
 The inevitability of human genetic enhancement and of its potential 
consequences is argued forcefully by Gardner, 65-84, as well as Baylis and Robert, 1-27.  
 
6
 See Lisa Sowle Cahill, "Genetics, Theology, and the Common Good," in 
Genetics, Theology Ethics: An Interdisciplinary Conversation, ed. Lisa Sowle Cahill 
(New York: Crossroad, 2005), 117-136; "Genetics, Ethics, and Feminist Theology: Some 
Recent Directions," Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 18, no. 2 (Fall 2002), 53-77; 
(Ed.), "Theology and Bioethics: Should Religious Traditions Have a Public Voice?" The 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17, no. 3 (June 1992), 263-272; and "Can Theology 
Have a Role in 'Public' Bioethical Discourse?" Hastings Center Report 20, no. 4 (July-
August 1990), 10-14. 
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harsh, moral assessment of germline enhancement.
7
 Another interesting facet of Cahill‘s 
project is the development from a particular theological standpoint (personalist ethics in a 
North American Roman Catholic context, with a tendency toward a feminist perspective) 
to the aforementioned participatory, social mode, which achieves a global perspective in 
her most recent writings.
8
 In this transnational context, Cahill grounds her bioethical 
arguments upon an explicit commitment to the Catholic Church‘s social justice tradition.9  
In her later scholarship, Cahill insists that justice is required from and afforded to each 
and every member of society, and its scope includes social structures like church and 
secular governance, political and social organizations, and policymaking entities. 
Moreover, her conception of justice requires constraints on activities to the degree that 
they concentrate social power into privileged, stratified classes of persons. In Cahill‘s 
account, justice empowers everyone – individually and collectively – to contribute to and 
participate in the pursuit of the common good. In Chapter Four, I refer to this 
methodological development in Cahill‘s later work as ―collaborative justice.‖ 
 In examining Cahill‘s views of justice, I situate her writings in relation to two 
contemporary conversations which are important for her context. At the theological 
margin, I focus primarily on Roman Catholic theologians writing after the Second 
Vatican Council. On the philosophical edge, I emphasize select ethicists writing since the 
1970s, when Cahill‘s writings first appear in publications. Within both boundary lines, I 
                                                     
 
7
 Cahill, "Germline Genetics, Human Nature, and Social Ethics," in Design and 
Destiny: Jewish and Christian Perspectives on Human Germline Modification, ed. 
Ronald Cole-Turner (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2008), 157; and Theological Bioethics 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 235-239. 
 
8
 Cahill, Theological Bioethics, 81-85. See also Bioethics and the Common Good 
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004), 41-50. 
 
9
 Cahill, Bioethics and the Common Good (Milwaukee: Marquette University 
Press, 2004), 41-50. see also "Germline Genetics," 145-166. 
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focus on women and men who are writing primarily to audiences in North America, with 
extensive (though not exclusive) emphases on bioethics. As I will demonstrate, Cahill 
dialogues with scholars in both fields, and these limits are necessary to examine her 
understanding of justice. 
 Chapter One begins with a brief exploration of the philosophical and theological 
influences on Cahill‘s work at various points in her career. In order to describe the 
expansion of Cahill‘s perspective on justice as precisely as possible, I divide her essays 
into two general periods: earlier and later. ―Earlier‖ refers to her work before 1990, and 
―later‖ signifies those essays after 1990. In the latter part of the chapter, I analyze 
Cahill‘s argument in favor of theological voices participating in the public forum. The 
chapter concludes with a summary of Cahill‘s guiding principles which allow such voices 
to facilitate intelligibility to others while remaining faithful to the tradition. 
  Chapters Two and Three provide a general discussion of six contemporary 
accounts of justice in order to locate Cahill‘s notion of justice within the streams of 
philosophical and theological scholarship. Chapter Two explores three philosophical 
perspectives from John Rawls, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Michael Walzer. Rawls and 
Walzer represent two strains of American liberal thought, which attempts to construct a 
society of free individuals who can pursue their own life plans. By contrast, MacIntyre‘s 
perspective is more communitarian in scope and presupposes a narrative tradition, which 
requires that its members fulfill a prior social role in the pursuit of their individual life 
goals. Not only are these three thinkers influential within their fields, but they also have 
borne some degree of influence on Cahill‘s work. While several points of similarity can 
be made with each account of justice, Cahill‘s notion of human dignity sometimes 
xxi 
 
demands that liberal notions of liberty and choice be set aside for the sake of the common 
good. I should clarify here at the outset that Cahill does not insist that social justice ought 
to come at the expense of individual choice. Rather, it is ideal that individual choices of 
privileged persons should not come at the expense of individual choices of the poor and 
others at risk for marginalization. At the same time, her insistence on vigorous 
participation from all in the larger political community attempts to avoid the danger of 
social marginalization of religious voices.   
Chapter Three analyzes three significant views of justice from the Catholic 
tradition. One comes from the Catholic hierarchy since Vatican II. Here, I consider select 
conciliar documents and later papal encyclicals, especially those from John Paul II and 
Benedict XVI. I also explore the American pastoral letter Economic Justice for All, which 
attempts to define ―basic justice‖ in the particular context of the late twentieth century 
United States. Next, I examine the work of two American representatives of the 
contemporary Catholic virtue tradition: Jean Porter and James Keenan. Considered 
separately, these two scholars offer contrasting accounts of virtue insofar as they differ on 
the degree to which the Christian tradition from which they argue can be expressed 
intelligibly to others. Taken together, though, both demonstrate that the virtue tradition is 
eminently communal in its roots and deeply relational in its anthropology. Third, I look to 
the specific realm of Catholic bioethics, where Cahill has written extensively throughout 
her career. In this part, I investigate the writings of Thomas Shannon and Margaret 
Farley, who have also collaborated with Cahill in various works. Shannon and Farley also 
point out the unique challenges of achieving justice in the distribution of scarce 
healthcare resources. 
xxii 
 
 Chapter Four turns to an extended analysis of Cahill‘s writings that ultimately 
synthesize into her later conception of collaborative justice. I divide her work 
chronologically into three sections in order to trace several developments in her 
expression of justice. The first covers her earliest writings, spanning from 1976 until 
1990, where her work focuses on the deconstruction of Roman Catholic personalist 
ethics. The second describes a ―transitional‖ period in Cahill‘s scholarship from 1991 
through 1996. Not only does she fully endorse Catholic participation in public discourse 
during this time, but she also undertakes a new integration with Catholic social thought. 
The final section explores what I have called Cahill‘s notion of ―collaborative justice.‖ It 
is built upon a worldview that entails global interdependence and a responsibility toward 
society‘s marginalized populations, especially women.  
The dissertation concludes by way of an epilogue that considers future bioethical 
applications of Cahill‘s understanding of justice. Collaborative justice is particularly 
relevant to genetic intervention, and challenges the liberal context which privileges 
autonomous choice above all other considerations. Because of the possibility of 
exploitation and further stratification of society according to wealth and privilege, Cahill 
is consistently inclined toward a strongly negative appraisal of human germline 
enhancement. If human germline enhancement is inevitably on the horizon, it seems that 
Cahill‘s strong claims regarding its contingent wrongness can be diffused by procedural 
or other applications of justice. But the cooperative, networked practices, which are 
inherent in Cahill‘s later notion of justice, look further than the immediate questions of 
whether and how to proceed with the act of genetic manipulation. In fact, if enhancement 
is a foregone conclusion, then Cahill‘s conception of justice might function even more 
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strongly in steering that process toward a less harmful outcome, and in caring for those 
affected by such interventions. 
 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
LISA SOWLE CAHILL AND PUBLIC MORAL DISCOURSE 
This first chapter serves three purposes which will ground the analyses of Cahill‘s work 
on justice in Chapter Four. First, it is necessary to explore some of the major theological 
and philosophical influences upon Cahill‘s work in order to appreciate her scholarship 
against the broad backdrop of Catholic theology in particular and Christian ethics in 
general. Second, since her essays attempt to address urgent social and ethical concerns to 
others both inside and outside of her faith community, it is important to analyze her 
significant contribution in support of theological voices participating in the public sphere. 
In her later writings, she makes an explicit case to identify justice with such participation. 
Third, and as a corollary to the first two, Cahill brings certain values, many of which are 
drawn from Catholic Social Teaching, into the kind of public discourse that she 
envisions. Therefore, it is vital toward this dissertation‘s aims to outline these values, as 
they underwrite her conceptions of justice, of contemporary society, and of moral 
theology and especially bioethics, all of which will be addressed in the remaining 
chapters. 
 The research here is presented in two major sections. The first part briefly 
highlights a few of the many individual philosophers and theologians whose work has 
significantly informed Cahill‘s essays at various points in her scholarship. It also 
summarizes Catholic Social Teaching, which is a distinct element that has created an 
indelible impact upon her later work. Catholic Social Teaching offers relevant 
anthropological principles based on human dignity and the common good, which Cahill 
firmly endorses and applies, especially in her later essays. Various illustrative examples 
2 
 
are provided in this section, especially as Catholic Social Teaching relates to her views 
on justice. 
Next, for over two decades, Cahill has argued in favor of theological voices 
participating in public discussion regarding significant moral issues and has offered solid 
warrants for this participation. The second part analyzes the premises of her arguments 
and finds them compelling. However, as this part of the chapter also demonstrates, 
difficulties arise for religious thinkers with regard to their ability to articulate a positive 
argument in a public forum while attempting to maintain the integrity of the theological 
foundations behind that argument. Cahill offers three clarifying principles to resolve this 
problem. Finally, the second section concludes with an analysis of some of the major 
philosophical and theological issues at stake for participants in public moral discourse. At 
the same time, this section will elucidate a few essential values of the Catholic standpoint 
from which Cahill argues. Not only do her writings indicate a strong commitment to the 
anthropological principles of Catholic Social Teaching, but they also exhibit a critical 
cognizance of the liberal, democratic values within the socio-political context from which 
she contributes to this discourse. Also, she occasionally uses the terms ―values‖ and 
―virtues‖ seemingly interchangeably. This feature of her work raises a few questions, 
particularly regarding the value/virtue of justice, which will need to be worked out in 
Chapter Four. 
 
Philosophical and Theological Influences in Cahill’s Work 
 
This first chapter section presents some of the thinkers and ideas who have 
influenced Cahill over the span of her writing career. It is laid out in two parts. The first 
3 
 
part simply highlights some of the individual philosophers who have exerted significant 
influence in her essays. However, the second parts describe in greater detail Cahill‘s most 
important theological foundation: Catholic Social Teaching (hereafter CST) and its 
affirmation of human dignity, human sociality, and the common good. Part two of this 
section outlines CST‘s contours, and describes precisely how they influence Cahill‘s 
work, especially in bioethics. CST is an essential element to Cahill‘s context, and her 
deepening appreciation of it over time becomes apparent through a chronological reading 
of her texts in Chapter Four. 
 
Philosophical Influences 
 First, the dissertation turns to the philosophers that have influenced Cahill‘s work. 
It must be stated at the outset that Cahill remains fully conversant with contemporary 
trends in social and moral philosophy. She is a frequent contributor to and editor for the 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, The Hastings Center Report, and other ―secular‖ 
periodicals. In individual essays, she considers the work of many philosophers, including 
Mary Ann Glendon, Alasdair MacIntyre, John Rawls, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer, 
and many others. However, within the totality of her writings there are three philosophers 
who have positively influenced her theological work: the moral philosophy of Mary 
Midgley as well as the collaborative writing of Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin. 
These next few pages summarize their influence and its significance for the rest of the 
dissertation. 
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Mary Midgley‟s Influence on Cahill‟s Early Natural Law Scholarship 
With regard to moral philosophy, Midgley‘s thought seems to have the most 
prevalence in Cahill‘s earlier writings. Midgley‘s influence is especially palpable in 
Cahill‘s theological anthropology. At several points in Cahill‘s earlier work on sexual 
ethics, she appropriates Midgley‘s writings regarding the complexity of the human 
person.
1
 With respect to human sexual experience, Cahill calls attention to some of the 
negative impulses toward sexuality in early Christianity. For instance, Augustine of 
Hippo refers to ―the shameful motion of the organs of generation,‖ and other ancient 
writers express a subtle (and at times overt) suspicion of sex in general.
2
 Nonetheless, the 
sex drive remains as an irresistible animal drive, and sexual desire should be strongly 
regulated.  Midgley‘s work counteracts some of this suspicion by first of all asserting that 
such interpretations miss the point that ―animality,‖ including its sexual dimension, is 
constitutive of but not totalizing of human experience.
3
 
Furthermore, following Midgley, Cahill argues that animal nature directly affects 
the sociality of human beings beyond sexual acts and into familial structures. 
The philosopher Mary Midgley once wrote that our distinctively human capacities 
arise within the patterns established by our animal nature, not over against them. 
This is a wise observation, insofar as it cautions us against defining relational 
ideals and moral obligations in a way antagonistic to the working material genetic 
inheritance provides to us. On the other hand those qualities which humanize us 
also need to transform our animal behaviors.
4
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Applying Midgley‘s claims to her own argument, Cahill demonstrates that while social 
hierarchy is common in mammalian species, and sometimes violently maintained, the 
varieties of human societies demonstrate common capabilities that lend themselves to 
respect for others beyond kinship and other particular social groups and resolution of 
conflicts. These capacities are constitutive of human nature.
5
 
 Further still, Midgley‘s work impacts Cahill‘s thought with respect to natural law 
ethics. Within the evolutionary context of natural law, there is a growing reliance upon 
normative descriptive accounts of humanity in excess of scripture and tradition, including 
contributions from the natural and social sciences. Cahill frequently addresses this 
development throughout the corpus of her scholarly work.
6
 Again drawing Midgley into 
her argument, Cahill claims that empirical evidence demonstrates that the ―whole cluster‖ 
of human qualities, including voluntary behavior, affectivity, cognition, and judgment.
7
  
Moreover, these traits are located neither exclusively nor predominantly in one sex. 
Rather, differences are spread throughout humanity and not reducible to inferiority in 
either males or females.
8
 
 To note Cahill‘s critical understanding of natural law theory is not to say that she 
has abandoned it. In fact, she often returns to natural law as the privileged language with 
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8
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which to engage in public moral discourse. Moreover, she demonstrates an appreciation 
for the cultural and ideological pluralism present in natural law discourse, and this 
approbation is exemplified especially in her bioethical writings. For instance, in an earlier 
discussion of the Catholic position on in vitro fertilization, she argues that norms 
articulated through the language of any moral tradition, especially a religious one, limits 
the scope of what one might reasonably claim in public settings.
9
 Again, Cahill cites 
Midgley on natural law thinking in ethics, which makes claims about those purposes or 
goals which are ideal or fulfilling for human persons. ―We all believe that understanding 
what we are naturally fit for, capable of, and adapted to will help us to know what is good 
for us and, therefore, to know what to do.‖10 Cahill qualifies Midgley‘s claim:  
A modest natural law moral claim requires an inductive judgment based on the 
consistent elements in humanity‘s de facto physical, psycho-spiritual, and social 
constitution – known experientially, refined critically and socially, and expressed 
in generalizations.
11
 
 
In other words, natural law claims, according to Cahill, can be neither fully derived 
through deductive reasoning, nor perfectly expressed in universal norms. Instead, such 
claims are in part dependent upon the human experience at the local level, and only then 
are they persuasive and applicable to the community. As others have argued, nature is not 
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merely a given, but is itself an ―interpreted category.‖12 To call something ‗natural‘ is not 
just to report on it, but to recommend its acceptance or approval.
13
 
 On this last point, it might be argued that ―approval‖ in this context could imply a 
mode of argumentation that amounts to ―emotivism,‖ as Alasdair MacIntyre calls it.14 A 
detailed consideration of MacIntyre‘s work and its relevance to Cahill‘s context will be 
taken up in Chapter Two. At this point in the dissertation, though, it is more fruitful to 
explore Cahill‘s enduring attention to the broad scope of cognitive claims and moral 
values within the postmodern context, which includes both rational and non-rational 
modes of argumentation. It is also a worthy point of departure to discuss the influence of 
Stephen Toulmin‘s thought on Cahill‘s own theological arguments. 
 
Albert Jonsen‟s and Stephen Toulmin‟s Influence on Cahill‟s Work 
 With regard to philosophical argumentation, the work of Albert Jonsen and 
Stephen Toulmin seems to have produced a lasting effect on Cahill‘s writings in two 
ways. One, it has helped her both to embrace and to critique her own traditions (i.e., the 
Roman Catholic moral tradition and the United States political tradition), particularly in 
the realm of casuistry. Two, it has challenged her, especially in her reflections on public 
moral discourse in the postmodern situation, to make her claims intelligible and 
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observing nature and constructing it. See A Scientific Theology 1: Nature (Grand Rapids: 
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persuasive through mediating language that is sometimes not translatable directly to her 
Catholic context. 
 First, casuistry, broadly defined, is a tradition of moral argumentation which helps 
to delineate the limits of received moral principles through the consideration of hard 
cases. The practice of casuistry in the Christian tradition is said to have flourished 
between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is also claimed that casuistry has 
often been abused.
15
 This abuse first of all refers to its misuse in the history of casuistry. 
For example, in the seventeenth century, the variety of positions that could conceivably 
be taken in a particular case led not only to moral perspectives such as probabilism, but 
also to the extremes of rigorism and laxism.
16
 Later, the Neo-Scholastic manuals of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries approached casuistry with their solutions 
modeled on Modernity‘s ideal of scientific truth, in continuity with the respective 
cognitive claims of their day.
17
 That is, the manuals proceeded deductively from 
universal, immutable principles to certain conclusions in any hard case. These solutions, 
like the principles from which they were derived, were also universal in their application. 
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 However, casuistry in the contemporary context has been recovered by way of 
fruitful revision, which is documented extensively in the work of Jonsen and Toulmin.
 18
 
Instead of applying a universally-recognized principle to a single case by use of 
deductive reasoning, contemporary casuistry argues by analogy.
19
 The ethicist takes a 
paradigm case that has reached a successful, consensus resolution in the past, and 
determines the suitability of that case to the morally relevant circumstances of a more 
complex issue at hand. Moreover, casuistry is not a practice accomplished for its own 
sake, but is set within the context of the moral striving of the agents involved and their 
moral community. As such, the resolution of the hard case is meant to be an inductive 
and dialogical process that requires careful discernment of the complementary and 
competing considerations in each case.
20
 Therefore, prudence is a required virtue that 
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lends itself to the achievement of a reasonable and fruitful conclusion, not just for the 
agents, but also for the community in which their moral wrangling is set.
21
 
 Utilizing Jonsen‘s and Toulmin‘s work, Cahill analyzes proportionate reason and 
applies it to the common good.
22
 Starting with the Catholic method of double effect 
reasoning, Cahill argues that it suffers from a similar shortcoming to casuistry in its 
traditional and revisionist forms. 
They take principles and rules that have evolved as short-hand, experience-based 
safeguards against biased thinking and action, and turn these prudential maxims 
into logically necessary and practically absolute characteristics of individual 
moral behavior. As scholars of casuistry have already shown, principles like 
double effect were refined, eclectically and over centuries, precisely to guide 
analogical thinking that compared present situations to dilemmas that had been 
satisfactorily resolved in the past.
23
 
 
This analogical application to individual acts introduces considerations of ―context and 
specificity‖ to moral discernment. One can also strive for the ideal of moral objectivity 
while simultaneously acknowledging the relativity of standpoints and needs.
24
 
 Furthermore, Cahill expands this mode of individual discernment to cover the 
practices of social groups. Citing again the work of Jonsen and Toulmin, Cahill notes the 
depth of agreement on public bioethical issues despite the plurality of social contexts of 
its participants.
25
 Jonsen and Toulmin attribute this consensus to Aristotelian practical 
reasoning. Again underscoring prudence as a guiding virtue in this discussion, they claim 
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that discourse provides good judgment in particular over formal deduction of universal 
norms.
26
 Cahill endorses this view, and applies it to her religious context. Rather than 
providing master theories to solve bioethical dilemmas, theology in the public sphere 
encourages a ―social and intellectual milieu in which the social priorities of religious 
communities can be recognized sympathetically.‖27 Consequently, in the public sphere, 
which ―is actually a meeting ground of the diverse moral traditions that make up our 
society,‖ there is a possibility of an overlapping consensus on particular moral 
dilemmas.
28
 This consensus corresponds to the ―locus of certitude‖ that Jonsen and 
Toulmin claim as a possibility in moral discourse.
29
 Without necessarily endorsing the 
foundational beliefs of an individual participant, the group might find his or her argument 
persuasive, and they will likely be convinced on different grounds. This persuasion works 
analogously. For example, one might not endorse the Judeo-Christian belief that humans 
are created in the image of God, but one can accept the ―human dignity‖ that is derived 
from this religious belief. On the grounds of common humanity, one can conclude that 
this solidarity is required to participate in a just society. Through this analogous 
reasoning, a participant might come to any number of agreements regarding access to 
health care, education, or other pressing concerns. This consensus in public discourse 
relies on contextual rather than universal claims.
30
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 Before moving to the influential theologians and religious frameworks that are 
significant to Cahill‘s work, it should reiterated that Cahill remains firmly engaged in 
public discourse, and is cognizant of the prevalent philosophical trends. As such, there 
are many other philosophers whose work she cites and critiques. She addresses the work 
of the philosophers analyzed in the next chapter, but there are many others. For instance, 
she frequently cites the work of legal scholars like Hillary Charlesworth, Mary Ann 
Glendon and Amy Gutmann; of social ethicists such as Martha Nussbaum and Jeffrey 
Stout; and of bioethicists like Allen Buchanan and Sidney Callahan. However, Cahill 
usually addresses their writings within individual essays or for illustrative purposes. By 
contrast, Midgley‘s thought and that of Jonsen and Toulmin, cited throughout Cahill‘s 
work in multiple writings, and in many instances, are constitutive components of her 
argumentation.  
 
 
Theological Influences 
In addition to the aforementioned individual philosophers in the previous section, 
there are also a number of Christian theologians who have had a weighty influence on 
Cahill‘s work. The late American Jesuit Richard McCormick is pre-eminent among these 
theologians with a telling effect on Cahill‘s scholarship. Throughout her career, Cahill 
analyzes McCormick‘s attempts to work through contentious issues in Catholic ethical 
methodology and broad disagreement on moral dilemmas which have developed since 
the Second Vatican Council.
31
 His method is a useful supplement to the theological 
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elements of Cahill‘s scholarship described herein. According to Cahill, this utility is 
derived from the dialectical relationship between McCormick‘s Roman Catholic tradition 
from which he writes and the North American political context to which he addresses 
himself. Nonetheless, while his influence on Cahill‘s thought is notable, she tends to 
depart from his work when she discusses the common good. Instead, she often employs 
McCormick‘s vocabulary with regard to the personalist concerns of ―human beings, 
integrally and adequately considered‖ and his description of embryos as ―nascent human 
life.‖32  
Furthermore, James Gustafson‘s theocentric ethics has deeply influenced Cahill‘s 
work throughout her career.
33
 Cahill frequently utilizes his various theological models as 
frameworks for her own theological reflection, one of which will be summarized in the 
next section of this chapter. Other theologians, like the array of philosophers mentioned 
at the close of the previous section, are addressed frequently in individual essays. For 
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instance, the Methodist ethicist Paul Ramsey usually appears in her writings in tandem 
with and contradistinction to McCormick‘s work. Also, the feminist theologian Margaret 
Farley, whose writings on justice will be analyzed in Chapter Three, is cited in many of 
Cahill‘s writings. Finally, given his central place in Catholic theology, Cahill frequently 
engages the work of Thomas Aquinas as a representative of classical Catholic thought. 
However, the tradition of Catholic Social Teaching (hereafter CST), especially its 
notion of the common good, is elemental to her work. This section discusses CST with 
respect to how it influences Cahill‘s thinking on public moral discourse. However, the 
various aspects of CST will reappear throughout the later chapters of this dissertation. 
First, this chapter section addresses three foundational, interpenetrating facets of CST: 
inviolable human dignity, essential human sociality, and the common good. Next, it 
offers several examples from the breadth of Cahill‘s writings that demonstrate CST, 
particularly its later expressions, is an essential component to her context in myriad ways. 
 
Three Basic Affirmations of Catholic Social Teaching 
 To begin, for over a century, CST has attempted to relate the Catholic faith to 
human social conditions. This is not to say that the church‘s hierarchy was uninterested in 
social matters prior to the late nineteenth century, but it is customary in Catholic theology 
to locate Leo XIII‘s encyclical Rerum Novarum as the starting point for modern social 
teaching – a starting point with which Cahill also concurs.34 Likewise, it is not implied 
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here that CST has been monolithic since Rerum Novarum. Indeed, Leo himself accepted 
social and economic inequalities as a symptom of the fallen world in which people live, a 
position rejected seventy years later by the Second Vatican Council.
35
 As CST evolved, 
however, it has consistently upheld three basic values: the inviolable dignity of the 
human person, the social nature of human beings, and a universal notion of the common 
good. These values are inexorably interrelated, though the last figures most prominently 
in Cahill‘s writings. 
 First, citing the creation stories of Genesis 1-2 and the song of praise in Psalm 8, 
the Second Vatican Council (hereafter Vatican II) locate basic human dignity with a 
createdness that is common to all human persons. As part of the created order, this 
dignity is ―sublime‖ and demands protection for the ―universal and inviolable‖ rights of 
all persons. In addition to the rights considered normative within a liberal democracy, 
such as freedom of conscience and religion, the Council affirmed other positive rights 
that, while applied to individuals, are required for participation in social life. These rights 
include food, clothing, employment, and self-determination, among others.
 36 
Since these 
rights are in constant flux from place to place, subsequent papal social encyclicals have 
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stressed the need for human development on a global scale.
37
 Still, this development 
always built on the transcendent and prior dignity of the human person.
38
 
 Second, CST does not assert these individual rights for the sake of isolated, 
autonomous action. From the time of Leo XIII, wages for labor signified far more than 
personal wealth and contractual obligations. Instead, he implies that compensation should 
support the survival of the employee‘s family, which is the first natural society.39 Later, 
John Paul II explicitly calls this fair pay a ―family wage.‖40 Moreover, rights such as a 
living wage represent a basic justice that allows human beings to participate more fully in 
their society. Human dignity is thereby placed within the context of the manifold and 
interdependent human relationships within society.
41
 In fact, it is humanity‘s social nature 
that enjoins church leaders at Vatican II to engage in active dialogue with the modern 
world. 
Today, there is an inescapable duty to make ourselves the neighbor of every 
individual, without exception, and to take positive steps to help a neighbor whom 
we encounter, whether that neighbor be an elderly person abandoned by everyone, 
a foreign worker who suffers the injustice of being despised, a refugee, an 
illegitimate child wrongly suffer for a sin of which the child is innocent or a 
starving human being who awakens our conscience by calling to mind the words 
of Christ: ―As you did it to one of the least of these my brothers or sisters, you did 
it to me‖ (Matt 25:40).42 
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The fulfillment of the aforementioned rights that facilitate active participation in turn 
discloses a call to identify those who cannot fully participate. Thus, there is a polar yet 
creative tension between individual and society that requires each Christian to attend to 
the amelioration of both – that is, to advance the common good. 
 Third, Vatican II understands this common good as ―the sum total of social 
conditions which allow people either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfillment 
more fully and more easily.‖43 As an aggregate condition, the common good requires 
both the respect for human dignity and the development of human societies. However, 
there is also another level of polarity found here: the political community within a world 
of other communities. As such, there is a certain particularity of these conditions within 
the local group that, relative to itself, may be rightly called the ―common good.‖ This 
community maintains and promotes the common good from within itself.  
On the one hand, as the philosophers discussed in Chapter Two of this dissertation 
point out, there will always be some level of disagreement about the constitution of the 
common good within each society.
44
 On the other hand, Vatican II envisions a 
transcendent common good. 
Close ties of dependence between individuals and peoples are on the increase 
world-wide nowadays; consequently, to facilitate effective and successful work 
for the universal common good the community of nations needs to establish an 
order suited to its present responsibilities, especially its obligations towards the 
many areas of the world where intolerable want still prevails.
45
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With these words, the leaders at Vatican II offer a perspective of the world that is rooted 
in human dignity and sociality, and also treats developing political communities 
analogously as persons in need. They point to the necessity of global organizations and 
international cooperation in order to achieve this vision of an overarching common good, 
especially with regard to agriculture and education.
46
 In fact, later in the document, they 
call attention to the exemplary activity of Christians working to foster such a universal 
community, though they do not mention any specific Christians or organizations.
47
 
 Furthermore, a required virtue to achieve and maintain the common good is 
solidarity. At its root, solidarity implies a fundamental respect for human dignity that 
might be formulated according to the Golden Rule (Matt 7:12).
48
 More importantly, 
solidarity carries a social connotation that requires the responsible use of all natural and 
manufactured resources for the good of everyone in order to sustain and develop life. 
Pius XII identifies this use as the ―law of human solidarity and charity.‖49 As this notion 
of solidarity developed, later encyclicals further identified it as an opportunity for 
conversion: a turning away from sin, which, in addition to breaking one‘s relationship 
with God, also destroys friendship with one‘s neighbor, either an individual or a 
community. 
50
 For instance, John Paul II claims that one must be attentive to the ways 
that one‘s pursuit of wealth and prosperity affects others. 
                                                     
46
 GS, 84-85. 
47
 GS, 90. By contrast, Cahill frequently identifies individuals, organizations, and 
policymaking entities that contribute to the common good, e.g., see Cahill, Theological 
Bioethics, 181. 
48
 Cf. The Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC), paragraph 2407. 
49
 Pius XII, Summi Pontificatus (1939), 3. 
50
 John Paul II, SRS, 38. 
19 
 
When interdependence becomes recognized in this way, the correlative response 
as a moral and social attitude, as a "virtue," is solidarity. This then is not a feeling 
of vague compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes of so many people, 
both near and far. On the contrary, it is a firm and persevering determination to 
commit oneself to the common good; that is to say to the good of all and of each 
individual, because we are all really responsible for all.
51
 
 
International solidarity is required order to achieve the universal common good described 
by John Paul. In addition, he adapts the motto of his successor Pius XII: ―peace as the 
fruit of justice,‖ to what John Paul claims is identically precise and equally biblically 
founded: ―peace as the fruit of solidarity.‖52 Or, put another way, peace is the fruit of 
reconciliation, in light of a deeply rooted practice of solidarity. 
 Before describing how CST has become an indispensable element in Cahill‘s 
writings, it is important to mention that this understanding of solidarity and the common 
good has become more and more tied up with various conceptions of justice. This section 
began with the conventional starting point of Leo XIII, and described his call for a living 
wage that moved beyond contractual obligations. However, Leo locates the obligation to 
pay a living wage within the context not of justice but of charity – ―a duty not enforced 
by human law.‖53 As the tradition evolved, the common good and solidarity have become 
constitutive of social justice.  As a result, more will need to be said about CST‘s 
theological conception of justice in Chapter Three. 
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Cahill and Catholic Social Teaching 
Moving now to Cahill‘s context, it is difficult to underestimate the importance of 
post-conciliar CST, especially with regard to her later writings. While much more will be 
said in light of her writings on justice in Chapter Four, a brief survey of her work here 
demonstrates the three-fold considerations of human dignity, human sociality and the 
common good that are affirmed in CST. This survey addresses two distinct research 
interests that Cahill has pursued throughout her career. The first involves her theological 
perspectives on the family, gender and sexuality. The second delves into bioethical 
concerns regarding aging, biotechnology, and HIV/AIDS. 
54
 Within this survey, it is 
apparent that Cahill‘s writings especially emphasize the common good and its requisite 
solidarity, while tacitly presuming the former two affirmations of dignity and sociality 
within the context of her arguments. There is also a major, polar departure from CST in 
that Cahill describes the community as prior to the individual. This discrepancy might be 
accounted for by the implied presumption of human dignity throughout her work.  
 
Cahill on Sex, Gender, and the Family 
Though they are conceptually distinct issues, Cahill usually address the moral 
concerns that arise from human sexuality, gender differences, and family dynamics as a 
unity. Her cohesive approach is derived from the biological, political, and religious 
aspects of sexuality. Because of its procreative capability, sex is ultimately at the service 
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of the species – the human community writ large.55 Since Cahill‘s approach to theology 
privileges the specific, local context, this ―service‖ is rendered more immediately at the 
level of the local community. Within Christian communities, sexual activity is informed 
by its foundational sources of scripture and tradition. This community is also informed by 
the values of the larger political community in which Christians participate. For example, 
in the United States, Roman Catholic couples have struggled with the magisterial 
teaching on artificial contraception at least since Paul VI‘s encyclical Humane Vitae in 
1968. However, the American political community already resolved the problem of birth 
control three years earlier.
56
 By the time Humane Vitae was promulgated, a significant 
number of men and women in the United States were engaging in ―free love,‖ ―sexual 
revolution,‖ and ―women‘s liberation,‖ much of it due in part to the acceptance of the 
benefits afforded by the oral contraceptive pill. 
 Furthermore, Christianity has exhibited ambivalent or negative attitudes toward 
sexuality, especially with respect to women. The previous section alluded to Augustine‘s 
―shameful,‖ involuntary appraisal of sexual activity. Cahill describes Augustine‘s 
sublimation of sexual desire through the rational will as consistent with his notion of 
human dignity, which is grounded in neo-Platonic thought. 
57
 Nonetheless, in the New 
Testament era which preceded Augustine, celibacy and perpetual virginity were upheld as 
positive values in light of the eschatological vision especially of Paul, and also against 
the sexual norms of the larger communities in which Christians lived. Cahill points out 
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that the longest New Testament discussion of sexual matters takes place within Paul‘s 
discourse on ethics for a healthy, kingdom-minded Christian community (1 Cor 5:1-
8:13).
58
 She writes, ―Paul sees, not just marriage, but also all preoccupation with one‘s 
social state in life, as a distraction and a hindrance to communal membership.‖ Paul 
relativizes marriage and other temporal statuses to the immanence of the coming of the 
kingdom of God. Instead, the norm of Christian membership is located in service to the 
community and awaiting the arrival of the eschaton.
59
 
 Later Catholic tradition, especially papal encyclicals on the family, emphasized 
the Christ-Church analogies from the New Testament‘s ―household codes,‖ which require 
women‘s submission and men‘s headship within the family (Eph 5:21-33; Col 3:18-21; 
Titus 2:3-5; and 1 Peter 3:1-7). The encyclicals did not harbor the same eschatological 
vision that Paul exemplified in 1 Corinthians, but they did begin to note the freedom that 
came with a growing liberalism in their societies. One example is found in Leo XIII‘s 
1880 encyclical on Christian marriage, where he insists on male headship, though he also 
espouses mutual love and limits the power of fathers by permitting their children to freely 
choose their own spouses.
60
 Another example is Pius XI‘s Casti Cannubii, where he calls 
for an ―order of love‖ within the Christian household. There, his body imagery mirrors 
the New Testament language of Ephesians 5, but extends it beyond duties of submission 
on the part of wives. The husband is the ―head‖ of the family, but the mother is its 
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―heart.‖ Furthermore, the dignity of women precludes them from being treated 
paternalistically or deprived of liberty.
61
  
At the end of the twentieth century, John Paul II wrote multiple encyclicals on the 
family, many of them under the banner of CST. Among them, he describes the family as 
the ―domestic church.‖ As a sacramental reality, the family transcends biological bonds 
of genetic kinship and the social bonds of contractual marriage. By contrast, the family 
―constitutes a specific revelation of ecclesial communion.‖ 62 The family still reflects the 
analogical Christ-church images presented in Ephesians 5, but not strictly in terms of 
hierarchical structure. Instead, the family imitates and communicates Christ‘s self-giving 
love, and becomes a ―saving community.‖ 63 More importantly, John Paul connects his 
theological reflection to CST by describing the family as a ―school of deeper humanity,‖ 
one that shares benefits and burdens among itself, and extends its action beyond itself in 
service to the larger society.
64
 
The Christian family is not closed in on itself, but remains open to the 
community, moved by a sense of justice and concern for others, as well as by a 
consciousness of its responsibility toward the whole of society.
65
 
 
Thus, this ideal of the family in John Paul‘s thought is far more substantive an account 
than Leo‘s ―first natural society,‖ as he called it in Rerum Novarum. The family becomes 
the primary contributor to the common good. 
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 While this increasingly positive appraisal of sexuality and family life in the papal 
encyclical tradition has been well received in Cahill‘s writings, it is not unproblematic. 
Part of the problem is located within church tradition, as it frequently has insisted on 
assigning gender roles within the Christian community. 
For most of Christian history, it has been taken for granted that biological sex 
entails specific gender roles that go beyond reproduction and child care to include 
significant differentiation in most domestic and social roles. Behind this 
assumption is the idea that women were created primarily for reproduction, and 
are in all other ways weaker than men. Men are assumed to be the natural leaders 
in public affairs, as well as the supervisors of women‘s fulfillment of domestic 
responsibilities.
66
 
 
Cahill‘s observation here is rooted in critiques from a variety of feminist writers in the 
Christian tradition. However, she also notes on the one hand the broad range of religious 
opinion on the implications of these inequalities for individual communities and on the 
other hand the increasing consideration of women‘s participation within the complexities 
of those opinions. For example, Augustine‘s pessimistic view of sex notwithstanding, 
Cahill insists that he was no misogynist. His strict view of sexual norms applies equally 
to men and women.
67
 During the Middle Ages, church interventions such as greater 
attention to women‘s rights in marriage and vowed celibacy in convents modified 
women‘s social roles and offered alternatives to the larger societies in which they lived.   
 Moreover, as these examples illustrate, the Christian vision of sexuality and 
family life, particularly in light of CST, offers a constructive critique of the liberal values 
toward sexuality in contemporary society. It also marks a significant development in 
Cahill‘s work that demonstrates the growing importance of CST for her context. In her 
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earlier writing on gender and sexuality, Cahill concludes that New Testament ethics is 
immanently and inherently communal.
68
 Consequently, Christian marriage structures 
human sexuality and deflects the power of gender differences.
69
 Historically, marriage is 
the vehicle that links the individual to the community, naming one‘s dynamic familial 
place, and its concomitant roles. Today‘s society envisions marriage and sexuality in a 
diametrically personal way. In the liberal vision of life in general, the person is an 
autonomous agent who exists to fulfill his or her own interests and needs, limited only by 
the competing rights of others. As such, liberal sexual ethics legitimize acts between 
consenting adults, with the absence harm to others as the sole regulating moral criteria.
70
 
Cahill proposes a solution for Christians living within larger society that refines rather 
than redefines Christian sexual ethics. In formulating moral criteria, Christians should 
consider the sexual norm of a ―lasting procreative union‖ between one man and one 
woman, while allowing for variance within the community. Departures from the norm 
include those conjugal situations which are found in contemporary society as ―choices:‖ 
e.g., divorce and remarriage, pre-ceremonial cohabitation, contraceptive situations, and 
committed homosexual relationships.
 71
 While these examples are excluded as moral 
choices in current Roman Catholic practice, they might be acceptable as part of the 
inclusive vision of the New Testament. 
 However, Cahill‘s later work utilizes CST to transform the society in which these 
choices are presented. For example, a decade after the work referenced in the previous 
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paragraph, where sex is at the service of the community, she switches the polarity with 
respect to its emphasis. She argues in her later work that the way sex and gender relate to 
the common good is primarily through the family.
72
 Her argument still rests on the major 
premise that sex is a fundamental service to the species, but modifies this assumption in 
that the gender roles within the family organize sexual activity and serve social purposes. 
Cahill also defines the common good as a ―philosophical and moral concept which gives 
content to the notion of justice considered in its societal dimensions.‖73 The common 
good orients sex and procreation justly by requiring distinctly human capacities – e.g., 
empathy, commitment, solidarity, and responsibility. Her definition of the common good 
also implies corresponding notions of sociality, equality, and interdependence. 
Furthermore, she adds that this arrangement is not always just. Consequently, justice as 
constitutive of the common good is required in order for sex, gender, and the family to 
function properly in society. 
 Given these capacities, Cahill looks to three normative models of the family in 
current scholarship (sociobiology, ―family values,‖ and deconstructionist) and why they 
fail in the Christian context.
74
 Sociobiology and evolutionary psychology reduce sex and 
parenting to biological strategies that ensure species propagation. The ―family values‖ 
approach describes the family unit in terms of its harmony and cooperation, with all 
members faithfully fulfilling their roles in the family, usually in conformity with socially 
conservative norms. The deconstructionist model asserts that there is no ―natural‖ pattern 
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of the family because it is socially and historically constructed. In this model, all family 
ties are voluntarily bound, with no regard for kinship or other factors. The first two fall 
short because of their ―givenness.‖ Sociobiology grants too little importance to these 
human capacities. As Midgley argues, human capacities arise within the patterns 
established by human nature, not in spite of them.
75
 To Midgley‘s claim, Cahill adds that 
our human capacities have a transforming effect on our animal nature, too.
76
 The appeal 
to values is unsuccessful because it envisions the normative values only within a nuclear 
family paradigm. The third model fails because of its overemphasis on contractual and 
intentional aspects of human relationships. 
 Instead, Cahill argues for a model of the family that integrates the positive 
natural, moral, and historical aspects of the three insufficient models. The way to 
integrate them, she argues, is through CST. CST envisions family as a fundamental unit 
of society that engages the world. It brings freedom and responsibility together to serve 
the common good. The family is dependent upon society, but also ministers to transform 
it.
77An organic part of Cahill‘s argument here involves the family as ―domestic church.‖ 
Here, she recalls the radical reinterpretation of family structures in light of her earlier 
work on the New Testament community.
78
 The family becomes the primary educator for 
solidarity and service to the community and society at large.
79
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 Conversely, because families serve the common good, Cahill argues that societies 
should also provide social support to families in order to facilitate their participation. 
Citing the U.S. bishops‘ letter on children and families, Cahill argues that this support is 
the ―flip side‖ to the family‘s service in light of an ―interdependent world.‖ 
Of all families, poor families (worldwide) need the most help. The question is not 
whether the middle class in our society has a duty to assist families needing 
welfare, but rather, what form of assistance expresses genuine solidarity and 
enables those families active, long-term participation in the common good.
80
 
 
In short, the family cannot serve the common good without a proportionate response from 
the society that is likewise served by the common good. The domestic church carries the 
moral vision of the larger church, and helps to transform its larger society. 
 However, Cahill notes a certain danger of the ―domestic church‖ as an integrative 
model for the family, especially for women. She applauds the later papal encyclicals that 
have strongly advocated women‘s rights internationally. John Paul‘s writings, especially 
Familiaris Consortio, have moved far beyond male headship of the family to a paradigm 
of marital love among equals.
81
 Nonetheless, this equality is counterbalanced by an 
emphasis on complementarity that reifies domestic roles as normative for women. It also 
says little for women‘s leadership roles within the Catholic Church. Thus, Cahill‘s later 
work also argues that justice for women must include special attention to their lives not 
only in the family but also within the church.
82
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 In summary, this section has demonstrated how CST has exerted a vital influence 
on Cahill‘s later work on sex, gender, and the family. Utilizing CST, Cahill‘s writings on 
sexual ethics and the family have moved from its significance for sustaining the Christian 
community itself to how the values of solidarity and responsibility can transform the 
larger society in which Christians live. Employing John Paul‘s metaphor of the family as 
domestic church, Cahill confirms the interdependence of the family and society upon 
each other, calling on society to provide support for families, so that they might thereby 
work for the common good. Cahill also demonstrates that the Christian community has 
not yet achieved complete participation of its own membership. Thus, her commitment to 
justice for all within the community gives her some reluctance to utilize fully the 
metaphor of ―domestic church.‖ 
 
Cahill‘s Bioethics of the Common Good 
Turning now to the influence of CST on Cahill‘s bioethical writings, this section 
surveys her writings on biotechnology utilization and HIV/AIDS prevention. Since a 
detailed examination of her appraisal of human germline enhancement is forthcoming in 
the dissertation‘s conclusion, this section focuses on biotechnology with respect to aging. 
This section also considers her application of CST regarding HIV/AIDS as her paradigm 
illustration of a bioethics of the common good in practice. What is clear from this survey 
is that Cahill rejects what she perceives in the current ethos in contemporary society as 
attempts to medicalize issues which are primarily social concerns. Against this trend, she 
argues that allocation of particular medical practices should be prioritized relative to their 
contribution to the common good. Furthermore, she increasingly describes bioethics in 
30 
 
terms of the common good over and above the other two affirmations of human dignity 
and sociality. 
 First, Cahill deals with the problem of aging exclusively in her later writings – she 
first takes up aging in 1991 in a volume of Concilium.
83
 It might be expected, then, that 
she would begin to integrate CST into her work, but in a brief editorial introduction, she 
alludes only to ―social and cultural challenges‖ of a growing population of elderly 
persons, with no explicit reference to CST. Similarly, the articles presented in the issue 
attempt to read the ―signs of the times‖ as they apply to aging (e.g., biblical and 
theological perspectives, and cultural responses to aging), but none of them refer to CST 
or its affirmations. 
 However, in more recent work, Cahill again has taken up the moral problems 
associated with aging, this time with a more fully developed theory that integrates CST as 
an element of her argument. In the United States, seventy-five percent of deaths occur in 
old age, with many leading causes of death disproportionately affecting the elderly.
84
 
Clearly, death is part and parcel with the experience of every human life, and longevity 
has changed the dynamics of dying in contemporary society. As the President‘s Council 
on Bioethics has noted, because human beings live longer, they die differently than they 
have in the past.
85
 So, the moral questions that arise are not about avoiding death, but 
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about the limits of prolonging life, the permissibility of hastening death, and the prudent 
employment of resources for the dying process. Implied in all three of these questions is 
the overarching issue about the general care and human dignity of the elderly, since other 
socioeconomic factors like poverty and gender enhance their vulnerability.
86
 
 Furthermore, prolonging human life often involves the employment of technology 
that can be scarce, expensive, and even burdensome. Yet, in addition to durable medical 
equipment like oxygen concentrators, bariatric beds, and dialysis machines, newer anti-
aging interventions are being developing that actually slow senescence. Such innovations 
include cell repair and hormone therapy, but like human genetic engineering, they remain 
in various stages of early research.
87
 Looking at the current marketing strategies of 
pharmaceutical and medical equipment companies, however, Cahill remains pessimistic 
that future anti-aging interventions will serve the common good. Instead, she argues that 
such technology will be marketed to societal elites, with two dangerous consequences: 1. 
Aging will be increasingly medicalized; and 2. Technological approaches to aging will 
siphon resources away from more widely accessible modes of care.
88
  
One part of the problem, Cahill notes, is that decline and death are often seen as 
―outside the norm.‖ 89 For example, Michael Walzer, whose thought on justice is studied 
in Chapter Two, addresses a problematic understanding of human disease that might be 
expanded to describe the situation that Cahill criticizes. He claims that: 
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What has happened in the modern world is simply that disease itself, even  when it 
is endemic rather than epidemic, has come to be seen as a plague. And since the 
plague can be dealt with, it must be dealt with. People will not endure what they 
no longer believe they have to endure.
90
 
 
Dealing with disease, however, requires costly medical research and a corresponding 
public effort. As he continues this line of argument, it must be stressed that there is only 
the perception that people should not have to endure a problem. But what happens when 
the ―problem‖ is simply age-related? Then, medicine has moved from a practice of 
restoring or even maintaining health to one of providing for human wants. Therefore, the 
personal desire for longevity, coupled with the entrepreneurial proclivities of technology 
development, and both set within a context that prizes free choice, tend to undermine the 
common good.  
Another part of the problem for Cahill is the increased isolation that the elderly 
feel as a result of the privatization and mobility of the nuclear family.
91
 A key source of 
this isolation is the growing distance among family members, who traditionally have 
been the primary caregivers for their elderly relatives. Furthermore, poverty exacerbates 
the declining health of older people because it tends to limit their means of access to 
health resources, proper nutrition, and other factors which facilitate active participation in 
society. 
As a solution, Cahill offers three proposals that achieve the common good 
through cooperative strategies. The first involves the urgent needs of the elderly already 
living today. While anti-aging interventions might produce some future benefit, their 
realization is still found in the unpredictable future. Because these current needs are 
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immediate, and their practical solutions ―relatively clear,‖ a bioethics of the common 
good demands that they not be compromised by resource allocation toward futurist 
technology.
92
 The second recalls the ―flip side‖ of providing for families as they promote 
the common good.
93
 A solidaristic appreciation of justice for older persons finds an 
obligation on the part of society, especially through government action, to subsidize 
support for the elderly and their caregivers, allowing them to participate in community to 
the greatest extent possible. In several writings, Cahill underscores the call from Vatican 
II to seek the universal common good through direct action and activism. She highlights 
the work of organizations like the Catholic Health Association and the lay religious 
community of Sant‘Egido, both of whom work to enhance the life of vulnerable 
populations like the elderly.
94
 The third encourages legislative and financial restrictions 
on anti-aging interventions. Without such measures, allocation decisions will be 
determined by the market, and diseases will be treated according to their profit margins.
95
 
With regard to the use of biotechnology, Cahill makes a clear connection to the 
affirmations of CST, especially the common good. Her proposed cooperative strategies 
suggest that a just society must attend to the treatment of persons rather than diseases. 
She also encourages society to move beyond consumerist interests. To embrace the 
market, with its strongly individualistic concept of freedom, might bring about a ―market 
only for the strong.‖ To allow people to decide within the context of voluntary 
                                                     
92
 Ibid., 222-223. 
93
 Cahill, ―Sex, Gender, and the Common Good,‖ 162-163. 
94
 Cahill, ―Aging, Genetics, and Social Justice,‖ 223-225; and Theological 
Bioethics, 83-88. 
95
 Cahill, ―Aging, Genetics, and Social Justice,‖ 227. 
34 
 
association might allow for a ―misguided compassion‖ that encourages the elimination 
and further marginalization of the elderly and other vulnerable people.
96
 
 Moving now to Cahill‘s bioethics of the common good in the context of 
HIV/AIDS, she describes this disease not only as a worldwide crisis that 
disproportionately affects women and the poor, but also as a useful case that poignantly 
illustrates the universal common good. In doing so, she highlights two major shifts in 
thinking about HIV/AIDS. The first is moves away from personalist sexual ethics that 
privilege autonomy and choice to a more structural paradigm that analyzes poverty and 
sexism. The second involves a reappraisal of absolute sexual norms within Catholic 
moral theology that prohibit condom use in light of this disease. While this latter shift 
might seem to remain a case of personal ethics in continuity with revisionist projects 
regarding sexual ethics, its reconsideration is actually located within and engendered by 
the larger framework of the former shift. 
 First, Cahill notes that American bioethicists in the 1980s initially described 
moral issues surrounding the AIDS crisis in personalist terms, encompassing problems of 
sexual promiscuity, illicit drug use, and medical confidentiality.
97
 The initial response 
from Catholic bioethicists involved stricter observance of sexual morality, and increased 
responsibility to care for patients with AIDS. 
98
 Even as preventive measures were 
developed, bioethical discussion remained firmly planted within a framework of 
individualist concerns such as informed consent (among sexual partners), needle 
exchanges, and mandatory testing. This discourse is consistent with liberal American 
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values like autonomy and liberty. Cahill argues that, absent a way to engage the larger 
problems of gender discrimination and poverty, analysis of the moral issues surrounding 
HIV will be ineffectual both in its treatment and prevention.
99
 For instance, according to 
available statistics, three-fourths of HIV-infected persons are living in the developing 
world, but only about ten percent of them receive anti-AIDS medication.
100
 The crisis is 
exacerbated by unrelenting poverty and patriarchal structures that especially affect 
women‘s choices regarding care for them and their children. One major part of this 
problem is that unmarried or widowed women, lacking the means to provide for 
themselves and their families, are forced into another marriage for their own survival. 
Another complication is the lack of women‘s sexual rights regarding abstinence or safer 
sex practices, and nearly no influence to change their husbands‘ sexual habits. Still  
another compounding problem is the stigma attached to HIV infection that is prevalent in 
developing countries.
101
 Stigmatization is located in the negative social interpretations, 
further isolating those already within marginalized communities.
102
 
 Underscoring theological bioethics as a possible solution, Cahill encourages the 
current contribution of Christian organizations that help to alleviate HIV/AIDS, and 
advocates their continued participation in the global fight the disease. Deeply influenced 
by CST, including its emphasis on the common good and the ―preferential option for the 
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poor,‖ Cahill offers four interdependent aspects of the common good to restore its 
power.
103
 One, a substantive account of the content of the common good is required. 
Contemporary CST has understood the common goods in terms of social justice and 
increased participation in a good society. Two, the means of achieving the common good 
must be located within the competent levels of authority. As such, subsidiarity is an 
important procedural principle that addresses not only ―vertical‖ aspects of hierarchical 
structures of administration, but also ―horizontal‖ aspects of maximizing the delivery of 
goods. Three, solidarity and hope are required in order to facilitate genuine commitment 
to the common good over and against pure self-interest. Solidarity helps to make 
religious symbols intelligible in a pluralistic world; hope transcends the current situation 
to continue work for a better future. Four, CST must interface effectively with other 
moral traditions and social traditions in order to achieve and maintain the common good.  
Tied together with solidarity and subsidiarity, particular groups can work together 
to encourage compassionate and participatory action in order to advance the common 
good.
104
 Cahill writes that 
The global common good, to be served by CST, is participation of all peoples in a 
diverse and differentiated, yet solidaristic and collaborative world society. The 
global common good is both a normative ideal and an incipient form of life, 
embodying the cooperative and just interdependence of all human beings and 
cultures, and also of all that is human with the entire created universe.
105
 
                                                     
103
 Cahill, ―Globalization and the Common Good,‖ in John A. Coleman and 
William F. Ryan ed., Globalization and Catholic Social Thought (Maryknoll: Orbis 
Books, 2005), 47-54. 
104
 Cahill differentiates between respect and compassion within the context of 
CST. Respect corresponds to the dignity of the person, while compassion corresponds to 
the solidarity of all in pursuit of the common good. This distinction will have further 
implications in comparing Cahill‘s notion of collaborative justice with Farley‘s 
understanding of compassionate respect in Chapters Three and Four. See Cahill, 
Bioethics and the Common Good, 70. 
105
 Cahill, ―Globalization and the Common Good,‖ 54. 
37 
 
 
In the case of HIV/AIDS, the universal common good is achieved through prudential 
reasoning about allocation of medication, while at the same time working to transform 
social structures that continue to complicate the epidemic. Because of the givenness of 
pluralism, this two-fold goal can be achieved only through a coalition with other health 
care organizations that do not endorse the ―full range of Catholic values.‖106 Public moral 
discourse about bioethics, which will be discussed at length in the next section of the 
chapter, will encourage this partnership. This partnership is essential, since the Catholic 
Church provides about one-fourth of the total care of HIV/AIDS victims globally.
107
 
 Next, with the ideal exceptions of sexual abstinence and absolute monogamy, 
condom use is the chief means of HIV prevention. This mode of prevention, though, is 
problematic from the standpoint of Catholic moral theology, which has an established 
tradition against using artificial means of contraception.
108
 Papal teaching insists that ―it 
is necessary that each and every marriage act remain ordered per se to the procreation of 
human life.‖109 Because condoms provide a barrier that prevents semen from moving 
freely, they have an apparent contraceptive use. However, this teaching is rooted in a 
church tradition which is ―on the side of life.‖110 The conjugal act with an HIV-infected 
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spouse seems to raise a paradox, as it risks the life of the uninfected partner if this 
teaching is to be upheld. Consequently, several Catholic theologians have attempted to 
resolve this issue through the principle of double effect or proportionate reasoning.
111
 In 
fact, Benedict XVI has opened the issue further in recent statements by speculating that 
when conception is not at stake (i.e., in homosexual acts), condom use does not present 
an insuperable moral problem per se.
112
 
 In the context of the HIV/AIDS crisis, though, especially in situations like those 
in developing nations, where the disease is directly complicated by a corresponding lack 
of women‘s sexual rights, Cahill calls such attempts ―a distraction‖ at best, and at worst 
―a contradiction‖ to the Catholic health care ministry‘s commitment to vulnerable 
populations.
113
 Even if condom use were permissible in a Catholic context, under double 
effect, proportionate reasoning, or some other justification, it would do little good 
because such a choice implies a freedom which women in particular – and the poor in 
developing nations in general – simply do not possess.114 Magisterial authority here is 
important, but it must it must be in an interdependent relationship with the receiving 
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community. Cahill locates that authority in the magisterium‘s power to illumine the ―real 
situation,‖ and offer guiding principles that respect human dignity and the common 
good.
115
 In short, theological debates are as much political as they are moral in scope. 
 Therefore, the solution to HIV prevention is not a straightforward moral choice, to 
be determined analogously through casuistry, or adjudicated according to proportionate 
reasoning. The discussion must return to the first shift away from one regarding personal 
behavior to one concerning the common good. A participatory bioethics informed by 
CST helps to translate that discourse. As she did with aging in the preceding paragraphs, 
Cahill names multiple Christian organizations and leaders that actively struggle against 
the epidemic and the social conditions that impair this endeavor. Groups like Catholic 
Relief Services, the Jesuit African AIDS Network, the Community of Sant‘Egido, as well 
as the African Catholic Bishops, the Church of South India all work to one degree or 
another to provide anti-retroviral medication, AIDS education, community-based support, 
and other direct action to combat the spread of HIV. In particular, Cahill points to the 
leadership of the Sisters of Mercy, especially that of Margaret Farley (see Chapter Two), 
in order to illustrate the ―global to local‖ Christian activism with regard to HIV. 116 
Starting with the feminist standpoint from which Farley most often writes, she 
collaborated with peers in the American theological community to form a movement of 
strategic planning and cooperative endeavors to raise awareness about the global scourge 
of HIV. In turn, her efforts became the springboard for the All Africa Conference: Sister 
to Sister, which developed financial interventions to support African women to do the 
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same in their local situation. This paradigmatic display of cooperation and solidarity, 
claims Cahill, is the essence of participatory theological bioethics.
117
 
 
Cahill and the Relationship between the Community and the Individual 
Before moving to Cahill‘s work on public moral discourse, one important contrast 
with CST in her writings must be discussed. As stated at the outset of this section, when 
employing the language of CST, Cahill emphasizes the common good over and above the 
other affirmations of human dignity and sociality. On the one hand, the papal social 
encyclicals generally use the dignity of the human person as their point of departure, 
trying to navigate between radical individualism and extreme collectivism.
118
 In fact, 
Paul VI reflects on some negative influences of the family on individual development, 
going so far as to claim that ―the family‘s influence may have been excessive to the 
detriment of the fundamental rights of the individual.‖119 On the other hand, at different 
points in her most recent essays, Cahill reverses the polarity. One example is located in 
her discussion of abortion where, against the current liberal ethos of choice, she 
underscores the importance of moral bonds that arise out of human sociality, which she 
calls elsewhere ―relationality:‖ interdependence with others in community. 120 
A theory of the common good begins with the premise that persons are by 
definition interrelated in a social whole whose fabric of reciprocal rights and 
duties constitutes the very condition of their individual and communal agency and 
well-being. The community is prior to the individual, and each individual is 
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entitled to participate in the community and share in its benefits as well as 
obligated to contribute to the good of the whole and of fellow members.
121
 
 
By absolutizing the value of choice, and exercising that primacy within an equally 
absolute context of autonomy, one neglects the social supports, personal obligations, and 
even human embodiment that interact within the milieu of a meaningful choice.
122
 It is 
unclear, though, what impact this priority of community relative to the individual might 
have in terms of personal accountability to that society. 
 Another example is found in her acceptance of coercive policies that enforce 
social change. Due to the consequences of human sinfulness, and especially the structural 
nature of some injustices, social transformation will never achieve a fully transcendent 
common good. As a result, power occasionally must be used against embedded power. 
Thus, an element to be accentuated in social teaching of the future is the 
occasional, but still very definite, need for coercion to secure justice in social 
relations. Still needed is a principle of forceful intervention that is similar to the 
principle that undergirded the traditional just war theory. Once again, though, the 
structures of social agency have changed in the age of globalization; coercive 
authority is not limited to the nation-state, a comprehensive public authority, or 
international institutions. Activist networks and non-governmental organizations, 
along with dissenting national governments, can challenge and even coerce some 
aspects of global systems, at least some of the time.
123
 
 
In so many words, Cahill seems to be advocating revolutionary action to some degree or 
other in order to destabilize the status quo. The activism that she envisions seems to be 
political in nature, though her inference to just war theory renders this claim somewhat 
uncertain. Happily, in a footnote following this provocative quote, she lists two examples 
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of legislation and litigation to combat pressing social problems, buttressing the notion 
that Cahill is endorsing political solutions and deliberative remedies.
124
 
 However, it would be imprudent to make much of these discrepancies with CST 
for two reasons. In the first place, issues like the marginalization of poorer women and 
their unborn children, the isolation of the declining elderly and the stigmatization of HIV 
victims are urgent, immediate concerns for Cahill. The status quo is unjust. The context 
of both illustrative quotes is the extreme individualism that CST attempts to 
counterbalance. By advocating direct action on behalf of the interests of the community‘s 
marginalized citizens, Cahill is tacitly upholding the human dignity of those affected 
negatively by the current ethos in both cases. In the second place, Cahill also presumes 
relationality (i.e., sociality according to CST) in these quotes. For instance, in her 
discussion of abortion, she notes that those who take a ―pro-life‖ position on abortion, 
conforming themselves to the Catholic Church‘s absolute prohibition against killing the 
unborn, do not seem to adhere equally to CST‘s call for solidarity with the most 
vulnerable and exploited members of society.
125
 The common good must be advanced by 
all and for all within the community. Given the relational nature of human beings, Cahill 
is affording those in power an opportunity for the aforementioned conversion that 
solidarity implies. Peace, indeed, is the fruit of reconciliation, which is borne by 
solidarity, the necessary virtue to achieve the common good. 
 In summary, this first section of the chapter has attempted to accomplish three 
tasks. First, it has demonstrated the philosophical and theological influences that are most 
relevant to Cahill‘s work, as they will underwrite her views on justice in Chapter Three. 
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Second, chief among these influences is Catholic Social Teaching, which she firmly 
endorses and consistently applies especially in her later essays. Illustrative examples from 
her writings on sex, family, and bioethics were offered to present her application of CST 
to the point that it has become elemental to her theological context. Finally, this section 
analyzed what seemed initially to be a radical departure from CST by prioritizing the 
community over the individual, falling into the extreme of collectivism which CST seeks 
to avoid. However, this critical perception can be reconciled in light of Cahill‘s 
significant emphasis on the common good. In dire circumstances, justice seems to be 
completely absent from the given context. Respect for human dignity demands action on 
behalf of the marginalized; social interdependence demands that society identify those 
who most need aid and discern how to help them with compassion and respect. In 
closing, if CST‘s affirmations of human dignity and the common good are to be relevant, 
then they must be advanced in public moral discourse in innovate ways.
126
 The chapter 
now turns to an analysis of Cahill‘s contribution to that discourse. 
Cahill and Public Moral Discourse 
In order to demonstrate how Cahill‘s writings on justice may apply to future 
public discourse about human germline enhancement, it is necessary to note her 
contribution in support of theological voices in the public sphere, since her later writings 
make an explicit case to identify justice as encompassing such participation.
127
 Starting in 
the late 1980s, and continuing through today, a trajectory can be drawn through her work 
that first makes the case that theological voices can participate in public discourse, that 
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they should participate, and finally, given the universal common good from CST that 
informs her later work, that they must participate. Also, Cahill notes the secularization of 
American bioethics and perceives a corresponding marginalization of religious voices 
during the 1970s and 80s. To counteract these inverse trends and to encourage wider, 
more inclusive participation, she offers guiding principles for religious yet public action 
to formulate policy discourse and to build political coalitions in support of their goals. 
 This section opens with a brief summary of Cahill‘s conception of public moral 
discourse. Next, it develops an historical analysis of her calls for participatory theological 
bioethics throughout various essays. Her strong argumentation entails a foundational 
claim that all knowledge is partial and perspectival; no standpoint can be considered, 
prima facie, more privileged or more reasonable than another. But this claim cuts both 
ways.  As a result, a question might be raised: what, if anything, are theological voices 
surrendering in order to engage in public discourse? Put another way, what remains 
―theological‖ about theological bioethics in the public sphere? Cahill addresses these 
concerns by suggesting principles for theological voices involved in such participation. 
The concluding part of this section briefly analyzes these guidelines. 
Bioethics and the ―Public Sphere‖ 
This section introduces two concepts that aid the reader in understanding the values 
that Cahill claims are at stake when theological voices engage in public moral discourse. 
The first is contextual, as it situates Cahill‘s writings within the historical framework of 
recent bioethics. It briefly addresses the secularization of bioethics that occurred over the 
last two decades of the twentieth century, and studies Cahill‘s reaction to this trend. The 
45 
 
second is more philosophical, in that it interprets the metaphor of the ―public sphere‖ in a 
manner consistent with Cahill‘s usage of the term. Taken together, they account for 
Cahill‘s positive arguments on behalf of theological voices participating in public 
discourse, which will be analyzed in the next part of the chapter. 
 
The Secularization of Bioethics 
Considering the broad scope of philosophical and theological history, bioethics as a 
specialized discipline is a relative newcomer. In the latter half of the twentieth century, 
the development and refinement of medical technologies and increasing mercantilization 
of health care gave rise to moral problems that could no longer be contained within the 
hospital setting, under the aegis of ―medical ethics.‖ Innovations like organ 
transplantation and kidney dialysis engendered concerns beyond principles of best 
practice involving the safety and efficacy of these respective interventions to issues of 
procedural justice regarding their deployment and utilization. Furthermore, the 
conversation included a wider range of participants beyond hospital staff; debates over 
these dilemmas involved not only physicians, but also policymakers and many others. 
Moreover, theological voices, particularly Christian and Jewish theologians, have been at 
the forefront of bioethics, and have served on prominent national policymaking and 
advisory boards for a half-century.
128
 Since its inception, bioethics has been 
interdisciplinary and has included diverse religious elements.
129
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However, theological bioethics enjoyed this great success in the 1970s and 1980s in 
part because there was an air of ―secularity‖ about them. In general, theologians opined 
with the language and methods of their secular counterparts. Some influential religious 
thinkers like Richard McCormick emphasized autonomous action and responsible choice. 
Because of his use of natural law, McCormick claims that his conclusions are not 
substantively different from reasonable nonreligious moral traditions.
130
 Cahill claims 
this influence came at the cost of increasing marginalization of theologians, or at least the 
foundations of their craft. 
131
 For example, Daniel Callahan notes that theologians in the 
field of bioethics rarely appealed to their theological convictions in their many and varied 
contributions. Moreover, as bioethics developed within a diverse society, the application 
of universal principles like autonomy, beneficence and justice were superior to private 
concerns like religion.
132
 Reflecting on thirty years of advances in bioethics, Daniel 
Callahan celebrates on the public acceptance of bioethics in a later essay. 
It is hard to recall these days [1993] that there used to be a great deal of suspicion 
about any public talk on the matter of ethics. Even to suggest that we needed a 
public debate and discussion about issues of ethics ran into a fundamental problem. 
For many, particularly among educated people and particularly the educated elite, 
ethics connoted religion, and religion had been put behind them, at least within the 
universities.
133
  
According to Callahan, public acceptance of bioethics in the United States was 
accomplished first by clearing out its superfluous religious considerations. Callahan‘s 
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claim betrays a secular worldview informed solely by the phenomenon of scientific 
advancement and consideration of its best utilization. There are traces of philosophical 
elitism that rings of Victorian secularism from the nineteenth century, and his claim is 
built on a premise that society has simply ―outgrown‖ religion. Public moral discourse 
has no place for ―private‖ matters like religion. As a result, ethical issues in the United 
States generally are resolved politically and economically, with both solutions grounded 
solely in Western liberal traditions. 
 Furthermore, philosopher Iris Young raises another problem of the ―civic public‖ 
regarding moral issues.
134
 Young argues that those who enter into public discourse 
generally do so with the goal of consensus in mind. In order to distill from the discussion 
the emotions, participants seek a ―reasoned,‖ public discussion that wants all voices to be 
heard. The idea of ―impartiality‖ creeps in, but this impartiality seeks to reduce plurality 
to unity, insofar as consensus is the goal of public discourse. As the discussion evolves, 
differences may be cast aside, but the impossible ideal of impartiality masks the 
inevitable partiality of perspective from which moral deliberation takes place. Thus, 
religious voices might be given a place at the table, and even heard with some deference. 
In the push toward resolution and consensus, though, difference must be wiped away, and 
to the degree that moral theology agrees with moral philosophy, its contribution will be 
accepted. However, any major difference can be accounted for by their religious 
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commitments, and the revelatory sources that they privilege.
135
 Thus, moral theology runs 
the risk of being reduced to moral philosophy. 
It should be noted that Cahill appreciates the growing suspicion of religious 
considerations in a public forum. She points to the political power of the American 
―religious right.‖ Socially conservative Roman Catholics and Evangelical Protestants 
undermined consensus on medical and social issues throughout the 1980s and 90s.
136
 
Nonetheless, Cahill sees a real contradiction in a public setting that excludes participants 
and creates new justice issues.
137
 ―Public‖ is distinct from ―secular,‖ and the public 
sphere is strongly inclusive of all voices. It covers society‘s diverse religious and secular 
moral traditions. Moreover, as the coming sections of this chapter bear out, Cahill argues 
that all moral discourse is tradition bound, and as one community among communities, it 
is unjust to exclude Christian thinkers simply because they are Christians.
138
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The “Public Sphere” as Place 
Just as Cahill‘s definition of ―public‖ is at odds with Callahan‘s presumption that 
bioethics is secular through and through, so is her account of the ―public sphere‖ or 
―public square‖ contrasted with other views. By employing geometrical metaphors of a 
public ―sphere‖ or ―square,‖ one might be inclined to conceptualize public discourse as a 
space. For example, Charles Taylor defines the public sphere as a common space where 
ideas may be discussed and a ―common mind‖ formed. 139 Though it is conceived of as a 
unity, the discourse is actually pluriform in that it is a multimedia locus for the exchange 
of ideas. The common mind can be described as the ―public opinion,‖ which emerges 
from the discourse. But the ―public sphere‖ is more than a meetinghouse for the exchange 
of ideas. Much less so is it a place for rational debate, and so ―public arena‖ is also 
imprecise. Cahill finds the idea of the public sphere as ―place‖ problematic, because it is 
far from a ―neutral‖ territory. 
The public sphere is never outside of or immune to the dialectics of power. 
Although the common space may not be identified with any one manifestation of 
institutionalized political power or government, the participants in discourse will 
have differentials of influence along a number of different axes – income, 
education, race, gender, age, profession – and so will the practices and institutions 
in which they participate. The public sphere is a space in which power is exercised 
and mediated, resulting both in conflict and in shifting equilibria.
140
 
Cahill‘s appraisal here squares with Taylor‘s account of the public sphere, but she takes it 
a step further by demonstrating theological bioethics potential role in transforming the 
dynamics of discourse. Others have noted that the public forum is usually convened 
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within the context of a capitalist media, and so advertising dollars can unduly influence 
its editorial content.
141
  
As a corrective to the power differential that frequently is found in policy debates, 
Cahill suggests an understanding of participatory bioethics that includes action and 
activism.
142
 Better still, participatory discourse involves multiple ―spheres‖ and networks 
that transcend ―secular‖ values, privileging specific goods while simultaneously 
excluding other goods. This exclusion thereby causes harm to those who cannot join in 
the discussion. For instance, using vocabulary similar to that of philosopher Michael 
Walzer (See Chapter Two) in her discussion of genetic therapy, Cahill argues that the 
value of this intervention collides against the ―sphere‖ that values equitable access and, 
one could add, the value of money. 
The moral center of Catholic social teaching is a concept of justice as including 
mutual rights and duties of all members and groups in society, the cooperation and 
interdependence of all in the common good of society, the moral and legal 
responsibilities of state, and the legitimate sphere of independence of local groups 
 and institutions.
143
 
As medical technologies become increasingly scientific and market-driven enterprises, 
they risk excluding the humanistic and common-good dimensions of their utilization. 
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Participatory theological bioethics works within a network of institutions, each with its 
own spheres of influence, vocabulary, and worldviews. It attempts to transform all three 
through cooperative strategies and political activism. 
 The next two parts of this section outline two vital components of this 
participation. What immediately follows is an historical analysis of Cahill‘s work 
regarding whether and to what degree theological bioethics can play in public discourse. 
After that, the final part examines her guiding principles regarding how to participate in 
these spheres. Also, these next two parts will refer back to the secularization of bioethics 
and the problem of the ―public sphere‖ discussed in this opening part. Ultimately, this 
analysis reaches a conclusion that justice is the overarching value at stake, and will need 
to be analyzed in subsequent chapters. 
Can (and Should) Theological Voices Participate in Public Moral Discourse? 
Historically, Cahill‘s work encouraging theological participation in public 
discourse can be traced to her 1979 essay in The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 
where she contrasts the methods of theologians Richard McCormick and Paul Ramsey.
 144
 
What is striking is that her essay (and the issue in which it appeared) characterizes 
theology as the primary voice in bioethics, a situation far removed from the 
marginalization she describes in her later work. The editors of that issue were theologians 
James Gustafson and Stanley Hauerwas. In their introductory editorial, Gustafson and 
Hauerwas remind readers that 
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In spite of secularization, there are still far more people who belong to religious 
communities in American [sic] than would warrant membership in that fictional 
denomination called autonomous rational moral agents to which our colleagues in 
moral philosophy seek to evangelize us.
145
  
However, Cahill envisions the theological wrangling between Ramsey and McCormick in 
a context quite remote from both Christian theology and public discourse. It is an 
exchange between two scholars, and, as such, their claims are not necessarily defended 
on the foundation of a comprehensive Christian faith. Furthermore, Cahill implies that 
public discourse helps to settle a theological matter. For example, she writes 
For both [Ramsey and McCormick], theology provides a court with which to hear a 
moral case, but the outcome is decided only with the assistance of amici curiae 
(e.g., philosophy, the social and empirical sciences).
146
  
The question raised by the exchange is what role these outside influences have in 
adjudicating the dispute. This meeting of minds is between two Christians, an internal 
matter, as it were, in which a third party – apparently a coalition of secular voices – helps 
to shape the key components of the discourse. As the field of bioethics became more 
secularized, though, its participants from religious communities often adapted their 
vocabulary for the emerging audience. Philosophers and theologians were already 
discussing the implications of this secularization in the early 1970s.
147
  
 By the end of the 1980s, Catholic theology‘s role in public bioethics seems to 
have been largely diminished. For their part, moralists pursued other pressing issues of 
the day, including nuclear disarmament, urban poverty, and environmental concerns. In 
fact, Cahill‘s own writing during this time emphasized family and gender concerns rather 
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than medical ethics.
148
 Bioethical questions were resolved to the satisfaction of many 
through secular channels with the vocabulary of autonomy and ―rights talk.‖149 
 
Cahill‟s Positive Argument for Participation 
Beginning in 1990, though, Cahill begins to build an argument that theology still 
has much to offer bioethics. As noted in the opening section of this chapter, she draws 
frequently from the respective works of James Gustafson and Richard McCormick, both 
of whom influenced her early work. In order to demonstrate that theology can and should 
have a participatory role in public moral discourse about bioethics, Cahill develops the 
following argument. First, public discourse about bioethics draws participants from a 
wide range of intellectual and moral traditions. Second, participants with religious 
commitments likewise speak from an intellectual and moral tradition. Third, there exists 
no independent realm of philosophical discourse, privileged as more reasonable, neutral, 
                                                     
148
 Cahill, ―Toward a Christian Theory of Human Rights,‖ Journal of Religious 
Ethics 8, no.2 (Fall 1980), 277-301; ―Nonresistance, Defense, Violence, and the 
Kingdom in Christian Tradition,‖ Interpretation 38, no.4 (October 1984), 380-397; 
―Sexual Ethics, Marriage, and Divorce,‖ Theological Studies 47, no.1 (March 1986), 102-
117; and "Catholic Sexual Ethics and the Dignity of the Person: A Double Message," 
Theological Studies 50, no. 1 (March 1989): 120-150; 497-522. As Chapter Four of this 
dissertation bear out, though, Cahill‘s understanding of justice develops considerably in 
her writings outside of bioethics, and cannot be considered apart from these other 
theological writings.  
149
 For a concise account of this trend toward autonomy, see Daniel Callahan, 
"Religion and the Secularization of Bioethics," Hastings Center Report 20, no. 4 (July-
August 1990): 2-4. The term ―rights talk‖ comes from Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: 
The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: The Free Press, 1991), see 
especially 40-46, 171-173. 
54 
 
objective, or less tradition-bound, than religious ones. So, concludes Cahill, public 
discourse ought to include participation from theological voices. 
150
 
 Cahill‘s first premise is not controversial. Religious voices continue to exert 
considerable influence in public discourse, as evidenced in recent public discussions 
about federal funding for embryonic stem cell research or California‘s recognition of 
same-sex unions. In these cases, some religious groups influenced public perspectives 
over and above those from a broad coalition of clinical researchers and social scientists, 
Hollywood actors and political activists, as well as secular philosophers and even other 
religious voices. 
151
  
 The argument‘s second premise is also uncontroversial in that religious traditions 
have strict, non-scholarly and even anti-intellectual interpretative movements within 
themselves. Several examples can be offered from the philosophical writers who are 
analyzed in Chapter Two. First, John Rawls simply excludes as ―unreasonable‖ those 
who do not accept the political conception of justice.
152
 Next, Michael Walzer notes that 
groups like the Amish or Jehovah‘s Witnesses do not participate in many aspects of 
public life in the United States. He claims that such groups are tolerated because they 
accept a position at the margins of society.
153
 Finally, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that a 
tradition in good order is always constituted by an ongoing argument about the ultimate 
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purpose of itself.
154
 But Cahill is not making the case that every religious tradition is a 
monolith. Rather, her second premise is heuristic. In public discourse, religious voices 
speak from an intellectual and cultural tradition, just as all other participants speak from 
their respective and mottled traditions. Therefore, the second premise to Cahill‘s 
argument is founded on two prior sub-premises.  
Theologians and religious groups can introduce the civil community to insights 
borne by their own traditions, on the assumption that and provided that these 
traditions are not sheerly insular nor the civil community a wholly foreign country 
in which values with originally religious sponsorship are entirely unintelligible.
155
 
Moreover, as David Tracy points out, the strictest religious interpretations and least-
willing dialogue partners simply will refuse to enter public discussion. Instead, they will 
withdraw into the ―safe‖ boundaries of their own communities.156 The concluding part of 
this section will address the self-limiting aspect of public participation for the confessing 
community, but the present discussion about theology‘s possible contribution implies at 
least some degree of openness to dialogue from all parties – religious and secular. 
 But Cahill‘s third premise requires further qualification. On the one hand Jeffrey 
Stout has recommended to theologians to limit their language to ―immanent criticism‖ in 
public discourse. 
157
 Because empirical data have become vital to contemporary accounts 
of reality, religion has been challenged to move the bulk of its enterprise away from the 
metaphysical realm. Thus, argues Stout, theologians can employ a vocabulary that rises 
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―above the fray,‖ that is, above the special religious commitment inherent in particular 
theologies.
158
 However, because so many of Christianity‘s claims, including moral ones, 
are founded upon metaphysical assumptions, it becomes difficult to assert any theological 
claim without moving, ultimately, away from the empirical realm. On the other hand, 
Cahill‘s responds to Stout‘s claim by rooting her third premise in the postmodern 
philosophical claim that all knowledge, even universal principles, is contextualized and 
perspectival. She reasons that all ethical discourse is tradition-bound, and this assertion is 
the crux of the third premise of her argument.
159
 Empirical studies, Cahill points out in 
another work, help to shed light upon ethical issues, but empirical information remains 
descriptive.
 160
  In order to apply this knowledge in any meaningful way in Catholic 
bioethics, it is necessary to examine empirical evidence in light of Sacred Scripture, 
Sacred Tradition, as well as human reason and experience, all of which might engender 
prescriptive accounts of the human person.
161
  
 More importantly, public policy discourse is a meeting ground for diverse groups 
of people with a common, highly specific purpose.
162
 The ad hoc character of public 
discourse implies that discussion can proceed in spite of a lack of consensus on 
substantive questions about either the ―good life‖ or other metaethical considerations. In 
deciding to enter into public discourse, all parties involved have (tacitly, at least) agreed 
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that a particular issue transcends local or particular concerns. The resolution of that 
public issue lends itself toward something that can be called ―the common good.‖163 
 
Participatory Bioethical Discourse 
Cahill reasons that while ethical discourse is tradition-bound, the plurality of 
traditions does not create an ideological impasse. Instead, it allows for discussion to 
commence from a common ground of shared assumptions and openness to dialogue. She 
cites William Placher‘s pluralistic model of conversation: ―Do not pretend that you can 
stop being a Christian and become the neutral and therefore authoritative moderator of 
the whole discussion. Do not let a representative of ‗modernity‘ or anyone else assume 
that role either.‖164 The challenge, notes Cahill, is not to replace a ―thin‖ tradition for a 
―thicker‖ one. In fact, there are already thick traditions embedded in the public sphere. 
The real issue is which tradition has priority, precedence, and presumed authority 
within the patterns of social exchange about ethics and ethical behavior. The three 
main contenders in twenty-first-century postindustrial societies are science, 
economics, and liberalism. Theological bioethics should and can confront these 
thick traditions with persuasive counterstrategies, symbolic systems, and narratives, 
as well as with ethical ―reasons.‖ The challenge before theologians is not to cast 
aside a thin discourse for a richer one, but to dislodge the thick discourses that are 
so widely entrenched that their constituting narratives and practices are no longer 
directly observed.
165
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Catholicism displays an interplay of scriptural and narrative, sacramental and liturgical, 
as well as historical and social theological methods. Those who seek to participate in 
public moral discourse must appreciate these overlapping parts of the tradition.  
 Toward the goal of effective engagement, Cahill describes five modes of 
discourse.
166
 The first four are taken from the work of James Gustafson: ethical, policy, 
prophetic, and narrative.
167
 The criteria of their taxonomy are not rigid, and the various 
modes can work in concert with one another. Rather, to describe them as such is to name 
a species among general types of discourse by referring to the activities associated with 
its participants in the public sphere. For example, policy discourse builds consensus on a 
common ground of experience in the context of shared political and legal institutions.
 
Issues are resolved through activities organic to those institutions, and their solutions are 
shaped by the values of that tradition. The challenge for theological bioethics is to resist 
being held in place exclusively by policy discourse, since the terrain of that public sphere 
is marked primarily with the values of liberal democratic capitalism.
 168
 Alternatively, to 
name practices of the body politic as ―sinful‖ or ―unjust‖ is to engage in prophetic 
discourse. At the same time, it calls for struggle against practices that are labeled as such, 
including revolutionary or subversive action against sinful practices and unjust 
institutions.
169
 But prophetic discourse takes place at the margins of the larger 
conversation. It entails in some ways a refusal to participate, since the contemplated 
action will lead to further harm. Nonetheless, it can also serve not only to unite coalitions 
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against deleterious actions by embedded economic and political forces, but also to call 
attention to them through public outcry and destabilizing activism.  
To these four, Cahill adds a fifth category called ―participatory discourse.‖ 
Gustafson‘s modes already imply willingness to take part in dialectic engagement, but the 
fifth brings the public nature of the discourse to the surface. Participatory discourse is 
characterized by a strong affinity to assess realistically the moral and political contours in 
which the public debate situated. The current context can be described as a ―deliberative 
democracy‖ or ―civil society.‖170 Some of the tools for engaging in participatory 
discourse have already been considered in this chapter. For one thing, casuistry is a 
helpful method for solving a current hard case in light of past success in an analogous 
issue. For another, subsidiarity and solidarity can help to respond to the ad hoc nature of 
pressing public concerns, as they both seek equitable resolutions at the appropriate levels 
of society. However, while faith commitment gives rise to participation in public 
discourse, faith language is of limited value, Cahill argues, as its use will convince only 
members of that faith tradition. In the forthcoming analysis of collaborative justice as it 
relates to human germline enhancement (see Epilogue), legal restrictions play a 
significant role in regulating this technology. For example, Françoise Baylis and Jason 
Scott Robert argue that not all ethical objections to human engineering are persuasive for 
everyone, and some (like religious arguments) will persuade no one who does not share 
similar beliefs. Atheists will hardly find arguments against transgressing divine laws 
persuasive.
171
 By contrast, participatory discourse links faith commitment with the public 
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context – its institutions, coalitions, and limitations. ―Participation,‖ then, can have a 
variety of referents, from advancing current public values to transforming or even 
subverting them. Once again, prudence is necessary to discern the wisest course of action 
for religious participants in public discourse.
172
 
In conclusion, Cahill‘s argument for participatory bioethical discourse is rooted in 
her commitment for inclusive participation of all, especially the marginalized of society. 
This influence comes from Catholic Social Teaching that is clearly expressed in her later 
writings, which was analyzed in the opening part of this chapter. Cahill‘s argument is 
further informed by her critical cognizance of the values of the larger society to which 
she addresses her essays. She seeks to transform those values in the service of the 
common good. Moreover, theological voices are not beholden to a single mode of 
discourse, such as those described by Gustafson. Instead, participatory strategies allow 
them simultaneously to embrace and to critique their own traditions. Informed by 
Catholic Social Teaching, participatory discourse aims to move beyond ―first world‖ 
issues (i.e., liberalism, technology, and the market) toward pressing global concerns, such 
as the poverty and sexism that were discussed in the previous section of this chapter.
173
 
Prudent action facilitates the best practices and strategies to resolve the issue at hand. 
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Cahill‘s Guiding Principles for Public Moral Discourse 
This section synthesizes Cahill‘s principles to guide the application of participatory 
modes of bioethics. These guidelines facilitate engagement in the various kinds of public 
discourse without isolating themselves within one particular mode and its concomitant 
values. At the same time, they especially help Catholic voices to make a distinctive 
contribution within the plurality of other religious voices and ideological commitments.  
There are three major guiding principles which can be gleaned from the breadth of 
Cahill‘s writings on public moral discourse and participatory theological bioethics: the 
self-limiting and self-critical nature of theological ethics, the conjunctive worldview of 
Catholic theology, and the common language of natural law ethics. 
 
The Self-Limiting Nature of Contemporary Theological Ethics 
To begin, if Cahill‘s premise from the previous section is correct that there is no 
privileged standpoint, then it begs the question: What should be distinctive about 
Christian contributions to such discussions in the first place? Reacting to a series of 
papers written by theologians, one of whom was Cahill‘s, Alasdair MacIntyre responds 
caustically to what he understood as muddled thinking in their positions. 
Theologians still owe it to the rest of us to explain why we should not treat their 
discipline as we do astrology or phrenology. The distinctiveness and importance of 
what they have to say, if it is true, make this an urgent responsibility.
174
 
Here, MacIntyre offers more than a choleric barb at a perceived weakness in certain 
theologians‘ methods.175 He challenges Christian theological voices to remain both 
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distinctively Christian and eminently relevant. In his estimation, the theologians whom 
MacIntyre addresses lost their prophetic bite and countercultural edge in articulating their 
positions, or, worse still, they used no theology to back their claims. 
 Early in her call for participation in public discourse, Cahill expresses an 
awareness of this danger. Rather than accepting dichotomous propositions that force 
policy discourse into one of two camps – ―rational scrutiny‖ or ―religio-moral fanaticism‖ 
– she suggests that there is an ―historical reasonableness‖ of the contextualized nature for 
all moral arguments, including those from religious voices.
176
 So, Cahill offers three 
guiding principles for theological voices that participate in this discourse. 
 First, theological bioethics ought to be socially engaged. This principle may seem 
tautologous; theological bioethics is essentially dialogical. However, this principle is 
essential because there are two levels of dialogue. The self-evident part of this principle 
is found at level of the dialogical nature of discourse itself. But the other necessary 
element of dialogue is the critical self-reflection by a particular community. In turn, 
deliberation about bioethical matters via participatory discourse helps a believing 
community draw boundaries for itself, what it will do or not do when faced with difficult 
moral choices. Cahill describes this self-defining character as the primary role of 
Christian bioethics.
177
 Toward this goal, paradigmatic narratives form and guide the faith 
community.  
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In turn, the self-critical community can enjoy robust participation in public 
discourse, since it is aware of its own boundaries. In the Catholic context, CST reappears 
as an essential agenda item for the values that its participants bring to public discourse. 
From her more recent work, Cahill argues that theological bioethics must take the option 
for the poor as its central theme in order to reassert a prominent place in public policy 
discourse about medical research and health care.
178
 Making this case, Cahill prioritizes 
justice as the chief participatory criterion. She thereby envisions theological bioethics as 
a ―self-conscious mediator‖ among ideological and institutional movements at the local 
and global levels. 
 
A Conjunctive Stance in Contemporary Catholic Ethics 
Second, Catholic theology often expresses a worldview that sees contrasts 
working in dynamic relationship rather than dividing in mutual exclusivity. For instance, 
the previous part described the vexing issue of distinguishing between faith language and 
faith commitment. MacIntyre‘s frank commentary suggests that some scholars find such 
a distinction unsatisfactory. In another context from his earlier work, MacIntyre argues 
that for theologians to shuck off faith language is to accept a priori the modern claim that 
only secular language is privileged to describe and, presumably, prescribe moral 
norms.
179
 Similarly, theologian Stanley Hauerwas notes that even if religious thinkers are 
the historically-recognized leader in bioethical discourse, it is not clear to what degree 
they remain in the discourse qua religious thinkers. 
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If the theologian attempts to underwrite the medical ethos drawing on the particular 
convictions of Christians, just to the extent those convictions are particular they 
will serve only to emphasize society‘s lack of a common morality. Thus 
theologians in the interest of cultural consensus, often try to downplay the 
distinctiveness of their theological convictions in the interest of societal harmony. 
But in the process we only reinforce the assumption on the part of many that 
theological claims make little difference for how medicine itself is understood or 
how various issues are approached.
180
 
The previous section also described Iris Young‘s critique of the ideal of impartiality. 
However, as Hauerwas states in another work, much of secular society‘s moral attitudes 
are rooted in Judeo-Christian beliefs that are popularly thought to be false, or at least 
irrelevant. Thus, much of the disagreement stems from the difficulty and implications of 
developing a truly secular, or better yet, public morality.
181
 
 Historically, Christian theology and philosophy have at times experienced an 
uneasy relationship. For example, in the second century, Tertullian perceived Gnostic 
errors in his opponents‘ writings. Because he believed that these errors grew out of their 
study of the natural philosophies, he was inclined to condemn all philosophy that tried to 
intertwine itself with church teaching.  
What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the 
Academy and the Church? Away with all attempts to produce a mottled 
Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic composition!
182
  
Contemporary thinkers often quote Tertullian‘s famous statement regarding the 
relationship between religion and other modes of describing the world, like science and 
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secular philosophy. But as Hauerwas notes, Tertullian‘s contemporaries developed 
effective apologetic strategies founded on natural observation. Even Tertullian admits 
that appealing to the scripture is of limited value to settle a controversy.
183
 But there is at 
least one significant difference between the early Christian schema and the contemporary 
context. In the past, the apologist was ever-seeking ways to make the Christian faith 
intelligible to non-believers. Today‘s situation, according to Hauerwas, is that many 
theologians temper their language in order to be admitted to the discourse, trying to 
locate the ―essence‖ of the religion free from its ―embarrassing particularistic aspects.‖184 
Hauerwas advises Christian theologians to avoid policy discourse and the seduction of 
―relevance.‖185 
 Moreover, the tandem metaphors of ―pilgrim‖ and ―home‖ help to describe the 
difficulty in maintaining particularity, especially in ethical discourse. In many cases the 
foundational claims of religion have had difficulty finding a home in the world. As Paul 
Tillich notes, theological ethics is often given shelter as a ―poor relative‖ to ethics for its 
instrumentality, namely to help people to be good, but is evicted quickly when its 
anthropological claims exceed secular ethics‘ needs.186 By contrast, Cahill uses the 
metaphor of a domicile both to describe the uncomfortable relationship among religious 
and other stances, and to encourage a more vibrant participation in the public realm to 
engage the issues that bring them together in public discourse.
187
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 These cautions notwithstanding, by employing Gustafson‘s modes of discourse, 
coupled with her own fifth participatory mode, Cahill demonstrates the conjunctive rather 
than disjunctive relationship between faith language and faith commitment. Arguments 
(especially moral arguments) that are laden with faith language will be most convincing 
those who share similar beliefs. Specific Catholic claims often entail a certain field 
variance that gives considerable weight to the privileged sources of Sacred Scripture and 
Sacred Tradition. Simultaneously, though, many arguments in Catholic moral theology 
are grounded in the invariant sources of reason and experience, in that both are common 
to all persons. For instance, the Natural Law tradition employs reason and observation in 
arriving at an appreciation for both primary purposes and ultimate ends of material 
phenomena. Moreover, while it is claimed that natural law principles are universal, they 
do not require divine revelation in order to be known, in that they are accessible to all 
reasonable people. Likewise, the Catholic bioethical tradition frequently revises positions 
in light of refinements in healthcare delivery and availability of medical technology. For 
example, CST is grounded in the human experiences of suffering and oppression, and the 
compassion they engender. It prohibits the common good from being undermined by any 
one particular interest. In so doing, Catholic social ethicists might argue that maximizing 
health in a community will be undermined by pursing the relief of suffering individuals 
with highly technological, relatively rare, and extremely expensive medical equipment or 
genetic intervention.
188
 
 Looking ahead to public discourse regarding germline enhancement (See 
Epilogue) and procreative technologies in general, faith commitment can transcend faith 
language. On the one hand, firm commitment to ethical discourse encompasses critical 
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self-reflection (via narrative discourse), significant engagement (via policy discourse) and 
policy-level critique (via prophetic discourse). Thus, CST can commit itself to public 
discourse on this topic in a way that emphasizes solidarity, even though the root 
metaphor of that commitment is the Catholic belief that humanity is created in God‘s 
image (Gen 1:27-28). 
 On the other hand, because all parties involved in this discourse seek resolution 
about enhancement of the human person, discussion might be best-informed by steering it 
along the natural law tradition insofar as it is conceived in pragmatic terms and informed 
by particular contexts. At least two reasons back this claim. First, the human person is 
generally understood as complex and relational. This fact is confirmed by psychology 
and anatomy, as well as theology. A holistic view of the person must be a primary focus 
of public discussion. Second, despite a lack of consensus on notions of the common good 
or other substantive issues, natural law, with its emphasis on reasoned observation, helps 
to locate shared experience and values within socio-historical contexts.
189
 Cahill writes 
A modest natural law moral claim requires an inductive judgment based on the 
consistent elements in humanity‘s de facto physical, psycho-spiritual, and social 
constitution – known experientially, refined critically and socially, and expressed in 
generalizations.
190
 
Thus, participants in public discourse do not need to agree on the ―ultimate purpose‖ of 
humanity in order to agree on the primary good of ―this‖ action, which requires 
immediate cooperation. As Jeffrey Stout notes, agreement on the immediate issue does 
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not mean that all parties must agree for the same reason.
 191
 Or, as John Rawls puts it, 
they do not necessarily have to agree ―all the way down.‖ 192 Similarly, Natural law 
ethics can respect these differences when building consensus on the issue. As the 
discussion surrounding human germline enhancement turns to the question of the 
―natural‖ character of these enhancements, natural law ethics might have a vital role in 
steering the conversation back to the person affected by the enhancement, and to the 
society engaged in this future practice. 
 
Natural Law Ethics and Consensus 
 Third, according to Cahill, there should be, if participation is properly ―catholic,‖ 
not only a countercultural edge to the contribution of religious ethics in the public sphere, 
but also ―bridging language‖ to span the chasm between Christian and secular ethics.193 
This second-order language is helpful when there is no generalized notion of the common 
good. Stout describes the language of rights as one such ―bridge dialect,‖ one that spans 
opposing or unconnected parties in public discourse. The language of rights maintains 
open channels for dialogue by providing a mediating vocabulary that is common to all 
parties and by establishing a framework that is operable in public spheres (i.e., 
government agencies, federal courts, and public education).
194
 For example, in public 
discourse regarding human rights, Christian communities under Islamic rule, like those in 
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Pakistan, have been employing a second-order discourse of human rights, what some call 
a ―bridging language,‖ which assists the more confessional, ―first-order‖ discourse of 
their respective traditions.
195
  
 In the American context, though, the referent for ―rights,‖ particularly in the case 
of procreative technologies, is individual rights. Couched in terms like ―reproductive 
liberty‖ and ―ethical individualism,‖ those contemplating parenthood are the ones for 
whom these ―rights‖ are often generated.196 In American bioethics, autonomy is often 
privileged as the primary ethical principle.
197
 Even though she agrees with the usefulness 
of ―rights talk,‖ Cahill envisions a more robust understanding of the relationship among 
autonomy and other moral considerations, particularly justice. This caution is especially 
warranted by CST, which seeks to counterbalance both extremes of individualism and 
collectivism. 
 Furthermore, this relationship is vital to public moral discourse about 
biotechnology in general, and human engineering in particular. For over a decade, Cahill 
has argued that in ―principlism,‖ which for years dominated secular bioethics, the values 
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implied in the principles of justice, autonomy, beneficence, and nonmaleficence are 
interdependent. Citing Linell Cady, public moral life is understood as a macrocosm of the 
atomistic individual. Alternatively, Cahill begins with the Catholic virtue tradition.
198
 She 
reasons that justice, the Thomistic personal virtue of giving to each his or her due  
implies a respect for the individual seen as part of a social whole within which 
benefits are to be shared and harms avoided. Thus autonomy and distributive 
justice should be treated together, as counterparts and neither can be isolated from a 
consideration of what counts as a good for persons or society in the first place.
 199
 
In a later work, Cahill asserts that justice ought to be the comprehending principle.
200
 So, 
Cahill‘s conception and application of justice places individuals and the community in a 
proper relationship that is a hallmark of her later writings – ―the common good.‖ 
The Catholic common-good tradition can bring to the public forum a viable and 
persuasive concept of the common good as entailing full social solidarity, 
participation, and empowerment, as well as the right to basic material and social 
goods. Moreover, it can embody a concept of an inclusive common good in 
specific narratives, image, and practices that capture the imagination and help 
create the political will to change social structures and institutions.
201
 
 
The vehicle for this change is participatory bioethical discourse. By applying the guiding 
principles outlined herein, Catholic voices can engage in public moral discourse. They 
can be fully self-aware of their position and defining the boundaries of their own actions 
in light of their particular privileged sources of moral knowledge. More importantly, 
outfitted with an integrative view of the human person, they can discern how to best 
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deploy their arguments in a public setting. Finally, with the aid of natural law and its 
practical reasoning in light of human experience, Catholic ethicists can effectively utilize 
the primary language of the American political context, while simultaneously criticizing 
the values implied in them. They can partner with those already at work in evaluating the 
customary liberal emphasis on autonomy and ―rights talk.‖202 Together, these three 
guiding principles offer Catholic voices and other religious participants a relevant, 
effective, and transforming participatory strategy. 
Conclusion to Chapter One 
Lisa Sowle Cahill‘s arguments, as stated in the dissertation‘s introduction, are 
formulated within the dual contexts of the Roman Catholic moral tradition and North 
American philosophical tradition. The first section of this chapter has attempted to sketch 
the contours of this complex by analyzing those aspects of both contexts that are most 
influential to her work. Theologically, she is rooted in the Roman Catholic tradition and 
often utilizes the sources and language of natural law ethics, which asserts that universal 
moral norms may be discovered in light of human reason and experience. However, the 
philosophical work of Mary Midgley, Albert Jonsen, and Stephen Toulmin have exerted a 
considerable impact on Cahill‘s work throughout her career, and have helped her to 
remain ever attentive to the particular contexts in which the natural law is expressed. 
Moreover, the tradition of Catholic Social Teaching has also grounded her later 
theological work in a tireless pursuit of advancing the common good. While she tends to 
emphasize this feature of CST over and above the other affirmations of human dignity 
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and relationality, both are fully present yet understated. Across the considerable topical 
span of her essays, the foundational principles of CST are elemental to her claims. 
 Also, because her scholarship is grounded in CST, it requires that Cahill engage 
the modern world in dialogue. Thus, the latter section has analyzed her positive argument 
in support of participatory theological bioethics. Her claim is rooted in the premise that 
all moral arguments are tradition-bound, and as such, religious traditions must not be 
excluded from the public forum. Cahill also notes that theologians have been somewhat 
marginalized as a function of the growing secularization in bioethics. As the field has 
considered nonreligious variants for its principles, Catholic theologians have struggled to 
articulate positions that are relevant while attempting to be faithful to their own moral 
tradition. To avoid the pitfalls of irrelevance in the discourse on the one side and 
departure from one‘s religious tradition on the other, she prescribes three guiding 
principles that serve to shape a responsible and effective participation. 
Toward the end of this chapter, some of the direct quotes from Cahill contained 
reference both to public discourse and to justice. Their proximity to one another 
demonstrates the significant but understated importance of justice as a comprehending 
concern throughout her writings. To date she has written no substantive account of justice 
itself, and in various contexts she refers to justice as a value, a virtue, or a principle. 
Thus, the aim of this dissertation is to distill from her writings a more complete 
understanding of her conception of justice, the bulk of which will be accomplished in 
Chapter Four. In order to situate the analysis of justice in Cahill‘s work, the dissertation 
now turns to a study of justice in the complexity of both contexts from which she writes. 
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The following two chapters consider the work of diverse representative voices from both 
the secular philosophical and Roman Catholic traditions, respectively. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
JUSTICE IN THREE WESTERN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS 
The next two chapters identify six accounts of justice that are significant to understanding 
Cahill‘s writings in Chapter Four and offer a general discussion of each.  The 
dissertation‘s focus on Cahill‘s thought makes it neither feasible nor necessary to offer a 
comprehensive account of justice in either the Roman Catholic or Western philosophical 
traditions. Rather, it follows the example of scholars like Karen Lebacqz and Mary 
Elsbernd, who give detailed but representative philosophical and theological accounts of 
justice in their respective writings.
1
 The purpose in taking this approach is to help to 
situate the forthcoming analysis of Cahill‘s writings on justice within their theological 
and philosophical contexts. 
 The present chapter opens with sketch of the Western philosophical terrain with 
respect to three secular accounts of ―justice.‖ While Cahill writes from within the Roman 
Catholic moral tradition, her work often addresses others writing outside of theological 
contexts. This representative survey helps to locate Cahill‘s writings within a 
contemporary philosophical frame of reference. The first comes from John Rawls and his 
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conception of justice as fairness, particularly with respect to distribution of goods. For 
Cahill, distributive justice is a hallmark of social justice; in turn, social justice is a vital 
component of her later bioethical writings.
2
 Since Rawls deliberately sets out to write a 
theory of justice, his work is essential to the discussion of Cahill‘s work. Moreover, with 
the revision of his theory in Political Liberalism, Rawls‘ work is more closely connected 
to Cahill‘s, which is situated similarly within a religiously and ideologically diverse 
democratic society. The second account is offered by Alasdair MacIntyre, who laments 
the contemporary use of a moral vocabulary with no real connection to its historical 
roots, and seeks to retrieve a communal morality, with justice as a prominent and guiding 
virtue for that community. It should be noted that Cahill has not explicitly engaged 
MacIntyre‘s thought in some time. Nonetheless, she makes several arguments regarding 
justice and the communal context, sometimes similar to his claims and other times quite 
different.
3
 Thus, MacIntyre‘s contribution, critically considered, lends itself toward 
locating Cahill‘s writings on justice along this philosophical trajectory. The third account 
is put forth by Michael Walzer. His writings on justice in a pluralistic society apply 
directly to the contemporary American context. His commitment to public discourse 
likewise complements Cahill‘s work on public discourse, which was discussed in the 
previous chapter and will be reprised in Chapter Four.
4
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This chapter surveys the respective works of Rawls, MacIntyre, and Walzer as 
they relate to justice. Individually and collectively, each writer‘s positions are addressed 
in Cahill‘s work on justice, which will be analyzed in Chapter Four. Individually, each 
account contributes to the dissertation‘s goals because they either attempt to define 
justice (as demonstrated in Rawls‘ earlier work), or apply the term in a significant way 
(as in Walzer, MacIntyre, and the later work of Rawls). Collectively, their work is 
significant because Cahill‘s writings resonate well with these three accounts. She often 
cites their work, and occasionally employs the term ―justice‖ in a manner similar to these 
three scholars.  
 The attempt to offer some account of justice within (or in spite of) the pluralist 
context is a hallmark of the writings of Rawls, MacIntyre, and Walzer. This section is 
divided into three parts in order to survey and analyze their work separately. Structurally, 
the three constitutive parts of this chapter are similar in that each begins with a survey of 
the scholar‘s seminal or foundational early project, followed by an analysis of their later 
writings, and finally a demonstration their explicit contribution to the analysis of Cahill‘s 
conception of justice in Chapter Four. 
 
John Rawls: Justice as Fairness 
No study of justice in contemporary liberal society could be complete without a 
consideration of the work of John Rawls. In fact, the sheer amount of analysis and 
criticism of Rawls‘ earlier work, A Theory of Justice (hereafter Theory), spurred him to 
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reconsider significant portions of his work.
5
 Therefore, this dissertation draws largely 
upon Rawls‘ claims in Political Liberalism, which represents his revision of Theory.6 
While he maintains the basic principles of liberty and difference (described herein), 
which was the prominent feature of Theory, Rawls‘ later work attempts to place them 
within the disparate worldviews and particular commitments of the intellectually, 
religiously, and culturally diverse Western democratic societies, particularly North 
Atlantic nations, those to whom Cahill also addresses the overwhelming majority of her 
essays.  
There are three parts to this discussion of Rawls‘ work. The first part offers a brief 
synopsis of Rawls‘ earlier Theory, and situates his later work within the context of the 
current study. The next portion summarizes two prominent features of Rawls‘ later work: 
his political conception of justice as ―fairness‖ and its corresponding idea of ―overlapping 
consensus.‖ Following this summary, this consideration of Rawls concludes with a 
cursory examination of some significant yet understated features of Rawls‘ work as they 
relate to the forthcoming analysis of Cahill‘s work.  
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A Theory of Justice 
Rooted in the social-contract tradition of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and 
deontological liberalism of Immanuel Kant, Rawls argues in Theory that a well-ordered 
society implies both cooperation and competition among its citizens. How does one draw 
a line between the two? Rawls constructs a thought experiment that helps to derive the 
society‘s principles of justice, which he calls the first virtue of its social institutions.7 For 
a proper and fair deliberative process, he begins by ―calibrating‖ the scales of social 
justice through what he calls the ―original position.‖ In the original position, all citizens 
begin deliberation under a metaphorical veil of ignorance, so called because they will not 
know where they will be in the society when the veil is lifted.
8
 Even though they are 
cognizant of society‘s basic workings (e.g., with respect to commerce and politics), 
citizens will not know their age, race, gender, education level, family relationships, or 
other socioeconomic factors that that they might be able to exploit for their own gain. In 
short, the power of privileged knowledge is subtracted from the original position.  
 In the context of an enlightened self-interest among citizens, coupled with each 
one‘s mutual disinterest in the affairs of others (i.e., each citizen is left alone to pursue 
her or his own life goals), their deliberation yields two principles which are necessarily 
just, because they are rooted in fairness to all.
9
 The first secures the equal right of all 
citizens to as much basic liberty as possible. It also assigns the basic duties of each 
citizen in a similarly equitable manner. The second principle accounts for the social and 
economic inequalities that a competitive society will generate over time. Such 
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inequalities are just, if they are arranged to be of advantage to all, especially the least 
well-off in the society. Additionally, all offices and occupations are open to those with 
the requisite talent with no regard to social class.
10
 The first principle is the Liberty 
Principle; the second is the Difference Principle. Taken together, these two principles will 
yield the social and economic arrangements that constitute a well-ordered society. 
 Furthermore, the two principles stand in serial or lexical relation to one another. 
In other words, the liberty principle may be constrained only for the purpose of garnering 
more liberty for all. One may not distribute social and economic goods according to the 
Difference Principle without first satisfying the Liberty Principle.
11
 For example, one 
may not correct social or economic inequalities through utilitarian modes that allow 
misery for a few while increasing happiness in the aggregate.
12
 In addition to overcoming 
this moral component of justice, Rawls asserts that the serial ordering is a practical 
method which avoids the thorny (perhaps insuperable) problem of having to balance the 
two principles when they seem to conflict with one another.
13
  
 In Rawls‘ theory of justice, the concept of right is prior to that of the good. 14 The 
political conception of justice guides one‘s public life; comprehensive doctrines inform 
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one‘s private sphere. Consequently, a striking feature of Theory is Rawls‘ account of 
deliberative rationality.
15
 Rawls claims that deliberative rationality is the best method for 
individuals to form life plans. In a well-ordered society, an individual‘s account of the 
good conforms to publicly-recognized principles of rightness, and there are myriad ways 
to formulate a life plan that is consistent with this conception of justice. Moreover, 
rational deliberation is subject to the various constraints of knowledge and opportunity 
costs of planning. Thus, one can formulate a plan only to the point where he or she can 
benefit from such planning.
16
 Afterward, one must execute the plan and revise it as 
circumstances dictate. 
 This contingency on an individual level stands in stark contrast to the deliberative 
process that Rawls describes at the outset on a societal level when it comes to choosing 
the two principles of justice. The ―back and forth‖ of describing the circumstances of the 
original position is accounted for in the phenomenon of reflective equilibrium.
17
 Rawls 
admits that the equilibrium itself might be unstable. Still, justification of the principles of 
justice it yields depends on its mutual support by all parties in the original position.
18
 It 
begs the question: why is an individual‘s life plan subject to revision, but not the 
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society‘s principles of justice? It is this question, among others, that Michael Walzer 
takes up within the context of a complex pluralism, and will be fleshed out in the 
concluding section of this chapter. For now, the dissertation departs from a direct 
discussion of Rawls‘ Theory to his later work in Political Liberalism, which attempts to 
revise a few major problems in the former while still maintaining its foundational 
conception of justice. 
 
Political Liberalism 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls states at the outset that his earlier project attempted 
to highlight both his endorsement of the social contract and its superiority to utilitarian 
senses of justice. The problem, Rawls notes, is that Theory made no adequate distinction 
between justice as moral virtue and justice as political conception. The distinction, he 
claims in Political Liberalism, is fundamental. As a result, it raises questions regarding 
the stability of the political community he envisions in Theory.
19
 Rawls‘ questions 
demonstrate a political rather than metaphysical grounding for his conception of justice.  
In doing so, Rawls differentiates his project from Enlightenment and Modern 
thinkers, all of whom were seeking universal, rational alternatives to the claims of 
religious authorities. Those philosophers sought secular claims that were no less 
totalizing than the claims of religious doctrines. In fact, Rawls admits that a major 
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shortcoming in Theory was to presume a particular comprehensive doctrine (i.e., Kantian 
liberalism) as a prerequisite to the stability of the society which he envisioned. 
20
 Rawls 
defines a ―comprehensive doctrine‖ as one which ―includes conceptions of what is of 
value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well of ideals of friendship and 
of familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, 
and in the limit to our life as a whole.‖ 21 In particular, ―comprehensive doctrines‖ 
include cognitive and value claims of concrete religious traditions, particularly Judeo-
Christian precepts that permeate the Western democratic regimes to which Rawls 
addresses his work.
22
 At the same time, major secular philosophical ideas, especially 
deontological and utilitarian liberalism, are likewise covered under the umbrella term of 
―comprehensive doctrine.‖ 
To solve this problem from Theory, Rawls asserts that political liberalism is not a 
comprehensive doctrine itself.
23
 Rather than taking a stand on the classic dichotomous 
                                                     
20
 Ibid., xl. 
21
 Ibid., 13. 
22
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―fundamentalist‖ contexts for religion. In his treatment of reasonable comprehensive 
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 Rawls‘ revised claim is still criticized especially by feminist and 
communitarian thinkers. For instance, Susan Moller Okin argues that Political Liberalism 
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questions of moral foundations (i.e., particular or universal epistemology, external or 
internal source, and external or internal motivation), as he did in Theory, Rawls states 
that his view accepts the second part of each question simply to construct a political 
conception of justice for a stable constitutional regime.
24
 Toward this practical end, 
Rawls argues for a freestanding conception of justice as fairness, which is engendered by 
an ―overlapping consensus.‖ This consensus is drawn from the disparate worldviews and 
divergent practices encouraged by various comprehensive doctrines, all of which work 
within a given social system.
25
 Rawls attempts to make his aim clear in his later work by 
stating that political liberalism ―offers no specific metaphysical or epistemological 
doctrine beyond what is implied by the political conception [of justice] itself.‖ 26 In doing 
so, Rawls‘ revision of Theory is not so much an abandonment of its principles as it is a 
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reduction of its scope.
27
 Instead of invoking a comprehensive doctrine to which all must 
agree in order to belong to this just society, the political conception of justice is a 
freestanding module. Hence, it can be held by all citizens, regardless of the individual 
comprehensive doctrine to which they subscribe.
28
 
As a result, Rawls‘ two-fold political conception of justice is very similar to the 
principles that he offers in Theory. First, ―each person has an equal claim to a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which schedule is compatible with 
the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those 
liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value.‖ 29 Next, social and economic inequalities 
are acceptable only under two conditions: ―first they are to be attached to positions and 
offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are 
to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.‖30 Each principle 
applies to different parts of the basic structure of a just society. 
[B]oth are concerned not only with basic rights, liberties, and opportunities, but 
also with the claims of equality; while the second part of the second principle 
underwrites the worth of these institutional guarantees.
31
 
 
 Thus, at the same time he outlines a political conception of justice, Rawls also argues for 
an egalitarian, democratic form of liberalism. 
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conceptions is a matter of scope: that is, the range of subjects to which a conception 
applies, and the wider the content a wider range requires.‖ Rawls, Political Liberalism, 
175. 
 
28
 Ibid., 144-145. 
 
29
  Ibid., 5. 
 30 Ibid., 6. 
31
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How does this restatement of the principles of justice as fairness move from a 
comprehensive doctrine in Theory to a political conception in Political Liberalism? 
Rawls claims that they are justified by overlapping consensus between the freestanding 
political conception of justice and the various comprehensive doctrines. Rawls argues in 
another essay that in a well-ordered society, all citizens can agree on the same political 
conception of justice, even though they do not agree for the same reasons, ―all the way 
down.‖32 The overlapping consensus is further based upon what Rawls called ―public 
reason.‖ This basis rests on a two-part claim. One, there are ―very great values‖ 
demonstrated by the political conception of justice, which are not easily overridden. 
There is a congruence of, or at least no conflict among, these political values with regard 
to the variety of comprehensive doctrines.
33
 Two, although Rawls‘ conception of justice 
is political, strictly speaking, citizens still hold it as a moral conception.
34
 This moral 
affirmation arises from the normative accounts of the good life and human action from 
the various comprehensive doctrines of each citizen; citizens must support the political 
conception for their own reasons.
35
 Utilizing public reason shifts Rawls‘ principles of 
justice from a comprehensive doctrine to a political conception. The overlapping 
consensus allows the political conception of justice as fairness to stand on no particular 
metaphysical grounds, or perhaps, on all reasonable metaphysical grounds.  
However, even though Rawls argues against the validation of any comprehensive 
doctrine, he notes a problem with his position regarding the stability of a community 
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constituted by this political conception of justice.
36
 He raises a potential objection that the 
political community will not and cannot be stable if the parties come to the political 
arrangement for the sake of self-interest over cooperation, or what is referred to as a 
modus vivendi. The overlapping consensus as distinct from both a modus vivendi and a 
constitutional consensus will be addressed in the next paragraph, but it is helpful here to 
note that Rawls insists that the consensus is free of any comprehensive doctrine. 
To this objection, we say that the hope of political community must indeed be 
abandoned, if by such a community we mean a political society united in 
affirming the same comprehensive doctrine. [But] This possibility is excluded by 
the fact of reasonable pluralism together with the rejection of the oppressive use 
of the state power to overcome it.
37
 
 
Due to reasonable pluralism, political liberalism can accommodate a wide range of 
conceptions of the good, even if those views are incommensurate with one another. 
Political liberalism does not delve into the foundational commitments and values that 
give rise to the differing accounts of the good, and is far more concerned with public 
commitment to a justice which is engendered by the individual accounts of the good. 
 While the political conception of justice is far more limited in scope than its 
comprehensive doctrinal counterpart in Theory, it is not to say that the overlapping 
consensus is superficial. In fact, Rawls makes two distinctions to demonstrate the great 
depth and binding capacity of the consensus. He argues that political liberalism is distinct 
from both a modus vivendi and constitutional consensus for two reasons. First, the 
overlapping consensus is distinct from what Rawls calls a modus vivendi.
38
 Here, Rawls 
uses the case of a treaty between two nations with competing aims to illustrate the limited 
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function of a modus vivendi. Because a treaty -- and implicitly, any modus vivendi - is 
focused narrowly upon particular circumstances, its terms of agreement are limited to the 
issue of contention to allow for fair play between the parties. More importantly, the treaty 
is contingent upon the belief that the agreeing parties will comply with its term. Thus, a 
modus vivendi does not capture the depth of Rawls‘ principles. Only a deeply held 
conception of justice (political or otherwise) will be able to restrain such action. 
 Second, the overlapping consensus is also distinct from a constitutional 
consensus. It is important to note that Rawls claims that his conception of justice as 
fairness is worked out for political, social, and economic institutions of society. By 
―society,‖ Rawls means the basic structure of the modern constitutional democracy.39 On 
the one hand, a constitutional consensus is similar to the overlapping consensus in that 
both are political syntheses of comprehensive doctrines. On the other hand, the principles 
by which any constitutional consensus is derived must be of necessity deeper than the 
consensus itself.
40
 Furthermore, the overlapping consensus ―goes beyond political 
principles instituting democratic procedures to include principles covering the basic 
structure as a whole.‖41 Further still, even though the overlapping consensus is deeper 
and broader in scope than a constitutional accord, Rawls also claims that the overlapping 
consensus is also far more specific because of its core focus on society as a fair system of 
cooperation, coupled with the notion of a free and equal citizenry over generations.
42
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 It should be noted here that Rawls enumerates five ―fundamental ideas‖ that lend 
themselves toward the political conception of justice. They are: society as a fair system of 
cooperation, the idea of a well-ordered society, the basic structure of such a society, the 
idea of the original position, and the idea of citizens as free and equal.
43
 While the 
original position was analyzed deeply in Theory, and is still included as a fundamental 
idea, it does not play as central a role in Political Liberalism as these other four.
44
 
Related to the aims of this dissertation, it is interesting to point out two premises 
that Rawls notes but does not address during the course of his argument in Political 
Liberalism. First, he assumes a basic cooperation among members of the society, each of 
whom works toward what he calls ―the common good,‖ even if they have different 
conceptions of that good (resulting from the incommensurability of their respective 
comprehensive doctrines). 
45
 He also presumes that a legal system must be in place to 
secure the common good and offers a few examples of what its content might resemble: 
―I assume a society has a conception of justice that meets this kind [of legal system that 
secures basic human rights] cohering with the common good. Otherwise, we may not 
have a society but something else.‖46 In light of his refusal to subscribe to a 
comprehensive doctrine, it is understandable that his conception of ―the common good‖ 
is purposefully general in scope. Nonetheless, in order to select one of his concrete 
examples (or any example), a more greatly evolved notion of the common good might be 
required to make more than an arbitrary choice. 
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Second, Rawls alludes to a lexically prior principle that requires citizens‘ basic 
needs be met.
47
 On the one hand, he does not refer to the content of these ―basic needs.‖ 
On the other hand, it seems that he is referring to a schema that generates within each 
citizen a set of positive rights that he or she can claim against the State.
48
 If the latter is 
the case, then regardless of how limited these basic needs might be, Rawls‘ position 
seems to conflict with certain comprehensive doctrines (e.g., Nozick‘s entitlement 
theory) and legal systems that do not aim to meet those needs through government 
intervention. This point raises an important question that this dissertation attempts to 
answer in the final chapter. Given that Cahill‘s ―faith language‖ gives rise to a ―faith 
commitment‖ (as described in Chapter One) and it is commitment brings one into public 
discourse, at what point does one‘s participation in public discourse become an 
inappropriate public expression of his or her comprehensive doctrine?  
Looking ahead, Rawls‘ work also figures prominently in Chapter Four. While 
Cahill occasionally cites Rawls in her work, she offers neither an endorsement nor a 
refutation of his entire project. But, as this dissertation argues in that chapter, her 
commitment to justice and public discourse might offer real content to Rawls‘ political 
claims and a satisfactory corrective for some critics of Political Liberalism. For now, the 
dissertation analyzes Alasdair MacIntyre‘s writings on justice and their contrast to 
Rawls‘ political liberalism. 
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Alasdair MacIntyre: Justice within a Community’s Moral Tradition 
This section analyzes the writings of the prominent British philosopher Alasdair 
MacIntyre. There are two purposes in addressing MacIntyre‘s work that relate to Cahill‘s 
context. The first is his critique of modern liberalism, which is found especially in his 
work from the 1980s, like After Virtue and Whose Justice? Which Rationality?  (hereafter 
Whose Justice), where he challenges the liberal notion that ―the good life‖ from a public 
standpoint is unresolvable.
49
 He also disputes Rawls‘ reduction of the virtues to mere 
sentiment.
50
 Many arguments in Cahill‘s essays are similar to MacIntyre‘s, though she 
makes them independently from or at least without direct reference to him. Not 
infrequently, she also reaches conclusions that contrast with MacIntyre, in spite of her 
own tradition-based point of departure.  The second purpose considers the implications of 
MacIntyre‘s claim that tradition-dependent claims are not necessarily relativist in nature 
in light of Cahill‘s arguments in support of theological voices participating in public 
discourse from the previous chapter.
51
 Her argument‘s second premise – that all 
participants speak from a tradition – demonstrates her appreciation for the pluralist 
context of contemporary Western society without reducing it to relativism.
52
 At the same 
time, MacIntyre further analyzes various kinds of public discourse within a community. 
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He distinguishes them in a way that is fruitful for the dissertation‘s later chapters.53 
Chapter Four also summarizes Cahill‘s criticism of liberalism, and its relevance to her 
understanding of justice. 
 This section of the chapter has two major parts. The first summarizes MacIntyre‘s 
project in After Virtue and Whose Justice, especially his claims regarding ethics within 
the living tradition of a politically-robust community. The second analyzes his account of 
the virtues, particularly his conception of justice, in these two works. These essays offer 
both a critique and an alternative to Rawls‘ political liberalism. 
 
After Virtue and Whose Justice? 
What follows here is a selective reading of MacIntyre‘s two most influential texts. 
They are selective because at no point does Cahill ever engage MacIntyre‘s entire corpus, 
but she does probe his claims in After Virtue. Hence, no effort is made here to detail the 
evolution of MacIntyre‘s thought from his early analytical writings on Marxism toward 
these later texts, since they do not relate to Cahill‘s work. As with the preceding section 
on Rawls‘ political liberalism, this analysis of MacIntyre is designed to locate Cahill‘s 
notion of justice within the currents of contemporary philosophical and theological 
streams. As such, the following paragraphs outline three concepts distilled from this 
reading of MacIntyre: the ―grave state of disorder‖ in moral discourse today, the 
―invention‖ of the moral individual by Enlightenment thinkers, and the ―transformation‖ 
of liberal ideas into a liberal tradition. 
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 The opening chapters of After Virtue attempt to name the root problem that 
MacIntyre describes as a state of ―grave disorder‖ with regard to public moral 
discourse.
54
 For example, in his analysis of two contrasting moral methods – deontology 
and utilitarianism – he calls attention to two key features of the problem.55 The first is the 
conceptual incommensurability of competing moral arguments. On the one hand, there is 
no basis for rational discernment between the notion of equality of persons and that of 
liberty for them. The former treats persons with obligatory respect, while the latter 
weighs consequences of proposed actions. On the other hand, each representative of these 
methods has in fact reached a conclusion in his or her mind regarding the right course of 
action. In spite of their corresponding personal convictions, neither can, in turn, convince 
the other of the grounds for his or her claim. One argues that if the moral rules are 
rational, then they must be uniformly binding upon for all rational beings.
56
 But another 
objects that if the rules do not attend to consequences, then they can undermine 
competing values that the rules seek to uphold. Even if they were to agree upon an 
action‘s moral rightness (or wrongness), the participants would still disagree on their 
reasons for calling it such. In cases of conflict, the disagreement is interminable. This 
conundrum arises because both root their claims within the authority of an impersonal 
rationality. 
 Consequently, MacIntyre makes a startling argument: emotivism, not rationality, 
is the basis for moral decision-making from the Enlightenment period into contemporary 
society. MacIntyre demonstrates that the prevailing liberal conception of the ―good‖ is 
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simply the appellation of a simple, indefinable property. It is also a major premise of 
Rawls‘ argument for reasonable pluralism. ―Right,‖ then, simply means the best course of 
action (a conclusion to which Rawls would not subscribe), and include personal and 
aesthetic enjoyments as the highest imaginable goods.
57
 Because of the 
incommensurability of rival traditions, each side must account for these different social 
and moral views. In contemporary moral debates, the contrasting representative voices 
tend to be interpreted in terms of pluralism.
58
 Lacking a rational discriminant for a 
definitive truth claim, MacIntyre argues that this gives rise to a kind of ―academic 
dualism.‖59 Moreover, the bifurcation of truth and value is a product of the catastrophic 
failure of the Enlightenment project. Thus, academic, purportedly ―value-free‖ methods 
fail to identify this dualism as a shortcoming.
60
 In other words, truth has been displaced 
by psychological effectiveness.
61
 Perhaps efficacy can be located in an experience of 
satisfaction that comes from achieving consensus on a particular moral issue. 
Nonetheless, overall satisfaction must be measured aggregately among all individual 
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experiences, divorced from the potential human good that was achieved by consensus in 
the first place.
62
 
 After sketching the contours of moral thinking from the Enlightenment through 
the Modern period, MacIntyre devotes the bulk of After Virtue‟s middle chapters to 
describing the complexities of divorcing the moral agent from his or her inherited modes 
of thought and praxis. MacIntyre notes that the task of the Enlightenment since Kant has 
consisted primarily in a human striving to think for oneself, rather than in conformity 
with the prescriptions and proscriptions of some seemingly external authority.
63
 
Enlightenment thinkers gave rise to the Modern ―invention of the self.‖ 64 This 
detachment has come at the cost of authoritative content for the autonomous agent‘s 
moral claims. The meaning and use of traditional moral language, now divorced from the 
cultures and societies which first uttered them, are separated by an unbridgeable chasm.
65
 
Thus, moral incommensurability is itself the product of a new historic conjunction: the 
point at which individuals attempted to achieve moral thought without reference to its 
moral legacy. 
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 As a result, new vocabulary soon emerged in the moral lexicon to describe the 
Enlightenment‘s landscape. MacIntyre outlines three nascent concepts: human rights, 
political protest, and psychological unmasking. With respect to rights, he strongly claims 
that they simply cannot exist in this new framework, except in some utilitarian mode of 
thinking.  
The truth is plain: there are no such rights, and belief in them is one with belief in 
witches and in unicorns…By ―rights‖ I do not mean those rights conferred by 
positive law or custom on specified classes of person; I mean those rights which 
are alleged to belong to human beings as such and which are cited as a reason for 
holding that people ought not to be interfered with in their pursuit of life, liberty, 
and happiness.
 66
 
 
MacIntyre‘s allusion to the ―unalienable rights‖ explicitly enumerated in the Declaration 
of Independence seems to place him in opposition to the entire liberal tradition. Despite 
many critics on this very point, his subsequent work expresses no effort to placate them.
67
 
One example is found in a 1991 article, where he refers to the ―inadequacy and the 
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sterility of the modern idiom and rhetoric of rights.‖68 Another is his 1999 biological 
account of the virtues, where there is a conspicuous absence of rights talk.
69
 It is 
important to note, though, that his rejection of human rights is a necessary conclusion of 
his thesis that discourse has lost its grounding in the Aristotelian-Thomistic morality of 
the past.
70
 Only a society so ordered could ground such human rights, since they had an 
internally coherent account of the good.  
Regarding protest, the interminable nature of contemporary moral debate implies 
(MacIntyre employs a stronger word: ―ensures‖) that protestors rarely have anyone else 
to talk to but themselves. This is not to say that protest cannot be effective, just that it 
cannot be rationally so.
 71
 Unmasking, which is a later, Freudian term, describes the 
superego as an inherited morality from which the agent must be freed. Nonetheless, 
theory is required to support observation, and vice versa, just as John Stuart Mill‘s 
―experiments in living‖ give content to his utilitarian theory to which many contemporary 
thinkers now subscribe.
72
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Moreover, MacIntyre points out that the ―mock rationality‖ of debate masks the 
arbitrary nature of will and power as its participants seek consensus.
73
 This insight leads 
him to a dichotomy, which is the eponymous title of After Virtue‘s ninth chapter: 
Nietzsche or Aristotle? He begins the chapter with a description of the ―vulgarized‖ 
nature of the moral culture in which Friedrich Nietzsche wrote; morality has become 
generally available to all in society, but as ghosts of their defunct ancestors.
74
 In 
MacIntyre‘s analysis, Nietzsche‘s central thesis is that all rational defense of morality 
fails. Thus, morality must be explained in terms of the non-rational will.
75
 He positively 
appraises Nietzsche‘s project, insofar as the latter was the first to remove the mask of 
rationality from Modern moral discourse.
76
 Modern moral terms like ―good,‖ or ―right,‖ 
or even ―obligation‖ have become as arbitrary as an ancient one like ―taboo.‖77 Nietzsche 
provides MacIntyre a starting point to explain what he perceives to be the incoherence of 
contemporary moral utterances. From the standpoint of moral individualism, the self is 
simply what the self chooses to be.
78
 Somehow, he or she can detach himself or herself 
from social and historical roles. In the realm of choice, there is at the same time a 
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presumption that the agent has the means (i.e., the will and power) to see the chosen 
action through and to enjoy the satisfaction of its successful completion.
79
 
MacIntyre‘s initial defense of Nietzsche turns on the question: was it right that the 
Enlightenment project should have been undertaken in the first place? By accepting the 
cognitive claims of the Enlightenment, many thinkers (including and especially 
Nietzsche) have rejected the teleological and communal traditions of its predecessors.
80
 
What once seemed to be appeals to rational objectivity turned out in the final analysis to 
be expressions of volitional subjectivity. Thus, MacIntyre takes Nietzsche to task for 
what the former takes to be an unwarranted, illegitimate leap from a descriptive statement 
about moral judgments in his day to the prescriptive nature of morality as such.
81
 
MacIntyre concludes this chapter by claiming that the problem is not a choice 
between two contrasting ethical theories, but a question about two mutually-exclusive 
ways of life. Either one must follow the Enlightenment project through, with its terminus 
in Nietzsche, or one must admit that the project should have never been undertaken. 
Clearly, MacIntyre accepts the latter part of the proposition. In the second part of this 
section, the dissertation‘s analysis of MacIntyre‘s will turn once again to After Virtue‘s 
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account of the virtues, especially justice. Before doing so, it is necessary to follow his 
enquiry regarding the translation of these liberal streams of thought into the living 
tradition of liberalism today. 
 In Whose Justice, MacIntyre continues upon a theme that began in After Virtue. A 
well-ordered tradition is partially constituted by conflict regarding the goods which give 
to that tradition its purpose.
82
 In this later work, MacIntyre reiterates this claim. 
The conclusion to which the argument has so far led is not only that it is out of the 
debates, conflicts and enquiry of socially embodied, historically contingent 
traditions that contentions regarding practical rationality and justice are advanced, 
modified, abandoned or replaced, but that there is no other way to engage in the 
formulation, elaboration, rational justification, and criticism of accounts of 
practical rationality and justice except from within some one particular tradition 
in conversation, cooperation, and conflict with those who inhabit the same 
tradition.
83
 
 
MacIntyre understands that traditions are not monolithic in thought or practice. Instead, 
they embody continuities of conflict, responding to rival claims, but always from within 
the tradition. 
 If MacIntyre‘s claims from After Virtue are true, and liberal society has devolved 
into a mélange of emotivist and freely-associating individuals, then the question can be 
asked, how did liberalism become a lasting (if unviable) tradition?
84
 In the late chapters 
of Whose Justice, MacIntyre attempts to answer this question. He offers three elements 
which seem to correspond to the principles enumerated by John Rawls in Political 
Liberalism. The three elements are: a pluralist notion of the good life, an individualist 
practice of practical reasoning, and a just procedure for adjudicating conflict. 
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 Initially, MacIntyre points out that the liberal project was designed to provide a 
three-fold framework (political, legal, and economic) in which all could assent to 
rationally justifiable principles for the purpose of living together in society.
85
 This 
daunting task, if it succeeds, allows individuals who embrace varying and even 
competing notions about the good to participate peaceably in all spheres of public life. 
―Reasonable pluralism,‖ as Rawls describes it, is part and parcel of contemporary society; 
all can agree that there is no agreement, at least with respect to the good life which is to 
be pursued.
86
 
 At the same time, participation in liberal pluralism entails a proscription: all must 
refrain from attempting to transform the community toward illiberal ends. In fact, any 
attempt to conform society toward something other than pluralism is, strictly speaking, 
unreasonable. On this point, Rawls insists that ―human good is heterogeneous because the 
aims of the self are heterogeneous.‖87 Moreover, a comprehensive doctrine like 
MacIntyre‘s Thomist-Aristotelianism, with its singleness of purpose, must be regulated 
within the society, precisely because its aims move far afield of reasonable pluralism. 
Although to subordinate all our aims to one end does not strictly speaking violate 
the principles of rationality…, it still strikes us as unnatural, or more likely as 
mad.
88
 
 
So, a corollary to the primary principle of pluralist notion of the good is the 
mercantilization of goods and compartmentalization of dispositions with respect to public 
participation.
89
 Goods -- and values, apparently - must be bargained for in liberal society. 
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 Another concept of the liberal tradition is the practical rationality of the newly-
constituted individual described in the previous paragraphs. MacIntyre begins this 
discussion by comparing liberal rationality with some of its cultural predecessors.
90
 In 
Aristotelian practical reasoning, it is the individual qua citizen of the polis who reasons. 
In the Thomist tradition, it is the individual qua enquirer into her or his own good and 
that of her or his community. In the Humean tradition, it is the individual qua propertied 
(or unpropertied) participant in a society of a kind of mutuality or reciprocity. With 
regard to liberalism, it is the individual qua individual who reasons. The strict, 
unmodified predication of the individual infers an immediate problem in practical 
reasoning. Lacking a context in which to reason, the reasoning individual must supply 
some motivation for action, which MacIntyre locates in the individual‘s preference or 
desire.
91
 
From this point of departure, liberal practical reasoning proceeds in the public 
realm through three stages. First, preferences are ordered by each individual and 
enunciated in the public realm. Next, these individual desires are translated into practical 
decisions, based upon the soundness of each individual‘s argument. Finally, the public 
acts in order to maximize the satisfaction of those preferences in accordance with the 
prior ordering. Preferences can and often do conflict, and it is necessary to devise a way 
to adjudicate competing claims. It is in this third stage that utilitarian methods are 
indispensable in public moral discourse.
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 What, then, is the function of justice in contemporary society? MacIntyre begins 
by claiming that justice might be a rational consideration, but it is by no means necessary 
in liberal society.
93
 It is in the first stage that individual preferences can be expressed in 
one‘s own terms. Religious, non-religious, and rights language, rooted in the 
comprehensive doctrines of each participant, supply the premises from which they argue. 
Because of the incommensurability of those doctrines, however, there will be no 
substantive agreement on their stated preferences. In tallying the preferences in order to 
rank them, liberalism (as a tradition) must engage in debate about the principles of 
justice. And even at this second stage, the full outcome remains inconclusive. 
Nonetheless, consensus can be achieved with respect to the principles of justice. Thus, 
the procedure justifies any inequalities in the eventual conclusion. 
Liberalism thus provides a distinctive conception of a just order which is closely 
integrated with the conception of practical reasoning required by public 
transactions conducted within the terms set by a liberal polity. The principles 
which inform such practical reasoning and the theory and practice of justice 
within such a polity are not neutral with respect to rival and conflicting theories of 
the human good. Where they are in force they impose a particular conception of 
the good life, of practical reasoning, and of justice upon those who willingly or 
unwillingly accept the liberal procedures and the liberal terms of the debate. The 
overriding good of liberalism is no more and no less than the continued 
sustenance of the liberal social and political order.
94
 
 
In short, there is power at work in the liberal notions of public moral discourse, no less so 
than in any other notion. And, like all other traditions, it cannot know in advance how 
and in what condition it will emerge from its encounters with rival traditions.
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Consequently, MacIntyre abandons any hope that a tradition, even one that has attempted 
to divorce itself from all of its predecessors, can be found that is rationally defensible and 
superior to ancient forms of moral and political thinking.
96
 
 Before moving to MacIntyre‘s detailed account of the virtues, it should be noted 
that his critique of liberalism is not unproblematic. The final section of this chapter 
explores Michael Walzer‘s thoughts on justice, and includes his response to MacIntyre 
and other critics of liberalism. Nevertheless, MacIntyre‘s conception of justice is useful 
both as a comparison for analysis of Cahill‘s tradition-dependent notions of justice and as 
a contrast to Rawls‘ two-fold political conception of justice. MacIntyre also offers a 
glimpse at what contemporary public discourse might look like within his context, and 
this vision will be discussed in the following section as well. 
 
MacIntyre‘s Account of the Virtues 
In the conclusion to his chapter on Nietzsche, MacIntyre argues that, on the 
modern view, the justification of virtue depends upon some prior scheme of rationally 
justifiable rules and/or principles. If they become radically problematic, as MacIntyre has 
argued they have, then so must the virtues which depend upon them.  Instead of looking 
to rules to justify the virtues, he asserts that the evaluative order should be reversed.
97
 
Throughout the bulk of After Virtue‘s later chapters, MacIntyre analyzes the virtue 
tradition from the ancient Greeks into the contemporary period. He demonstrates that 
morality is embedded within the evolving social milieu of each living tradition. Despite 
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the pessimism with which MacIntyre describes contemporary moral discourse and 
practice, he offers a feasible solution by way of recovery of an Aristotelian virtue 
tradition.  ―If a premodern view of morals and politics is to be vindicated against 
Modernity, it will be in something like Aristotelian terms or not at all.‖98 This section 
explores MacIntyre‘s account of virtue with respect to his understanding of the 
Aristotelian conception of virtue, the nature of the virtues as such, and, most especially, 
the virtue of justice. With respect to the former two, MacIntyre‘s work stands in stark 
contrast with the liberalism he critiques. With regard to the latter, MacIntyre provides a 
strong criticism not only of Rawls‘ Theory, but also of its critics, many of whom share 
the same moral and political presuppositions as Rawls. 
 Turning back momentarily to Friedrich Nietzsche, his ideal person was the 
Overman, whom he envisioned as one who lived by pure will.
 99
 Curiously, MacIntyre 
devotes very little space to discuss the Overman in After Virtue. Initially, it may be 
because Nietzsche provides an inconvenient foil to MacIntyre‘s argument against 
Modernity, to the degree that Nietzsche argues that humans in fact have a telos.
100
 His 
―will to power‖ is tied to his claim that Western morality does not describe human beings 
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as they really are. Therefore, they could never reach their ―highest potential power and 
splendor.‖101 The will encompasses far more than a survival instinct; it calls human 
beings to flourish by expansion, even at the expense of others.
102
 The Overman rules over 
these others, and they glorify him over and above humanity, to a new relationship even 
with nature. Nietzsche‘s thought contrasts with MacIntyre‘s interpretation of Aristotle not 
only in its understanding of human nature, but also in its application of the virtues. 
Whereas on Nietzsche‘s account, honor is the highest goal, for Aristotle it can be no more 
than a secondary goal. Moreover, honor in Nietzsche‘s world can be afforded to only one 
– the Overman. In Aristotle‘s reality, which is an honor culture, honor is due to all 
persons by reason of their place in the social order. 
103
 
  In an Aristotelian account of the virtues, being a good person means being a good 
citizen. Every human activity aims at some perceived good, a telos. The ―good‖ here is 
defined in terms of specific human characteristics. At the same time, human beings have 
a nature which is peculiar to the species, and this nature likewise has a specific telos. 
Aristotle calls this human telos ―happiness‖ (eudaimonia). Thus, all action is aimed not 
only toward the good to be drawn from the act itself, but also toward human happiness in 
the pursuit of a complete human life. The virtues are those qualities necessary to enable 
an individual to achieve happiness, and the lack of which to frustrate movement toward 
the telos.
 104
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 This initial description of Aristotle contrasts with contemporary liberal morality in 
two ways. First, the political nature of these Aristotelian goods means that all action is 
expressive of more than just individual preferences or choices. They are tied to 
communal life. Second, there is an overriding account of the human good, which cannot 
be the case if one envisions a political structure free of comprehensive doctrines. These 
are the positive contrasts that MacIntyre wishes to convey in his argument. But there are 
negative contrasts as well. For example, Aristotle‘s system of virtues is elitist.105 For 
instance, the wealthy possess certain virtues that the poor cannot. Moreover, Aristotelian 
teleology presupposes a metaphysical biology that allows slavery, misogyny, and other 
practices that are rightly abhorred in contemporary society. 
MacIntyre also deals with these issues by way of historical analysis of the 
subsequent virtue tradition found in Thomas Aquinas. Prior to doing so, he rejects 
modern Aristotelian arguments that attempt to ―thin out‖ or generalize a notion of the 
good and name it ―human flourishing.‖ Such notions ignore the deep conflicts and rival 
traditions that give rise to these necessary tools of human flourishing on the Aristotelian 
account and, more importantly, betray the relationship between the structure of the ethos 
and that of the polis.
106
 Instead, he turns to the New Testament, Augustinian and 
Thomistic traditions to demonstrate the correction to the Aristotelian tradition that arose 
from its encounter with the Christian tradition over time. The Christian view of human 
nature is no less teleological, though. The ―happiness‖ of Christianity is eternal 
communion with a Trinitarian God. This shifting of the telos gives rise to new 
―theological‖ virtues that are required for achievement toward that end (like faith, hope, 
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and love). Therefore, while the New Testament differs from Aristotle with regard to 
content, the logical and conceptual structure of the virtues remains largely intact.
107
 
 MacIntyre goes on to describe the nature of the virtues, which are such that they 
can be at home in two vastly different social and moral traditions.
108
 First, he insists that 
virtues are secondary; no single virtue stands upon itself, for its own sake.
109
 These 
virtues are required not only by the individuals who act within society, but also by the 
community itself, if it is to remain a viable institution. In other words, the virtues are 
functional. Next, MacIntyre describes three stages in the logical development of 
Aristotelian virtue that can be sustained today. The initial stage requires a background 
account of what MacIntyre calls a ―practice.‖110 It must be qualified here that, first of all, 
MacIntyre does not mean to imply that the virtues are only exercised in the course of 
practices, and, second of all, that practice is – like Rawls‘ use of it – a technical term to 
contrast with its mundane usage (as in ―rehearsal‖). As such, MacIntyre‘s definition of 
practice has three criteria: it must be complex, it must have internal goods, and it must 
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have standards of excellence. For instance, his scheme includes farming and football as 
practices, but he distinguishes them from acts like planting a vegetable or kicking a 
football, even though both can be part of its corresponding practice.
111
 Internal goods are 
those achieved from engagement in the specific practice, and only that practice. For 
example, being a football player (or farmer, for that matter) might bring money, fame or 
power to that person. Nonetheless, these goods are external to the practices so defined – 
money and fame can be gained in manifold ways. Being consistently called upon at 
critical moments in games to make a crucial play is both an internal good and a sign of 
excellence. To call players or farmers as good or bad must have a clear standard for 
calling them so and thereby removes emotivist tendencies of preference.
112
  
 At this point, MacIntyre offers a definition of virtue that belongs to his prior 
concept of practice. 
A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends 
to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of 
which prevents us from achieving any such good.
113
 
 
While he distinguishes external goods from internal ones in certain practice, MacIntyre 
takes care to note that some virtues are internal to all practices. Justice, courage and 
honesty must be exercised in any practice.
114
 Justice relates to playing (or farming) fairly 
with other practitioners in giving them their due. Honesty is required to face one‘s own 
deficiencies in his or her practice, so that one can become more excellent at it. Finally, 
courage is necessary to face one‘s critics, and submit to their constructive advice. 
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 The second concept central to MacIntyre‘s account involves a narrative order that 
unifies the virtues for a single human person. In each life, there is no adequate means of 
choosing among which practices to pursue. MacIntyre‘s use of narrative here is helpful 
for unifying rather than bifurcating one‘s actions in light of conflicting claims. Striving 
for excellence in the practices of an academic life, for example, can easily conflict with 
those of being a good parent or worthy spouse. At times, there seems to be mutual 
exclusivity among them. Using a narrative mode of explanation, MacIntyre claims that 
one can understand human action in terms of rationally-grounded intention, rather than 
emotivist preference.
115
  
Adapting MacIntyre‘s analogy of gardening, one might ask the question: What is 
Dennis doing?
116
 A variety of plausible answers can be given: he is writing a paper; he is 
exercising his mind; he is earning a doctoral degree; or he is paradiddling on the 
computer keyboard. Each answer implies a history that can be derived from them, and all 
of them are true to a degree. But the answer is none of them. Dennis is in fact preparing 
for career that offers myriad opportunities and benefits for himself and his family. 
We identify a particular action only by invoking two kinds of context, implicitly if 
not explicitly. We place the agent‘s intentions, I have suggested, in causal and 
temporal order with reference to their role in his or her history; and we also place 
them with reference to their role in the history of the setting or settings to which 
they belong. In doing this, in determining what causal efficacy the agent‘s 
intentions had in one or more directions, and how his short-term intentions 
succeeded or failed to be constitutive of long-term intentions, we ourselves write 
a further part of these histories. Narrative history of a certain kind turns out to be 
the basic and essential genre for the characterization of human actions.
117
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In order to understand the intentions of Dennis‘ actions, one must situate the perceived 
action within the stream of intersecting narrative histories: of his academic and work life 
and of academic life generally, in the history of Dennis‘ marriage and of the institution of 
marriage (and even perhaps the Catholic sacrament of Marriage). MacIntyre claims that 
actions become intelligible only in this way. 
 MacIntyre describes the ―narrative self,‖ who is constituted by a set of social roles 
within various communities, vis-à-vis the ―emotivist self,‖ who is abstracted by liberal 
notions of autonomy, reason.
118
 Earlier in his text, MacIntyre described the medieval 
view of the person as essentially in via, embarked upon a quest or sojourn. The hero 
seeks to achieve a goal or end, not just for its own sake, but in doing so can redeem all 
that was wrong with his or her life up to that point.
119
 Here, he returns to that theme: 
human life consists in a quest for the good. In turn, the conception of the good life is 
identified as a quest for the good life. 
Some conception of the good for man is required. Whence is such a conception 
drawn? Precisely from those questions which led us to attempt to transcend that 
limited conception of the virtues which is available in and through practices. It is 
in looking for a conception of the good which will enable us to order other goods. 
It is in the course of the quest and only through encountering and coping with the 
various particular harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which provide any 
quest with its episodes and incidents that the goal of the quest is finally to be 
understood. A quest is always an education both as to the character of that which 
is sought and in self-knowledge.
120
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Not only do the virtues allow the sojourner to realize the internal goods of the quest and 
its practices, but also they enable him or her to take the first step. Lacking the virtues, he 
or she can be corrupted along the way, or easily distracted from the goal. 
 While the logic of MacIntyre‘s narrative account is patently circular, it is likely so 
by design in light of MacIntyre‘s development of the virtues as it reaches the final stage: 
a moral tradition. As stated before, he envisions traditions as embodied and partially 
constituted by arguments about the goods which constitute themselves. Practices and 
individual lives immerse themselves in these historical streams, which have been the 
setting for these conflicts over generations at times.
121
 For instance, Rawls writes with a 
stream of liberal thought that is often called ―social contract,‖ which could well be 
considered a ―tradition.‖ Since in its early expressions, each writer (e.g., Hobbes, Locke, 
and Rousseau) disclosed a clear conception of the human good beyond the political 
structure of society. While human beings are essentially selfish, there are ways in which 
they can tolerate one another in pursuit of their own goals.
122
 Rawls enters this stream of 
tradition because he found that the social contract often falls prey to utilitarianism; justice 
is at the mercy of instrumental political expediency.
123
 In Theory, he attempts to 
ameliorate this shortcoming by integrating Kantian respect for persons into the social 
contract. Put another way, Rawls is entering the ongoing argument of the social contract 
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tradition. As a comprehensive doctrine, however, this Kantian addition limited the scope 
of the society Rawls envisioned. In Political Liberalism, he attempts to overcome this 
problem by reducing the scope of the principles of justice to political considerations. As 
such, they do not entail a particular moral demand upon individuals to respect others. Or, 
at least Rawls does not impose that reason. 
 Here is where the overlapping consensus and reflective equilibrium become vital 
to this ―tradition.‖ The freestanding conception is held by those individuals for their own 
reasons. The process by which this occurs is the overlapping consensus. But the 
mechanism required in order to accomplish the consensus is the reflective equilibrium.
124
 
In determining the principles of justice, there is interplay between the conditions of the 
original position and one‘s judgments about them. Either can be revised. As described in 
the previous section, Rawls places this equilibrium prior to the selection of principles. In 
other words, the ―ongoing argument‖ about the original position must eventually become 
―institutionalized‖ by the political conception of justice. At this moment, it seems that 
Rawls no longer has a tradition in MacIntyre‘s sense of the term. Contra Rawls‘ claim 
that justice is the first virtue of institutions, MacIntyre insists that practices should not be 
confused with institutions. Each person, each practice is a part of the tradition, and 
tradition can afford unity to individuals. The stream of tradition enters the person as 
much as the person enters the stream. Hence, the circularity of MacIntyre‘s second stage. 
 Moving now to MacIntyre‘s conception of justice, it can be stated simply that he 
subscribes to an Aristotelian-Thomistic notion of justice as rendering to others what is 
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due to them. The simplicity betrays the complexity undergirding his argument. To 
demonstrate this intricacy, MacIntyre turns to the classic exchange between John Rawls 
and fellow American political philosopher Robert Nozick on justice. Their two positions, 
borne out of their shared presuppositions of a liberal, capitalist society, are diametrically 
opposed.
125
 On the one hand, Nozick claims that just entitlement (in acquisition or in 
transfer) sets limits to the possibility of redistribution. On the other hand Rawls argues 
that just distribution sets limits to legitimate entitlements. In both cases, the price of one 
person‘s justice is paid by another.126 
 MacIntyre employs a three-fold argument against both positions. One, the 
incompatibility of the arguments mirrors one another. Both offer reasonable arguments, 
which are founded upon sound premises from their conclusions flow. Because of the 
incommensurability of the rival positions, there is no way to decide between them on the 
merits of argumentation alone. Two, there is an element, namely the concept of desert, 
that neither party fully captures, but survives in classical traditions where the virtues were 
central. In both schemes, individuals are prior to and independent of any social bonds 
between them. By contrast, desert is intelligible only within the context of community.
127
 
In Nozick‘s thought, desert is further ruled out, since entitlement can be traced to original 
acquisition.
128
 Rawls allows for a ―common sense‖ view of desert, but argues that what is 
deserved cannot be known prior to the principles of justice being generated. Once 
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formulated, though, desert has been ruled out by Rawls‘ principles.129 Three, both share 
some social presuppositions, which allows each to generate a general principle of 
equality. Rawls makes need the primary principle; Nozick describes it as entitlement. The 
former gives no attention to history; how the need arose is irrelevant. However, for the 
latter, history is eminently germane with regard to establishing ownership. 
 MacIntyre‘s critiques of both positions help to develop the positive features of his 
own claims about justice. Each seems to be complaining that the other‘s method is unjust. 
Thus, they are arguing about injustice rather than justice, with no way to discern between 
them. MacIntyre paints liberal society as individuals shipwrecked upon an uninhabited 
island with other individuals.
130
 At length, he denies the concept of a neutral, tradition-
free rationality that can give rise to an adequate account of justice.
131
 Furthermore, 
MacIntyre‘s appeal to desert exhibits his allegiance to the Aristotelian-Christian view of 
justice, which he calls a ―tribute to the residual power and influence‖ of that older 
tradition.
132
 
 Finally, in After Virtue, MacIntyre opens up a further discussion regarding the 
participation of religious voices in public discourse. They hail from tradition-laden 
communities, which have both a deep sense of its own purpose and an ongoing 
conversation about that purpose. A major issue from Chapter One of the dissertation was 
the problem of translating the foundational religious concepts into vocabulary for use in 
the public sphere. Here, MacIntyre makes a similar point. To enter into public debate 
                                                     
129
 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 249; cf. Rawls, Theory, 310. 
130
 Ibid., 250. 
131
 This point is a major argument of Whose Justice, see 334. 
132
 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 251. 
115 
 
enforces participation in a culture mélange, and requires the search for a ―common stock‖ 
of concepts and norms to which all may employ or appeal.
133
 He sees a clear and constant 
danger of erosion of these communities. If his argument is correct that contemporary 
society cannot hope to achieve any moral consensus, except by marginalizing such 
voices, then it also entails a rejection of participation in the political order.
134
 
 However, in a later work, he offers a glimmer of hope by analyzing the limits of 
toleration in public discourse.
135
 The essay attempts to answer two questions. The first 
attempts to draw a line between justifiable intolerance and unjustified suppression. The 
second seeks to describe the kinds of utterance, if any, that ought to be found 
intolerable.
136
 MacIntyre begins with a classic liberal view of tolerance from John Locke. 
Agents of the state promote general security and social order, but do not regulate beliefs, 
except for the sake of security and order. Locke grounds this claim on premise that since 
an individual cannot command his or her own opinions beyond the present, ―one cannot 
give another power over that which he has no power himself.‖137 However, religious 
beliefs seem to be distinguished from other types of belief. On the ground that they are 
indefinitely contestable, religious beliefs may be justifiably restricted in ways that other 
personal beliefs are not. 
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 MacIntyre turns to a discussion of the contemporary state, arguing that the state 
not only is not neutral in matters of public conflict, but also is radically different from its 
Enlightenment counterparts in at least three ways. First, Western politics has been largely 
secularized. While this point is contestable, in light of the role that religion has played in 
the American presidential elections since at least 2000, MacIntyre prefers to focus only 
upon rival political conceptions of the good, which in fact are largely secularized. 
Second, the scope of state activity has grown exponentially. It has become a vast network 
of institutions, each with their own political values and internal goods. Third, the 
activities of the state have global significance with regard to commerce and security. A 
brief review of the current news headlines warrants his third claim.
138
 
 As a result of this secularized, magnified, transnationally-significant state activity, 
MacIntyre states that particular cases are adjudicated by employing the concepts of utility 
and rights. These procedures are justified by the three stages already described from 
Whose Justice in the previous section.
139
 There is also a further tension between the 
demands of the state and the market and those of the ―rational local community.‖ 
Because the state cannot be neutral with regard to these conflicting claims, local 
communities must treat the agencies of the state with an ―unremitting suspicion.‖ For that 
reason, the state must remain tolerant of all forms of local public discourse.
 
 
So by a very different route we have arrived at very much the same conclusion as 
that reached both by classical liberals and by modern liberals: the state must not 
be allowed to impose any one particular conception of the human good or identify 
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one such conception with its own interests and causes. It must afford tolerance to 
a diversity of standpoints.
 140
 
 
While MacIntyre reaches the same conclusion as liberals regarding public discourse, but 
for a very different reason. Classical liberals like John Stuart Mill envisioned the 
institutional tolerance of contrasting viewpoints as a sign of its inherent neutrality.
141
 But 
in contemporary society, as MacIntyre has shown, the government holds no such 
neutrality to decide among competing claims. Further still, the government‘s power to 
enforce those decisions endangers the stability of local communities. Therefore, agencies 
of the state should not be the ones to exclude participation in public discourse.
142
 
 Nonetheless, MacIntyre‘s essay claims that certain kinds of utterances may be 
justifiably excluded – just not through government power. He lists five conditions, rooted 
in his understanding of virtue, that promote and maintain rational dialogue. The starting 
condition concerns the participants. Those who wield power should be excluded from 
discussion until after a decision has been made. Here, MacIntyre uses the example of 
public discourse about health care. Participants should include health care practitioners 
and community stakeholders, but not insurance executives.
143
 Another necessary 
condition is the cultivation of those virtues necessary to exercise prudent judgment 
regarding the modes of expression in the debate. Those with racist, sexist, or overtly 
irrelevant ideas ought to be excluded from the discourse. The virtues are necessary here 
because negative modes of speech like lampooning and insults often play a large part in 
political debate. The participants must distinguish among them on a case-by-case basis. A 
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third condition is that certain questions must be settled conclusively prior to engaging in 
the discussion at hand. Such issues include the values at stake, the purpose of the 
community‘s participation, and other substantive issues. As a corollary to the third 
condition, a fourth situation involves the exclusion of certain classes of opinions. For 
example, a Holocaust denier is not simply wrong on a question of historical fact.
144
 
Because to deny the Holocaust also entails an unreasonable conception of human good 
and likely involves an underlying anti-Semitism, the very holding of such an opinion is 
grounds for excluding a participant in any public discourse. Finally, just as the state 
cannot decide who should participate, it must likewise refrain from enforcing conditions 
of tolerance against the reasonable will of the community. Local autonomy must be 
respected. On the flip side of this political coin, the local participants are also liable to 
―argumentative accountability.‖145 In the end, MacIntyre‘s account of the virtues comes 
into play at every level of the discourse. Justice, honesty, and courage are all required, as 
they lend themselves to deciding the list of participants, setting the agenda of discussion, 
and submitting themselves to their opponents‘ scrutiny. 
 The necessity of the virtues notwithstanding, MacIntyre also insists that tolerance 
is not in se a virtue. In fact, too much tolerance is a vice.
146
  
Toleration is an exercise of virtue just in so far as it serves the purpose of a certain 
kind of rational enquiry and discussion, in which the expression of conflicting 
points of view enables us through constructive conflict to achieve certain 
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individual and communal goods. And intolerance is also an exercise of virtue 
when and in so far as it enables us to achieve those same goods. 
147
 
 
Virtue here is taken to mean ―virtue of the local community,‖ which is constituted by 
ongoing conflict about its purpose and values. In contemporary political and moral 
debate, the community is inundated with external messages given to them by the media. 
The local community thereby can be hamstrung by national political slogans, short 
attention span, or even slick commercial advertising. Another nagging complication 
arises. Even if a community has generated a set of compatible and coherent arguments, it 
can still be weakened by the incompatibility between its rhetorical modes of rational 
enquiry and those of the dominant and external political culture.
148
 
 In closing, MacIntyre‘s work, like Rawls‘ Theory, is dense and complex. Unlike 
Rawls, MacIntyre eschews any hope of finding a rationally superior method to resolving 
public moral issues beyond those which met their demise in the medieval period. The 
fragmentation of public discourse mirrors the bits that have survived from that bygone 
period. It is MacIntyre‘s firm opinion that the grave disorder contemporary society‘s 
moral utterances can be ameliorated only through a return to a tradition-based sense of 
Aristotelian telos. But he is pessimistic that an entire nation can achieve such a recovery. 
Instead, he looks to local communities, especially religious ones, which at least stand a 
chance of withstanding the Dark Ages he claims that society has entered. Though he 
offers a way for local communities to participate in public discourse, he offers a strong 
caveat against too much commitment to toleration. 
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 Looking back to Chapter One of the dissertation, it is clear that Cahill does not 
share MacIntyre‘s pessimism regarding the state of moral discourse. In fact, as Chapter 
Four will demonstrate, she is counting on the cooperation of diverse communities to 
achieve a higher standard of justice. Moreover, while MacIntyre‘s critique of Rawls‘ 
political liberalism has been devastating, other liberals have noticed the same problems 
with Rawls‘ position. They attempt to correct some of the thorny issues that MacIntyre 
raises against him from within the tradition of liberalism. They also do not let 
MacIntyre‘s negative appraisal of liberalism go without a response. One such response 
comes from American political thinker Michael Walzer, toward whose work this chapter 
now turns to explore. 
 
Michael Walzer: Complex Equality and Passionate Liberalism 
This third section surveys and analyzes the writings of Michael Walzer for two 
purposes. First, while Walzer writes from within a similar liberal context as Rawls, he 
distinguishes his project in several ways which will be considered here. Second, Walzer 
describes a ―down-to-earth‖ worldview that is more accessible than Rawls‘ original 
position.
149
 In presenting the basic research of his writings, this part surveys three major 
works: Spheres of Justice (hereafter Spheres), On Toleration, and Politics and Passion, 
respectively. This chronological survey also notes important concepts which contrast 
with Rawls‘ project, especially Walzer‘s notions of complex equality and non-
deliberative political strategies. Walzer‘s principles of justice, derived from these works 
that span his writing career, might thereby have a closer affinity than those of Rawls with 
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regard to the complex public discourse about human genetic engineering described in this 
dissertation‘s last two chapters. Walzer also offers a rejoinder to MacIntyre‘s 
communitarian critique of liberalism, which comprises the final part of this section. 
Furthermore, Cahill‘s later writings reflect a deep awareness of the intricate coalitions 
and passionate engagement that Walzer claims are necessary to resolve difficult political 
issues. 
 
Spheres of Justice 
To begin, Walzer‘s first criticism in Spheres is very broad in scope. He asserts 
that since the time of Plato, political thinkers have assumed that there is one and only one 
distributive system that philosophy can rightly encompass.
150
 In essence, Rawls‘ claims 
in Theory are simply the latest trend of this political fashion. On the one hand, Walzer‘s 
starting point is similar to Rawls‘ in the idea that justice is a human construction. On the 
other hand, Walzer‘s approach to distributive justice in Spheres sharply contrasts with 
Rawls‘. Given the plurality of human interests, it doubtful that the principles of justice 
can be as monolithic as Rawls‘ account makes them to be. As such, Walzer starts with a 
society where distributive justice is not the first virtue of social institutions of free and 
equal members (as in Rawls‘ Theory), but instead is the source and context for the art of 
differentiation, of which ―equality is the end product.‖151 In other words, it is not simply 
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that there is pluralism in justice as a philosophical concept, but that the principles of 
justice are themselves pluriform.
152
 
 Next, Walzer‘s idea of equality also contrasts with Rawls‘ account of it in Theory 
and Political Liberalism. Walzer defines the aim of political equality as a society free 
from domination, that is, one which is mediated through a set of social goods.
153
 At root, 
equality has a negative meaning, one aimed at eliminating not every difference, but a 
particular set of them. His purpose, then, in Spheres is to describe a liberal society where 
no social good serves (or can serve) as a means of domination.
154
 Rawls‘ idea of equality 
presupposes a particular kind of dominance: government power. Because Rawls begins 
with a society of free and equal persons, he requires a mechanism to return periodically 
or continually to a situation as close to the original position as possible. The Difference 
Principle serves this purpose. On the one hand, it breaks the monopoly of wealth (the 
dominant good in contemporary liberal society), and emphasizes the cooperative nature 
of individuals and groups in society. On the other, in order to break the cycle of 
supremacy, constant government intervention is necessary in order to constrain the talents 
of the dominant group that possesses the wealth (e.g., by way of taxation or other 
equitable policies). Unfortunately, the practical outcome proves Walzer‘s point. Because 
government intervention is required to maintain or recover the original position, Rawls 
has simply replaced one dominant good (i.e., wealth) with another dominant good 
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(namely, government power). In the end, government authority generally and political 
power particularly become the object of competitive struggles, rather than wealth.
155
 
 To be clear, Walzer is not saying that the dominance of political power itself is 
necessarily an unfortunate situation. On the contrary, political power is a special sort of 
social good. Instead, the problem is a simple equality that is presumed by liberal society. 
As a constant overriding factor of other spheres, political power is always 
dominant – at the boundaries but not within them. The central problem of political 
life is to maintain that crucial distinction between ―at‖ and ―in.‖ But this is a 
problem that cannot be solved given the imperatives of simple equality.
156
 
 
As a corrective, Walzer argues that a general reduction of dominance is needed in a just 
society, and that an understanding of complex equality is the vehicle to overcoming the 
tendency of tyranny.
157
 Complex equality is the opposite of tyranny. It resembles Rawls‘ 
overlapping consensus in that both account for the wide range of worldviews (or, per 
Rawls, comprehensive doctrines) that actually are represented within a political 
community. The political community is the setting for this distributive scheme, and its 
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world of common meanings. However, membership in this body itself is a good, in that 
its distribution happens by accepting others into it.
158
  
 For example, the right to religious freedom, guaranteed in the First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution, is a fundamental rule of complex equality.
159
 It constructs 
a dividing line between the spheres of religious community and the larger body politic. It 
allows each ecclesial community to determine its membership, while at the same time 
allowing individuals to join such groups that will have them as members; ―politics is not 
dominant over grace nor grace over politics.‖160 Walzer illustrates this point by using the 
case of conscientious objection. The political community does not nourish souls, but still 
is not willing to allow a person‘s eternal salvation to be placed in jeopardy by forcing him 
or her to take up arms against a national enemy. This situation respects boundaries of 
religious belief, without acknowledging the truthfulness of the individual‘s religious 
belief.  
Still, this respect for boundaries is tenable only as long as those with such beliefs 
remain at the margins of the political community. Following this strategy, the Amish or 
Jehovah‘s Witness communities are tolerated only because they embrace their lifestyles 
at the margins of society with respect to accommodations that must be made to their 
eccentric beliefs regarding involvement in political and military life. What, then, are the 
limits of toleration in a just society? Walzer attempts to answer this question in On 
Toleration, the second book analyzed in this section. 
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On Toleration 
Following his claim in Spheres that membership is the first social good to be 
distributed, he further argues that toleration is often underestimated as the most minimal 
of entitlements in a just society.
161
 In this work, he describes precisely what societies do 
when they tolerate difference within their political community. While his work takes a 
broad historical approach with regard to various regimes of toleration, the following 
paragraphs focus on those aspects of Walzer‘s argument there that describe contemporary 
democratic society, which is the social context for this dissertation.
162
 
 In contemporary nation-states and immigrant societies, citizens have equal rights 
and responsibilities. In other words, citizens of these regimes are considered as 
individuals rather than groups. The difference between these two regimes is that in 
nation-states, the majority (political, ethnic, religious, etc.) is permanent.
163
 In practice, 
this means that the minority is treated first as citizens with respect to rights, privileges, 
and responsibilities, and secondarily as members of a religious or ethnic minority with 
particular communal practices. While members may form voluntary associations (like 
religious identity), they may not exercise legal jurisdiction (i.e., Sharia or Canon Law) 
apart from the institutional law of the land. More precisely, Sharia or Canon Law cannot 
be applied beyond the principles of constitutional law. For example, while divorced 
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Catholics might be barred from the sacraments of the Catholic Church if they remarry, 
and are even forbidden from remarrying in a Catholic church building, they are still free 
to wed according to the law of the land.  
By contrast, immigrant societies are constituted by individuals who arrive in 
waves, but not as organized groups. The sustainability of immigrant societies is based on 
purely voluntary association with regard to identification as part of ethnic or religious 
groups. Therefore, tolerance is far more personalized in immigrant societies, as opposed 
to the stereotypical tolerance of an identifiable minority in the nation-state.
164
  
 In his later chapters, Walzer argues that toleration is always a relationship of 
inequality, and he applies the practical consequences of that claim to several social 
issues.
165
 With regard to power, the nation-state recognizes all individuals as citizens 
before the law, and immigrant societies have a ―neutral state‖ that stands above particular 
ethnic interests.
166
 With respect to class, Walzer claims that intolerance is worse when 
differences of culture, ethnicity, or race coincide with socioeconomic status. Here, the 
minority in nation-states serve the same function as the newest immigrants from poorer 
countries. They are tolerated to the degree that they serve economically useful ends. They 
do hard labor for low wages, and they are essentially invisible in society.
167
 Furthermore, 
toleration is most compatible with inequality when the class systems are reiterated among 
the different ethnic or racial groups. Walzer claims that government interventions aimed 
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at equality (e.g., affirmative action) are not designed to help individuals, but instead to 
achieve class stratification throughout a previously disenfranchised group.
168
 Hence, such 
corrective actions aim at simple equality, and do not achieve the egalitarian liberalism 
envisioned by Walzer. 
 In terms of gender issues, Walzer makes a few points that are applicable to the 
later chapters of this dissertation. In nation-states and immigrant societies alike, regimes 
are intolerant of particular practices that transgress the rights of individuals, even when 
those practices are wholly internal, community matters. For example, in the United States 
the banning of polygamy, at one time practiced among Mormons, was aimed at bringing 
all citizens under a single law.
169
 It is significant to note here that the issue of gender also 
frequently crosses into that of religion -- e.g., Mormon polygamy in America, Muslim 
hijab in France, or Hindu suttee in British-ruled India. This hybridization is partly due to 
the public nature of these intersecting expressions of gender and religion. In the case of 
polygamy, a particular religious group seeks State recognition (and presumably, 
approval) of a particular kind of conjugal arrangement.
170
 In France, the hijab is very 
controversial, but there would likely be little complaint about it if Muslim women did not 
attend public school. In other words, polygamy and hijab might be tolerated by society 
were they ―purely‖ internal matters of their respective communities. However, the right 
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of ―communal reproduction,‖ implied in the phenomenon of toleration, often conflicts 
with individual citizen‘s rights or the nation‘s legal codes.171 More importantly, the 
common denominator in all three cases is that women from these particular religious 
communities are joining increasingly the public sphere, and as they do, questions of the 
limits of toleration arise.
172
 
 What of the toleration of religion itself? Walzer‘s earlier work describes 
constitutional religious freedom as an illustration of his concept of complex equality. In 
On Toleration, he makes two further points that are pertinent to the goals of this 
dissertation. One, equality is guaranteed through the First Amendment by denying 
political power to all religious authorities. This freedom is not neutral, though, because it 
arises from the ―realistic assumption‖ that all religious communities are potentially 
intolerant.
173
 With fresh memories of the Puritan Commonwealth of England in the minds 
of the Constitution‘s authors, the original position of the United States was designed to 
maintain a separation between the spheres of political power and religious 
communities.
174
 This separation also makes the State dominant over particular religious 
communities, as evidenced by the aforementioned banning of polygamy. Two, the 
tolerance is maintained at the level of the community, not of individuals. In practice, 
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some communities are allowed to use narcotics and alcohol as part of their religious 
ceremonies in excess of the law, but individuals are not permitted such use of those 
substances. For instance, a Catholic grade-school child may partake of the chalice during 
the celebration of the Eucharist, but he or she may not drink a glass of wine with lunch in 
the classroom. In reality, the state tolerates the Catholic doctrine that wine is no longer 
substantially present in the sacramental cup, but they do not extend the practice beyond 
the boundary of the liturgy in which that belief is expressed. 
 However, this communal paradigm is shifting toward emphasis on individual 
rights because of the privileging of voluntary assembly. Walzer locates this compatibility 
in the entirely free and voluntary nature of association in any religious community. Is 
there a contradiction here? Walzer answers in the negative. All religions, even tolerated 
ones, aim to restrict various actions that are concomitant with individual freedom. Even if 
religions are intolerant as communities, their goals are entirely compatible with the idea 
of religious toleration. In this sense, Walzer‘s answer is closely related to Rawls‘ idea of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Rawls argues that such comprehensive doctrines are 
neither fixed nor unchanging. Even so, being reasonable also limits the scope of what can 
be justified to others. 
175
 This recognition leads to forms of toleration and supports the 
idea of public reason. In Rawls‘ thought, this ―public reason‖ takes shape in the liberty of 
conscience and freedom of thought.
176
 But this toleration only includes comprehensive 
doctrines that are not unreasonable. Walzer‘s schema of toleration seems to include 
unreasonable comprehensive doctrines, with the caveat that religious communities, no 
matter how intolerant ad intra, still must accept religious freedom for all as a prior 
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principle. Thus, the community itself might be intolerant of certain practices (like 
homosexuality or drinking alcohol), but it also must be committed simultaneously to the 
idea of religious freedom, even of other local communities that do not find homosexuality 
or alcohol consumption objectionable.
177
 
 In his concluding chapter, he attributes this conflict to what he calls ―postmodern 
life.‖178 He argues that the postmodern project undermines every sort of common 
identity. ―Us‖ and ―them‖ have no fixed point of reference.179 This situation means that 
all are strangers, and makes each individual responsible for his or her own identity, a life 
without clear boundaries. Citing French scholar Julia Kristeva, the community (such as it 
is) is founded upon ―lucidity rather than fate,‖ the latter being a reference to the regimes 
of toleration in both nation-states and immigrant societies, where the minority casts its 
fortunes.
180
 Kristeva claims that individual choice should create the social group, rather 
than common origin. Without such choice, citizens (women especially) are reduced to 
―boundary-subjects,‖ with socially-prescribed roles readymade for them.181 Walzer 
disagrees with her contention. If everyone is a stranger, then no one is.
182
 Nevertheless, 
the postmodern context encourages a ―politics of difference,‖ one that requires the 
ongoing negotiation of group relations and individual rights. This negotiation requires a 
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double protection of persons as differentiated citizens of both state and groups, who live 
simultaneously as strangers to both.  
The problem, Walzer notes, is that over generations, the ―divided self‖ will 
weaken the undivided groups out of which they arose. From within what he calls ―the 
first generation‖ (i.e., the current one), he concludes with cautious optimism. 
There may be good reasons, then, to live permanently with the problems of what I 
have called the first generation. We should value the extraordinary personal 
liberty that we enjoy as strangers and possible strangers in contemporary 
―transitional‖ societies. But we need at the same time to shape the regimes of 
toleration in ways that fortify the different groups and perhaps even encourage 
individuals to identify strongly with one or more of them.
 183
 
 
In the end, Walzer argues that these centrifugal forces of selfhood and culture will correct 
one another only if there is some planning. In contrast to Rawls, a balance between the 
two is required, but that balance is not fixed. Consequently, one does not need to defend 
either communitarianism or liberalism, but both can be held as the situation dictates.
184
 It 
is unfortunate, though, that he names this method ―social democracy.‖185 
In this context of voluntary association, the dissertation returns to an important 
question raised by Walzer in his previous chapter. ―What will be the staying power and 
organizational strength of a purely voluntary faith?‖186 This question is relevant for the 
aims of this dissertation because it is also related to public discourse. Public moral 
discourse brings many people with various comprehensive doctrines together to reach a 
consensus on a pressing issue with broad social consequences. Public reason will admit a 
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large number of voices into the discourse, but Rawls‘ notion of the term implies that 
some will not have a place there. Apparently, religious communities that are constituted 
by those with a ―purely‖ voluntary comprehensive doctrine will be deemed reasonable. 
But what will be the role of emotional engagement as the various parties come together to 
debate the issue? Does such public ―reasoning‖ rule out ―repugnance‖ as an argument 
against human genetic engineering because its major premise is at root an appeal to an 
emotion? Furthermore, what is the form of discourse that will allow the public to reach a 
consensus? Will it be deliberative, arbitrative, or representative in scope? Walzer 
provides a few ways to answer these questions in Politics and Passion, the final work 
considered in this section. 
 
Politics and Passion 
In Politics and Passion, Walzer explains in greater detail these last points that he 
made in On Toleration. He argues that a more egalitarian and strongly multicultural 
politics is required to bring about a society of truly free citizens. In doing so, he alludes to 
what he calls the ―deficiencies‖ of standard liberalism.  
[Standard liberalism] is inadequate because the social structures and political 
orders that sustain inequality cannot be actively opposed without a passionate 
intensity that liberals do not (for good reasons) want to acknowledge or 
accommodate. Accommodation is especially difficult when passion is, as it 
commonly is, the product of our attachments and belongings.
187
 
 
For this reason, he concludes that there must be a better doctrine than standard liberalism. 
His argument rests on several premises, all of which are significant for the goals of this 
dissertation. First, ―freedom‖ and ―equality‖ can still exist within the context of several 
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important involuntary associations. Second, the United States political community is a 
deliberative democracy, and deliberative politics is itself problematic. Finally, passionate 
engagement with the hard cases of contemporary society is necessary in order to win the 
arguments that will bring about a free and equal society. This part elaborates upon these 
assumptions, which Walzer fleshes out in certain chapters of Politics and Passion. 
 First, Walzer describes four kinds of involuntary associations, which make for 
what he calls ―intellectual servitude.‖188 He divides them into two categories: sociological 
and philosophical. In the sociological category, there is a radical givenness to 
family/social contexts and cultural determination. In the familial and social realm, 
parental instruction and family dynamics reify notions of kin groups, national identity, 
social class, and gender roles. Of these four notions, the only development that seems to 
be encouraged is an upward mobility in the social hierarchy.
189
 In addition to these 
considerations, there is also a cultural determination within our associational life. For 
example, Walzer addresses the institution of marriage. Even a prenuptial agreement only 
speaks to details of the arrangement; the conditions which make for a marriage are 
dictated by law.
190
 While marriage is freely contracted, the range and style of choices is 
already determined. 
 The next set of involuntary associations is political and moral. As citizens, our 
membership is ―given‖ to us as the primary distributive good: a point that Walzer makes 
in Spheres.
191
 Membership allows access to all of the opportunities and other goods that 
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the society has to offer. ―If you are here in the political community, you are caught up in 
a set of arrangements that you had no part in designing.‖192 This claim contrasts sharply 
with standard liberal assumption that all associations are free and voluntary.  In the moral 
realm, it is not just the social mores or legal codes that constitute morality. Following 
Rousseau, there is also an imperative to remain within a society, especially during times 
of national or organizational crisis. This obligation stems from the benefits that were 
reaped during the better days of the republic, or in local matters (say a labor union or 
civic group), from the vanguard work of its activists and early leaders. In this context, 
Marxist arguments about ―class consciousness‖ are really claims about the moral 
epistemology of the nature of involuntary associations.
193
 Solidarity, then, is more about 
a moral identification with the plight of others rather than a social or political idea. 
 In practice, even the abolition of these forms of association requires the grounding 
of individuals in a less-than-voluntary association. Again citing Julia Kristeva, Walzer 
claims that it is not possible (in fact, not even desirable) to have a community free of 
involuntary associations.
194
 To form such ―entrepreneurs of the self‖ is not a matter of 
simply commanding schoolchildren to choose freely, but necessitates the formation 
guiding narratives that disclose the requisite values and paradigmatic rituals that reenact 
the struggle for individuality.
195
 To bring about this situation, a community would first 
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need to find this goal valuable, and then construct a social program through public 
education and civic religion in order to instill these values within its members. 
 Next, while deliberative democracy is a standard contemporary political practice, 
Walzer claims that it represents a shift in American liberalism. This shift is found in a 
movement from a discourse of rights to one of decision.
196
 However, the process of the 
second still looks toward the goals of the first, as evidenced by the litigious nature of 
American politics. Deliberative democracy is akin to Rawls‘ public reason. In the face of 
a pressing social issue, there is great value in ―reasoning together‖ in order to reach a 
resolution. In fact, Rawls cites the Supreme Court as the ―institutional exemplar‖ of 
public reason.
197
 There, deliberation takes place within the limits of ―reason alone,‖ 
removed from the political process. It is not to say that their function is not political. 
However, it does mean that their personal morality is irrelevant and their political values 
are limited within the scope of the constitutional question before the justices. In 
deliberation, the Supreme Court must appeal only to the public conception of justice and 
the political values of public reason.
198
 
By contrast, Walzer expresses dissatisfaction with deliberative strategies by way 
of his criticism of the work of Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson.
199
 Public reasoning, 
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according to Gutmann and Thompson, is qualified by reciprocity, publicity, and 
accountability, none of which are morally neutral.
200
 Walzer‘s critique here is about the 
incompleteness of the strategy, and he amplifies the constitutive elements of deliberation. 
Politics has many other values beyond qualified reason: passion, commitment, solidarity, 
courage, and competitiveness, among others. In reality, American political discourse has 
little to do with deliberation. In turn, he offers fourteen political strategies that are non-
deliberative in form.
201
 Here, only two – debate and bargaining - are briefly considered. 
In debate, the chief goal is to persuade the audience to agree with the speaker. The 
parties involved in a debate are contestants; the point is not to agree but to win.
202
 In 
Politics and Passion, Walzer seems to have in mind a structured debate between two 
representatives from two conflicting intellectual positions. In public discourse, though, a 
debate might appear much like a battle royal, if there are multiple positions. However, as 
this dissertation pointed out in the first chapter, one goal of engaging in public discourse, 
especially if minds cannot be changed, is to steer or slow down the process toward its 
inevitable outcome. In this sense, winning a debate means to succeed through integration 
of the party‘s values into the final resolution in some significant way.  
Furthermore, it is not likely to be accomplished through debate alone, since there 
will be multiple competing interests in this future public discourse. In moving toward 
resolution, bargaining might be a viable option. In contemporary democracy, Walzer 
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contrasts bargaining with deliberation by way of an example using the example of a jury 
or panel of judges. In a criminal case, it will not do to engage in bargaining; all parties 
involved want a true statement about a defendant‘s guilt. Politicians, on the other hand, 
have options and method available to them from which juries are barred. Consequently, 
political decisions are rarely deliberative in the literal sense of the word. Rearranging the 
metaphor slightly for yet another comparison, while a criminal is constitutionally 
protected from double jeopardy for the same crime, politicians must stand for reelection 
at regular intervals. Politicians thereby can face adversity from opponents time and again 
for all of their decisions. Thus, it is in the politician‘s interests to seek an equitable 
solution to the issue the first time.
 203
 
Here, the dissertation turns again to the idea of a modus vivendi. Walzer‘s critique 
of Gutmann‘s and Thompson‘s claims focus on their tolerance of negotiation in a 
deliberative democracy. As long as a moral principle is not involved, a bargain can be 
made when the parties ―consider the merits of the collective results of their individual 
deals.‖204 This claim presumes the necessity of making good arguments as a moral 
requirement, since parties recognize one another as free and rational men and women. A 
political victory is more legitimized by a wide, bipartisan majority decision. As an 
egalitarian theory, though, deliberative democracy must remove power from the 
process.
205
 In Rawls´ Theory, this end is accomplished by placing a veil of ignorance over 
the participants as they deliberate. However, as Walzer argues in Spheres, equality is the 
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end product of the process.
206
 As a result, it is not necessary to recognize others as 
rational in the same way 
But also as members of groups with beliefs and interests that mean as much to 
them as our beliefs mean to us. If deliberation follows from the first of these 
recognitions, bargaining and compromise flow from the second. In political life it 
is the second that is more often appropriate, even morally appropriate: the better 
we understand that differences exist, and respect the people on the other side, the 
more we will see that what we need is not a rational agreement but a modus 
vivendi.
207
 
 
In other words, a modus vivendi implies the regular presence of conflicting interests, but 
Walzer contends that good argumentation alone rarely will prevail in such conflicts. This 
culture of argument cannot be isolated from other political activities. In practice, the 
―back and forth‖ of debate and the push toward resolution of a particular issue eventually 
will involve a negotiation of its solution. Therefore, deliberation has an important place 
in political discourse, but not an independent one.
208
  
 Third, Walzer concludes this line of argument by returning to the problem of 
passionate engagement. This passion stems from a strong commitment to a particular set 
of beliefs, which Walzer describes in the context of his critique of deliberation.
209
 As 
Rawls notes, reasonable comprehensive doctrines limit the scope of what can be 
demonstrated to others.
210
  Walzer concurs with this argument, as the social range of such 
convictions derived from exclusive comprehensive doctrines is limited.
211
 However, to 
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join a group is more than a rational decision. Group membership entails affective ties, 
and implies a commitment to the emotional, moral and material demands of the group.
212
  
 As this group engages in public discourse, it is imperative to recognize the 
interests of others in the discussion. Quoting Karl Marx, Walzer argues that egalitarian 
participation strategies stand vis-à-vis ―the ideas of the ruling class are the ruling 
ideas.‖213 In combating these ideas, Walzer claims that no party can succeed against 
established hierarchies of power and wealth unless it can arouse the passions of those on 
the lower end of that hierarchy.
214
 Unfortunately, these emotions regularly take the form 
of envy, hatred, and resentment. By recognizing the others and their particular interests, 
and appreciating the strength of their commitments, enlightened participation can 
accommodate itself to the passions while excluding these ―fiercer forms‖ of struggle.215 
Coupled with non-deliberative strategies, enthusiastic participation can resolve society‘s 
complicated issues in a way far superior to a standard liberalism that privileges 
deliberation. 
 Finally, two relevant points can be made which relate Walzer‘s notion of justice 
to Chapter Four. To the first point, it can be argued that his understanding of justice is not 
fixed, at least when compared to Rawls‘ arguments in Theory and Political Liberalism. In 
Spheres, Walzer claims that justice is relative to social meanings.
216
 He still holds this 
idea. In December 2009, he writes:   
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What is most distinctive about humanity is its creative power—to think, imagine, 
speculate, argue, and disagree. So men and women will imagine different good 
societies, argue about their political and economic arrangements, and disagree 
about which one is best.
217
 
 
In cases of disagreement, such as the one envisioned in this dissertation‘s Epilogue, 
justice requires that society remain faithful to the disagreements by providing outlets for 
their resolution.
218
 To elaborate, his argument in Politics and Passion relies heavily on 
recognizing that others can have strongly-held beliefs (i.e., a comprehensive doctrine, to 
use Rawls‘ phrase). Disagreement can be resolved within a reasonable yet passionate 
setting.
219
 Walzer‘s further claims that it is through negotiation that an equitable solution 
can be found rather than deliberation. Similarly, the ―back and forth‖ of Rawls‘ reflective 
equilibrium implies the importance of discourse when choosing principles. At times, this 
equilibrium requires the revision of one‘s principles even if the theory does not conform 
precisely to his or her judgments.
220
 Other times, it requires a radical shift of one‘s moral 
vision. Nevertheless, Rawls insists that the two-fold political conception of justice would 
be chosen. But in doing so, he also notes that the conception which meets this criterion of 
reflective equilibrium is the one that is most reasonable. In Rawls‘ work, this conception 
is singular; in Walzer, it seems to be manifold and situational. 
 To the second point, because justice is determined by context, Walzer claims that 
substantive accounts of justice are necessarily local in scope.
221
 In addition to the 
relativity of social meanings, one‘s methodology need not be fixed either. He argues at 
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the conclusion of On Toleration that there is a need for a balanced rather than exclusive 
method of resolving such cases.
222
 One consequence of a highly contextualized method 
seems to indicate that there is no readymade principle (Rawlsian or otherwise) that covers 
every imaginable case. Another consequence, given the willingness for debate and 
negotiation, is that all complicated issues are potentially resolvable. This claim is the 
reason why ―standard‖ liberalism is inadequate, according to Walzer‘s argument in 
Politics and Passion.
223
 In political liberalism, this negotiation can only take place in the 
original position, and then only to describe its conditions. In practice, deliberation takes 
place within the down-to-earth context where structures of power are already firmly 
rooted in place. As a result, deliberation fails to resolve an issue unless a party can 
mobilize its members to engage these sedimented structures of political power, to form 
coalitions with likeminded groups, or to negotiate solutions with those in power. In other 
words, successful resolution to public dilemmas can be achieved only through something 
other than deliberation. 
 Walzer‘s self-critical understanding of liberalism also affords him the opportunity 
to respond to liberalism‘s detractors. MacIntyre is one such writer. He and others who 
offer this strand of criticism are often labeled ―communitarians,‖ though few of them are 
comfortable with that term. In fact, MacIntyre has explicitly refused the attribution.
224
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The dissertation briefly analyzes Walzer‘s response to MacIntyre and other critics of 
liberalism. 
 
A Response to the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism 
Walzer describes communitarianism as a useful contrast with social democracy. 
In this essay he highlights two arguments against liberalism, one related to practice and 
the other to theory, which he claims are ―deeply contradictory‖ and therefore mutually 
exclusive. 
225
 The first argument holds that liberal political theory accurately reflects 
liberal social practices. In this account, humans exist as radically isolated individuals. 
There are no necessarily shared values among them. The concrete absence of value 
exhorts one to disintegration of any social fabric through exit, utility (understood as 
personal utility), and especially choice.
226
 Moreover, choice and utility are not governed 
by any rational criteria; society is fragmented not only in values but also in practice. The 
second argument claims, contra the first, that liberal theory radically misrepresents real 
life. In reality, as Walzer has already noted in Politics and Passion, human beings are 
caught up in entire networks of relationships, power, and communities. If this claim is 
true, then all societies, even liberal ones, are deeply communitarian in structure. Here, the 
communitarian argument further asserts that liberal theory distorts this reality, blinding 
its members to the social ties that bind them. Thus, on the communitarian critique, an 
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explanation can be offered for the liberal inability to form ―cohesive solidarities‖ and 
―stable movements,‖ and also accounts for the dependence on a central state. 227 
 To these arguments, Walzer responds first by stating that 
Liberal theory now seems to have a power over and against real life that has been 
granted to few theories in human history. Plainly, it has not been granted to 
communitarian theory, which cannot, on the first argument, overcome the reality 
of liberal separatism and cannot, on the second argument, evoke the existing 
structures of social connection. In any case, the two critical arguments are 
mutually inconsistent; they cannot both be true.
228
 
 
Based on Walzer‘s own critique of ―standard liberalism,‖ he claims that both arguments 
are partially true. In recovering the positive aspects of the communitarian critique, he 
admits that Americans live in an ―unsettled society.‖ He grounds this argument on four 
types of mobility: geographic, social, marital, and political. A sense of place is weakened 
by the voluntary migrations of individual members. Movement is usually a logical 
necessity as a result of upward social mobility, as individuals move to make a better life 
for themselves and their families. Insofar as home is the first community, the relative ease 
of contracting and dissolving marriage disintegrates the ―first school of ethnic identity 
and religious conviction‖ represented by the home. Lastly, with its emphasis on 
autonomous choice, liberal citizens make for a volatile independent electorate, and local 
politics is as liable to upheaval as federal elections.
 229
  Taken together, these four 
mobilities can weaken a sense of community and its vitality. 
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 These several points of agreement notwithstanding, there is simply nothing else 
besides liberal society, according to Walzer.
230
 As such, he offers three ways to offset 
communitarian arguments against liberalism. The first is the insistence on a fuller 
conception of voluntary association. As demonstrated in earlier discussion, patterns of 
association are not the product of the will alone. Liberalism is more concerned with exit 
from the group, and disrobing oneself from its social identity than with the freedom to 
form groups. 
231
 The second is the liberal possibility of what he calls ―cooperative 
coping.‖232 Pluralism allows communities to deal with its various crises through a variety 
of means. By contrast, the imposition of a unitary way of life offers no escape for those 
who would find such a scheme oppressive. While there is a danger of erosion, Walzer 
argues that the local community must always be at risk.
233
 But communitarian tendencies 
are no help here. Tradition requires the risk of traditionalism or fundamentalism. Thus, if 
the first communitarian argument were true, then there would be no communities or 
traditions to place at risk in the first place. The third way involves the constitution of the 
liberal self. Walzer claims that contemporary liberals do not have a presocial notion of 
the self. Instead, liberalism ―is best understood as a theory of relationship, which has 
voluntary association at its center and which understands voluntariness as the right of 
rupture or withdrawal.‖ With regard to the four types of mobility, liberal citizens are in a 
state of perpetual motion. For instance, if marriage is truly voluntary, there must be a 
permanent possibility of divorce. Seen in this light, liberal selves are not pre-social, but 
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post-social, insofar as they can choose to depart only after coming to an opinion about the 
current set of relationships to which they are bound.
 234
  
 By contrast, an illiberal amelioration of these risks would deny the very 
possibility of rupture, withdrawal, or divorce. There could only be shunning, 
excommunication, and disfellowship. And few communitarians, especially MacIntyre, 
would advocate such measures. Nonetheless, the communitarian critique is prophetic, 
insofar as liberalism tends toward dissociation. A communitarian critique enjoins liberal 
society to reflect on and reinforce its internal binding capacity, but cannot overcome 
these risks entirely. 
 Before leaving this discussion of Walzer‘s work, it is helpful to conclude with a 
few words about its relevance for Cahill‘s writings. Chapter Four analyzes Cahill‘s 
participatory bioethics, which includes strategies consistent with Walzer‘s principles 
described in this section.
235
 In fact, these pages of her book also include an analysis and 
subtle critique of the argument from Gutmann and Thompson, whose argument Walzer 
rejects in Politics and Passion. Furthermore, Cahill‘s later work also makes a strong 
connection to the complex of social relationships, from which a free choice is no mere 
abstraction.
236
 Finally, Cahill argues similarly with Walzer that justice itself is 
contextualized. 
237
 This is not to say that she has abandoned an attempt at a universal 
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principle. For now, perhaps it is more precise to say that she seeks an understanding of 
justice that is universally but differentially applicable in any context. Cahill argues that 
the bioethical application of Rawlsian principles are laudable to the degree that they 
attempt to promote the common good, but that they fall short in the end as they tend to 
embrace the status quo of market-based approaches to medicine.
238
 Political liberalism is 
not radical enough in its pursuit of an equitable solution to these issues. As technology 
drives on, absent a moral or even political compass, it becomes imperative to find a 
method of engagement that slows its relentless march, or at least steers it toward its least 
harmful conclusion. As Walzer notes in Politics and Passion, activism frequently arouses 
the negative passions of envy and resentment. However, if the theological voices engaged 
in this future public discourse are successful, then the technological achievement of 
human engineering (to be discussed in the dissertation‘s Epilogue) can be conducted in a 
manner that leaves open the way to forgiveness and reconciliation, should the end result 
prove to be harmful. Finally, Walzer also provides a response to the critique of liberalism 
by MacIntyre and others who are commonly labeled ―communitarians.‖ 
 
Summary and Conclusion to Chapter Two 
This chapter has attempted to relate three recent philosophical accounts of justice 
that are most relevant to understanding Cahill‘s context, which will be analyzed in the 
Chapter Four.  Because of her emphasis on participatory moral discourse, Cahill often 
addresses thinkers outside of her Roman Catholic tradition particularly and apart from 
religious communities generally. This theoretical exploration opened with the work of 
John Rawls, who offers a contemporary liberal account of justice as fairness which is 
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derived from freely-chosen principles. These principles maximize liberty while 
restraining unjust socioeconomic differences. Rawls‘ theory is clearly reasonable and 
internally coherent. At the same time, this chapter raised two problems about its 
applications to current and future bioethical dilemmas. One is his rather ―thin‖ notion of 
the common good, which seems to refer mostly to legal and political systems that secure 
the rights of the people. Lacking a compelling reason to do otherwise, competition 
overrides mutual disinterest. Given the market-based ethos of medicine, Rawlsian 
principles are not strong enough to constrain the differences that might arise from 
biotechnologies. The other is his requirement to meet ―basic needs.‖ Without a thicker 
notion of the common good, it seems difficult to determine what constitutes the meaning 
of ―basic.‖ Cahill‘s later work, informed by Catholic Social Teaching, already provides 
such a notion of human rights, but the fourth chapter will explore her claim that they can 
rarely be absolute. 
 Next, Alasdair MacIntyre criticizes Rawls‘ Theory and other liberal views (like 
Robert Nozick), claiming that justice might be rational but not necessary in liberal 
society. He argues that Rawls and other liberals have no rational way to adjudicate their 
opposing claims because they have no overriding sense of the good. Rooted in the 
classical traditions of Aristotle and Aquinas, MacIntyre insists that the political nature of 
goods in ancient societies means that actions are expressive far more than autonomous 
choice, but are tethered to communal life, which is not possible in a political structure 
free of a singular comprehensive doctrine. MacIntyre calls for a return to a tradition-
based sense of Aristotelian telos, even though he is pessimistic about the possibility of 
such a recovery. Nonetheless, he offers a way for local communities to participate in 
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public discourse, with a strong caveat against an overzealous commitment to toleration. 
Similarly, Cahill insists that all intellectual and religious voices speak from a tradition. 
By contrast, it is through toleration of all voices that public discourse can be endeavored. 
Cahill grounds this call in a collaborative effort to increase justice in society. 
 The third account comes from Michael Walzer, who claims to remain firmly 
within the liberal tradition even while critiquing what he calls ―standard liberalism,‖ 
which is represented in this dissertation by Rawls. Walzer‘s ―complex equality‖ 
overcomes the necessity for constant government intervention to achieve the equity 
envisioned by Rawls. At the same time, it demonstrates that justice is relative to social 
meanings and is necessarily local in scope. Like Rawls, he is concerned about the 
stability of the political community over time. For Walzer, freedom and equality are still 
possible within the context of select involuntary associations. More importantly, Walzer 
allows room for social action beyond ―public reason.‖ Disagreements can be negotiated 
within a reasonable yet passionate setting. Cahill‘s later work resonates with Walzer‘s 
analysis insofar as both address the complex of social relationships, from which a free 
choice is no mere abstraction. 
 Now, the dissertation returns to some of Cahill‘s more familiar dialogue partners 
in the Roman Catholic moral tradition. It is better to begin with the philosophical 
movements because, while these philosophers have generally not addressed the 
theologians in the next chapter, the opposite cannot be said. The Catholic social tradition 
looks especially toward the common good and social justice, which are especially 
addressed by Rawls and Walzer. As Chapter Three demonstrates, both James Keenan and 
Jean Porter rely – heavily at times – on MacIntyre. Similarly, Catholic Social Teaching 
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leans heavily up a communal understanding of human dignity in a manner not 
inconsistent with MacIntyre. Catholic bioethicists also navigate the complexities of 
meeting individual needs with balancing social realities.   
150 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY ROMAN CATHOLIC MORAL TRADITION 
Toward the task of specifying what is meant by the Catholic tradition, toward which 
Cahill often refers, this chapter focuses on influential scholars and church documents 
written since the Second Vatican Council (hereafter Vatican II). There is both a clear 
development in the theological language and also an evolving understanding of justice 
expressed in the Council‘s documents. To cite one salient example, the council reflects 
upon human createdness in God‘s image, which grounds the essential equality of 
persons.
1
 Equality is rooted in a human ―dignity,‖ which transcends racial, 
socioeconomic, and even religious differences.
2
 In taking this position, which is based on 
human dignity over social or ecclesial identity, the council expressed the church‘s desire 
to enter into public conversation as a dialogue partner, rather than a dictatorial voice. This 
willingness to engage the world is a clear departure from the polemical writings from the 
church‘s hierarchy during the Modern period.3 Furthermore, it demonstrates a general 
acceptance of religious and political plurality that may have been understated in the past. 
Moreover, this position is emblematic of Cahill‘s primary task of participation in public 
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moral discourse – a critical self-understanding of one voice‘s own collective context, as 
discussed in Chapter One. 
Since Cahill writes from within a Roman Catholic context, the first section 
focuses exclusively on scholarship from within that tradition. This approach does not in 
any way intend to denigrate the weighty contributions of Protestant writers, or scholars 
writing from Jewish and other non-Christian religious traditions. In fact, as demonstrated 
in Chapter One, Cahill often mentions the influence of Protestant writers like James 
Gustafson and Stanley Hauerwas in her own writings. To reiterate what was introduced in 
the first chapter, and what will resonate throughout this chapter, public discourse brings 
together disparate intellectual positions that represent particular contexts. But contexts 
themselves are rarely monolithic, either. Thus, this chapter analyzes diverse writings 
from Catholic scholars and church documents that clarify what is meant by this Catholic 
context, and how Cahill significantly engages each representative part of the tradition. 
 This chapter is divided under three major headings, which analyze three post-
conciliar accounts of justice in the Roman Catholic tradition. The first part surveys three 
modes of the church‘s hierarchical teachings in the wake of the Second Vatican Council, 
to include the Pastoral Constitution on the Church, various social encyclicals of the post-
conciliar popes, and a pastoral letter from the United States‘ National Conference of 
Catholic Bishops. The second account analyzes the recent recovery of virtue ethics in 
Catholic moral tradition, including some interesting proposed developments. The final 
part discusses justice within the particular context of Catholic bioethics. 
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Recent Statements from the Catholic Hierarchy Related to Justice 
In analyzing these statements, the research is presented in three segments. Starting 
with Gaudium et Spes, the first segment examines the aforementioned development of the 
church‘s voice: one as dialogue partner with the modern world. This trend continues in 
the social encyclicals of Paul VI and John Paul II. The second considers the 1985 
statement from the United States Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for All. This 
document is significant to the present study for several reasons: its explicit definition of 
―basic justice,‖ its principles of participation, and its balanced approach toward justice for 
individuals and the community. Economic concerns give rise to questions of distributive 
justice, which, in Cahill‘s later bioethical writings, is often identified with social justice, 
but at times is at odds with the papal social encyclicals.
4
 The third segment studies 
Benedict XVI‘s 2009 encyclical Caritas in Veritate, which is the most recent papal 
statement that addresses Catholic Social Teaching. It focuses on his conception of justice 
as prior to charity, as well as his attempt to define a spirituality of technology as a vehicle 
for human development. 
 
Justice in the Documents of Vatican II and Subsequent Papal Social Encyclicals 
The first chapter summarized at length the influence of Catholic Social Teaching 
on Cahill‘s later work. Now this section analyzes the understanding of justice that 
developed in the documents of the Second Vatican Council (hereafter Vatican II) and the 
papal encyclicals in its wake. This section has two parts. The first analyzes Vatican II‘s 
Pastoral Constitution on the Church, Gaudium et Spes, which derive the anthropological 
                                                     
 
4
 Cahill, Theological Bioethics, 250-251. 
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principles from which the council‘s conception of justice is formed. It begins with a brief 
analysis of Leo XIII‘s seminal encyclical Rerum Novarum in order to demonstrate the 
development of Catholic Social Teaching in the intervening years between this document 
and the council. The second studies three papal social encyclicals were written in the two 
decades after Vatican II. These are Paul VI‘s Populorum Progressio and John Paul II‘s 
Laborem Exercens and Centesimus Annus. Drawing from these sources, and especially 
from its commitment to dialogue with the modern world, Vatican II‘s conception is most 
precisely called ―social justice.‖ Later papal social encyclicals demonstrate continuity 
with the conciliar understanding of social justice. 
 
Leo XIII‟s Rerum Novarum and the Roots of Distributive Justice 
The Catholic Church already expressed a vibrant social teaching tradition for 
nearly seven decades prior to Vatican II. Modern Catholic Social Teaching is said to have 
germinated from Leo XIII‘s Rerum Novarum, a groundbreaking encyclical on the rights 
of workers. There, he urges employers to pay a living wage within the context not of 
justice but of charity – ―a duty not enforced by human law.‖5 Compensation should 
support the survival of the employee‘s family, which is the first natural society.6 In other 
words, commutative justice, that is, the obligations between persons in the context of 
contractual duties, is not at stake here. Or, more precisely, commutative justice is not 
sufficient to meet the needs of working class families, according to Leo. 
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 Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (1891 – hereafter RN), 22. 
6
 RN, 12-13. 
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While commutative justice is not an issue in Leo‘s encyclical, distributive justice 
initially seems to be vital in the context of the ―natural right‖ of private ownership.7 
Ownership and labor both serve the good of all. 
8
 However, Leo does not mean the 
―common good,‖ as it is used in later magisterial writings. Instead, he locates the 
common good squarely within the government of civil society. 
9
 That is, Leo understands 
the common good to be served only by persons and not by material goods. 
Furthermore, Leo‘s notion of justice as a virtue seems to be utilitarian in scope. 
Against the extreme collectivism of socialist governments, Leo writes that leaders must 
allow their citizens free reign. The upper limit to that liberty is the conflicting claims of 
others and the needs of the state, which is identified as the common good. He writes, ―We 
have said that the State must not absorb the individual or the family; both should be 
allowed free and untrammeled action so far as is consistent with the common good and 
the interest of others.‖10 It is incumbent upon every citizen to contribute to the common 
good. Thus, the common good, as Leo understands it, is a matter of contributory justice. 
Moreover, it is a grave offense against the common good for individuals to seize 
the property of others. To take forcibly what belongs to another ―under the futile and 
shallow pretext of equality‖ serves neither justice nor the common good. 11 It is 
significant here that Leo bifurcates these two terms, because they converge in the later 
social tradition. He insists that fair wages should go beyond commutative justice to 
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8
 ―The earth, even though apportioned among private owners, ceases not thereby 
to minister to the needs of all.‖ RN, 8. 
9
 RN, 51. 
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 RN, 34. 
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 RN, 38. 
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charity.
12
 More importantly, this charity is a virtue found in individuals, and never in a 
state bureaucracy. He equates government-run relief agencies with paganism.
13
 Taken 
together, the common good, in Leo‘s estimation, is separate from distributive justice. 
 
Vatican II‟s Pastoral Constitution on the Church  
With the exception of contributory justice, Vatican II categorically rejected Leo‘s 
claims about justice in Rerum Novarum.
14
 Instead, they insist that justice is determined 
by its impact on the well-being especially of the poor.
15
 They ground this idea of justice 
on a two-fold premise. First, they argue that human beings are the ―center and summit‖ of 
creation. This claim implies a fundamental dignity that discloses both a special 
relationship with God and the essential equality of all persons.
16
 Next, in light of human 
dignity, the council insists that human beings are social by nature.
17
 Thus, the person is in 
relationship not only with God, but also with each another. The evidence of human 
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 RN, 22. 
13
 RN, 30. 
14
 It must be stated that this development is in no way a quantum leap. In the 
intervening years between Rerum Novarum and Vatican II, the encyclicals of Pius XI and 
John XXIII departed from Leo with regard to the common good and to justice. In fact, 
they begin to conflate the two. For instance, Pius claims that social justice demands that 
―each must be given his own share of goods, and the distribution of created goods… is 
laboring today under the gravest evils due to the huge disparity between the few 
exceedingly rich and the unnumbered propertyless, must be effectively called back into 
conformity with the norms of the common good, that is, social justice.‖ Pius XI, 
Quadragesimo Anno (1931), 58. Later, John XXIII argues (over Leo‘s claims to the 
contrary) that both private and public institutions must be directed toward the common 
good. See Mater et Magistra (1961), 40. 
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 Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes (1965 – Hereafter GS), 27. 
16
 GS, 12, 14. 
17
 GS, 24. 
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sociality is borne out in the interdependence that is expressed in family life and the 
political community.
18
 
It must be noted that the lexical order here is significant to the Council‘s 
argument. Sociality is dependent upon human dignity. Initially, it can be said that the 
council follows Leo, insofar as they claim that every individual has a duty to contribute to 
the social order.
19
 However, the council‘s vision of the common good in Gaudium et Spes 
is also at odds with Leo‘s perception of it in Rerum Novarum.20 According to Vatican II, 
the common good serves both individuals and groups within society.
21
 Because 
participation presupposes dignity, the council asserts a series of necessary positive rights 
in order to effect this contribution from individuals.
22
 Consequently, the common good 
not only requires contributory justice from its members, but also demands distributive 
justice toward them. Thus, Vatican II has some continuity with respect to contributory 
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 GS, 25. 
19
 Here, the council does not cite Leo directly. Instead, they cite John XXIII, 
Mater et Magistra (1961). However, John opens his encyclical with an exposition of 
Leo‘s Rerum Novarum and of Pius‘ Quadragesimo Anno, both of which relativize 
individual work to the aggregate needs of the state. 
20
 Cf. RN, 51. 
21
 The council defines the common good as ―the sum total of social conditions 
which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfillment more 
fully and more easily.‖ GS, 26. 
22
 ―There is a growing awareness of the exalted dignity proper to the human 
person, since he stands above all things, and his rights and duties are universal and 
inviolable. Therefore, there must be made available to all men everything necessary for 
leading a life truly human, such as food, clothing, and shelter; the right to choose a state 
of life freely and to found a family, the right to education, to employment, to a good 
reputation, to respect, to appropriate information, to activity in accord with the upright 
norm of one's own conscience, to protection of privacy and rightful freedom even in 
matters religious. Hence, the social order and its development must invariably work to 
the benefit of the human person if the disposition of affairs is to be subordinate to the 
personal realm and not contrariwise, as the Lord indicated when He said that the Sabbath 
was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath.‖ GS, 26, emphasis added.  
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justice, but the council radically departs from Leo with its understanding of the common 
good. 
Furthermore, the council describes the ideal conditions of the common good as 
―social justice.‖23 While there are tolerable inequalities among persons, equal dignity 
demands that society strive to ameliorate social conditions. To fail to address vast social 
and economic disparities constitutes an offence against social justice. In contrast to Leo, 
who insists that government is incapable of providing charity, Vatican II calls upon 
public and private organizations to avail themselves in service of human dignity. The 
pursuit of equality and justice also requires advancement beyond individualistic morality 
to participatory ethics that strive for the common good.
24
 
Finally, Gaudium et Spes expresses tension between universal and particular 
concerns.
25
 After laying out these principles of dignity, equality, and the common good, 
the Council turns to the role of the Catholic Church in applying them. 
All we have said up to now about the dignity of the human person, the community 
of men and women, and the deep significance of human activity, provides a basis 
for discussing the relationship between the church and the world and the dialogue 
between them.
26
 
 
In this dialogue, the church summarizes its service to individuals and to society.  On the 
one hand, the church helps to protect human dignity from shifting opinions by upholding 
consistently the primacy of conscience and the importance of charity. The church also 
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Church in applying them. See ―Commentary on Gaudium et Spes,‖ in Kenneth R. Himes 
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proclaims human rights, which regulate all social and activity in light of the Gospel.
27
 On 
the other hand, the church does not provide clear answers in the political, economic, or 
social order. As a universal body, the church is not beholden to a single cultural mode of 
existence. Instead, it insists on a universal dialogue in support of the basic rights of 
persons and of the family, which are the requirements of the common good.
28
 Similar to 
Rawls‘ position, Gaudium et Spes envisions the church‘s participation in public discourse 
not only as a demand of Christian faith to be involved in the world, but also as a 
requirement of reasonableness in light of these universal principles.
29
 The church thereby 
can engage in public discourse while remaining faithful to the Gospel.
30
 
In summary, there is a clear development in the Catholic social tradition at 
Vatican II. Rooted in the notion of the equal human dignity of persons, coupled with its 
understanding of human sociality, the council enjoins all individuals to contribute toward 
the common good. While this call is consistent with the origins of the church‘s social 
tradition, it is not unidirectional. The common good also requires that the individual‘s 
needs be met in order to facilitate participation. Radically departing from Leo‘s 
teachings, Vatican II claims that these needs fall under the auspices of justice, not charity. 
Further still, they describe the common good in terms of social justice. These 
anthropological tenets, upon which their notion of justice is based, are universal in scope 
and general in principle. As such, they require a fuller account of how they are applied at 
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comprehensive doctrines which do not necessarily conflict with his political conception 
of justice. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 168-169. 
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the local level. One such account, offered by the United States bishops, will be analyzed 
later in the chapter. But now, further warrants for this particular application are provided 
in some papal encyclicals that followed Vatican II. The dissertation turns now to them. 
 
Paul VI‟s Populorum Progressio 
Paul VI‘s 1967 encyclical on economic and social development is significant to 
this dissertation for two reasons. One, it affirms and extends Vatican II‘s teachings on 
social justice while implying a greater need for subsidiarity, which, curiously, was 
understated at the council. The most important aspect to this first point is the ―option for 
the poor,‖ which was taken up zealously by Catholic bishops in the local contexts of 
Medellín and, later, of Washington, D.C. Two, and conversely, while focusing on the 
local situation with respect to direct assistance, Paul VI amplifies Leo‘s principles 
regarding wages to cover agreements among nations. This section briefly summarizes 
these two points because they factor into the oscillation between universal and particular 
concerns in Cahill‘s writings on justice, which will be addressed in the next chapter. 
First, Paul VI calls for greater attention to be paid in the Catholic Church to 
listening in addition to teaching, which he also affirms in his subsequent writings.
31
 On 
the one hand, this attending to the ―signs of the times‖ is wrought by increasing 
industrial, economic, and political developments throughout the world at the time of the 
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 ―It is up to these Christian communities, with the help of the Holy Spirit in 
communion with the bishops who hold responsibility and in dialogue with other Christian 
brethren and all men of goodwill, to discern the options and commitments which are 
called for in order to bring about the social, political, and economic changes seen in many 
cases to be urgently needed.‖ Paul VI, Octogesima Adveniens (1971), 4. 
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encyclical.
32
 These developments were signified by rapid communications, increased 
travel, and widespread decolonization, which together resulted in unprecedented global 
awareness.
33
 On the other hand, there were two kinds of polarization that threatened both 
peace and justice in the 1960s. One was the Cold War, which pitted the United States and 
other North Atlantic countries (often called NATO countries) in an arms race against the 
Soviet Union and other nations of the Communist Bloc, which was formed by the 
Warsaw Pact Treaty in 1955. The Cold War often spilled over into proxy wars, which 
were usually staged in ―third world‖ nations, i.e., those poor countries that were not part 
of NATO or the Warsaw Pact.
34
 The other was the unrivaled post-war prosperity in the 
West that occurred through vast economic expansion, thanks in large part to the 
aforementioned increase in industrialization, communications, and travel. However, this 
prosperity encouraged a widening gap not only between rich and poor individuals within 
particular countries, but also between the nations themselves. Thus, the 1960s might be 
characterized as a time of both hope and crisis. While the documents of Vatican II remain 
firmly optimistic in this context, Populorum Progressio takes a somewhat more somber 
tone. 
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 In fact, the United Nations calls this period as ―the decade of development.‖ See 
United Nations Children‘s Fund, ―The 1960s: Decade of Development,‖ The State of the 
World‟s Children 1996. n.d. Online Document, 
http://www.unicef.org/sowc96/1960s.htm, retrieved August 4, 2011. 
33
 The political and ecclesial context of Populorum Progressio is summarized in 
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161 
 
Next, Paul VI describes the interplay between the global and the local situations, 
and the church‘s role in both. The church‘s mission is universal in proclaiming the 
Gospel. The principles of Catholic Social Teaching are also universal insofar as they are 
accessible to all reasonable persons. Consistent with social encyclical tradition, though, 
he argues that both are concerned especially for the poor.
35
 In continuity with the 
teachings of Gaudium et Spes, the church can offer guiding narratives regarding human 
persons and their relationships with one another.
36
 While this mission and vision remain 
global in scope, the encyclical points to specific, local ways that the church has fostered 
human progress, like the construction of schools and hospitals.
37
 
Later in the document, Paul affirms the teachings of Vatican II as they pertain to 
advancement of the common good.
38
 He lauds industrial and technological innovations 
that gave rise to prosperity, but he also cautions against ―unbridled liberalism‖ that 
paradoxically leads to tyranny. This political system is rooted in an equally unfettered 
capitalism, and results in the ―international imperialism of money.‖39 In contrast, Paul 
turns to Vatican II‘s principles on the judicious use of private property. 
Now if the earth truly was created to provide man with the necessities of life and 
the tools for his own progress, it follows that every man has the right to glean 
what he needs from the earth. The recent Council reiterated this truth: "God 
destined the earth and all it contains for all people and nations so that all created 
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things would be shared fairly by all humankind under the guidance of justice 
tempered by charity."
40
 
 
Free trade and property rights are thereby subordinated to the council‘s principles of 
social justice. Since there is a common right to a sufficient amount of the earth‘s goods 
for each family, the state should justly delineate the terms of their transfer. 
 Moving to international trade, Paul VI returns to Leo‘s principles outlined in 
Rerum Novarum, and augments their application to include obligations between nations. 
Paul conceives of wealthier nations as analogous to Leo‘s employers and landowners. 
Prosperous nations have a great deal of bargaining power over nations who are less well 
off. As such, the sole criterion of mutual consent (i.e., the liberal notion of contract) does 
not ensure fair conditions when applied to international trade agreements. Instead, Paul 
insists that the demands of natural law are superior to those of the contract‘s provisions. 
In Rerum Novarum this principle was set down with regard to a just wage for the 
individual worker; but it should be applied with equal force to contracts made 
between nations: trade relations can no longer be based solely on the principle of 
free, unchecked competition, for it very often creates an economic dictatorship. 
Free trade can be called just only when it conforms to the demands of social 
justice.
41
 
 
Thus, wealthier nations are subject to the needs of poorer nations when they come to 
terms on trade and other economic endeavors with one another. The open market does 
not need to be eliminated, but it must be constrained by demands of social justice.
42
 The 
dictates of natural law regarding human dignity, sociality, and the common good generate 
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within more affluent countries a three-fold obligation: mutual solidarity, social justice, 
and universal charity.
43
 They work synergistically to promote peace for the future. 
 Finally, Paul VI calls for collaboration about the best course of action to take in 
cultivating the common good through social justice. He challenges individual families, 
professional organizations, and cultural institutions to ―friendly rivalry‖ with one another 
to implement the best ideas.
44
 Implied throughout the encyclical‘s middle paragraphs is 
the principle of subsidiarity, a consistent focus on and respect for local schemes that build 
particular communities. Paul also hints at the need for public discourse in resolving this 
urgent social concern of development. Collaboration includes not just other Christians, 
but all groups who are likewise committed to the cause of human development. Pressing 
social needs can sublimate ideological differences.
 45
 As Chapter One and earlier 
discussion in this chapter point out, parties can come to terms on immediate issues 
without accord on comprehensive notions that ground commitment to public discourse. 
 In conclusion, Paul VI‘s Populorum Progressio takes a realistic perspective on 
social justice in the wake of the Second Vatican Council. In the context of increasing 
global economic development, he notes the widening gap between wealthier and poorer 
nations. Using the seminal social principles of Leo XIII and coupling them with the 
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global vision of Vatican II, Paul transforms the obligations of wealthy individuals into the 
duties of affluent nations. Guided by the virtues of solidarity, justice, and charity, nations 
can cooperate as well as compete with each other. Peace becomes the fruit of this 
synthesis. Like the documents of Vatican II, Populorum Progressio subtly describes the 
need for subsidiarity by enjoining the smaller units of society to attend appropriately to 
the common good. He also makes an explicit case for collaborative strategies, the kinds 
of which are envisioned in the later chapters of this dissertation. 
 
John Paul II‟s Laborem Exercens and Centesimus Annus 
Traditionally, a papal encyclical or apostolic exhortation has commemorated the 
significant anniversaries of Leo XIII‘s groundbreaking promulgation: Rerum Novarum. 
In them, the pontiffs rehearse Leo‘s principles in Rerum Novarum, and then apply their 
remarks to the current situation in which they write. One such encyclical is Pius XI‘s 
Quadragesimo Anno in 1931. This eponymous letter addresses the world on the fortieth 
anniversary of Rerum Novarum as it suffered through a global economic depression. In 
1961, John XXIII‘s Mater et Magistra addressed the impact of Leo‘s document to 
address the timely concerns of health care, education, and housing. A decade later, Paul 
VI marked the eightieth anniversary of Rerum Novarum with an apostolic exhortation to 
Maurice Cardinal Roy, serving at the time as president for the Pontifical Council for 
Justice and Peace. In addition to summarizing the foundational precepts laid out in Leo‘s 
encyclical, and recapitulating reflections on social justice from both the Second Vatican 
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Council and his recent letter, Populorum Progressio, Paul addresses environmental 
concerns for the first time in the history of papal encyclicals.
46
 
 During John Paul II‘s long reign, he had the opportunity to write two 
commemorative encyclicals, both of which are briefly addressed in this section. The first 
is Laborem Exercens, which discusses the meaning of human work and the role of labor 
unions (a major element in Rerum Novarum) vis-à-vis the struggle against Communism 
in his native Poland. The second is Centesimus Annus, which notes that class struggles 
have persisted in the age of industrialization and addresses the recent fall of Communism 
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This section focuses on Laborem Exercens‟ 
conception of justice in light of the received Catholic social tradition, and briefly 
discusses the continuity of its teaching on the subjectivity of workers in Centesimus 
Annus. In addition to their significance for the analysis of justice in the next chapter, John 
Paul‘s spirituality of work in Laborem Exercens has further relevance with regard to the 
meaning of human achievement in a genetically-enhanced world, which will be discussed 
in the dissertation‘s conclusion. 
 In many ways, Laborem Exercens is consistent with the received tradition of 
Catholic Social Teaching. For example, the third section reiterates Leo‘s teachings on the 
struggle between labor and capital, emphasizing the need to place the rights of ownership 
in relation to the common good.
47
 The fourth section outlines the rights of workers. 
Proceeding from the premise that labor takes priority over capital, John Paul argues that 
workers‘ rights have their basis within the larger context of human rights.48 As such, they 
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have the right to demand living wages and to bargain collectively. As noted in previous 
sections, while Leo perceived the wage issue as a matter of charity, subsequent 
magisterial writings see them as constitutive of social justice. John Paul‘s teaching in 
Laborem Exercens is consistent with the latter part of the tradition. There are also two 
noteworthy features in the document that will bear upon the later chapters of the 
dissertation. The first is John Paul‘s exposition on the meaning of work. The second is his 
implicit identification of social justice with the common good, which Catholic Social 
Teaching has usually treated separately. 
 First, John Paul‘s theological reflection on the meaning of human work offers a 
few insights that make explicit what was only implied in Leo‘s seminal encyclical. Rerum 
Novarum claims that social teaching is grounded in the meaning of work. As previous 
discussion demonstrates, Leo located its significance in terms of sustainable wages, 
warranted by the theological virtue of charity.
49
 There is an implicit notion of human 
dignity, which is filled out in later social encyclicals and at Vatican II. In fact, church 
documents locate the right to employment under the aegis of dignity.
50
 John Paul takes 
this analysis further by grounding work and human dignity in the opening chapter of 
Genesis.
51
 This analysis is juxtaposed sharply against the punitive toil of accursed 
humanity (Genesis 3:17-19 – NRSV), and from the meaninglessness of human work, for 
which only grief and anxiety are its fruits (Ecclesiastes 2:17-26).  Instead, John Paul 
insists that work is part of a prelapsarian schema. It is located in stewardship, a gloss of 
which is found is found in God‘s blessing upon humans in Genesis 1:27-28. 
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 This claim is warranted by prioritizing the subjective dimension of work (the 
worker– the human agent) over its objective counterpart (the type of work).52 Humans 
work in myriad ways, and often they are labeled by the nature of their work: blacksmith, 
economist, farmer, physician, etc. In the past, technology has been a key ally to workers, 
and provides tools with which they produce more efficiently, but in recent decades, 
machines have replaced human workers. This trend does not obviate the essential 
subjectivity of the worker. It simply raises different ethical questions and, less simply, 
presents other employment opportunities for displaced workers.  
Turning to the subjective dimension, the encyclical discusses the ancient world, 
which divided its kinds of labor according to social class.
53
 Christianity brought about 
some social change in this regard. For example, the previous chapter described Cahill‘s 
analysis of the New Testament community as transforming social roles within larger 
society.
54
 Using Jesus‘ occupation as a carpenter as his prime illustration, John Paul 
argues similarly that the value of work is not found in its type, but in the one doing it. 
This leads immediately to a very important conclusion of an ethical nature: 
however true it may be that man is destined for work and called to it, in the first 
place work is "for man" and not man "for work". Through this conclusion one 
rightly comes to recognize the pre-eminence of the subjective meaning of work 
over the objective one. Given this way of understanding things, and presupposing 
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that different sorts of work that people do can have greater or lesser objective 
value, let us try nevertheless to show that each sort is judged above all by the 
measure of the dignity of the subject of work, that is to say the person, the 
individual who carries it out.
55
 
 
This dignity is brought out further in his closing remarks, which express three elements 
of a spirituality of work. The first is drawn from Gaudium et Spes, which roots human 
dignity in creation.
56
 In light of this teaching, all human work participates in God‘s 
creative activity. The second turns to Jesus as exemplar for a ―man of work.‖ Human 
labor contributes not only to earthly progress, but when it is engaged in vocational 
activity, it also builds the reign of God.
57
 Finally, all work has an element of toil. As 
such, it links to the redemptive value of suffering and the virtue of commitment to 
excellence in one‘s efforts. Christian discipleship can transform the simplest or harshest 
labor into a wide contribution of saving activity.
58
 
 Furthermore, questions on the meaning of work will be raised again at the 
dissertation‘s conclusion in the context of human germline enhancement. Bioengineering, 
when aimed at enhancing human function, has the power to ―transform the moral 
landscape.‖59 Current appreciation for human achievement and personal struggle might 
erode into the pure fulfillment of a (humanly) ordained purpose. There is broad 
disagreement on the extent to which this future technology might affect these elements of 
human work, and they will be discussed in the coming chapters. For now, the meaning of 
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work should be tied to the common good that is sought in resolving the matter. When 
they participate in future debate about enhancement, John Paul‘s spirituality of work is 
one resource from which Catholic voices can draw. 
 Next, John Paul begins implicitly to identify social justice as the common good. 
In his discourse on labor unions, he calls organized labor a mouthpiece in the struggle for 
social justice.
60
 It is significant that this struggle is not ―against‖ others; he conceives a 
unifying relationship between labor and management. This vision of solidarity is two-
fold. On the one hand, there is solidarity among workers as they bargain collectively and 
work together. On the other hand there is solidarity with workers, as owners strive to 
outfit their employees with the necessary tools in order to build their own businesses.  
It is characteristic of work that it first and foremost unites people. In this consists 
its social power: the power to build a community. In the final analysis, both those 
who work and those who manage the means of production or who own them must 
in some way be united in this community. In the light of this fundamental 
structure of all work-in the light of the fact that, in the final analysis, labour and 
capital are indispensable components of the process of production in any social 
system-it is clear that, even if it is because of their work needs that people unite to 
secure their rights, their union remains a constructive factor of social order and 
solidarity, and it is impossible to ignore it.
61
 
 
John Paul sees this unity as necessary to endeavor toward what he calls the ―just good.‖ 
He defines it in the present case, as ―the good which corresponds to the needs and merits 
of working people associated by profession.‖62 On closer examination, this ―just good‖ 
seems to be a ―local version‖ of the common good. More generally, if ―profession‖ were 
taken to mean ―vocation,‖ as Gaudium et Spes describes the singular calling of humanity 
toward divine unity, then social justice and common good can well be considered one and 
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the same.
63
 This potential identification between the common good and social justice has 
implications for the analysis of justice in Cahill‘s later writings, which often privileges 
the common good over the other two affirmations in Catholic Social Teaching. 
 Finally, John Paul takes yet another turn to the subjective in Centesimus Annus. 
As stated in previous sections of this dissertation, Catholic social thought attempts to plot 
a moral course between the extremes of libertarian individualism and socialist 
collectivism. On the one hand, John Paul reflects upon the class struggles that persist in 
spite of the fall of Communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Taking aim at 
socialism‘s objectifying tendencies, he claims that its most egregious error is 
anthropological in scope; socialism insists that the good of the individual can be achieved 
independently of autonomy.
64
 On the other hand, John Paul makes his strongest criticisms 
against unrestrained capitalism. Regarding the use of private property, he employs Leo 
XIII‘s precepts in Rerum Novarum and Vatican II‘s teaching in Gaudium et Spes as his 
foundation, claiming that there is a natural but not inalienable right to property. God 
offers the earth‘s riches for all.65 John Paul calls this reality the ―law of the common 
purpose of goods.‖66 Later, he identifies this law as the foundation for the universal 
destination of the earth‘s good.67 
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 However, John Paul‘s universal destination of goods is inconsistent with Leo‘s 
understanding of private property, which is described as an inviolable right in Rerum 
Novarum.
68
 Instead, John Paul insists that limits on the exploitation of privately-held 
goods should be determined by its effect on the common good, especially to the 
disadvantage of the poor. The law of the common destination of earthly goods is rooted 
in the social quality of private property.
69
 Furthermore, the common good is achieved 
only when individuals and local political groups are understood as subjects. 
According to Rerum novarum and the whole social doctrine of the Church, the 
social nature of man is not completely fulfilled in the State, but is realized in 
various intermediary groups, beginning with the family and including economic, 
social, political and cultural groups which stem from human nature itself and have 
their own autonomy, always with a view to the common good. This is what I have 
called the "subjectivity" of society which, together with the subjectivity of the 
individual, was cancelled out by "Real Socialism".
70
 
 
John Paul‘s account of subjectivity is multi-layered, and in some ways similar to Michael 
Walzer‘s description of complex equality. This subjectivity is expressed by (although not 
reduced to) the variety of social relationships in which each person engages, including 
both involuntary and freely-chosen associations. Persons must participate within each 
organization according to its internal workings. Property may be owned, but exchanges 
may be blocked according to their deleterious effects on the common good. 
 Another difference with Rerum Novarum is found in John Paul‘s discussion of the 
various forms of property. While Leo conceived of ―property‖ as commercial real estate 
and industrial machinery, John Paul widens this understanding to include intellectual 
property: know-how, technology, and skill. In fact, John Paul claims that these latter 
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forms of ownership constitute the wealth of industrialized nations far more than natural 
resources.
71
 By extension, intellectual property also possesses a social characteristic that 
allows its use for all in service to the common good. As the next chapter demonstrates, 
Cahill locates her understanding of social justice in the context of biotechnology along 
this line of thought. 
 To conclude this brief sampling of John Paul‘s social teaching, three significant 
points influence the remaining chapters of the dissertation. One, his theological reflection 
on work locates its positive meaning within the created order, though this meaning may 
be compromised in the future due to the development of enhancement technology. Two, 
he implies identity between the common good and social justice, as Cahill frequently is 
wont to do. Three, his complex understanding of subjectivity and extension of the social 
nature of private property in service of the common good has further implications for the 
futurist technology of human engineering. Now, the study turns to the American context, 
with a consideration of the United States Bishops‘ statement on economic justice. 
 
The NCCB‘s Pastoral Letter: Economic Justice for All 
This section analyzes Economical Justice for All, a 1986 pastoral letter from the 
United States National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB)
 
on Catholic Social 
Teaching in light of the economic policies that the U.S. government was pursuing at the 
time.
72
 It is arguably one of the most influential documents that this episcopal assembly 
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has written since it was published. In the quarter century since its publication, the precise 
economic conditions described by the bishops do not necessarily apply in the post-Cold 
War era. With regard to this dissertation, though, the document remains significant for 
two reasons. One, the NCCB offers a definition of ―basic justice,‖ and outlines justice‘s 
role in serving the common good. Two, the letter attempts to synthesize many of the 
various hierarchical resources summarized in this section thus far with regard to 
participation in order to describe the unique American context with respect to social 
justice. The first point provides a useful working definition within the setting of the 
liberal values of the United States, and the second point warrants further participation in 
public discourse to provide pragmatic solutions to pressing issues. 
 
Basic Justice 
Drawing from the received Catholic social tradition, the NCCB claims that ―basic 
justice‖ is a virtue that lends itself to full and active participation in society, which itself 
is a basic right of all people.
73
 It establishes a ―floor of material well-being on which all 
can stand.‖74  There are three interpenetrating spheres of basic justice: commutative 
justice, distributive justice, and social justice. Anthropologically, basic justice is 
consistent with the received social tradition insofar as it is founded on Catholic Social 
Teaching‘s three affirmations of human dignity, sociality, and the common good, but the 
pastoral letter emphasizes the first two affirmations over the last one. The NCCB also 
holds a somewhat different view of solidarity as a guiding virtue. Instead, they prefer to 
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uphold hope and courage as the leading virtues that lend themselves to achieving basic 
justice.  
 First, the NCCB‘s view of commutative justice is located primarily within the 
realm of employment.  The virtue of industriousness facilitates commutative justice.
75
 
Diligent work is demanded of employees and fair wages are expected from employers for 
their work.
76
 To this point, the NCCB upholds the church‘s support for labor unions to 
maintain this aspect of basic justice.
77
 They call for a less adversarial posture between 
labor and management. In doing so, labor unions must make a positive contribution over 
and above a protectionist stance. 
Labor unions themselves are challenged by the present economic environment to 
seek new ways of doing business. The purpose of unions is not simply to defend 
the existing wages and prerogatives of the fraction of workers who belong to 
them, but also to enable workers to make positive and creative contributions to the 
firm, the community, and the larger society in an organized and cooperative 
way.
78
 
 
In light of the unique situation for American workers in the 1980s (i.e., loss of 
manufacturing jobs and President Ronald Reagan‘s anti-union policies), the bishops 
encourage increased cooperation within industries between labor and management. 
 Next, the NCCB claims that distributive justice is another essential aspect of basic 
justice. Built upon libertarian notions of desert, the American polity is frequently 
uncomfortable with redistributive schemes, preferring religious and charitable 
organizations over government-run bureaucracies to meet the basic needs of the poor.
79
 
                                                     
75
 EJA, 102. 
76
 EJA, 69. 
77
 EJA, 104. 
78
 EJA, 304. 
79
 Leo XIII argues similarly, see RN, 30. 
175 
 
By contrast, following the words of the Second Vatican Council, basic justice requires 
that all distributive schemes be evaluated by its effect on the poor.
 80
 Toward this end, tax 
policies should be reformed to support working families and non-commercial farming as 
they compete in the marketplace.
81
 Furthermore, the NCCB conceives of distributive 
justice as more than the exchange of material goods. Following John Paul II, they see 
employment itself as a fundamental good that is constitutive of human dignity.
82
 In turn, 
they support equitable policies to curtail discrimination and increase opportunities 
especially for disenfranchised social groups.
83
 These endeavors require considerable 
government intervention. 
 Third, they envision social justice as encompassing the organization of all social 
and political institutions. The institutions are also composed of individuals. As such, 
there is a corresponding demand of contributory justice from individuals to participate 
actively and effectively toward the common good. Citing Pius XI, contributory justice is 
the ―very essence of social justice.‖84 Its teaching focuses on individual rights and 
responsibilities. At the same time, it casts these responsibilities against the backdrop of 
the common good. Thus, the bishops‘ view of social justice attempts to reconcile the 
liberal values of Western democracy with the communitarian values of Catholic Social 
Teaching. 
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 Anthropologically, the document privileges human dignity and sociality over the 
common good. In keeping with the Catholic social tradition, they avoid both extremes of 
individualism and collectivism. As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, they focus 
upon individual action, but their outline of urgent problems emphasizes their effects at 
the local levels of society, especially the family.
85
 The bishops claim that the common 
good redounds to the individual and local good.
86
 For example, in their discussion of 
employment as a basic right, a healthy economy serves the common good, but it 
especially lends itself toward achieving the self-actualization of persons and meeting the 
basic needs of families.
87
  
 Finally, the NCCB offers two guiding virtues that help to achieve basic justice. 
Catholic Social Teaching is grounded in a firm belief in the inestimable worth of persons, 
in light of their dignity as human subjects. They claim that hope and courage are the 
primary virtues in order to engage in building up the kingdom of God on earth.  
This conviction gives Christians strong hope as they face the economic struggles 
of the world today. This hope is not a naïve optimism that imagines that simple 
formulas for creating a fully just society are ready at hand. The Church‘s 
experience through history and in nations throughout the world today have made 
it wary of all ideologies that claim to have the final answer to humanity‘s 
problems.
88
 
 
This hope engenders courageous action on behalf of the kingdom by transcending the 
blighted vision of the present situation, and looking ahead toward a better future. Courage 
helps to overcome the difficulties that contribute to the present bleakness. 
                                                     
85
 EJA, 15-19. 
86
 Charles E. Curran makes this point. See Curran, ―The Reception of Catholic 
Social and Economic Teaching in the United States,‖ in Modern Catholic Social 
Teaching, 480. 
87
 EJA, 137. 
88
 EJA, 131; cf. GS 39. 
177 
 
 In the previous chapter, solidarity was described in Catholic Social Teaching as a 
fundamental virtue to achieve and maintain the common good. To be clear, the NCCB 
also find solidarity important, as the word appears over thirty times in the pastoral letter. 
However, solidarity is not necessarily a virtue in their estimation. Rather, it is more of a 
pragmatic value in that it is useful for building a community. 
89
 Alternatively, perhaps 
they mean solidarity as a ―first principle‖ in a liberal democracy like the United States. In 
a nation of strangers bound together by choice and free association, solidarity offers a 
way of relating to the other. It gives rise to a sense of civic commitment, which in turn 
demands one‘s contribution to the common good. While it is certain that solidarity plays 
some role in the bishops‘ letter, it is not clear that they use the term in a manner 
consistent with the tradition. 
 The analysis of Economic Justice for All now turns to the NCCB‘s discussion of 
participation, which reiterates previous calls for engagement in public discourse and other 
cooperative strategies. There is also an element of pragmatism in their writing that must 
be considered in light of the epilogue of this dissertation, which offers a practical 
resolution to a future public dilemma about human engineering. 
 
The NCCB‟s Interpretation of the Principle of Participation 
Participation is one of the principal themes of the pastoral letter. It is elemental to 
the common good, since individuals must contribute to its advancement. By the same 
token, society must ensure that all are able to contribute appropriately. Therefore, 
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participation is prior to the common good. Due to this priority, society has an obligation 
to enumerate the fundamental conditions of participation. 
These fundamental duties can be summarized this way: basic justice demands the 
establishment of minimum levels of participation in the life of the human 
community for all persons. The ultimate injustice is for a person or group to be 
treated actively or abandoned passively as if they were nonmembers of the human 
race. To treat people this way is effectively to say they simply do not count as 
human beings.
90
 
 
The bishops imply that there is a basic right to participation.
91
 This right is derived from 
human dignity and sociality, which are affirmed by Catholic Social Teaching.
92
 In one 
sense, they argue in a manner consistent with Walzer‘s view of justice, in that 
participation connotes membership in society, which is the primary distributive good, 
according to Walzer.
93
 Participation thereby allows individuals to select a life plan and 
contribute to the common good in their own way. The NCCB‘s view of basic justice is 
also an instance of Walzer‘s simple equality. Participation can easily become a dominant 
good, since membership includes all of the goods demanded by basic justice. Thus, 
frequent government intervention is required to ensure that goods do not become 
monopolized over time. 
 Nonetheless, their insistence on participation as a basic right is aimed at 
improving living conditions for those who, due to unfortunate and especially unjust social 
arrangements, have been excluded from contributing to the common good. The 
                                                     
90
 EJA, 77. 
91
 With regard to participation in economic/social life, they are explicit. See EJA, 
15. 
92
 ―This tradition insists that human dignity, realized in community with others 
and with the whole of God‘s creations, is the norm against which every social institution 
must be measured.‖ EJA, 25. 
93
 Walzer, Spheres, 28. 
179 
 
overcoming of marginalization is not complete, but is gradually decreased. The bishops 
strive for what they call ―biblical justice,‖ which they understand as a society fully 
expressive of ―love, compassion, holiness, and peace,‖ but they understand that in light of 
human sinfulness, guidance is required toward this ideal aim.
 94
 As such, they see great 
value in finding practical solutions, perhaps in the form of a modus vivendi, that 
ameliorate conditions gradually over time, as they continue to strive for ideal, biblical 
justice. 
Our approach in analyzing the U.S. economy is pragmatic and evolutionary in 
nature. We live in a ―mixed‖ economic system which is the product of a long 
history of reform and adjustment. It is in the spirit of this American pragmatic 
tradition of reform that we seek to continue the search for a more just economy.
95
 
   
The bishops seek to achieve increased participation through cooperative strategies. In the 
context of this dissertation, their goal is significant with respect to arguments about 
resource allocation for human genetic engineering. According to the norms spelled out in 
the pastoral letter, basic justice remains as an overriding concern. The principle of 
participation calls for a right relationship between research and development in genetic 
technology and the economic situation and basic needs of the larger community.
96
  
Before leaving this section, it is important to note that the virtues played some 
role in the bishops‘ letter. For example, basic justice is the primary societal virtue. It 
empowers individuals to participate actively in order to contribute to the common good. 
Like Paul VI, John Paul II, and Cahill, the NCCB argues that it is incumbent upon society 
                                                     
94
 EJA, 68. 
95
 EJA, 131. 
96
 Cahill makes a similar argument, ―Aging, Genetics, and Social Justice,‖ in 
Catherine Y. Read, Robert C. Green, and Michael A. Smyer ed. Aging, Biotechnology, 
and the Future (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 219-222. 
180 
 
to ensure that every individual possesses the material wherewithal that facilitates this 
participation. They depart somewhat from the Catholic social tradition by reducing the 
scope of solidarity, but this discrepancy is more pragmatic than epistemological. Instead, 
hope and courage are the guiding virtues that serve the advancement of basic justice. Due 
to the recent recovery of the virtue tradition in Catholic moral theology, a discussion of 
virtues warrants further analysis, which is forthcoming in the next major part of the 
chapter. The dissertation now analyzes Benedict XVI‘s accounts of justice, charity, and 
the common good, which is found in his 2009 encyclical Caritas in Veritate. 
 
Benedict XVI‘s Caritas in Veritate 
Located within the context of a recent global financial crisis, Benedict‘s first 
social encyclical outlines his vision of global economic development in light of the 
message of Paul VI‘s Populorum Progressio.97 Written in 2009, it represents the most 
recent papal encyclical in the tradition of Catholic Social Teaching. There are two facets 
of Benedict‘s encyclical that are pertinent to the aims of this dissertation. First, 
Benedict‘s accounts of charity and justice overcome the implied dichotomy between 
them described in earlier social encyclicals, especially Leo‘s Rerum Novarum. Second, he 
offers a few incisive comments on the proper use of technology, especially in the realm 
of bioethics. 
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The Relationship between Charity and Justice 
In the opening paragraphs of Caritas in Veritate, Benedict seems initially to take a 
regressive approach to the received social tradition. Whereas social justice has been at the 
heart of Catholic Social Teaching since the time of Pius XI, Benedict argues that caritas 
in veritate is the guiding principle of the tradition.
98
 As his argument develops, though, 
Benedict insists that justice and the common good are intrinsically linked to charity. In 
fact, justice is prior to charity.
 
Conversely, charity transcends justice in that it offers a 
strategy of giving and forgiving, going beyond the ―minimal duties‖ of justice.99  He adds 
that the common good is a requirement of both justice and charity. This duty is found 
especially within the local context. Securing the common good in the political order 
discloses love for one‘s neighbor.100 This charity is also found in an increasingly 
globalized society, as the human family works together to achieve the universal common 
good. 
Moreover, Benedict calls for a greater appreciation of the meaning of charity. He 
points out several problems raised by a misunderstanding or reduction of its meaning. 
I am aware of the ways in which charity has been and continues to be 
misconstrued and emptied of meaning, with the consequent risk of being 
misinterpreted, detached from ethical living and, in any event, undervalued. In the 
social, juridical, cultural, political and economic fields – the contexts, in other 
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words, that are most exposed to this danger – it is easily dismissed as irrelevant 
for interpreting and giving direction to moral responsibility.
101
 
 
Benedict attempts to resolve this problem by linking charity with truth. He sees two 
advantages to this strategy. He bases these benefits upon a two-fold conception of truth 
that is informed both by reason and by faith. One, reason allows charity in truth to 
advance beyond mere emotivism. Truth allows for a disinterested charity without 
reducing the latter to sentimentality, which he perceives as a danger that makes charity 
irrelevant and morally superfluous. He implies a natural law approach, though his 
evidence here is largely scriptural.
102
 Nevertheless, he does argue that the pressing social 
and economic questions are in the final analysis questions about human nature. Two, 
charity has both a personal and public dimension when it is informed by faith.
103
 Charity 
in truth demands a personal commitment to human development in light of each person‘s 
vocation toward fulfillment in the created order.
104
 Following Paul VI‘s argument in 
Populorum Progressio, a lack of material goods is not the primary cause of 
underdevelopment. It is first of all a lack of personal will that neglects one‘s duties of 
solidarity, and second of all an absence of thoughtful reflection that fails to properly 
guide the will.
105
 There is also a public dimension of charity in truth.
106
 Given the 
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tendency toward relativism in the social context, Benedict insists that truth, which he 
identifies as ―the values of Christianity,‖ is essential for building a good society.107  
Benedict‘s idealism here is at odds with the NCCB‘s pragmatism in Economic 
Justice for All.  Benedict‘s importunity also has consequences with respect to discourse in 
a diverse society. On the one hand, he argues that a Christianity of charity without truth 
would become reduced to a helpful set of sentiments, but ultimately irrelevant. For that 
reason, he decries coercive government family planning policies that promote 
contraception and impose abortion. ―Respect for life‖ cannot be detached from questions 
about human development.
 108
 Benedict also takes a ―common good‖ approach to finance. 
Investors are not a company‘s only stakeholders, but also include workers, suppliers, 
consumers, the natural environment, as well as society at large.
109
 On the other hand, he 
remains committed to seeking ―satisfactory solutions‖ to the socioeconomic problems 
that have persisted since Paul VI‘s encyclical.110 For instance, he calls for a reform of the 
United Nations, and seeks a global political authority with what Benedict calls ―real 
teeth‖ to ensure compliance with its decisions. 111 But it is that same world political 
authority (namely, the United Nations) that institutes the family planning policies that he 
denounced in his previous paragraphs.
112
 Furthermore, Benedict calls for redistributive 
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policies and public welfare in order to increase an ―openness to forms of economic 
activity marked by quotas of gratuitousness and communion.‖113 His proposed policies do 
not square with the socioeconomic ethos of the current American context. As the next 
election cycle for president and Congress draws near, there seems to be little political will 
to undertake such intervention. 
Nonetheless, Benedict makes a strong case for tying charity to a truth that is 
rooted in human reason and Christian faith. Benedict‘s account of the human person 
insists upon both personal development in one‘s own life and public engagement with the 
world. This strategy also warrants a uniquely Christian way of participating in public 
discourse about social, economic, and moral issues. Further still, justice remains at the 
fore in these debates. While Benedict‘s proposed answers seem to fall short for the 
current American situation, Caritas in Veritate makes a convincing argument for 
continuing to seek such practical solutions in the tradition of Catholic Social Teaching. 
 
Technology and Development 
Turning to the impact of technology on development, Benedict follows John Paul 
II in his claim that technology is the objective side of human action.
114
 More importantly, 
there is a danger in the context of globalization that ideologies could be replaced with 
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technology. Benedict argues that technology must not become a substitute for human 
freedom. 
The development of peoples goes awry if humanity thinks it can re-create itself 
through the ―wonders‖ of technology, just as economic development is exposed as 
a destructive shame if it relies on the ―wonders‖ of finance in order to sustain 
unnatural and consumerist growth. In the face of such Promethean presumption, 
we must fortify our love for a freedom that is not merely arbitrary but is rendered 
truly human by acknowledgment of the good that underlies it. To this end, man 
needs to look inside himself in order to recognize the fundamental norms of the 
natural moral law that God has written on our hearts.
115
 
 
Instead, technology must refer to the subjective dimension, i.e., to the moral agent at 
work. With subjectivity comes moral responsibility, especially with regard to 
technology.
116
  
Benedict also worries that technology might become a dominant good if it 
benefits only those who possess it. The current logic of business practice submits to the 
maximization of profit as its sole criterion for action.
 
While the drive for profit reaps a 
short-term benefit, overall human development is diminished.
117
 His claim is similar to 
John Paul II‘s in that technology must serve the common good.118 More importantly, men 
and women must be ―finely attuned‖ to the requirements of the common good. 119  The 
sharing and exchange of technology are now a vital component of diplomacy in the 
                                                     
115
 CV, 68. 
116
 CV, 70. 
117
 Cahill also makes this argument in several different essays. For instance, 
pharmaceutical research and development is finding cures for ―profitable‖ diseases. See 
Cahill, ―Biotech and Justice: Keeping up with the Real-World Order,‖ Hastings Center 
Report 33, no.4 (2003), 34. 
118
 cf. John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, 32. 
119
 CV, 71. 
186 
 
world. Thus, a common-good approach to technology lends itself to peace-building 
strategies. 
Next, Benedict moves explicitly to the realm of bioethics.
120
 He is pessimistic 
about the current technocratic ethos, and names the field of bioethics a ―battleground.‖ 
The combatants locked in this pitched skirmish, according to Benedict, are the supremacy 
of technology and human moral responsibility. He sees expressions of this technological 
supremacy especially in embryonic research and in vitro fertilization. He envisions the 
―systematic eugenic programming of births‖ just below the horizon.121 It is not enough 
that Christians avoid these technological advancements; they must offer convincing 
reasons to others about their objectifying tendencies.  
Toward this end, Benedict claims that a faith informed by reason will avoid 
deluded thoughts of human omnipotence on the one hand, and irrelevant fundamentalism 
on the other.
122
 Just as John Paul sought to develop a spirituality of work, so Benedict 
attempts to produce a spirituality of technology.
123
 One aspect of this spirituality is a 
renewed appreciation of mystery in nature, something over and above the empirical 
datum. 
The development of individuals and peoples is likewise located on a height, if we 
consider the spiritual dimension that must be present if such development is to be 
authentic. It requires new eyes and a new heart capable of rising above a 
materialistic vision of human events, capable of glimpsing in development the 
―beyond‖ that technology cannot give. By following this path, it is possible to 
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pursue the integral human development that takes its direction from the driving 
force of charity in truth.
124
 
 
Building on the common-good approach to technology and the subjective dimension of 
work, Benedict asserts that a spiritual appraisal of technological advancement lends itself 
to fruitful human development. From this perspective, technology is not neutral, but it 
does not necessarily have to be ominous, either. 
 Benedict‘s cautious appraisal of technology in Caritas in Veritate is a timely work 
on the vital priority of human freedom and responsibility as subjects. Cahill has also 
commented favorably on Benedict‘s encyclical, in light of what she perceives as a 
significant development in his attention to social concerns during his pontificate. 
 
Conclusion to the Analysis of the Catholic Hierarchy‘s Statements on Justice 
This lengthy opening part of Chapter Three has attempted to highlight a few of 
the perspectives on justice from the Catholic hierarchy. Vatican II‘s Pastoral Constitution 
on the Church captured the development about justice in the Catholic social tradition 
from its inception in Leo XIII‘s Rerum Novarum through the pre-conciliar social 
encyclicals. Rooted in the essential notions of human dignity and sociality, the justness of 
human action must be evaluated with regard to its impact on the poor. Moreover, the 
common good, which is the third affirmation of Catholic Social Teaching, is 
bidirectional. All individuals are called to serve the common good; this is a matter of 
contributory justice. In turn, society, which also must serve and is served by the common 
good, is enjoined to provide each person with the material goods necessary to facilitate 
his or her contribution; this is a matter of distributive justice. Vatican II describes the 
                                                     
124
  CV, 77.    
188 
 
ideal conditions, when all can most readily serve (and are best served by) the common 
good, as ―social justice.‖ 
 The social encyclicals of Paul VI and John Paul II build upon the council‘s 
teachings on justice and apply them in a variety of ways.  Paul VI argues that free trade 
and property rights are subordinated to the council‘s principles of social justice. He also 
applies Leo‘s relationship between labor and management to the analogous relationship 
between nations in terms of international trade. The guiding virtues of human solidarity, 
social justice, and universal charity dictate that wealthier nations should negotiate 
commerce agreements with poorer nations by principles in excess of commutative justice. 
John Paul argues that workers‘ rights are derived from human rights. He also provides a 
spiritual reflection on the meaning of work, perceiving it as a fundamental good in the 
created order. There may be a further development in the tradition, as John Paul begins to 
identify the common good as social justice. Here, the conditions are not simply an ideal; 
social justice ought to be the norm. The conditions can be said to be contextualized in 
what he calls the ―just good.‖ Furthermore, John Paul‘s claims about property are 
consistent with the post-conciliar social tradition insofar as they are relativized by the 
demands of social justice. But he also outlines a fuller account of property to include its 
intellectual dimensions. Skills and technology thereby fall under the jurisdiction of the 
common good, a theme that Benedict takes up in his encyclical. 
 The National Conference of Catholic Bishops offers a definition of ―basic 
justice,‖ which encompasses three interrelated spheres of commutative, distributive, and 
social justice. They argue similarly to the Pastoral Constitution that participation is a 
human right, and call for concrete action to help each person contribute toward the 
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common good. They express a desire for pragmatic solutions, found through cooperative 
strategies, toward facilitating that fundamental right. 
 Finally, Benedict XVI‘s encyclical opens with the theme of charity. He clearly 
demonstrates that justice is prior to charity, but also wants to present a fuller account of 
charity as a theological virtue. Charity must be informed by both reason and faith. 
Without reason, charity is reduced to sentiment. Without faith, charity becomes 
irrelevant. Moreover, he presents a spiritual reflection on technology that hearkens back 
to John Paul‘s subjective dimension of work. Technology should not master nature, but 
instead should open up the subject to ponder nature‘s mystery‘s further. Technology 
ought not to be used as a tool of oppression, but should serve the common good. 
 Taken together, these theological perspectives on justice from the hierarchy 
highlight a circuitous trajectory toward a terminus that can be called social justice or the 
common good. All aspects of justice discussed thus far seem to find their realization in 
one or the other. Sometimes its conditions are presented ideally, as in Vatican II, Paul VI, 
and Benedict XVI. Other times, they are described in situational or pragmatic terms, as in 
John Paul II and the NCCB, respectively. Looking ahead to Chapter Three, Cahill‘s 
conception of justice is similarly complex. Part of her context is rooted in the Catholic 
Social Tradition, which emphasizes social justice as an overarching principle. 
 The dissertation now turns to the idea of justice as a personal virtue. Virtue ethics 
has a longstanding prominence in Catholic moral theology, though for many years its 
influence was somewhat understated. The first section described virtue in philosophical 
terms, with its analysis of Alasdair MacIntyre. Recently, there has also been a palpable 
return of virtue in theological ethics, too, though its impact thus far is difficult to discern. 
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The next section outlines some of the features of the recovery of virtue ethics and 
considers a few representative writings from scholars within the contemporary virtue 
tradition. 
 
Recovery of Virtue Ethics in the Catholic Moral Tradition 
The first chapter briefly outlined the Natural Law tradition, where the virtues play 
a vital role. The previous chapter already explored Alasdair MacIntyre‘s account of the 
virtues and its connection to the living tradition of a community. Now, this part briefly 
considers writings from American moral theologians Jean Porter and James Keenan as 
representatives of a strand of Catholic moral theology that attempts to reunite virtue with 
Catholic Natural Law ethics. A treatment of virtue is required because justice is included 
as one of the four cardinal virtues, along with courage, self-control, and prudence. In the 
Catholic tradition, these volitional, affective, and intellectual attitudes have been 
understood as virtues upon which all the others hinge (Wisdom 8:6-7).
125
 They ground 
human action, orienting the person toward those ends which are considered ―worthy of 
praise‖ (Phil 4:8-9). For their part, Keenan and Porter demonstrate that there is neither a 
complete nor an uncritical recovery of the classical Thomistic tradition. Moreover, even 
in a critical reclamation and outright revision of the virtue tradition, justice remains 
indispensable.
126
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 This discussion of the contemporary virtue tradition proceeds in three parts. First, 
a cursory examination of ethical method since Vatican II reveals a reinvigoration of 
Natural Law ethics, with brisk exchanges among several contrasting approaches. As these 
debates waned, it seems that a conceptual space had cleared for greater attention to 
personalist ethical methods. Among these, a rediscovered virtue tradition is prominent. 
After this brief excursus, Jean Porter‘s work on Natural Law is analyzed in light of her 
reliance on MacIntyre‘s account of the virtues. She concludes that virtue ethics cannot be 
universal in scope, a point disputed by Cahill (see Chapter Four). Third, the work of 
influential American Jesuit moral theologian James Keenan is explored in the context of 
his attempts to root moral discourse more deeply in scripture while continuing to reflect 
the realities of the contemporary world. 
 
Excursus: Moral Theology in the Wake of the Second Vatican Council 
It is interesting to trace the renewal of Catholic moral theology since Vatican II, 
especially when viewed from a wider perspective which includes the Council‘s sixteen 
major promulgations. It seems strange that the oft-cited warrant for reinvigorating moral 
reflection in the church comes from a relatively minor document on priestly formation, 
where the Council calls for greater attention to the revision of ecclesial studies, especially 
philosophy and scripture, as they lend themselves carefully to the ―perfection of moral 
theology.‖ 127 This approbation is underwhelming in light of the Council‘s dramatic 
announcement of a both a universal ―priesthood of believers‖ and ―call to holiness.‖128 
Vatican II seems to retain a view that moral theology, albeit a ―perfected one,‖ was solely 
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for the confessional, as its renaissance is located in a document that deals with the 
ministerial priesthood alone. Thus, it is surprising that so much literature has been 
produced from this narrowly-focused decree. 
 Nevertheless, the sheer amount of scholarly and ecclesial work in moral theology 
requires at least a brief historical examination of them as they pertain to the dissertation, 
and warrants this departure from the discussion of justice in the Catholic moral tradition. 
As this section demonstrates, Catholic ethical method clearly developed in the wake of 
the Second Vatican Council, but for the most part, it also remained firmly anchored 
within natural law reasoning. Some of the contrasting and sometimes vehement 
exchanges seem initially to vindicate Alasdair MacIntyre‘s lament about the 
incommensurability of rival traditions which have both lost their tether to the predecessor 
culture. By the same token, it can also be a sign of development within that rich culture; 
it is making room for mature, individual, and responsible decision-making on pressing 
moral issues. Instead of seeing it as a dysfunctional dialogue that wrongly uses 
vocabulary from the forgotten past, perhaps it is a healthy disagreement within an 
evolving tradition about the purpose of moral action. In either case, it proceeds in a 
MacIntyrean way; Porter‘s and Keenan‘s work especially bear out this claim. 
 First, a brief look at the taxonomy of ethical methods is helpful to navigate the 
writings of Porter and Keenan in the next two parts. Porter describes the traditionalist 
post-conciliar efforts in moral theology as ―new‖ natural law theory.129 She uses this 
designation to refer particularly to American writers like Germain Grisez and John 
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Finnis. In turn, they call their own method the ―Basic Goods Theory.‖ 130 By contrast, 
Keenan sees them as contemporary examples of ―neo-manualists.‖131 In fact, the structure 
of Grisez‘s three-volume work, The Way of the Lord Jesus, resembles classical moral 
manuals in that it introduces basic principles, then exhorts Christian living, and finally 
considers hard cases. With an appreciation for its several aliases, the following 
paragraphs focus on Grisez‘s work. 
     The Basic Goods Theory (hereafter BGT) attempts to give content to Aquinas‘ 
first principle of practical reasoning: the good is to be sought, while the evil is to be 
avoided.
132
 While initially seeming to connect his theory with the classical tradition, 
Grisez‘s account of the basic goods describes them as a priori and self-evident. In other 
words, they do not, as Aquinas does, derive these goods from observed knowledge of the 
natural order, and do not depend on any particular comprehensive doctrine. Grisez lists 
seven basic goods: human life (to include health and procreation), knowledge/aesthetic 
appreciation, skilled performance, self-integration, authenticity/practical reasonableness, 
justice and friendship, and religion/holiness.
133
 Later, Grisez adds an eighth good: 
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marriage.
134
 Even though they are free from experience, they stand in no serial or lexical 
relation to one another.  
 After listing the basic goods, the BGT further explains that human actions must 
reflect a ―will toward integral human fulfillment.‖ Grisez names this the first principle of 
morality. 
135
 This principle is further explained by eight modes of responsibility, which 
demand that the agent should not be moved by ―a stronger desire for one instance of an 
intelligible good to act for it by choosing to destroy, damage, or impede some other 
instance‖ of them. Hence, the basic goods are also incommensurable. 136 
 The BGT is not the only natural law theory to develop since Vatican II. Other 
theologians have used the natural law as a starting point for specifying moral norms, 
though they have attacked the issues in a manner at odds with the BGT. As with the 
BGT, they are also called by various names: revisionism, proportionalism, and 
consequentialism, among others. For instance, moral theologian Todd Salzman uses 
―revisionism‖ to describe the natural-law methods that have developed in contrast to 
BGT.
137
 Bernard Hoose utilizes the term ―proportionalism‖ to describe methods that 
generally accept the basic goods as formal norms. However, he insists that in concrete 
action, a right relationship must be realized among them in order for an act to be 
considered morally good.
138
 Still others like Richard McCormick and Charles Curran 
employ the word ―consequentialism‖ to emphasize the goodness in the act, which is 
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found by looking to the reasonably foreseeable consequences as they affect the human 
person, adequately considered. However, consequentialism is a label often used 
pejoratively by McCormick‘s opponents. Grisez, for example, equates the term with 
utilitarianism, as ―efficiency in promoting measurably good results,‖ and calls it 
―dangerous nonsense.‖139 American Jesuit Paul Quay describes consequentialism in a 
manner consistent with MacIntyre‘s emotivist, consumerist culture: as a ―mercantilization 
of values,‖ which are to be ―balanced, exchanged, and traded off for one another.‖140 
McCormick‘s writings from the 1970s are especially attacked by his critics, though his 
work develops significantly until his death in 2000.
 141
  
 Through the early 1990s, the BGT-proportionalism debate seemed to be an 
exemplar of MacIntyre‘s claim to the interminability of rival arguments.142 In fact, they 
mirrored the debates among Enlightenment thinkers. On the one hand, the BGT insists on 
a set of universal, rational, a priori norms, which must always be upheld and never 
undermined directly. More importantly, there are some acts which are excluded from 
moral choice by the nature of the acts themselves. They are called intrinsically evil; no 
good intention can ever overcome the badness in such acts. But such acts are problematic. 
What happens when one is faced with a choice of undermining truth in order to protect 
innocent life? On the other hand, proportionalist arguments counter that the goodness of 
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an act cannot be determined without attending to all aspects of the act. It must hold a 
right relationship among the goods, both proximate and remote. Furthermore, these ends 
are most readily discovered by looking toward the consequences of the act. Still, while no 
proportionalist writer would ever justify murder, they have difficulty in claim that murder 
in se is wrong from within their context. If some imaginably (if improbably) better 
consequence could be proposed, could such a terrible act be found more tolerable than 
something else?
143
 Space does not permit a fuller treatment of these debates, but they 
remain very interesting for the recent history of moral theology and significant for the 
field today. 
 Suddenly, the debate seemed to have dissipated in the 1990s. In one recent study, 
American theologian Aline Kalbian proposes that these ―deontology vs. teleology‖ 
debates were certainly fierce and seemingly unrelenting, but in the end they were the 
undercard to the main conflict in Catholic moral theology. Instead, proportionalism was 
ultimately successful ―in influencing the development of Catholic ethics by encouraging 
a reappraisal of the methodology for evaluation moral action in a direction that was more 
hospitable to concerns about the particularity of the context of the agent.‖144 While their 
sometimes myopic focus upon consequences is perhaps unwarranted, they facilitated a 
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shift toward personalist thinking in three ways.
145
 First, the emphasis on agency is 
consistent with Vatican II‘s universal call to holiness. As such, the striving of the moral 
agent becomes the source and context for deliberation, a point driven home by 
proportionalism‘s representatives. At the same time, a rejection of intrinsically evil acts 
arouses fears of relativism; one example is urgently described by John Paul II.
146
 Kalbian 
argues here that proportionalists in fact agree that exceptionless norms can be stated as 
universals, but that they are not so solely by virtue of the object.
147
 Instead of looking to 
the intrinsic nature of moral acts, proportionalists acknowledge the complex environment 
of human intentions. Every act contains within itself values and disvalues. Aquinas‘ 
elegant account of the procession of human action backs Kalbian‘s claim. Curiously, 
Aquinas‘ reflections here are ignored by Grisez.148  
Third, proportionate reason was first described in Chapter One of the dissertation. 
Here, Kalbian refers the four-conditioned principle of double effect. Drawing on seminal 
essays from German theologian Peter Knauer
149
 and the work of Richard McCormick, 
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she claims that the associated goods of an act must be commensurate when allowing 
physical evils to occur.
150
 On McCormick‘s account of proportionate reason, 
consequences have a determining role, but they are not the only one. Moreover, 
proportionate reason is not identical with a utilitarian calculus. As Alasdair MacIntyre 
has complained, one cannot determine best outcomes without a prior and determinant 
notion of the good.
151
 In proportionate reason, McCormick already has a notion of the 
good, rooted in his firm commitment to the Christian tradition. Thus, the problem is not 
that there is a calculus; it is that the calculus must be ―truly adequate and fully Christian.‖ 
152
 
Finally, Kalbian applies proportionalism‘s contributions in the context of three 
contemporary, contrasting streams of Catholic ethics – virtue ethics, case studies, and 
feminist ethics. While in no way implying that these three developing methods are 
basically proportionalist, she demonstrates that proportionalism‘s vanguard attempts to 
problematize more traditional ethical methods have cleared a conceptual space that 
allows for a more holistic, personalist reflection upon human action. 
153
 A proportionalist 
approach does not capture the richness of virtue, but still requires the virtue of practical 
wisdom implied in proportionate reason. A contemporary ethic of virtue builds upon the 
context of the striving moral agent, thereby coinciding with a central component of 
proportionalism. The reinvigoration of casuistry, described in the work of Albert Jonsen 
and Stephen Toulmin in Chapter One, ascribes vital importance to context and 
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circumstances. Citing Jonsen and Toulmin, Kalbian connects proportionalism to casuistry 
by noting that in both instances, ―moral knowledge is essentially particular.‖154 Thus, 
contemporary casuistry offers no deductive principles to dictate proper action in all future 
cases, but instead affords an inductive method to aid reflective discernment in light of 
particular circumstances. While acknowledging the wide range of feminist thought, 
Kalbian focuses on one common strand: feminist critiques of natural law physicalism.
155
 
By rooting feminist method in human experience, rather than given norms derived from 
natural law, one can more readily evaluate moral action in a manner consistent with 
proportionalism. 
Before moving on to an analysis of the contemporary virtue tradition, a brief 
consideration of this part‘s relevance to Cahill‘s work is in order. As mentioned in 
Chapter One, Cahill‘s earliest scholarly work focused on McCormick‘s consequentialism. 
In several essays, she attempts to defend McCormick against his critics by distinguishing 
between his teleological method and crass utilitarianism. For instance, she anticipates 
MacIntyre‘s insistence on foundational notions of the good to make human action 
intelligible by pointing out that proportionalists (and especially McCormick) advance ―a 
telos whose substance is not circumscribed.‖ More importantly, proportionate reasoning 
must be evaluated as ―the consistency of an action or pattern of action with the life of 
virtue, understood by Christian authors as a life consistent with the will of God.‖156 A 
truly good action must bear fruit that resonates with this telos. Thus, McCormick‘s 
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emphasis upon consequences is intelligible because it is rooted in the Christian command 
to love God and neighbor (Matt 22:34-40). 
Many writers, including Kalbian, describe Cahill‘s writings under the banner of 
―feminist‖ theology. While this dissertation hesitates to label her work strictly as such, it 
is true that Cahill‘s understanding of natural law is consistent with Kalbian‘s feminist 
analysis.
157
 
A commitment to an objective moral order, knowable by reasonable reflection on 
human experience, especially of the goods which are constitutive of human 
flourishing, and the institutions necessary to secure, protect, and distribute them.
 
158
  
 
In other words, Cahill‘s method is rooted in human experience, and this contextual 
givenness is far from static. It stands in a mutually-informative relationship to both the 
past and present. More significantly, it generates a mutually-corrective thrust toward a 
more just future. Further still, Cahill seeks to transgress the marked boundaries of 
tradition, to form coalitions with likeminded representatives of other religious and secular 
traditions to achieve that end. 
 Now the dissertation analyzes two representatives of the new virtue tradition, both 
of whom engage in academic exchanges with Cahill in their respective works. First, Jean 
Porter‘s account of the virtue tradition is considered with respect both to her 
interpretation of the natural law (with a strong affinity to Kalbian‘s analysis) and to the 
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earlier exploration of MacIntyre‘s work. Then, a brief survey of James Keenan‘s work 
will help to locate Cahill‘s understanding of justice as a virtue in the next chapter. 
 
Jean Porter‘s Thomistic Accounts of Natural Law and Justice 
After a brief introduction to Porter‘s account of traditional understandings of the 
natural law, this part analyzes her critique of Grisez‘s conception of the natural law. She 
claims BGT is at odds with these traditional descriptions. Next, it explores Porter‘s 
recovery of the natural law tradition and her strong commitment to personal virtue within 
it. Her account of the natural law also departs from traditional understandings of it, 
though in a much different manner than Grisez. Lastly, this part turns to her treatment of 
justice, which stresses the personal aspect of this cardinal virtue over and above its social 
applications. 
 
Natural Law and a Critique of the Basic Goods Theory 
On the traditional view of natural law, which Porter claims is also endorsed by the 
Catholic magisterium, moral norms are ―grounded in the processes and inclinations of the 
human person, including sensual, rational, and spiritual inclinations.‖159 Furthermore, 
these norms are seen as intrinsically teleological and universally binding. They dictate 
that humans should act in a manner consistent with these normative purposeful functions, 
which are discerned through reasoned observation of human life.
160
 Traditional moral 
rules that prohibit murder, theft, lying, and the like are considered expressions of the 
natural law, and are therefore universal and exceptionless.  
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 Porter claims that the BGT is innovative, in that it departs from this traditional 
understanding of the natural law as rooted in the physical nature of human persons.
161
 
Grisez attempts to overcome criticisms of naturalistic fallacy by detaching moral 
significance from physicality in human action. For instance, he distinguishes between 
direct and indirect action, especially with regard to killing, without interpreting the action 
in terms of causality. 
As Grisez explains, an act involves an evil will in the moral sense if either of two 
conditions is met: If the bad effect is the very point of the act, or if the good 
sought can only be attained through some further action, either by the agent, or by 
someone else.
 162
  
 
Porter argues here that eschewing traditional language runs the risk of reducing the 
agent‘s intention to the act itself, so described. Killing a patient can be described simply 
as seeking the good of ―pain relief.‖163 Furthermore, human action is not often as 
indivisible as Grisez would like. Complexity in human action, as described by Aquinas, 
demonstrates that an evil will rises to the surface in deliberation and choice regarding the 
means to achieve some desired end.
164
 Grisez simply bypasses this stage of action by 
locating the unity in the act within the good to be sought. 
 In the end, Porter suggests that the whole reason Grisez and other ―new‖ natural 
law thinkers approach these moral questions in such a manner is that they seek to justify 
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the institutional agenda of the Catholic magisterium with regard to moral teachings.
165
 In 
fact, she argues that Grisez‘s influence is particularly pronounced in John Paul II‘s 
subsequent encyclical dealing with the natural law.
166
 Other American moral theologians, 
like Salzman and McCormick, have made similar claims.
167
 As Porter notes, the problem 
is not with upholding the norms of a community. Rather, as a comprehensive doctrine, it 
limits the scope of what can be reasonably demonstrated to those outside that tradition.
168
 
 
Particularity in Porter‟s Conception of Natural Law  
In other words, Porter is arguing that moral norms derived from natural law are 
not universal. In subsequent work, she develops and advances this claim by pointing to 
the inherently theological manner by which medieval natural law theologians employed 
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their methods. This entrenched theology is especially prominent in Aquinas.
 169
 In his 
Summa, he frequently turns to the sources of revelation and the Christian tradition which 
grew from them. Moreover, he does not compartmentalize them, but instead oscillates 
between his intelligent observations and the revelatory texts. He offers no ―hermeneutics 
of suspicion‖ with regard to scripture, but seems to envision them as justifying his claims 
about the natural law. This affinity among revealed scripture, reasoned observation, and 
the natural world is a hallmark of the Summa. 
 Porter sees natural law as germinating from and shaped by a religious tradition. 
Human reasoning about nature or anything else is also shaped by the particularities of 
human experience. The sources of revelation and tradition thereby inform one‘s personal 
experience to the degree that they constitute a major component of a community‘s self-
understanding. In light of contemporary pluralism, though, any moral claims necessarily 
arise from within a local context. Porter sees insuperable difficulties in achieving 
universal moral consensus. 
The claim that all moral traditions share a fundamental core, which amounts to a 
universally valid morality, appears to me to be defensible only if the core in 
question is described at such a high level of generality as to be virtually empty, 
and even then, it is difficult to arrive at a statement of principles that would be 
universally acceptable.
170
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The ubiquity and pervasiveness of pluralism seems to militate against any meaningful 
claim of universality. Any argument about a good to be achieved must begin from ―the 
particular convictions and practices of the communities out of which they emerge.‖171  
At first blush, this line of argument raises a large problem for anyone who speaks 
from a religious tradition. In fact, it seems to encourage theologians to relinquish their 
strongest symbols and practices in order to participate in public discourse. But Porter 
does not go this far. In fact, she argues that particularity is problematic only ―if we 
assume that rational inquiry must be purified of all historical and cultural 
contingencies.‖172 By contrast, she claims that natural law offers ―a way of thinking about 
the theological significance of human nature and the moralities stemming from 
nature.‖173 
In this vein of diversity within a community‘s moral tradition, Porter reveals her 
indebtedness to Alasdair MacIntyre with respect to virtue. She argues that virtues 
―operate in and through the pursuit of the goods proper to human life.‖174 Following 
Aquinas, she further claims that happiness is best understood as the ―ultimate perfection 
of a rational nature.‖175 And since for Aquinas, this perfect happiness is only realized 
within the beatific vision, Porter makes the case that the practice of the virtues lends 
themselves to this aim. Virtues also help individuals to strive toward attainment of the 
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ends of humanity‘s ―natural principles of operation.‖176 Still, virtues remain 
―paradigmatic‖ rather than universal in scope.177 
Porter‘s analysis of virtue is undergirded by a commitment to the wide communal 
context, which she claims is lost in new natural law theories like the BGT. Once again, 
her reliance upon MacIntyre becomes apparent. The content of the natural law draws 
upon the ―collective processes of experience, debate, and reflection,‖ all facilitated 
through prudent examination of the community‘s purpose.178 In turn, those norms 
constitute the paradigmatic point of departure from which individuals discern proper 
human action. 
It is one thing to say that we are naturally oriented toward certain desiderata, and 
this orientation provides a natural starting point for practical reflection and moral 
action. It is something else again to say that we have a rational grasp of certain 
basic goods, elemental enough to be regarded plausibly as self-evident to all and 
yet provided with enough content to provide an immediate basis for practical 
reflection.
179
 
 
In short, natural law provides at most a basis for moral reflection, rather than readymade 
answers for moral action, as the BGT claims it does. 
 Despite Porter‘s reliance upon MacIntyre, she departs from him with regard to 
modern rights language, though not radically so. Whereas MacIntyre cannot see rights as 
existing in the current state of grave disorder, Porter sees them as potentially functioning 
in a community of common material and emotional needs.
180
 Moreover, she argues that 
human rights can serve Christian purposes. But she accomplishes this task by tracing the 
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idea of rights to their roots in medieval natural law thinking.
181
 Of course, MacIntyre‘s 
argument that rights do not exist turns on his premise that an Aristotelian or Thomistic 
foundation has been lost, and these are the only traditions that could have supported a 
healthy notion of rights.
182
 In the end, her claim is not so much at odds with MacIntyre 
with regard to rights, as it is to the possibility that a recovery of the Thomistic tradition is 
not so far off as he presumes. 
 Yet a different problem emerges for Porter. She summarizes her argument by 
claiming that setting forth normative behavior is a fundamental necessity. At the same 
time, she claims that these norms are provisional at best. And even with a theological 
foundation, it cannot be known with certainty ―whether in a particular case they are 
informed by grace, reflective of the unconditional will of God.‖183 A particular Christian 
community is constituted by the prior understanding that it stands in relation to a triune 
God who has acted in human history. It would seem strange then that the community 
envisioned by Porter would lack the necessary tools to discern moral action with regard 
to divine guidance, given that these resources give rise to the paradigm in the first place. 
Nevertheless, her compelling case for a richer recovery of the Thomistic natural law 
tradition and her subtle contrast against MacIntyre‘s problems with rights language allow 
for a more precise analysis of Cahill‘s theological writings on justice in the next chapter. 
In fact, Cahill offers a critical response both to Porter‘s pessimism regarding a universal 
ethic and to her agnosticism with regard to particular cases. For the moment, the 
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dissertation analyzes Porter‘s conception of justice, and its implications for the next 
chapter. 
 
Porter‟s Thomistic Account of Justice 
Porter‘s fullest treatment of justice as a personal virtue is found in her 1990 book, 
The Recovery of Virtue, where she offers a lengthy analysis of Aquinas‘ exposition on 
justice from the Summa.
184
 Her Thomistic understanding of justice remains a large part of 
her subsequent work. Thus, this section draws largely from this earlier essay, while 
noting its lasting influence throughout her later work. After a short introduction to 
Thomistic justice in relation to other virtues, this part turns to Porter‘s claim that Aquinas 
is not a one-sided communalist.  This argument is supported by Aquinas‘ notions of harm 
to others, equality among persons, and justice in community, all of which she discusses at 
length in the essay considered here. Her work on justice is significant toward the aims of 
this dissertation because she emphasizes the importance of the individual good over that 
of the common good in Aquinas. This is a major point of contrast between Porter and 
Cahill, as introduced in Chapter One and to be further analyzed in the next chapter. 
  To begin, justice consists in giving to others what is due to them. It contrasts with 
the other cardinal virtues in two ways. First, it is a volitional virtue, unlike the intellectual 
virtue of prudence, and the affective virtues of temperance and fortitude. Because 
Aquinas sees the will as naturally inclined toward the good, it needs no further 
orientation toward the good of the moral agent. Correlatively, justice, coupled with 
charity, directs action toward the good of others. Justice thereby is ―exhibited in terms of 
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external actions which embody right relations among individuals, or between individuals 
and the community.‖185 Justice, then, is aimed primarily toward the right functioning of a 
well-ordered society.  
This conclusion would seem to have the common good as its goal. Indeed, 
Aquinas claims that the common good takes precedence over the good of individual at 
several places in the Summa.
186
 Porter argues that Aquinas‘ emphasis on the common 
good results from his anthropology. Human beings are inherently social; they can flourish 
only within a communal setting. Part of this flourishing comes through the necessary 
exercising of humanity‘s natural capacities. 187 The larger community is also necessary to 
help in providing material support, even more so than the family, which is the basic unit 
of the community. 
At the same time, Aquinas‘ anthropology insists upon the fundamental equality of 
persons. This egalitarian precept places limits upon a community‘s coercive capacity over 
the individual. For instance, the wrongness of theft is founded on the legitimation of 
private property, which itself is developed from a notion of human dominion over 
creation.
188
 As such, the community has a normative obligation to punish theft as a crime 
against the natural order. Nonetheless,  
When the institution of property threatens its own raison d‟être by preventing 
individuals or the whole community from having access to the necessary means of 
life, then the institution itself breaks down, or at least the claims that it guarantees 
under ordinary circumstances must give way to more exigent claims. It is on this 
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basis that Aquinas justifies the seizure of property by private individuals who are 
pressed to do so by urgent need.
189
 
 
While the community must provide for the protection of private property as a basic right, 
there is a limit to this right. Hence, communal needs redound to the individual. Moreover, 
the example of property demonstrates conflicting claims with regard to harm. An 
individual has seized the property of another individual out of an urgent desire for 
survival. The presence of this need reflects poorly upon the community that is charged 
with the just distribution of the materials required for meeting basic necessities. In 
Aquinas‘ estimation, the community must forego the punishment of individuals in these 
circumstances. The harm incurred by the property owner is also considered in relation to 
the needy individual‘s situation. 
 Porter‘s analysis of Aquinas‘ account of distributive justice demonstrates his 
complex interplay between the individual good and the communal good. Another 
example of this intricacy is found in her discussion of the Thomistic distinction between 
murder and justifiable homicide. On the one hand, capital punishment and wartime 
killing can be morally justified under stringent criteria.
190
 In both instances, the state 
accomplishes the killing through its authorized agents. On the other hand, vigilante 
killings or remorseful suicides both ought to be condemned as murder, since no private 
individual has authority over the life of another or even oneself.
191
 Once again, the 
difference is found in the essential equality of persons and a presumed immunity from 
harm. In the latter cases, it is not for individuals to decide who may be killed. In the 
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former cases, a further distinction can be made. In the case of capital punishment, the 
condemned has forfeited his or her protection from harm by some prior action for which 
he or she is found guilty. In the case of killing in war, there are also presumptions of just 
cause and means of last resort. In both cases, an unjust aggression against the order of the 
community must be answered with a definitive response. 
 Aquinas‘ account of killing in self-defense provides yet another instance of his 
preference for the individual good over the common good. Since the killing is being done 
by a private citizen, it seems to contradict the aforementioned cases of justifiable 
homicide. However, so long as the actor‘s sole intention is the preservation of her or his 
life, killing is vindicated because ―no one has a duty to take more care of another‘s life 
than his own.‖ 192 Like the example of acquiring another‘s property in times of urgent 
need, killing another in self-defense is morally justified by analyzing the agent‘s 
circumstances in light of communal notions of survival and flourishing. The just 
community agrees that all citizens are equal with respect to protection from harm. By the 
same token, the aggressor‘s grave action de facto forfeits his or her security. Thus, the 
immediate and extraordinary circumstances which threaten one‘s survival override the 
ordinary criterion that would identify this act as murder. 
 Finally, Porter analyzes Aquinas‘ brief treatment of distributive justice in the 
context of these three notions of harm, equality, and community. Aquinas specifies two 
kinds of justice: commutative and distributive. Commutative justice concerns exchanges 
between private individuals, and distributive justice concerns the sharing of common 
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material (and spiritual goods).
193
 Both are rooted in equality, but they reflect different 
forms of it.
194
 Commutative justice insists on equality with regard to contractual 
exchanges; distributive justice describes the due proportion an individual receives from 
the community. Porter describes his account of distributive justice as ―too abstract to 
provide for much substantive guidance‖ for at least two reasons.195 For one thing, 
Aquinas distinguishes among the various systems of government in which distribution 
takes place in a descriptive sense. He offers no opinion on which would provide the most 
just forms of distribution. Correlatively, there is no difference between merit and desert 
with regard to distribution. Desert seems to have a more direct application in matters of 
distributive justice, at least with regard to the ―necessities of life.‖196 Justice, therefore, is 
completed by the virtue of prudence in giving definitive content to the concrete principles 
of justice. 
 This last point raises another problem that was introduced in previous discussion 
of MacIntyre‘s work. Questions about distribution can be paraphrased: ―Whose justice? 
Whose prudence?‖ Aquinas‘ account of distributive justice seems to fit any distributive 
scheme, but this versatility offers little resolution to today‘s pressing issues. It does not 
follow that prudent deliberation will result in just principles of distribution, as 
demonstrated by the varieties of disagreement outlined in the first part of this chapter. 
Without a more complete rendering of the good, Thomistic notions of justice are no more 
or less problematic than any of the others offered thus far. 
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 Porter has anticipated this problem through a prior analysis of Aquinas‘ 
discussion of the human good.
197
 There, she describes his first principle of practical 
reason – ―good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided‖ – as a self-evident 
claim.
198
 Through a complex discourse, Porter builds a case that actions can be discerned 
with respect to the human good, though it is only an overture to a fuller account of the 
virtues. Following Aristotle, Aquinas claims that all action is aimed at some perceived 
good. In fact, the ultimate goal of action is grounded in the pursuit of the good life. While 
most human action does not attend directly to this remote end, immediate ends are 
sufficiently similar to render it intelligible.
199
 Thus, Aquinas‘ account of the good allows 
for pursuit of many ends that harmonize with the comprehensive good, but this ultimate 
happiness is found in the proper exercise of virtues.
200
 It is not enough that a moral action 
be good; the moral agent must also be so. 
 This examination of Porter‘s work concludes by summarizing her description of 
the permanent significance of Aquinas‘ theological reflection. He synthesizes the 
received tradition up to his time, and addresses the ongoing arguments that constituted 
that tradition. His work remains foundational for the current rival arguments within the 
Catholic moral tradition today.
201
 Moreover, his thought sheds light on ecumenical and 
political discourse in light of the development of his work by others inside and outside of 
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the Catholic context.
202
 Porter retains her claim that Aquinas‘ work is most suited for 
ongoing discourse within the tradition. In fact, Catholic thinkers would do well to 
consider the claims of modern science and American pragmatism in order to dialogue 
more fully with these rival traditions. 
 
James Keenan‘s Account of the Virtues 
The dissertation now moves to the writings of American Jesuit James Keenan, an 
influential moral theologian whose work in virtue coincides with some of the 
considerations suggested by Porter. Like Porter, Keenan claims that the virtues are 
largely paradigmatic in function, though he uses the term ―heuristic‖ to demonstrate the 
individual‘s role in learning or discovering virtue.203 Keenan‘s tradition-dependent 
account of the virtues over a principle-based approach is also consistent with MacIntyre‘s 
and Porter‘s work.204 While he engages the classical tradition, his work is also 
characteristically post-conciliar insofar as he uses scripture as the source and milieu of 
his virtue ethics rather than a reminder or confirmation of it.
205
 His work also contrasts 
with Porter in at least two ways. First, he emphasizes a common good approach to justice, 
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one that has a closer affinity to Cahill‘s work than Porter‘s, at least in the texts considered 
thus far. Sometimes, justice can compete with one or more of the other cardinal 
virtues.
206
 This conflict comes from Keenan‘s relational anthropology and encompasses a 
globalized perspective which is emphasized especially in his most recent work.
207
 
Second, for almost two decades he has expressed dissatisfaction with the classical list of 
cardinal virtues, due in part to his anthropological concerns. In proposing new virtues, 
justice still heads the list.
208
 
This section briefly examines Keenan‘s account of the virtues, and explores his 
proposed revision of the cardinal virtues. In continuity with the aims of the dissertation, 
this segment focuses upon his writings on justice. It is presented in two parts. The first 
includes a general discussion of Keenan‘s analysis of goodness and rightness in the 
Summa and his work on the virtues in recent scholarship. The second explores his 
Thomistic interpretation of justice, and its place in his new list of cardinal virtues. 
 
Intellect and Will in Keenan‟s Analysis of the Virtues 
Keenan points out that the goodness/rightness distinction is vital for post-conciliar 
moral methodology.
209
 Goodness means that the agent strives out of love to live and act 
rightly; rightness means that ―our ways of living and acting actually conform to rational 
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expectations set by the ethical community.‖210  In human action, goodness‘ goal is to 
become more rightly ordered, and rightness‘ aim is to behave in accord with reason.211 
With rich attention to the development of the Summa, Keenan notes that Aquinas‘ 
writings after 1270 implicitly contain this distinction, while it is absent in his prior 
work.
212
 He claims that in Aquinas‘ discussion of the relationship between the will and 
the intellect, the former moves toward goodness of a specification of the act proposed by 
the latter.
213
 Failure to act in accordance with reason or to submit to its dictates is a moral 
failure.
214
 Thus, an agent‘s good will redounds to right reason. 
Keenan argues that rightness is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for 
goodness. This difficulty stems from several examples, among them the case of the lying 
Egyptian midwives (Ex 1:15-21).
215
 Aquinas, uncomfortable with calling their lie 
meritorious, must deal with the fact that their actions were rewarded. He resolves the 
problem by distinguishing between two acts: one of truth telling and another of saving 
children. It was for the latter act and not the former that God rewarded the midwives. 
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Keenan further claims that the contemporary goodness/rightness distinction represents 
this later Thomistic bifurcation.
216
  
If Keenan‘s claim is true, then justice becomes the comprehending moral virtue, 
with prudence as its evaluative measure.
217
 The object of justice is life‘s needs. Without 
prudence, the virtues can only be habits or inclinations. Prudence formalizes justice and 
the other moral virtues by directing them toward their achievement in the mean of action. 
Prudence, then, is ―the form, rule, and measure‖ of justice.‖218 At the same time, the 
moral virtues cannot be perfected without the infused virtue of charity.
219
 With the 
exception of charity, the intention, end, and even virtuous striving by the agent are 
located within rightness, not goodness.
220
 Keenan explains that charity alone pertains to 
goodness because this virtue‘s final end is union with God. It remains imperfect during a 
pilgrim‘s life until it is achieved in Beatific Vision.221 
 Keenan describes the task of virtue as the ―acquisition and development of 
practices that perfect the agent into becoming a moral person while acting morally 
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well.‖222 Following MacIntyre, he also claims that specific cultures employ paradigmatic 
practices that disclose and inform their sense of virtue.
223
 Within this culturally- and 
historically-informed context, Keenan expresses dissatisfaction with the received list of 
cardinal virtues that lend themselves toward this worthy end. He argues from the premise 
that the virtues are not prescriptive in an absolute sense. 
Rather than being definitive expressions of character, the cardinal virtues perform 
a heuristic function to answer broadly the three questions of MacIntyre. These 
three questions are extraordinarily general; they do not fill in the claims of either 
culture or the individual. Thus we pursue the cardinal virtues because they 
express what minimally constitutes a virtuous person.
224
 
 
On the one hand, Keenan‘s proposed changes acknowledge the same difficulties as Porter 
does regarding universal consensus on moral norms.
225
 The virtues sketch the general and 
basic conditions of the virtuous person. On the other hand, Keenan argues that justice and 
prudence are in fact universal in scope, and can be articulated with a greater degree of 
specificity than Porter allows.
226
 Thus, the next section analyzes Keenan‘s proposed list 
of new cardinal virtues and the role of justice within it. 
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Justice and New Cardinal Virtues 
While the cardinal virtues rightly direct an agent‘s actions, they do not necessarily 
inform one‘s faith life. Because virtuous habits can be acquired by all persons regardless 
of their religious identity, they can be applied in a wide range of social contexts. 
In scholastic language they are the acquired virtues and not the infused ones 
which, like charity, God gives through grace. Certainly these cardinal virtues can 
be "informed" by a community's faith life.
 
But the virtues can be pursued by 
anyone who intends and exercises them rightly. Thus we can urge each other to 
acquire them whether we are sitting in the same pew or on the same park 
bench.
227
 
 
For this reason, the traditional list of virtues is called cardinal because they order human 
life in its many activities. In fact, in a different context, Keenan notes that virtue ethics 
serves as a connection between theologians and pastors and their worshipping 
communities by offering a practical response to the call of Christ.
228
  
Nonetheless, Keenan argues that the received list is inadequate to serve the 
contemporary needs of moral agents.
229
 His argument rests on three premises. First, he 
claims that it is ―deceptively simple and inadequate.‖ Aquinas‘ structure of the virtues 
does not admit of conflict. Since each virtue has its own sphere of operation, there are no 
shared grounds that require them to challenge one another. Even if there is an overlap, 
Aquinas insists on a hierarchical distinction. As the previous section described, prudence 
is the most important acquired virtue, and justice is the chief moral virtue.
230
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Next, Keenan describes an emerging relational anthropology that admits of the 
possibility of conflict among the cardinal virtues.
231
 Correlatively, he points to a trend 
that bears out this anthropological claim. Citing the diverse thought of theologians like 
Walter Burghardt, Margaret Farley, John Paul II, and Stanley Hauerwas, Keenan claims 
that human relationality has rendered the Thomistic understanding of human action 
problematic. 
Like others, I believe that to have a viable anthropology is to understand ourselves 
as agents and not as objects; moreover as agents we are always relational. Thus 
virtues do not perfect what we have or what we do; rather they perfect who we are 
in the mode of our being, which is as being in relationships.
232
 
 
Keenan‘s relational anthropology is especially founded upon love.233 Building upon this 
claim, he proposes a new list of cardinal virtues: justice, fidelity, self-care, and prudence.  
Rather than perfecting ―powers‖ in the Thomistic sense, these virtues are built on 
Keenan‘s understanding of relationality. He claims that persons are relational in three 
ways, and each moral virtue corresponds to a relational sphere of operation. One, humans 
are relational in a general manner, and so justice is the comprehensive virtue that dictates 
all interpersonal interaction. Two, they are also relational in a specific way. Fidelity helps 
to sustain particular relationships. With love as a formal principle, faithfulness helps to 
determine right action in the concrete operations that involve those familial and affective 
ties common to humanity.
234
 Three, humans are uniquely relational, in that they can relate 
to themselves. Self-care attends to this sphere of relationality. This intrapersonal 
relationship is complex, and animates all aspects of the person: affective, cognitive, 
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physical, and spiritual.
235
 Finally, prudence serves the same role as it did in the classical 
list. It integrates and connects the other virtues, fixing the mean of right action according 
to circumstances. 
Finally, as cardinal virtues, they order the web of human relationships. In the 
Christian context, they are founded upon the love that is idealized in Jesus Christ. 
In fact, I think we can say that it was precisely because Jesus knew the virtues of 
fidelity, justice, and self-care that the agony in the Garden was so painful. He was 
a man who loved God, humanity, his friends, and himself: his conflict, like all 
true conflicts, was to determine which relationship made the greater claim on 
him.
236
 
 
Thus, for the Christian, Keenan‘s new list of cardinal virtues helps to balance the 
competing claims not only to live authentically in imitation of Jesus‘ loving example, but 
also to strive virtuously toward one‘s human self-actualization. 
 In conclusion, this limited exploration of virtue ethics closes with a few points 
that are germane to the forthcoming analysis of Cahill‘s writings on justice. First, it 
should be noted that she does not often use the vocabulary of virtue. Instead, she tends to 
privilege the conciliar discourse of rights described in the previous section. Unlike Porter, 
moreover, Cahill believes that substantive universal consensus can be achieved regarding 
human goods through passionate dialogue and collaborative action aimed at justice. Her 
faith commitment gives rise to this participatory strategy, and shapes the contours of her 
contribution to such involvement. At the same time, Cahill‘s work, which emphasizes the 
intricate nature of human persons and the complex dynamics of their relationships, has a 
harmonic resonance with the writings from Keenan considered in this section. Keenan‘s 
classification of justice as the virtue that operates in humanity‘s general relationships fits 
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well with Cahill‘s firm adherence to equal personal dignity. She also attempts to recover 
a sense of universality in human nature and objectivity in moral reasoning, while 
critiquing both abstract reason in Enlightenment philosophy and ahistorical universalism 
in natural law.
237
 
 Now, the final section of this chapter examines justice in theological bioethics. In 
this highly specific context, elements from these analyses of philosophical and 
theological ideas of justice can be discovered. Notions of natural law, liberal principles, 
human rights, communal concerns, and virtue ethics can be discerned throughout this 
discussion. 
 
Justice in Recent Catholic Bioethics 
Since the goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate how Cahill‘s commitment to 
justice undergirds her call for participatory strategies toward justice, it is necessary to 
locate her concept of justice within the specialized field of Catholic bioethics. To 
accomplish this task, this final section of the chapter briefly surveys writings about 
justice from American scholars Thomas Shannon and Margaret Farley as they relate to 
theological bioethics. Their contributions are important to the goals of this dissertation 
not only due to the depth and breadth of their individual scholarship, but also because of 
their occasional collaboration with Cahill in bioethical writings.
238
 Shannon‘s approach to 
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bioethics tends to integrate the ―principlism‖ of Thomas Beauchamp and James Childress 
that was highly influential during the 1980s and 90s with Catholic proportionalist 
arguments, especially those of Richard McCormick.
239
 Farley‘s methodology employs a 
clear feminist perspective that emphasizes personal freedom in pursuit of the common 
good. While Shannon‘s and Farley‘s methods contrast considerably with one another, 
there are elements in their respective works that resonate at various points with Cahill‘s 
bioethical essays. 
 
Thomas Shannon: Justice and the Idea of Human Nature 
This section briefly analyzes select writings in Shannon‘s essays that bear upon 
the notion of justice in Catholic bioethics. This portion of the dissertation is outlined in 
three parts. First, an early sketch of his account of justice is similar to the principle of 
justice described by Beauchamp and Childress. At the same time, Shannon exhibits a 
preference toward proportionalist moral reasoning in his project. Second, an important 
component of this discussion of justice is Shannon‘s differentiation between human 
persons, who are the subject of rights (and, by extension, of justice), and human nature, 
which is the subject of value. His distinction is problematic for an examination of 
germline interventions, because his ethical reflections do not allow adequate room to 
consider their impact on future persons. Third, Shannon‘s later ethical analyses of the 
medical applications of the Human Genome Project and its potential implications for 
                                                                                                                                                              
and Farley also critically engage Cahill‘s later essays at times, and these examples will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
239
 While they write for a large audience that includes secular philosophers, it is 
significant that Beauchamp and Childress both hold advanced degrees in theology. Their 
project thereby expresses an affinity for religious considerations of bioethics at many 
points. 
224 
 
human nature demonstrate a development in his own understanding of justice. In this last 
part, two similarities to Cahill‘s work can be also be discerned. Like Cahill, Shannon‘s 
bioethical work is influenced by a turn to Catholic Social Teaching. The other is his 
retrieval of casuistry as a part of his lasting commitment to proportionate reasoning. 
 
Justice in Shannon‟s Scholarship 
In the Introduction to his bioethics reader, Shannon relies heavily on 
Beauchamp‘s and Childress‘ categories of bioethical principles to outline the necessary 
ethical framework for analyzing the articles in this volume. Eighty percent of the citations 
come from their essays.
240
 Shannon also utilizes McCormick‘s account of proportionate 
reasoning as a crucial determinant for the obligation to nonmaleficence in bioethics.
241
 
References to McCormick‘s works comprise the other twenty percent of the citations 
from his introductory chapter. Taken together, these three scholars form the foundations 
not only for an informed reading of Shannon‘s anthology, but also for the major claims of 
his later arguments regarding human persons and human nature. 
Regarding justice, Shannon employs an overarching theme of distribution and 
allocation, both of which are vital considerations in medical ethics. He describes two 
modes of thinking about justice.
242
 The first is comparative justice, by which the goods 
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received by one person or group are determined by consideration of completing claims 
from others. Comparative justice implies competitive strategies for the same, scarce 
resource (as access to health care is often depicted). Applications of comparative justice 
are manifold, and generally embody material principles of justice. That is, distribution is 
usually determined on the basis of medical need, social worth, individual desert or some 
combination of the three.
243
 The other is non-comparative justice, which is rooted in a 
formal principle of justice. In this scheme, goods are distributed through some 
determined procedure. While non-comparative justice offers a clear rule, and upholds a 
clear respect for the equality of persons, it generally does not specify a moral component 
to its procedures.   
 Shannon points to a hybrid strategy between comparative and non-comparative 
types that entails allocation strategies that emphasize equality of opportunity. This 
approach satisfies the formal principle of justice by employing a randomized lottery or 
triage system into which all can enter during a time of medical need. At the same time, 
equitable material distribution can be achieved according to the momentary severity of 
each patient‘s need. Shannon argues that its strengths lie in the emphasis on respect for 
persons and building of trust in the health care system. Additionally, the distributive 
system avoids thorny questions of social worth. Unfortunately, this last point could 
threaten to undermine this system as it ignores three important factors.
244
 If there is no 
required screening to be admitted into the randomization process, it removes questions of 
personal responsibility from the situation. Thus, lifestyle choices that increase risk factors 
(like diabetes, cancers, and sexually-transmitted diseases) are essentially irrelevant. This 
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compromise position also overlooks the condition of the patient in the overall context of 
health. ―That is, if a fifteen year old is more likely to benefit from a procedure than an 
eighty year old, should the eighty year old have an equal opportunity for treatment?‖245 
Correlatively, this mode of distribution presumes boundless resources, since the ―only 
relevant criterion‖ is apropos of nothing, excepting equality of opportunity. 
 
Human Natures, Human Persons, and Human Rights 
 Moving from the classical discussion of distributive justice to a modern discourse 
of rights language, Shannon outlines five major understandings of rights.
246
 Essentially, 
rights fall into one of two categories: positive or negative. Positive rights express one‘s 
claim to action upon another person, and negative rights describe an obligation to 
noninterference by others. It is here that the question of the subject of rights becomes 
especially relevant for this dissertation. Shannon argues that persons alone can be the 
bearer of rights (as opposed to non-human animals or non-sentient life forms). In itself, 
this claim is uncontroversial. For the purposes of this dissertation, other considerations 
outside of human rights are unnecessary. However, Shannon‘s conception of personhood, 
introduced in this text and further analyzed in the next few paragraphs, raises a number of 
problems with regard to genetic manipulation. He sets a very high standard by describing 
a person as a moral agent ―with an enduring concept of self and capable of autonomous 
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actions.‖247 While he tempers this view of personhood in later essays in light of its 
implications for abortion and embryonic research, it remains a troubling issue for the 
concept of justice in the context of genetic interventions. 
 Throughout a series of articles spanning the 1990s, Shannon – sometimes as an 
individual scholar and others as co-author – makes a consistent argument that the 
protection afforded to human life is relative to its developmental stages.
248
 One catalyst 
for these writings is the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith‘s (CDF) 1987 
Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation. 
The document describes life as a ―gift‖ given from God, for which each human person is 
responsible for its promotion.
249
 Moreover, it calls human life an inviolable right ―from 
the moment of conception until death.‖250 Still another major claim from the Instruction 
is the ―immediate animation‖ of the human person. 
From the moment of conception, the life of every human being is to be respected 
in an absolute way because man is the only creature on earth that God has 
―wished for himself‖ and the spiritual soul of each man is ―immediately created‖ 
by God; his whole being bears the image of the Creator. Human life is sacred 
because from its beginning it involves ―the creative action of God‖ and it remains 
forever in a special relationship with the Creator, who is its sole end.
251
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Through a careful study of developmental biology, Shannon raises problems with both 
the idea of a ―moment of conception‖ and the theory of ―immediate animation.‖252 He 
claims that a zygote (i.e., the fused gametes that concludes the process of conception) 
does not possess sufficient genetic information to develop into an embryo, which is the 
―precursor of an individual member of the human species.‖ Furthermore, an embryo lacks 
individuality because it has the potential for fission and recombination following 
twinning. These distinct biological features have no explicit moral implications for at 
least three weeks after fertilization, when embryonic totipotency and twinning are no 
longer possible.
253
 Even after individuation, there is a further problem of the ―rational 
soul.‖ On a contemporary interpretation of the Aristotelian formula that form is ―educed 
from the potency of matter,‖ Shannon insists that the structures necessary (i.e., a ―fully 
integrated‖ human nervous system) for such actuality do not develop until at least eight 
weeks after fertilization.
254
 
 While Shannon‘s primary purpose of the article in the current analysis is to 
achieve an irenic resolution to contentious debates about abortion, there are further 
implications for manipulation of the human genome. Shannon builds upon these 
conclusions in two later works about the morality of genetic research and its 
consequences for understanding human nature.
255
 In theological terms, the ethical use of 
                                                     
252
 Shannon and Wolter, ―Reflections on the Moral Status of the Pre-Embryo,‖ in 
Shannon ed., Bioethics, 37-40. 
253
 Ibid., 44. In a later article, Shannon revises this time downward to two weeks. 
See Shannon, ―Delayed Hominization: A Response to Mark Johnson,‖ 734. 
254
 Ibid., 51-52, 54. 
255
 Shannon, ―Human Nature in a Post-Human Genome Project World,‖ in Harold 
W. Baille and Timothy K. Casey ed., Is Human Nature Obsolete? Genetics, 
Bioengineering, and the Future of the Human Condition (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
229 
 
science and technology are rooted in human nature, understood as part of the created 
order.
256
 As such, the core principle of ethical genetic research lies in its prior respect for 
human dignity.
257
 Thus, there is a ―positive value‖ in this kind of scientific exploration 
but not an ―absolute right‖ to it. The good of knowledge from genomic inquiry thereby 
must be placed in due proportion with regard to the good of protecting persons from 
undue risk of harm.
258
 
Here again, Shannon‘s understanding of personhood is a decisive component of 
his qualified approbation for embryonic research and subsequent manipulation of the 
human germ line. He distinguishes between ―dignity‖ and ―value.‖ Persons have dignity; 
natures have value.
259
 Human nature deserves value, but it is not identical with a human 
person, which deserves protection. He turns to proportionate reasoning as the justification 
for embryonic research. 
The destruction of embryos is indeed always a significant disvalue because they 
are killed. Nonetheless because they are prepersonal, such killing is not murder. 
However, such a premoral disvalue needs to be offset by equally significant 
premoral and moral values.
260
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Shannon argues that current embryonic stem cell techniques have not sufficiently 
advanced to be applied with safety and efficacy. This caution notwithstanding, he claims 
that protocols can be developed by investigators and funded by the government.
261
 
 He closes with an appeal to Catholic Social Teaching by attempting to locate the 
debate about genetic research within the larger needs of the U.S. healthcare system. 
Given the expense of such research and the limited resources to be allocated, there must 
be further discussion regarding the social justice aspects of funding embryonic research. 
While Shannon claims that this argument is separate from that of the moral status of the 
human embryo, it also seems to qualify further his use of proportionate reasoning to 
resolve the matter. These social justice considerations give him pause to weigh the short- 
and long-term consequences of genetic inquiry. 
 
Embryonic Research and Human Transcendence 
 The analysis thus far might raise the question: does Shannon‘s account of ―human 
nature‖ have any impact upon his notion of justice? He seems that hold that nature ought 
to be justly valued to some degree, but that it has no decisive role in questions about the 
moral status of the pre-embryo. In another writing though, Shannon comments on the 
influence of the Human Genome Project for understanding human nature. Reacting to 
claims from scientific materialists (represented in this essay by evolutionary biologist 
Richard Dawkins and sociobiologist E.O. Wilson), Shannon cautions them against 
limiting the range of discourse about human nature to mere biological reduction. In other 
essays, he focuses on the individual act of embryonic research. But here, he concentrates 
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on the larger implications of freedom for moral analysis as a continuous, ongoing 
endeavor.
262
  
Utilizing insights from medieval Christian theology and contemporary 
transcendental methods, Shannon argues that the natural world disclose a possibility of 
transcendence beyond any claim of scientific materialism. He builds this case upon three 
foundational analyses. The first is that materialistic investigations of nature do not 
adequately explain the whole. For example, Wilson describes genes as ―holding culture 
on a leash.‖ As such, cooperative strategies must be essentially selfish, and any altruism 
that is unilaterally directed toward others is the ―enemy of civilization.‖263 
Sociobiological accounts of freedom and altruism describe behaviors, which are 
indicative of, but not reducible to, natures.
264
  
The second is a Ressourcement of John Duns Scotus‘ concept of nature. Shannon 
claims that Duns Scotus‘ concept of nature is determinative and has explanatory value for 
behavior. But in the will in which those behaviors are realized, two further distinctions 
can be made to reflect a human nature behind one‘s choice, which is not predetermined 
by biology. One is affectio commodi, by which the agent seeks the good for himself or 
herself. The other is affectio justitiae, by which the agent seeks the good for its own 
sake.
265
 Both aspects have a bearing on justice. The affectio commodi lends itself toward 
the perfection of an individual. According to Duns Scotus, while affectio commodi 
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essentially seeks one‘s self-interest, it is nevertheless part of a divinely-created order.266 
The affectio justitiae, or affection for justice, goes beyond an understanding of freedom 
as simple choice for one‘s own benefit. In other words, affectio justitiae allows the agent 
to value another being irrespective of personal or social utility.
267
 In this sense, affectio 
justitiae transcends the ―natural state‖ that is indicated by affectio commodi. 
The third foundation of Shannon‘s argument concerns the limitation of genetic 
knowledge that has been outlined in the previous essay, and the tendency to overestimate 
the moral clarity that comes from that information. Using the transcendental theology of 
Karl Rahner, Shannon insists that all matter is part of a dynamic system, and that human 
persons are beings ―in whom the basic tendency of matter to find itself in the spirit by 
self-transcendence arrives at the point where it definitively breaks through.‖268 This 
perfection is an addition, rather than a transformation, and is mediated through the 
―historical patterns of God‘s self-communication.‖ By contrast, naturalistic accounts of 
human nature fall short because of their refusal to admit any transcendence in reality.  
In synthesizing these three parts of Shannon‘s argument, two points can be made. 
One, Duns Scotus‘ affectio justitiae ―checks‖ human nature, but not as an opposing force. 
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Instead, it gives direction to human action beyond self-seeking behaviors. Medieval 
understanding of freedom does not reduce choice to a particular event and contrasts with 
normative ―American expressions of freedom.‖269 By the same token, this orientation 
should not be confused with Aristotelian accounts of ethics. The free moral agent is not 
concerned only with self-perfection, but can act toward others in ways that include 
charity, forgiveness, reconciliation, and mercy. In short, human freedom is the stuff of 
―grace and glory‖ in which self-actualization can take place.270 
Before leaving this discussion of Shannon‘s work as it relates to justice, it is 
useful to point out two similarities and one contrast to Cahill‘s methodology. Like Cahill, 
Shannon‘s later work is heavily influenced by Catholic Social Teaching.271 While he does 
not share the tradition‘s concern for nascent human life, Shannon nevertheless envisions 
medical care as part of an overall structure of a health system that privileges human 
dignity and social interdependence over and above its technological aspects. His 
appropriation of Duns Scotus‘ categories of affectio commodi and affectio justitiae 
supplies a foundation for human dignity beyond social worth. Shannon also utilizes 
casuistry as an illuminative strategy in resolving hard moral cases. As discussed in 
Chapter One, casuistry is not an endeavor for its own sake, but is set within the context of 
the moral striving of the agents involved and their moral community. Cahill sees 
casuistry as an inductive and dialogical method for achieving the common good.
272
 
Shannon argues similarly that casuistry does not solve a problem, but helps a moral agent 
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to recognize the importance ―of the development of moral character and a theology of 
love.‖ The traditional sources of moral wisdom shed light on the situation in a relevant 
way.
273
 By prudently appreciating a situation, one can use casuistry to resolve a hard case 
in a virtuous manner.
274
 
Even though Shannon and Cahill employ similar methods in their respective 
bioethical inquiries, they come to opposing conclusions regarding genetic research and 
intervention. Shannon‘s concern for social justice does not dissuade him from arguing 
that further research and implementation of genetic protocols should be more widely 
pursued and publicly funded. However, his argument seems to overlook the consumerist 
culture which is prevalent in North Atlantic countries. By contrast, Cahill fears that the 
distribution of new germline technologies will be accomplished through market forces.
275
 
While Shannon is optimistic that human self-transcendence can be aided by genetic 
interventions, Cahill worries that genetic ―shortcuts‖ can undermine the social practices 
that elucidate such prized human traits.
276
 The dissertation will address Cahill‘s view of 
genetic technology more pointedly in the Epilogue. 
 
Margaret Farley: Justice and Compassionate Respect 
Chapter One introduced the idea of local and global concerns within the context 
of public discourse, and the potential value that a natural law approach might bring to that 
endeavor. Natural law, which is rooted in the complexities and commonalities of human 
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experience, can advance a moral argument that transcends the particular values of each 
community whose voices are represented in the larger debate. Cahill‘s critical analysis of 
the natural law tradition has noted that both ―public sphere‖ and ―human experience‖ 
have been rooted historically in male paradigms. Likewise, Enlightenment thought was 
dominated by men‘s experiences and those experiences were often amplified into 
universal norms. By contrast, feminist ethics attempts to deal with the polarity of 
particular versus universal concerns by including women‘s perspectives into 
considerations of human experience.
277
 
 This final chapter portion briefly sketches the contributions of controversial 
American feminist scholar Margaret Farley toward this greater cognizance of women‘s 
experience as it relates to justice in Catholic bioethics.
278
 Her attempts to wrest moral 
norms from abstract and essentialist universals are a constant theme in essays that span 
four decades of her academic career. At the same time, she avoids falling prey to what 
Cahill calls a ―nagging relativism‖ in feminist thought that insists there are no universals 
by rooting her ethical writings in an obligation of respect for concrete persons within a 
real context, no matter how diverse or particular it may be.
279
 This section analyzes three 
interdependent elements in Farley‘s conception of justice. The first is personal freedom, 
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which is found in the context of the second, the common good. The third, a common 
morality, is the foundation for both.
280
 Together, they resist tendencies to bifurcate justice 
into ―personal‖ and ―social‖ forms. They also spur further reflection upon the kind of 
public discourse analyzed in Chapter One. 
 
Personal Freedom and Embodiment 
The Catholic tradition has insisted that human freedom and autonomy define 
moral agency. Moral analysis, which includes the object, intention and circumstances, 
presumes that an act must be free. The same tradition also claims that humans are also 
social beings. Because both are a significant part of Catholic social thought, Farley 
contends that there must be an interdependence of individual relations and social 
institutions that are part of the meaning of justice.
281
 But this relationship is rendered 
prima facie problematic because of the wide historical exclusion of women from public 
life. Utterances about human universals, even as they apply to individuals, are difficult to 
maintain because of ―the historical, the particular, the situated, the contingent‖ upon 
which all experience is bound.
282
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Farley employs the free human agent as her point of departure. Autonomy and 
relationality are the obligating features that ground her universal requirement to respect 
persons in all ways they relate to one another as ends in themselves. This practical 
method is built upon her inquiry of whether it is even possible, given the perspectival 
nature of knowledge, to identify common elements in any human experience (male or 
female) that does not suppress ―voices different from one‘s own and without mistaking 
the contingent for the essential.‖283 It is practical because human relationality demands 
the task, no matter how wary, to sketch the contours of human nature at least be 
undertaken.
284
  
The obligating features of Farley‘s argument deserve further analysis. First, 
Farley sees autonomy as the capacity for free choice, and it is constitutive of respect. 
Why? Because freedom of choice as we experience it is a capacity for self-
determination as embodied, inspirited beings, which means a capacity to choose 
not only our own actions but our ends and our loves. It is a capacity therefore to 
determine the meaning of our lives and, within limits, our destiny.
285
 
 
To respect autonomy means not only to acknowledge one‘s ability to set her or his own 
agenda, but also to refrain from violating another‘s autonomy by unfairly absorbing him 
or her into that agenda. Second, the idea of respect itself already implies relationality at 
work. Farley understands that this human capacity for relationship is not simply 
instrumental in scope, insofar as persons must depend on one another for their survival.
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286
 Rather, it is obligating because it is an ability to open oneself to others while 
simultaneously reaching out to them. Freedom, then, has as its end the sake of 
relationship.
287
 
 Farley‘s obligating features of respect for persons are mediated by her concept of 
embodiment. Respect for persons as a universal moral principle has been advanced 
especially by Kant as a grounding premise for his Categorical Imperative. While it is a 
laudable rule to treat others as ends in themselves in all situations, the universality offers 
only one way to respect others as ends in concrete situations. Or, as Farley puts it, the 
problems of Kantian autonomy stem from the understanding of a ―disembodied self.‖288 
Contrasting with Kantian respect for persons, Farley‘s understanding of embodied 
autonomy allow for a universal principle to be applied differentially and contextually.
289
 
Cognizance of the particularity and diversity of others provides ―the content of the 
obligation to respect persons,‖ which in turn provides the norms for ―true caring.‖290 
Embodied agency gives rise to universal claims to rights, and recognizes that they can be 
fulfilled in manifold ways. 
 Farley‘s notion of embodiment transcends the Enlightenment dualism that she 
often criticizes in her work. The body transcends mere instrumentality for the sake of free 
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choice. Her account of autonomous embodiment as a vehicle of self-transcendence also 
contrasts with Thomas Shannon‘s discussion of the topic in the previous section. 
Shannon, following Karl Rahner, sees the capacity for transcendence arising from within 
the matter of the universe. Moreover, the process of perfection is additive rather than 
transformative in Shannon‘s view; a new creation is not born. But Farley claims that 
The capacity for free choice is the capacity to introduce something new into what 
one is – as when we ratify love in a new way, nurture an attitude that is only 
partially formed, develop talents in this way or that, attempt to gain possessions or 
to let them go, respond to a call that still beckons, or chooses against all calls and 
all loves and hence end up alone.
291
 
  
The implication here is that a free choice generates a new context, and hence a fresh 
opportunity for the embodied agent to determine oneself. Part of this new context entails 
the relationships that one has formed with others.  
Farley‘s concept of an embodied, contextualized person deserving of respect is 
the foundation of her formal ethical principle of justice: ―persons and groups of persons 
ought to be affirmed according to their concrete reality, actual and potential.‖292 Once 
again, capacity for freedom engenders a call to relationality. It is necessary, then, to 
analyze the other two elements of Farley‘s work. The next portion describes her 
description of the common good, and its role in providing better understanding of her 
notion of justice. 
 
The Common Good and Its Relation to Justice 
Since her earliest writings, Farley has resisted attempts to dichotomize the 
personal and social aspects of justice. She employs a concept of the common good, 
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gleaned from Catholic Social Teaching, to demonstrate the complementarity between 
justice as fairness and justice as rightly-ordered social relations. 
From the standpoint of the Roman Catholic ethical tradition, it is a mistake to pit 
individual good against the good of the community, or the social good, when what 
is at stake is the fundamental dignity of the individual. If it is the case, then, that 
the reality of woman is such that a just love of her demands that she be accorded 
fundamental personal rights, including equality of opportunity in the public world, 
then to deny her those rights is inevitably to harm the common good.
293
 
 
Farley‘s notion of the common good provides meaning for justice in social relations that 
does not neglect the individual good. One is not reducible to the other; both remain 
independent from one another. At the same time, they are not isolated from each other, 
either. 
 In the realm of bioethics, Farley‘s continues to apply this complementary concept 
of the common good to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, especially in Africa. In this real 
context, justice can be applied in at least three ways. Regarding the moral norms from 
Catholic teaching on sex and gender, Farley insists that a woman lacks personal justice 
due to the ―uncritical imposition of traditional rules.‖294 If anything, it has added to the 
shame and stigmatization associated with AIDS. Moreover, it may even contribute to its 
spread by refusing to allow infected partners to use condoms or other ―safer sex‖ 
practices.
295
 A distinct but related issue to the first is the institutionalized victimization of 
African women. 
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Stories abound, for example, of the exile or even stoning of women infected by 
their husbands, and of unmarried women raped and infected by men who think 
that sex with virgins will prevent or cure their own infection by the AIDS virus.
296
 
 
Just and compassionate social policies, rooted in the Preferential Option for the Poor, 
should seek to protect and empower women. This goal can be accomplished by reflecting 
upon sexual norms within the larger milieu of societal function and dysfunction.
297
 
Thirdly, justice is applied to both individuals and the community through a concerted 
effort to allocate the necessary life-saving medicines to combat HIV. Farley has argued at 
length that current ethical methodologies like ―principlism‖ and ―ethics of care‖ stumble 
in their efforts to resolve the issue justly for opposite reasons. The former cannot 
reasonably relate to patients as unique persons, and the latter cannot formulate adequate 
criteria for ―true caring.‖298 Reiterating the demand to respect persons, Farley calls for a 
collaborative, cross-cultural approach toward allocation beyond market capitalism. 
 In fact, Farley has attempted to put the Preferential Option for the Poor into 
practice by leading one such cooperative effort: All-Africa Conference, Sister to Sister 
(AACSS).
299
 The product of a long collaboration with academic, government, and 
religious organizations, AACSS provides collegial and financial partnerships to gather 
women for training in the religious dimensions of the struggle against HIV/AIDS.
300
 
AACSS represents not only a drive to develop the personal freedom and empowerment of 
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African women, but also a commitment to advance the common good in their societies. 
One might ask how these various disciplines can hope to collaborate effectively with 
their disparate methods, values, and goals. Within these interdisciplinary bonds of 
relationships, there is in Farley‘s project yet a third element – a concept of common 
morality – which requires further analysis. 
  
Common Morality and Public Discourse 
Farley‘s notion of the common good places limits on what can be accomplished 
externally from a particular social context. It is unjust to impose externally any action 
purporting to be help that does not arise from a respect for other persons within their 
concrete situation. Historical examples include various forms of paternalism and 
colonialism. It is problematic to know ―what is good‖ for someone without having a prior 
relationship with that person. How, then, can one understand the criteria for just caring in 
light of the perspectival nature of knowledge? Farley describes her attempts to answer the 
question as a ―chastened realism:‖ 
One that acknowledges the partiality of all knowledge and the influence of social 
constructions of meaning on all that we know, but that nevertheless keeps looking 
to understand things as they are, as best we can.
301
 
 
The criteria for just social practices are essentially dialogical, and require the 
participation of all who are affected by them. 
 Given the wide diversity of human experience, Farley is challenged to find a 
common ground that roots morality in some universal experience. As Michael Walzer 
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notes, there must be some degree of sameness before one can recognize otherness.
302
 
Farley attempts to locate demand for respect in the experiences of love and suffering. 
Unlike the Kantian idea of respect for persons, grounded firmly in reason, Farley insists 
that suffering gives rise to compassion as the primary component of respect. Whereas the 
cognitive faculty can identify the poor circumstances of another, it is the affective part 
that discloses ―an assumption of more acute access to knowledge of the concrete reality 
of others.‖303 While it is not likely to generate a detailed list of justice‘s requirements, 
compassionate respect can detect unjust social practices across cultures. Farley‘s efforts 
in support of the AACSS are emblematic of her commitment to this common morality. 
 Expanding these three-fold elements into the church‘s political agenda, there is a 
clear connection to be made between theology and public discourse. Farley sees three 
major problems with the church‘s myopic focus upon abortion as the axial public issue.304 
Taken together, they undermine the effectiveness of the church‘s witness in the public 
forum. The first is a lack of credibility regarding abortion. Besides its staunch opposition 
to most forms of contraception, the church has generally excluded women‘s issues from 
its considerations surrounding abortion. The church must address its own relation to 
women before it can be effective in combating overly-permissive abortion policies. The 
second is what Farley calls the ―extreme politicization‖ of abortion and related issues. 
Here, she refers to attempts to recriminalize abortion. At the same time, she criticizes the 
church‘s lack of nuance regarding its rhetorical use of the ―moment of conception.‖ 
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Following Thomas Shannon, she claims that embryonic biology admits no such 
moment.
305
 The third is the opportunity cost of a near-exclusive emphasis on abortion. 
Alluding to the United States Bishops‘ 1996 statement, ―Political Responsibility,‖ she 
lists eighteen pressing issues for the nation, with abortion at the top of the alphabetical 
list. She wonders at the possibilities of success if all of them received the same attention 
as abortion. 
 Farley also notes the tension between the internal discourse of the Catholic 
Church and the external arena in which it speaks. Echoing a few of the sentiments raised 
in analysis of the post-conciliar documents, Vatican II represents a turning point in the 
life of the church insofar as it engaged the problems of the modern world. Farley claims 
that this development was received with ―trust and confidence‖ by those outside the 
church.
306
 Unfortunately, as previous sections of this dissertation have also noted, there 
has been a general repression of internal debate over moral issues. Theologians have 
found themselves at odds not only with local bishops and other representatives of the 
church‘s magisterium, but also with ―self-appointed groups of lay and clerical monitors 
of Catholic orthodoxy.‖ 307 She argues that the damage to the church‘s credibility is more 
than a matter of bad press. It also limits the church‘s capacity to participate effectively. 
Farley moves toward a potential resolution of the conflict by urging the church‘s 
hierarchy to place abortion within the complex of other pragmatic and pressing concerns. 
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Founded on her three-fold obligation to respect persons, she claims that participation in 
the public forum entails requires a spirit of humility, respect, and compassion.
308
 
 Finally, two comparisons can be made between Farley‘s and Cahill‘s respective 
projects. On the one hand, Farley seems to emphasize to a greater degree the internal 
strife of the ongoing debates that constitute the church‘s living tradition. Her concern is 
that the church‘s role in the open forum will be undercut by what she perceives is a 
destructive force of suppression. On the other hand, Cahill is more focused on the 
valuable external contribution that theological voices can make toward public discourse. 
This is not to say that Cahill ignores the internal debate. Instead, she identifies the interior 
arguments as part of the self-critical and self-limiting aspects of the community which is 
participating in the discourse.
309
 In spite of this difference, both conclude that there is a 
prophetic aspect to the church‘s participation in the public sphere. There is also a 
legitimate role that offers reasons for political action that can be rationally defended to 
those outside the tradition and beyond standard liberal accounts of free choice. 
 Moreover, there is a shared concern for the common good which in turn 
influences each scholar‘s notions of justice. It is further interesting to note how they 
differ with regard to locating the meaning and content of justice in their respective 
accounts of the common good. In Farley‘s case, it offers a general meaning for justice in 
social relations, while particularity provides the content of justice‘s demands through 
compassionate respect. In Cahill‘s work, the common good provides justice‘s content, 
while ancillary notions of solidarity and equality help to define justice‘s meaning in 
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particular contexts.
310
 This difference might account for their contrasting emphases in the 
context of public discourse. For Farley, it is scandalous to engage it political discourse 
when she perceives so much injustice within the church. Unless the church can 
effectively address these problems, its message will necessarily be weakened. By 
contrast, Cahill argues that the common good demands the participation off all peoples, 
and that this is not just an ideal but an incipient form of life. Thus, it is unjust to exclude 
oneself from the liability to serve the common good. 
 
Summary and Conclusion to Chapter Three 
 Because of the vast diversity and history of Catholic thought, it was necessary to 
limit the scope of the theological views on justice to three general categories: select 
statements from the Catholic hierarchy since Vatican II, recent reinvigoration of the 
Catholic virtue tradition, and a brief analysis of justice in Catholic bioethics. In analyzing 
these magisterial documents, there is an overwhelming emphasis on ―social justice‖ and 
―the common good.‖ In her later writings, Cahill‘s conception of justice is rooted within 
the Catholic social tradition. Like the U.S. Bishops‘ Economic Justice for All and John 
Paul‘s social encyclicals, Cahill is concerned with pragmatic yet just solutions to pressing 
ethical issues. 
 The accounts of justice also explored writings from American moral theologians 
Jean Porter and James Keenan, who represent the reinvigoration of virtue ethics within 
Catholic Natural Law tradition. Dissatisfied with novel post-conciliar interpretations of 
the natural law from Basic Goods theorists, Porter argues that virtues are paradigmatic 
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rather than universal in scope. Relying upon MacIntyre‘s work, she envisions the 
community as the point of departure for individual discernment of right human action. 
The natural law provides a space moral reflection, rather than readymade answers to 
moral questions. Her notion of justice underscores the individual good over the common 
good in Aquinas, which contrasts with Cahill‘s work in several ways to be discussed in 
the next chapter. Additionally, Keenan argues that the traditional list of cardinal virtues is 
inadequate to guide contemporary moral agents. Building upon a relational anthropology 
founded upon love, he proposes a new list of virtues: justice, fidelity, self-care, and 
prudence. Because humans are relational in a general manner, justice is the 
comprehending virtue that dictates correct interpersonal interaction. Keenan‘s 
anthropological claims are very similar to Cahill‘s, which argue similarly that justice 
ought to be the overriding principle that determines right action. 
 Finally, since this dissertation concludes by way of analysis of Cahill‘s work in a 
bioethical context, it was necessary to sketch the contours of scholarship on justice in 
Catholic bioethics. The works of Thomas Shannon and Margaret Farley were selected 
because of their resonance with Cahill‘s essays, and because of their occasional scholarly 
collaboration with her. Shannon‘s work emphasizes distributive justice in medical ethics. 
He employs methods from the Catholic social tradition to place genetic research within 
the larger context of the needs and goals of American medical care. Moreover, his 
Ressourcement of Duns Scotus‘ idea of affectio justitiae allows the agent to value another 
being beyond one‘s personal or social utility. In spite of similar points of departure, 
Shannon and Cahill arrive at opposing conclusions regarding genetic research and 
intervention. Margaret Farley‘s obligation to respect persons is founded upon three, 
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interdependent concepts: free choice, the common good, and a shared morality. Farley 
finds this common ground in the face of the experience of suffering, which gives rise to 
compassion. Compassionate respect allows the moral agent to help the individual sufferer 
in a just manner and to criticize the unjust situation in solidarity with him or her. Farley‘s 
thoughts on the church‘s role in public discourse are also emblematic of her tripartite 
foundation of respect. While the church has much to offer in the political realm, it creates 
scandal because of its poor treatment of women and its exclusive focus on abortion. 
Cahill‘s and Farley‘s separate interpretations of the common good locate the meaning and 
content of justice at different points. For Cahill, the common good supplies the content; 
for Farley, it provides the meaning. This contrast may be two sides to the same coin, 
since both require supplementary notions of particularity, solidarity, and equality to fill 
out the complementary aspects for justice‘s meaning (for Cahill) and content (for Farley) 
in their respective accounts.  
 In the next chapter, the dissertation employs a chronological reading of Cahill‘s 
work to analyze several significant developments in her ideas about justice over time. 
The six accounts of justice under consideration in these two preceding chapters will serve 
as guideposts to help find points of continuity and contrast with her own. As will be 
demonstrated, there are many points during her writing career where her notions of 
justice resonate with one or more of the scholars represented here and in Chapter Two. At 
the same time, Cahill‘s complex notion of justice seems to transcend all of them. While 
she has not yet put forth a fully-developed theory of justice, her various applications of 
justice – as cardinal virtue and as a theological or political principle – can be constructed 
into a coherent unit. This dissertation refers to this unified, synthetic whole as 
249 
 
―collaborative justice.‖ In turn, this holistic, synthetic account, gleaned from the wide 
range of her scholarship, can offer a method for theological voices to participate in future 
public discourse about bioethics in an effective manner. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
JUSTICE IN THE WRITINGS OF LISA SOWLE CAHILL 
With the aid of the examination of significant philosophical and theological accounts of 
justice from Chapters Two and Three, the present chapter builds upon those analyses to 
explore Cahill‘s writings on justice within her intellectual context. As the previous 
chapter demonstrated, the various referents for ―justice‖ in recent scholarship are clearly 
divergent. Even individual scholars understandings of justice expand or narrow over 
time. For instance, Rawls‘ thought develops considerably between his broadly-conceived 
Theory of Justice in 1971 and its focused refinement two decades later in Political 
Liberalism. Similarly, it is unsurprising to discover that Cahill‘s scholarly reflections 
have shifted foci throughout the course of more than thirty-five years of inquiry. Like 
many Catholic ethicists of the mid-1970s, Cahill‘s early work engaged the contentious 
methodological debates over post-conciliar applications of natural law theory. In the 
1980s and 90s, her research turned to pressing and persistent issues of the day like sex, 
gender, war, and poverty, among others.  
Cahill‘s most recent work attempts to construct theoretical and foundational 
frameworks that are applicable across a broad range of ethical and theological issues. In 
bioethics, she designs participatory and collaborative strategies aimed at achieving 
equitable health-care access for all, especially among the most vulnerable populations of 
the world‘s diverse societies. In fundamental moral theology, she formulates a Christian 
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political and economic worldview for the twenty-first century, emphasizing personal and 
societal responsibility toward the common good. In foundational systematic theology, 
Cahill‘s latest work exemplifies a vital shift toward Christology and spirituality not 
explicitly found in her previous thought.
 1
 It remains to be seen – indeed, anticipated – 
precisely how this Christological turn will influence her future reflections on ethics. 
A chronological reading elucidates a few consistent motifs in Cahill‘s essays on 
ethics. One of them is the feminist perspective that she brings to Catholic natural law 
ethics. Another is her firm commitment to justice, which is also informed by her feminist 
standpoint. While it is clearly a prominent theme throughout her work, her conception of 
justice – like that of other thinkers considered in this dissertation – has evolved over time. 
This development seems to correspond with some of the shifts in her research interests, 
which were previously mentioned. Her early view of justice is mostly consistent with a 
Thomistic understanding of the virtue tradition. Later essays develop an idea of justice 
that is not only a personal virtue that guides a moral agent‘s action toward others within 
an interpersonal context, but is also an ongoing enterprise that engages social action with 
others toward the common good. It is also important to note that this latter view of justice 
is conjunctive rather than disjunctive with her earlier work; she does not abandon 
personalist ethics so much as situate it within a wider milieu. Therefore, an historical 
analysis of Cahill‘s writings is warranted in order to discover the context and significance 
of this development in her notion of justice. 
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The research for this chapter divides Cahill‘s ethical writings into three temporal 
units in order to synthesize them into a coherent whole. The first section considers her 
early writings, spanning from 1976 until roughly 1990, in which her prevailing notion of 
justice is related to her deconstruction and critique of Catholic personalist ethics. 
Influenced by feminist and ecumenical interpretations of the natural moral law, Cahill‘s 
project strives for greater inclusion of women‘s experience and communal referents for 
ethical decision making. While she premises her arguments upon Catholic values such as 
fidelity to scripture and love of neighbor, she rarely cites the Catholic social tradition 
during this part of her scholarship. 
The second part describes a ―transitional‖ period in Cahill‘s thought from 1990 
through 1996. During this time, her writings in ethics and her notion of justice expand 
beyond strictly confessional issues (i.e., Catholic moral theology) toward concerns within 
the larger American political order. While she remains firmly rooted in the Catholic 
moral tradition, her project focuses greater attention to an American context in which, 
sadly, the voices of Catholic leadership seemed to have become less and less relevant. 
Much of this ground has already been covered in Chapter One‘s discussion of public 
moral discourse, but here it is integrated with and bolstered by Cahill‘s thoughts on 
justice. If there is a countercultural Catholic voice, it will resound more clearly as 
communitarian critic of a myopic focus upon autonomous choice as the decisive indicator 
of justice, rather than constabulary monitor of sexual matters and other moral norms. As 
Cahill and other Catholic theologians have exemplified, these concerns also remain the 
subject of ongoing debate within their own tradition. 
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The third unit analyzes Cahill‘s move from ―local‖ communal concerns to 
pressing global issues from 1996 to the present. While her work continues to address a 
largely American audience, Cahill rarely writes without a purposeful eye toward 
international contexts, especially those of developing nations. This trend, which is at 
times implicit in her previous work, moves to the forefront in her most recent essays. She 
never loses a grasp on the particular, though, as she calls special attention to the plight of 
women across cultures. It is also during this latter period that her concept of justice 
expands most clearly from a nexus of personalist-local ethics toward a widely inclusive, 
immanently participatory schema. She also fully integrates the Catholic social tradition 
into her work. 
Ultimately, the dissertation refers to Cahill‘s holistic, inclusive, and cooperative 
framework as ―collaborative justice.‖ As this chapter will demonstrate, Cahill‘s 
collaborative justice resonates to some degree with all of the accounts of justice 
considered in Chapter Two while simultaneously transcending them. As her notion of 
justice evolves, she begins to apply it futurist genetic technologies like human cloning 
and germline enhancement as a part of her participatory strategy of bioethics. 
Collaborative justice provides pragmatic answers to moral issues of wide social import 
more readily than the liberal, communitarian, and other theological justice concepts 
presented so far. These writings will be considered in the dissertation‘s Epilogue. 
 
Early Writings: Justice in a Personalist Context 
This first section analyzes Cahill‘s essays from 1976 through 1989, and discovers 
three overarching thematic elements during this part of her academic career. The first is 
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an enthusiastic defense of proportionalist ethical methodology, particularly the kind 
represented by Richard McCormick. This trend is most evident in her bioethical writings. 
The second is an inchoate Christian theory of sexual ethics that is eminently communal in 
its foundations. This theory evolves considerably over the next two decades. At the same 
time, her account of individual moral agency regarding sexual issues remains firmly 
rooted in the ethics of proportionate reasoning. The third major theme is a consistent 
assertion of the universality of ―human dignity‖ throughout her early work in both 
medical and sexual ethics. Her conception of dignity is founded upon the theological 
claims of Catholic Social Teaching, albeit tacitly, over and above liberal notions of 
respect for persons. This methodological grounding in dignity serves as a springboard for 
the widening scope of her later work, which will be examined in subsequent sections. 
 During the early part of her career, Cahill rarely addresses the issue of justice per 
se and even then her notion of justice is more implicit than overt. Nonetheless, her 
inquiries into medical and sexual ethics are far more than a tangential discussion of 
justice. She raises related issues like the communal context for Christian ethics, 
hermeneutical uses of empirical data, and social implications of gender roles, all of which 
impact questions of justice.  
 
Cahill‘s Developing Communitarian Ethic: 1976-1981 
Cahill‘s earliest publications employ bioethical and theological principles 
developed from her dissertation, which applied the contrasting ethical methodologies of 
the Catholic moral theologian Richard McCormick and Methodist ethicist Paul Ramsey 
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to the case of euthanasia.
2
 Chapter One of the present dissertation already described 
Cahill‘s 1979 analysis of their exchange regarding biomedical research.3 There, Cahill 
argues that their conflicting claims are neither founded upon a comprehensive Christian 
faith nor adjudicated by appeals to scripture and tradition. Because the two speak from 
related though distinct theological traditions, the outcome must be decided on other, 
secular grounds. These resources are provided by what she elsewhere calls ―normative 
and descriptive‖ accounts of the human person, referring here to philosophical and 
empirical research.
4
 Though it is clear in the essay that she prefers McCormick‘s 
proportionalist approach to Ramsey‘s covenantal-deontological method, she envisions 
their debate as an intra-disciplinary matter regarding the role of religious commitment in 
medical practice and research.
5
 
Much of her subsequent work further defends McCormick against charges of 
utilitarianism. In a 1981 article, her paradigm is McCormick‘s reconsideration of formal 
moral norms.
6
 McCormick suggests that exceptions to abstractly stated moral norms can 
be justified by reference to the special circumstances in which an act falling within the 
purview of a norm will be performed, and that a due ―proportion‖ must exist between the 
                                                     
2
 Cahill, ―Euthanasia: A Catholic and a Protestant Perspective‖ (PhD diss., The 
University of Chicago, IL), 1976. 
3
 Cahill, "Within Shouting Distance: Paul Ramsey and Richard McCormick on 
Method," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 4, no. 4 (December 1979), 398-417. See 
also Richard McCormick and Paul Ramsey, ed., Doing Evil to Achieve Good (Chicago: 
Loyola University Press, 1978). 
4
 Cahill, Between the Sexes: Foundations for a Christian Ethics of Sexuality 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 4-11. 
5
 Cahill, "With Shouting Distance,‖ 415.  
6
 Cahill, ―Teleology, Utilitarianism, and Christian Ethics,‖ Theological Studies 46 
(1981), 601-629; cf. Richard McCormick, Ambiguity in Moral Choice (Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 1973). 
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value concretely sacrificed and the value realized by the choice. After providing a concise 
historical perspective regarding the development of deontological and utilitarian norms, 
Cahill moves to an evaluation of McCormick‘s early work on ―consequentialism.‖  
It is during the course of this analysis that Cahill‘s early notion of justice as a 
personal virtue becomes apparent. Following the moral taxonomy of the Scottish 
philosopher W.D. Ross, she argues that deontological and teleological models can be 
construed in terms of the priority they give to principles of justice and beneficence, 
respectively.
7
 Against the charge of ―utilitarianism‖ leveled by McCormick‘s critics, 
Cahill counters that John Stuart Mill‘s notion of justice is identified with expediency, 
embodied in an ―immediate, empirical, and quantifiable‖ aggregate concerned solely with 
maximizing welfare.
8
 Critics of proportionate reason like Germain Grisez, Paul Quay, 
and John Connery (who were mentioned in Chapter Two) have missed the point when 
they equate proportionate reason with ―moral mercantilism,‖ and instead refer to the 
binding authority of a traditional yet transient list of intrinsically-evil acts. Cahill 
counters that absolute moral norms simplify matters, but they do not attend adequately to 
potential disproportion between the ends sought and the values sacrificed. Nonetheless, 
as part of her critique of McCormick‘s earlier work, she notes that he has provoked his 
critics by failing to consider the long-term consequences of his case examples.
9
 
                                                     
7
 Ibid., 604: ―The inclusive or broad teleologist will claim that doing good is the 
essence of moral obligation, but that good must be distributed fairly, and that the equality 
and rights of all persons must be respected. The broad deontologist will claim that duty, 
obligation, and equal respect for persons define moral agency, but that duty contemplates 
responsibility for the consequences of one‘s acts.‖ 
8
 Ibid., 605-606. 
9
 Here, Cahill refers largely to McCormick‘s rejection of absolute norms that 
prohibit specific physical acts in Ambiguity in Moral Choice and his responses to critics 
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Cahill‘s defense and critique of McCormick are founded upon prior, inherent, and 
communal values informed by a Christian tradition, which are found especially in 
Thomas Aquinas‘ writings. Cahill‘s approbation for McCormick‘s developing 
proportionalism is rooted in Thomistic natural law ethics. 
One pertinent and undeniable shortcoming in McCormick‘s sort of innovative 
teleology is that, in the absence of a classical or medieval metaphysics and 
anthropology, it is no mean task to discern and agree upon the precise relations of 
values in the hierarchy upon which the theory depends… It is possible to enjoin or 
to prohibit absolutely certain resolutions of value conflicts only in the light of 
knowledge of the ways in which such resolutions impinge on human nature. This 
is why the achievement of some consensus on the hierarchical relations of 
potentially conflicting values, while so elusive, is so vital.
10
 
 
Cahill claims that Aquinas‘ ethical project is teleological regarding communal welfare 
and personal morality, but at the same time protects the inviolability of individuals within 
that community.
11
 In his later work, McCormick‘s concept of telos is more consistent 
with Thomistic notions of the common good insofar as it is not founded upon an 
exclusive maximization of social welfare. Furthermore, his teleological approach 
presumes that ―to actualize human nature through conformity to the ordo bonorum is to 
follow the will of the Creator, and in doing so, to approach the summum bonum.‖ Thus, 
his account of ―human flourishing‖ refers both to the particular human in concrete moral 
agency and to humans generally in the ―universal common good.‖12 
 A further instance of Cahill‘s applications of the natural law tradition can be 
found in a 1980 essay, where she constructs a framework toward a Christian theory of 
                                                                                                                                                              
throughout the remainder of the decade in ―Notes on Moral Theology‖ from Theological 
Studies throughout the 1970s. 
10
 Cahill, ―Teleology, Utilitarianism, and Christian Ethics,‖ 617. 
11
 Ibid., 625. 
12
 Ibid., 612, 629; cf. Gaudium et Spes, 68, 84. 
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human rights.
13
 In the context of human rights, the ―deontology vs. teleology‖ debate is 
transcended by God‘s love, which makes a prior moral claim on the agent‘s moral 
existence. In the Christian tradition, love of neighbor in light of this priority enjoins the 
agent‘s duty to respect and protect another‘s rights, rather than asserting one‘s own 
claims.
14
 Citing Aquinas, she claims that the rational and free intellect is under an 
―unconditional obligation‖ toward virtue, whose goal orients human action toward 
happiness beyond one‘s rational capacity, that is, friendship with God.15 Thus, human 
action is immanently social, constituted by participation with others in the common good. 
 As such, Cahill affirms the necessity of rights language in postlapsarian morality, 
since it must address the conflicts that develop between the free responses of persons to 
God in light of the needs of their neighbors. By focusing on the moral agent as 
responsible rather than claiming, Cahill believes that a common good approach to rights 
is able to avoid moral individualism on one extreme with totalitarian collectivism on the 
other.
16
 Moreover, a natural law approach to rights is privileged over utilitarian liberalism 
since the former proceeds from a universal order inclusive of a community in which 
individuals live. In a communal context, Cahill admits her argument implies that very 
few rights can be absolute. While food, education, and healthcare can be classified as 
essential goods necessary for human flourishing, their distribution can only occur in 
situations where they realistically can be found. In this early work, she finds only an 
absolute right to personal integrity, founded on the inviolable dignity of the human 
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 Cahill, ―Toward a Christian Theory of Human Rights,‖ Journal of Religious 
Ethics 8, no.2 (Fall 1980), 277-301. 
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person. An incomplete list of fundamental goods and a corresponding measure of the 
justice/injustice in a particular society are grounds for social criticism and action, but do 
not constitute rights in themselves.
17
 
In synthesizing Cahill‘s early vision of moral theology from these articles, it is 
very interesting to find two clear, though limited, connections to Alasdair MacIntyre‘s 
conception of moral traditions in Cahill‘s insightful analysis of Christian teleology vis-à-
vis Enlightenment utilitarianism. She takes Richard McCormick to task for reducing 
proportionalism to a consideration of mere acts rather than persons with his insufficient 
regard to human dignity. Her penetrating appraisal of his early proportionalism is 
balanced by her attentive consideration of the later theological development in his 
method. She claims that McCormick‘s later work is protected from charges of crass 
consequentialism to the degree that justice has taken precedence over beneficence in his 
subsequent ethical writings, and that it has attended to the adequate consideration of 
human persons.
18
 Justice is located in a requirement that all persons be treated equally 
with respect to social, material, and moral goods. Moreover, a theological grounding 
helps to determine just distribution of those goods. Here, Cahill – like MacIntyre – 
appeals explicitly to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition.
 19
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 Ibid., 291-292. 
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 Cahill, ―Teleology, Utilitarianism, and Christian Ethics,‖ 625. 
19
 Ibid., 627-628: ―In contrast [to utilitarian accounts of happiness], Aristotle and 
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p. 628). 
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Additionally, her analyses anticipate parts of MacIntyre‘s devastating evaluation 
of contemporary ethical discourse in After Virtue. For example, her insistence that the 
debate between McCormick and Ramsey is a wholly theological matter is consistent with 
MacIntyre‘s understanding that moral traditions are constituted by ongoing arguments 
about their purposes.
20
 This is not to say that MacIntyre would agree with Cahill on this 
point. In fact, MacIntyre would likely see Ramsey and McCormick as arguing from two 
distinct moral traditions (i.e., covenantal deontology vs. proportionalist revisionism, 
respectively).
21
 By contrast, Cahill does not see their clashing methods as rival traditions, 
even though they speak from distinct confessional stances. Instead, she locates their 
exchange within the stream of an evolving but unitary Christian moral tradition.
22
 Within 
this tradition, this significant point of difference with MacIntyre is explained by Cahill‘s 
widely-inclusive methodology, which will be discussed at greater length in the next 
portion of this section. 
At the same time, this convergence with MacIntyre‘s thought is limited in two 
important ways. In his postscript to the second edition of After Virtue, MacIntyre 
concludes with a summary of three critical arguments against his thesis, two of which are 
relevant to the present discussion.
23
 The first questions the relationship of moral 
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 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 222. 
21
 MacIntyre, ―Theology, Ethics, and the Ethics of Medicine and Health Care: 
Comments on Papers by Novak, Mouw, Roach, Cahill, and Hartt,‖ Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy 4, no. 4 (December 1979), 436-438. 
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 MacIntyre, Whose Justice, 400. 
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philosophy to history. Against these critics, MacIntyre argues that moral philosophers 
are, above all, proponents of claims of particular moralities to rational allegiance.
24
 Cahill 
argues in a similar fashion throughout her later essays on public moral discourse. She 
takes the position that there is no form of philosophical discourse which is any less 
tradition-bound than religious ones. However, MacIntyre goes one step further than 
Cahill with his claim that one moral theory should transcend the limitations of its rivals.
 
25
  In his case, he clearly privileges the Aristotelian account of virtues as the ground of 
morality. By contrast, Cahill builds her argument upon a premise that no method has a 
greater claim to rationality or a lesser allegiance to its tradition. Consequently, while 
MacIntyre seems to abandon any hope of rational consensus, Cahill sees broad, 
substantive agreement on particular issues as a normative expectation for public 
discourse. Further parallels and contrasts with MacIntyre‘s thought on this issue are also 
evident (especially the manner in which they utilize sociological and empirical data), but 
these will become more apparent in the next part of the chapter. 
The second criticism concerns the relationship of moral philosophy to theology. 
On MacIntyre‘s account, the Aristotelian virtue tradition challenges religious claims of 
divine command. Virtue places human action at the center of moral questions. In 
reconciling the two components of theological ethics, he argues a religious tradition must 
uphold the necessity of obedience to divine law as constitutive of the virtuous life. He 
further claims that Aquinas provides such a defense.
26
 MacIntyre‘s attempt to retrieve the 
natural law in this way is somewhat knotty, and other scholars argue that the medieval 
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tradition seemed to have a broader understanding of law as such than MacIntyre seems to 
allow.
27
 More importantly, Cahill in her earlier work finds difficulties regarding 
obedience to the law problematic in light of her proportionalist tendencies. The ―law‖ 
described by the neo-manualists insists upon intrinsically-evil acts, a position that Cahill, 
following McCormick, clearly rejects. 
This second limitation is further qualified by MacIntyre‘s response to Cahill‘s 
1979 essay, the only time that he has engaged her published work. He claims that Cahill 
is ―quite mistaken‖ in equating consequentialist and teleological methods of morality, 
especially in light of her references to Aristotle‘s thought. 28 Contrary to Cahill and 
McCormick, MacIntyre insists that teleological thinkers must recognize that certain types 
of actions are prohibited. He names two categories of precepts that guide the common life 
of community constituted by a common understanding of the good. The first type refers 
to the virtues required to achieve that good; the second kind prohibits behavior that is 
destructive of it. 
To violate the second type of precept is to commit an act sufficiently intolerable 
to exclude oneself from that community in which alone one can hope to achieve 
the good. Thus the absolute prohibition of certain specifiable kinds of actions 
finds a necessary place within a certain type of teleological framework; since the 
Christian doctrine of ethics appears to be a teleology of just this type, the 
existence of Christian theologians who deny that there are any such absolute 
prohibitions would be prima facie puzzling.
29
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 As we saw in Chapter Two, Jean Porter argues that the natural law is already 
rooted within a biblically-informed worldview. Moreover, natural law itself is 
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MacIntyre points to McCormick‘s position that certain actions are always 
disproportionate simply because of lack of certitude about consequences to act in that 
way. If this is the sole criterion, MacIntyre argues, then McCormick is ―a utilitarian who 
is more skeptical than most utilitarians‖ about an agent‘s ability to determine outcomes.30 
MacIntyre‘s assessment here is consistent with the discussion of Porter‘s account of 
Thomistic ethics from Chapter Two. Aquinas could see no conflict among the cardinal 
virtues. Prudence fixes the mean for right action, and justice orients those actions toward 
others. Thus, MacIntyre rejects proportionalism‘s assertions of conflict among the virtues 
on the basis of this Thomistic assertion of harmony among the virtues. 
 So far, this first part of the section has focused on an emerging communitarian 
ethic in Cahill‘s earliest publications. Her germinating scholarship draws significantly 
from the research in her dissertation in theological bioethics. She also develops a new 
stream of research in sexual ethics during this period, and this inquiry will mature 
throughout the 1980s into a theory of Christian sexual ethics.
31
 The next part analyzes the 
interplay between personal and communal issues in Cahill‘s seminal theory of Christian 
sexual ethics. In it, she accepts a collective morality in sexual matters as normative, but 
she also allows room for departures from this norm within the striving community. Here, 
her work continues to contrast with MacIntyre, especially regarding the manner in which 
they utilize empirical and sociological data in their respective projects. The next part also 
explores Cahill‘s resonance with liberal ideas of justice in the context of sexual ethics. At 
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the same time, it will examine her feminist reflections on ethics generally and sexuality 
specifically.  
 
Cahill‘s Early Work in Feminist and Sexual Ethics: 1981-1989 
Cahill‘s research moves beyond strictly bioethical concerns throughout the 1980s. 
In addition to her continued work in medical ethics and moral methodology, she delves 
into issues like human rights, abortion,
32
 just war,
33
 and divorce.
34
 During this period, 
though, she concentrates mainly on sexual ethics. The local community remains her 
consistent focus in the area of sexuality. However, her feminist interpretations of natural 
law and human sexuality provide a space to discuss matters concerns for individual 
persons as well. Though she insists on the importance of an individual‘s autonomous 
capacity in sexual ethics, she never reduces it to liberal notions of free choice. Instead, 
the relationship between an individual and the community mutually informs the decision-
making process, with a determinative reference to an objectively-knowable and 
theologically-grounded moral order. Her work remains rooted in both Sacred Scripture 
and the Catholic Thomistic tradition, but also relies upon normative descriptive accounts 
of humanity from the natural and social sciences. This part of the discussion emphasizes 
Cahill‘s writings on sexual ethics, especially her book, Between the Sexes, as well as 
selected articles on feminist theology from the same period. It will also apply an analysis 
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of these essays to her concurrent work in bioethics, especially artificial contraception and 
assisted procreation. 
 
Between the Sexes 
In her first book-length theory of sexual ethics, Cahill tries to overcome what she 
perceives as a duality of sexual experience in the Christian tradition. 
[Sexual experience] is physical, urgent, and pervasive. It is also an avenue of 
affective and spiritual relations among persons, for good or ill. Yet the human 
person is not a duality. At least Western philosophical and religious traditions 
have learned to resist dualistic interpretations of the person, even if they have not 
overcome them.
35
 
 
She claims that this dichotomy, present at least since Augustine and evolving throughout 
the Patristic era, is at odds with the Genesis creation accounts that disclose the essential 
unity of individual humans generally and of sexual partners especially. At the same time, 
this harmony is not reducible to atomistic individualism, which is prevalent in today‘s 
liberal societies. Instead, the creation stories portend meaningful richness for the life of a 
worshipping community and its constitutive members. As such, Cahill outlines four 
positive implications for this theological narrative of creation.
36
 One, sexual 
differentiation is aimed toward cooperative modes of procreation and nurturing. Two, 
contra modern liberalism, male and female are intrinsically related to the common good. 
Three, there is an equal dignity between the sexes, derived from the image of God. Four, 
the communal nature of sexuality is a mirror of that divinity. Taken together, these points 
give rise to two major claims. First, human sexuality is endowed with a fundamental 
goodness as a constitutive element of the created order. As a corollary to this first point, 
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this theological sense of createdness offers the believing community a telos that produces 
a ―harmonious and productive existence‖ in the natural world.37  
As part of creation, an agent‘s free response is required to enter into this divinely-
ordained accord. Sin disrupts this striving toward this harmony and fulfillment. 
Employing the work of Reinhold Niebuhr, Cahill argues that humans exist in a dialectical 
relationship between freedom and finitude. Sin is constituted in the failure to recognize 
the limits of either pole, both of which are given by God as part and parcel of creation.
38
 
In other words, one sins when he or she denies what it is to be human.  Thus, historical 
systems of hierarchy and dominance regarding gender relations are aberrations from the 
original created order, which is marked by equal dignity and cooperation. 
It must be noted that Cahill‘s exegesis of Genesis 1-3 is not a ―pure,‖ isolated 
reading of this particular literary unit, but is a prologue to the continuing story of the 
church tradition. Determining the story‘s ―original audience‖ has an illuminative but not 
a determinative function, and does not preclude later normative interpretations of any 
biblical text.
39
 This dialectic between the past and the current state of church teaching is 
further informed by her careful inquiry into the New Testament community.  
Cahill claims that the ethics of the New Testament is ―thoroughly communal‖ in 
its orientation.
40
 For example, she points out that its most significant discussion of sexual 
norms is located within Paul‘s discourse on the Body of Christ, that is, the community 
redeemed by Jesus (1 Cor 5:1-8:13). While Paul envisions all preoccupation with 
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marriage and sexuality as distractions, a position that contrasts with the creation accounts, 
Cahill carefully argues that his views are wholly consistent with the norms set forth in 
Genesis 1-3.
41
 She founds this claim upon the communal criterion of the moral life 
present in both texts, which depict humans as created by and responsible to God. Paul‘s 
text is further informed by the redeeming experience of Jesus Christ, who should be the 
central focus of the Corinthian community to whom Paul addresses himself. Instead, they 
are distracted by issues of hierarchy and power, all signs of the consequences of sin 
outlined in Genesis 3:16-23 (1 Cor 3:1-5). Throughout his letter, Paul insists that the 
community is the Body of Christ. As such, he enjoins them to act in harmony with Jesus‘ 
kingdom message in all matters: legal, sexual, and liturgical.
42
 
Cahill‘s research moves beyond scriptural texts and into Catholic tradition with an 
analysis of Thomas Aquinas‘ inquiry into marriage and sexuality. Like Paul, Aquinas 
claims that virginity is preferable to marriage. The former is more conducive to ―thinking 
on the things of God,‖ which is the telos of human existence, according to Aquinas.43 At 
the same time, Cahill underscores two salient features of Aquinas‘ reflections on 
marriage that she claims are often overlooked. The first is what Cahill calls Aquinas‘ 
―honest portrayal‖ of the intense human love between husband and wife. On the question 
of whether a man ought to love his wife more than his parents, Aquinas claims that on the 
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part of the union, a wife ought to be loved more because of the oneness of their flesh.
44
 
There is also the value of partnership in the couple‘s domestic life. This second point 
correlates to the first.  In this special union, there is a friendship ―of the highest sort.‖45 
To this point, even if polygamy could have been justified through Old Testament texts, in 
the Christian context it would reduce the friendship of each wife for her husband and turn 
to a ―servile relationship‖ that emphasizes procreation alone over this loving friendship.46 
Furthermore, Aquinas‘ account of virtue turns on what it means to be ―genuinely 
human.‖ Cahill claims that this understanding is ―necessarily empirical.‖ His descriptive 
account of humanity is inclined toward an uncritical application of Aristotle‘s 
metaphysical biology. Cahill sees three shortcomings in Aquinas‘ Aristotelian 
anthropology. One, women‘s capacity for rationality is less than men‘s; two, women are, 
by nature, assigned a subordinate place within the household; and three, men‘s aptitudes 
are greater than women‘s abilities with regard to wisdom and judgment.47 But Aquinas‘ 
differentiation in social roles and intellectual capacities is balanced by the essential 
partnership of men and women found in Gen 2 and is concomitant with their biological 
differences. Aquinas sees far greater relevance in their equal potential for charity, which 
Cahill defines as the ―love of God which extends to those God loves.‖ Tying sexual 
expression to its communal foundations, Cahill also finds it significant that Aquinas 
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supports marriage as a ―sacrament,‖ which is what makes Christian marriage a vehicle of 
Christ‘s presence.48 
In this early search for objective sexual norms, Cahill wrestles with the reality that 
Christians not only live within a faith community informed by their religious tradition 
(and its requisite virtues), but also live within a larger society constituted by different and 
at times competing values (and virtues). 
Perspectives on sexuality in both Testaments favor the institutionalization of 
sexuality in heterosexual, monogamous, permanent, and procreative marriage that 
furthers the cohesiveness and continuity of family, church, and body politic, and 
that respects and nurtures the affective commitments to which spouses give sexual 
expression.
49
 
 
With Cahill‘s utilization of the dialectic between the original audience and the current 
situation, these normative interpretations give rise to practical problems in applying them 
in contemporary, pluralistic settings. The biblical tendency toward standardization in 
sexual norms allowed for occasional exceptions.
50
 The post-biblical tradition also 
demonstrates further development with regard to marriage and sexuality. Moreover, these 
religious norms are juxtaposed against a liberal societal backdrop that privileges 
autonomous choice in sexual matters above all else. 
 To settle the matter, Cahill turns to the use of empirical data as part of the 
enterprise of ethics. In her earlier essay on McCormick and Ramsey, she saw their 
exchange as an intra-disciplinary matter, with observed information aiding in its 
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adjudication.
51
 In other words, she seemed to argue that the current trends in the social 
and empirical sciences can settle a theological dispute. In this later context, though, she 
locates the ―special helpfulness‖ of empirical research in its ―ability to illumine the 
reality of situations that the ethicist evaluates.‖52 Much like the normative accounts from 
scripture and tradition, empirical data provide still another observable explanation of 
human sexuality. However, empirical studies remain wholly descriptive rather than 
morally prescriptive, and they are not arranged into categories that are necessarily ―value 
free.‖53 Therefore, a faith community can decide its course of action in sexual matters 
only through consideration of the full complement of resources at its disposal. 
 In light of her research, Cahill‘s positive argument suggests two moral criteria 
that form the central Christian sexual norm of a lasting, monogamous, heterosexual and 
procreative union. First, the community should express fidelity to this norm while 
allowing variance in its fulfillment. Second, it is necessary to contemplate rare departures 
from these norms, provided they ―represent the most morally commendable courses of 
action concretely available to individuals caught in those tragic or ambiguous situations 
that agonize the decision maker and vex the analyst.‖ 54 According to her claims, the 
Christian tradition might justify some departures such as remarriage after divorce, 
occasional avoidance of conception in conjugal sex, and committed homosexual 
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relationships while prohibiting others like adulterous relationships, non-committed 
cohabitation, and coercive or violent sexual acts.  
 In analyzing these criteria, two observations can be made about Cahill‘s early 
notion of justice. The first concerns her commitment to proportionate reasoning in sexual 
matters. On the accounts of proportionalism considered here and in Chapter Two, it is 
clear that Cahill attempts to maintain fidelity to the objective moral order that she 
espouses in the early part of Between the Sexes. By describing the biblical and traditional 
teachings on marriage and sexuality as ―normative,‖ she expresses a deeply-held value in 
upholding them. She entrusts the wisdom of the faith community to seek a healing and 
equitable way for those affected by hurtful situations such as divorce to remain fully 
within the church, should a divorced person choose to remarry.
55
 By the same token, she 
rejects the notion of marriage as pure contract. Cahill is not claiming (as Michael Walzer 
does) that the constitutive element of voluntary marriage is the permanent possibility of 
divorce.
56
 Instead, she infers that remarriage after divorce should be a rare application of 
the ideal of the permanent marriage. Perhaps the striving moral agent now enters into the 
second marriage with a fuller knowledge of the pain and difficulty that comes with 
maintaining a loving relationship, yet still trusts God‘s grace to help him or her in the 
sacrament. Cahill here endeavors to uphold the values of reconciliation and justice with 
that of the permanence of Christian marriage. 
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 The second comment pertains to her significant and qualified use of empirical 
data. Cahill points out that observable phenomena related to human behavior have an 
impact upon moral judgment.
57
 But she seems to hold two diverging opinions on the use 
of empirical information. On the one hand, she argues that society is obliged to enhance 
human life to the greatest possible extent for those that have certain biological or 
psychological conditions irrespective of the desirability of those conditions.
 58
 These 
circumstances are gleaned from a careful consideration of observable data. This 
sentiment is consistent with her Thomistic understanding of inviolable human dignity 
within a community‘s norms, and with a reasoned observation which is a constitutive 
element of natural law ethics. It also seems to square with Jean Porter‘s analysis of 
Aquinas‘ individualistic context for the common good, described in Chapter Three.59 On 
the other hand, Cahill claims that empirical studies alone fail to elucidate what these 
factors ought to be. She also admits that the data are arranged and interpreted into 
categories that are not value-neutral. Here, there is an implicit resonance with Alasdair 
MacIntyre‘s analysis of empirical studies.60 Building on a premise that contemporary 
scientific utterances about human behavior must omit all reference to intentions, purposes 
or reasons for action, MacIntyre argues that attempts to describe them in purely 
mechanical terms must conflict with teleological anthropology. He also makes explicit 
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what Cahill implies about the ―value-free‖ façade of empirical data by demonstrating that 
the flip side to value-neutrality is manipulative power.
61
 
 In Between the Sexes, Cahill does not engage in a critical dialectic with empirical 
studies about sexuality to the same degree that she did with scripture and tradition. She 
devotes whole chapters to the latter while sparing only a few pages for the former. As a 
result, she argues for significant departures from the tradition regarding homosexual 
activity with insufficient attention to the novel sources which she introduces to bolster 
her argument. By contrast, her claims that pertain to divorce and remarriage, pre-nuptial 
cohabitation, and marital contraception do not seem as dependent on her analysis of 
empirical data, and are more deeply rooted in her study of scripture and tradition. 
 Before leaving this discussion of Between the Sexes, it bears repeating that Cahill 
does not explicitly discuss ―justice,‖ and this feature is common in her early writings. 
Nonetheless, justice is implied in her insistence that all members of the community be 
treated fairly with regard to their individual circumstances. If she errs, it is on the side of 
inclusion rather than exclusion from the Christian community. Her concept of justice as 
egalitarian fairness will be studied further in the next few paragraphs. Furthermore, it is 
also interesting to note that she makes no appeal to the Catholic social tradition here. In 
fact, her conception of justice seems to develop to the degree that she incorporates 
Catholic Social Teaching into her essays family and sexual ethics. These facets of her 
work will be introduced in the next major section of this chapter.   
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Cahill‟s Feminist Critique 
This part of the chapter analyzes Cahill‘s evolving conception of justice as 
egalitarian fairness in the context of sexual ethics. Her maturing theological reflections 
during this epoch in her career turn upon an identification of feminist theology with 
moral theology and ethics.
62
 As such, defining equality and justice are the primary tasks 
of feminist ethics. By examining the normative function of women‘s experience, feminist 
theology can transform the community by projecting more egalitarian social 
arrangements among its constituents.
63
 Coupling the perspectival aspect of personal 
experience with the historical context of moral agency, feminist criticism is an enterprise 
informed by a critical dialectic with the sources of Christian ethics.
64
 This section 
describes Cahill‘s developing feminist critique of two magisterial teachings on sexual 
ethics. The first is her early discussion of contraception. The second is the use of assisted 
procreation techniques. Permanent, heterosexual marriage is the paradigm for her 
theological reflection. 
 Cahill opens this discussion on contraception by considering the personalist trend 
in Catholic sexual ethics since the early twentieth century.
65
 She points to a change in 
definition of marriage from the 1917 Code of Canon Law as ius in corpus that envisions a 
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contract which is tied to ―acts apt for procreation‖ to the 1983 Code‘s communio 
definition that combines covenant language with the contractual understanding of it in an 
interpersonal partnership.
66
 Building upon this interpersonal understanding of marriage, 
she describes the early controversies surrounding the use of oral and barrier 
contraceptives. Cahill finds it significant that both supporters and detractors of oral 
contraceptives in the Catholic moral tradition focused on potential damage to the 
marriage, rather than to the sexual act itself.
 67
 She claims that moralists had to define a 
woman‘s part in sexual acts in terms of traditional roles of domesticity and motherhood. 
In Cahill‘s analysis of arguments from the early 1960s against the use of 
contraceptives, she includes ―new‖ natural law theorists like Germain Grisez. He seems 
to eschew this relational language in favor of an exclusive emphasis on the conjugal act 
itself. Because contraception intentionally thwarts life, one of Grisez‘s basic goods, every 
instance of its use is inherently immoral.
68
 Cahill offers two responses to Grisez‘s thesis. 
The first questions the incommensurability of the basic goods. Basic goods might be able 
to be formulated as universal, exceptionless, and formal norms, but they cannot be so in 
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concrete actions which threaten to undermine at least one of them.
69
 The second more 
directly reflects Cahill‘s feminist criticism of a traditional sexual ethic that narrowly 
defines morality in nearly-exclusive terms of acts. 
Why is contraception (especially within an otherwise procreative marriage) 
genuinely an act ―against‖ the good of procreation, rather than a deferment of it to 
a more appropriate time? The definition of a contraceptive act as an act violating 
the procreative good seems to require that the significance of each act of 
intercourse be defined as an isolated event, rather than in relation to a continuum 
of events within a sexual, personal, and social relationship. But it is this reciprocal 
narrowing of the meaning of sex acts to their immediate contexts, and of the 
procreative and unitive goods to single acts which do or do not realize them 
concretely, which is precisely the target of personalist revisionism.
70
 
 
Cahill roots her argument here within the communal context, which was developed in 
Between the Sexes and remains a constant theme in her later sexual ethics.
71
 She is not 
making the case that every act of contraception can be morally justified. Citing 
philosopher Paul Ricoeur on the symbolic expressions of sex, Cahill is aware that 
contraception risks cheapening sex by reducing its significance to become a mere vehicle 
of pleasure.
72
 Instead, she insists the act cannot be isolated from the pursuit of the 
common good.
73
 She also supplies an egalitarian corrective to any personalist ethic that 
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neglects the social context of the moral agent.
74
 Cahill‘s ongoing development of this 
theme of the common good will be addressed further in the next section. 
 Turning to the use of assisted-reproduction techniques (ART), Cahill‘s context is 
heavily influenced by the Vatican‘s 1987 Instruction on procreation, which effectively 
condemns any attempt to divorce conception from the conjugal act.
75
 The Instruction 
draws largely from traditional natural law understandings of sex, but there are instances 
of personalist language that describe the conjugal act in inexorable terms of love, 
intercourse, and procreation.
76
 Cahill offers a qualified approbation for ART on much the 
same grounds as her consideration of artificial contraception, that is, a consideration of 
the couple within a community of faith. Her cautiously positive analyses of ART during 
this period are especially noteworthy because they contrast starkly in later essays with her 
explicitly negative assessment of germline interventions, which employ similar methods 
to ART. 
 From the essays considered in this part thus far, Cahill points out that in the 
Instruction‟s blanket rejection of ART, the magisterium has ―missed another 
opportunity‖ to offer timely and prudent advice to Catholics living in a society that 
locates commitment and procreation almost exclusively within the realm of autonomous 
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choice.
77
 She raises a concern that the Instruction has not made a distinction between 
donor gametes and homologous fertilization. While she shares the magisterium‘s 
objection to third-party donations, she questions whether infertile couples experience 
―laboratory conception as a violation of their sexually-expressed love relationship, or as 
an assisted fulfilment (sic) of it.‖78 At the same time, her feminist analysis of the situation 
recognizes the danger of ―alienation‖ the female body that can arise from conception 
achieved through technology and the reification of women‘s social roles as mothers. She 
extends this criticism to the larger social context by pointing to the commercialization of 
reproduction, the potential exploitation of the poor, and the perception of children 
primarily as products rather than persons.
79
 Nevertheless, she remains committed to a 
favorable appraisal of ART on personalist grounds. Moral analysis of ART must be 
considered in light of the couple‘s ―total partnership.‖80 
 The Instruction engendered further scholarship for Cahill. In 1988, she co-
authored a reference-style commentary on the document with Thomas Shannon (see 
Chapter Three). They argue that the Vatican goes too far in its prohibition of all ART.
 81
  
While the Instruction is a ―rather remarkable statement‖ insofar as it finds homologous 
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fertilization less objectionable than heterologous intervention, the authors find the 
Instruction problematic because it isolates the sex acts from the loving relationship of the 
couple.
82
 They also claim that these prohibitions are likely to fall upon deaf ears because 
it asserts rather than argues its position.
83
 More importantly, they attempt to rehabilitate 
the document‘s importance by changing the focus of its natural law approach. Instead of 
using the natural law as a tool of casuistry in ART, Cahill and Shannon attempt to use a 
revised natural law approach modeled in Catholic Social Teaching (CST) to demonstrate 
the interrelated issues of marital love, parenthood, and sexuality in a contemporary, 
pluralistic society.
84
 This text quickly became outdated because its discussion of 
techniques, once on the cutting edge of reproductive technology, are now commonplace 
or have been superseded by more efficacious practices. Nevertheless, it remains 
significant because it represents one of Cahill‘s early integrations of Catholic social 
thought into her larger project. 
 The following year, Cahill expands on one of the major themes of CST in a 
comparative analysis between the Vatican‘s Instruction and a secular American 
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document: The Office of Technology Assessment‘s (OTA) Infertility: Medical and Social 
Choices.
85
 In that essay, Cahill argues that the language of natural law ―suggests that a 
mediating language like that of ‗rights‘ may depend for its success at least partly on 
essential structures of human experience which tradition mediated but which they do not 
create.‖86 As she considers these two documents, she first notes the diverging foci on 
their respective subjects of rights language. On the one hand, the Instruction focuses on 
the rights and welfare of the embryo and the protection of familial integrity. As such, it 
rejects all forms of ART that remove sexual acts from procreation. At the same time, it 
prohibits surrogate motherhood on similar moral grounds. Furthermore, it urges 
governments to legislate protection for embryos as persons with full rights from the 
moment of conception.
87
 On the other hand, the OTA document emphasizes reproductive 
freedom and rights of couples. The right to procreate as a principle of liberty is relatively 
uncontroversial in the case of fertile couples or individuals, but in the case of infertility, it 
becomes difficult to assert a claim against others to realize this otherwise undisputed 
right.
 88
 Thus, the government‘s role is one of quality control in embryo production and 
just enforcement of contracts in surrogate parenting. 
 Despite these differences with regard to premises and conclusions, Cahill points 
out three significant similarities that might encourage further dialogue between their 
contrasting opinions. First, they are both products of group authorship. Second, both 
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represent attempts to moralize within an affluent, well-educated, Western context that has 
the resources and will to utilize ART. Most important, they both employ rights language 
to advance their respective arguments, and strive to achieve consensus on the same 
thorny public issue. 
The authors of each seem to assume that their arguments about rights are self-
evident, are grounded in values so basic and indisputable that the only 
prerequisite to agreement is elucidation and restatement. 
89
 
 
The Instruction speaks of three ―fundamental rights:‖ to life and physical integrity from 
conception until a natural death; of the family and of marriage as a normative institution; 
and of a child‘s right to be conceived, born, and raised by his or her parents.90 The OTA 
document speaks of a two-fold right: the couple‘s free, autonomous choice to reproduce 
in accordance with their own values and the correlative respect for those choices.
91
 
 Cahill points to conflicting worldviews as the reason for their diverging 
conclusions on the morality of ART. The OTA grounds their arguments within liberal, 
democratic values that maximize liberty, while the Instruction is rooted in a Thomistic 
view of human nature that emphasizes duty equal to rights. Here, Cahill turns to the work 
of Alasdair MacIntyre and Jeffrey Stout to build her argument that a richer consideration 
of human nature could serve as a mediating language toward a viable social perspective 
regarding ART. Stout insists that the moral philosopher must be ―pragmatic and eclectic‖ 
by exploiting common vocabularies and reasoning patterns in order to resolve 
troublesome social issues.
92
 He envisions rights as a bridging language for the public 
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sphere, allowing for consensus from participants with contrasting and even competing 
worldviews.
93
 Because of its pragmatic nature, only a partial or overlapping consensus 
regarding the good is necessary to reach a broad social agreement.
94
 This method is good 
so far as it goes, though it seems more concerned to proximate ends, rather than ultimate 
ones. In the case of intentionally making life, it seems a bit imprudent to act rashly on 
any superficial notion of the good. 
 Based upon the consideration of MacIntyre‘s work from Chapter Two, it would 
seem that he would reject Stout‘s claims. Common moral vocabulary does not equate 
with common meanings, and participants from opposing worldviews are reduced to 
―assertion and counter-assertion.‖95 MacIntyre instead maintains the importance of a 
unitary tradition as the source of coherent discourse about social practices.
96
 With regard 
to determining which activities constitute practices, and the virtues internal to them, 
MacIntyre specifically mentions ―the making and sustaining of family life.‖97 In this 
instance, Cahill notices that the practices of family life ―involve different voices,‖ and 
make it possible to move toward about ―consensus about the sort of excellence of which a 
practice may aim.‖98 
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 Furthermore, despite their diverging conclusions, Cahill demonstrates that both 
MacIntyre and Stout locate the centrum of their moral discourse in shared practice.
99
 In 
this context, Cahill suggests that a key theme to moral discourse is ―human nature.‖ 
Another reason to adopt this vocabulary to critique the practices of family and 
reproduction in contemporary North American Culture is that they will be useful 
as a corrective to the dominant liberal emphasis. Finally, the vocabulary of 
―nature‖ can be made flexible or open enough to accommodate the value in the 
liberal position. This is true because appeals to nature are most fundamentally 
appeals to human experience and so assume and rely on the praxis so key in 
contemporary hermeneutical theory.
100
 
 
Cahill appeals here to Mary Midgley‘s work (discussed in Chapter One) as backing for 
Cahill‘s own ―modest‖ natural law claims, which are rooted within an inductive, 
experiential, and critical process.
101
 She concludes from this process that while 
parenthood is ―vastly important,‖ it must remain secondary in marriage to the spousal 
union itself. Thus, neither document is true to the experience of married couples. The 
Instruction overstates the physicality of individual sex acts; the OTA study exaggerates 
the autonomy of the couple. 
 Cahill closes her essay with a carefully qualified and strictly limited claim that 
ART is morally acceptable only when used by committed couples to conceive a child 
genetically related to both of them.
102
 Her argument is warranted by the liberal notion 
that a parent-child bond is an embodied and freely-chosen relationship in its formation. It 
is further backed by a personalist premise that parenthood is achieved as an extension of 
the loving relationship of the couple, rather than a disruption of it. 
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Conclusion to the Analysis of Cahill‘s Early Work 
This analysis of Cahill‘s early work elucidates three major themes that will give 
shape to her work throughout the 1990s. Two are well developed while the third remains 
nascent. First, the community is the constant source and context for her moral reasoning. 
Sometimes, ―community‖ refers specifically to the Roman Catholic tradition from which 
she speaks, as in her analyses of the prohibition of ART from the Vatican‘s Instruction. 
Other times, she expresses a more diverse yet unitary Christian moral tradition, as in both 
her assessment of Richard McCormick and Paul Ramsey and her first theory of sexual 
ethics. Still elsewhere, she reaches beyond the confessional boundaries of Christianity to 
larger American society, as with her comparison of magisterial and congressional 
documents regarding in vitro fertilization, and even occasionally to the human 
community writ large in global context, like her developing theory of human rights. 
 Second, with a significant appropriation of the Catholic natural law tradition, 
Cahill roots her ethical reasoning within an objective and universal moral order created 
and redeemed by a loving God. Unlike the new natural law theorists like Grisez, Finnis, 
and others, she does not undertake a search for absolute and exceptionless norms. As 
introduced in Chapter One and fleshed out further in this section, her utilization of the 
natural law is based on an inductive and experiential process. A significant part of it is 
informed by a feminist perspective that historicizes and contextualizes the objective order 
found in the natural law. These twin resources allow Cahill to embrace and affirm the 
Roman Catholic tradition while simultaneously criticizing and transforming it. 
 Finally, the development of Cahill‘s conception of justice is subtle during this part 
of her career. In the earliest writings considered in this first section, justice is a largely 
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personal virtue which is located in the striving agent within his or her context. This 
narrowly-focused notion is consistent with the Thomistic virtue tradition. As this view is 
utilized within a larger theoretical framework, she expresses a natural law vision of rights 
founded upon a major presumption of human dignity. She begins to draw into her project 
the Catholic social tradition, which was discussed at length in the first two chapters of 
this dissertation. The addition of Catholic Social Teaching amplifies her ethical 
arguments to a wider audience that includes secular voices and affirms the communal 
context that is already present in her writings. As the dissertation moves to the next 
period in Cahill‘s writings, it will demonstrate CST is no mere appendage to her work. 
Instead, justice becomes more pronounced as a function of her growing tendency to 
integrate the social tradition into her essays. 
 
Egalitarianism, Embodiment, and Social Justice in Cahill’s Work: 1990-1996 
This section analyzes a ―transitional‖ period of Cahill‘s scholarship in order to 
draw out some of the major themes that will comprise her more theoretical projects in the 
latter part her career. They also shed light on her conception of justice. As mentioned in 
the introduction to this chapter, Cahill‘s work is so often timely and practical. 
Throughout these diverse writings on early life, end-of-life decisions, family life, and 
sexual ethics, she employs a few concepts that aid her in reaching firm though cautious 
conclusions to these and other concerns. This section analyzes three of those notions as 
they relate to three corresponding, interrelated segments of her theological inquiry during 
this period. The first is equality, especially with regard to sexual and family ethics. The 
second is embodiment, particularly as it concerns medical care. The third is justice as it 
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relates to social issues like war and poverty. While egalitarianism has been a consistent 
theme throughout the early period of her writing, social justice was latent or implied in 
her early work. Both have been developed and amplified to become major motifs in later 
work, which will be discussed in the final section of this chapter. Curiously, embodiment 
seems to fade as a prominent concept in her later work. At least two possible reasons 
account for this shift away from embodiment.  
 
Egalitarianism and Sexual Ethics 
In Between the Sexes and other early essays, Cahill‘s sense of justice implies 
fairness: that men and women of the community be treated as social equals. Egalitarian 
considerations are a constant theme throughout her work, and this transitional period is 
no exception. Her concept of equality is implicit in every aspect of her research, but 
nowhere is it more pronounced than in her writings on sexual ethics. This section 
explores this egalitarian theme in two significant texts during this transitional period. The 
first is an article, ―Sexual Ethics: A Feminist Biblical Perspective,‖ which seeks to locate 
sexual ethics in a more explicitly communal rather than personalist setting.
103
 The second 
is a book-length work, Sex, Gender, and Christian Ethics, which develops a broader 
philosophical framework for sexual ethics from her previous work in Between the 
Sexes.
104
 
 Reprising some themes from Between the Sexes, Cahill‘s perspective here is both 
feminist and Christian. It is Christian in that it attempts to demonstrate that the positive, 
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community-building aspects of biblical teachings on sex have normative value for the 
contemporary Christian disciple. It is feminist in its commitment to personal respect and 
equal social power for both men and women. As such, her project involves a significant 
treatment of the ―egalitarian inspiration of Christianity,‖ which is ―perennially liable to 
perversion by powerful authorities.‖105 Cahill points out the New Testament communities 
challenged the prevailing sexual ethos of Roman culture, which was characterized by 
power, domination, and exclusion with competing values of compassion, solidarity, and 
inclusion.
106
 While the transformative aim of her article is to argue for greater equality in 
the social determination of women‘s roles, she insists that a feminist interpretation seeks 
equality for both men and women. As such, her analysis focuses less on the control of 
sexual behavior and more on the embodiment and social relationships which transcend 
sexual ethics.  
 Cahill‘s concerns are also not unidirectional. She worries that the decline of 
traditional Christian sexual morality portends the installation of yet another dominant 
social order: one in which autonomous choice is the sole determinant.
107
 With the 
prioritization of individual interests, decisions about sex are cut off from all social 
supports.
108
 She insists that sex is social, even political, in nature, this conviction leads 
her to couple this communal notion with the concept of gender. Gender expresses the 
social nature of sex in the New Testament, and is the point of departure for feminist 
                                                     
105
 Cahill, Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics, 1. 
106
 Cahill, ―Sexual Ethics: A Feminist Biblical Perspective,‖ 6. 
107
 Cahill, Sex Gender and Christian Ethics, 46-72. 
108
 Cahill, ―Sexual Ethics: A Feminist Biblical Perspective,‖ 9. 
288 
 
critique of potential injustice, as opposed to particular sexual sins, which were ―defined 
in relation to the unity of the community and to equal consideration of all its members.‖  
A feminist biblical sexual ethic does not ―dilute‖ or ―reject‖ the normative force 
of the biblical witness. However, it does shift the focus of the Bible‘s 
interpretation from specific action-guiding norms, especially exclusionary norms, 
to a positive vision and communal practice that is compassionate and 
egalitarian.
109
 
 
The New Testament vision of sex encourages the growth of the new community in their 
internal relations. Christian marriage and virginity were once reactions against a 
dominant political system that used sex as a tool of control. As the church grew in scope 
and power, these positive functions became institutionalized within a new dominant 
structure. By recovering the inclusive vision of biblical teachings, the church can 
ameliorate these injustices. At the same time, the church can rightly criticize various 
kinds of non-marital sexual practices; sex apart from commitment does not symbolize the 
solidaristic worldview of the New Testament.
110
 
 Today‘s Christian ethicists consider equality, autonomy, and fulfillment as moral 
criteria. In fact, Cahill often uses McCormick‘s term ―human flourishing‖ to describe 
these three terms collectively. She is aware of the varied practical meanings of equality, 
but grants that their employment as moral criteria are generally taken for granted.
111
 
While the vocabulary of equality and rights is distinctly modern, they are essential to 
moral discourse. At the same time, a renewed understanding of practical reason, rooted in 
the communal ethics of the Christian tradition, can move these concepts beyond 
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theoretical considerations in to ―concrete, effective means‖ toward equitable social 
participation.
112
  
Cahill‘s understanding of justice, which is grounded in her Christian context and 
coupled with a feminist standpoint, also reflects this sense of equality. 
Roman Catholic feminist theology often upholds an ideal of full human moral 
agency and well-being which presumes a common standard, and understands 
justice neither procedurally nor as protection of individual rights, but as 
egalitarian participation of all human beings in the common good.
113
 
 
Justice as an egalitarian principle does not stand alone. It is also buttressed by her 
insistence on participation and the common good. Her vision of justice includes both its 
commutative and distributive dimensions. 
Justice consists in establishing social relations which are conducive to the 
flourishing of all human persons. Justice goes beyond the assertion of their 
personal rights by encouraging and supporting each person‘s contribution to all 
the conditions of social living which further the common good, including the 
fulfillment of duties to other individuals and to the community as a whole.
114
 
 
Human flourishing, in its sexually-embodied dimension, depends upon the practical 
equality of men and women. Departing from the various natural law accounts of sexuality 
that tend to establish hierarchical relationships between them, Cahill admits that equality 
may in fact be a modern development. But political movements such as abolition and 
women‘s suffrage have also confirmed that equality is a ―fundamental form of human 
excellence.‖115 As such, the move toward gender equality is not just about the personal 
rights of a woman, or even of women in general, but also concerns the good of all in 
society. 
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 As Chapter One pointed out, Cahill argues that sexuality is expressed primarily 
through the family. Further analysis of Cahill‘s work will be provided in the third part of 
this section, which discusses social ethics. But it warrants a brief consideration here in the 
context of egalitarian structures of the family, since Cahill sees that the family situation 
and sexual ethics pose similar moral problems in light of Catholic social thought. While 
early Christians challenged their social context, they opened the door to spousal and 
familial subordination under the aegis of mutual love (see Eph 5:21-33).
116
 Family, as the 
basic unit of society, can help to secure the necessary goods for human flourishing. 
Moreover, families are a cross-cultural phenomenon, though they take many different 
forms in various places.
117
 But the form is not ethically neutral. For instance, 
contemporary Western societies have narrowed its concept of a domestic household to 
the ―nuclear‖ family, yet they demand employed adults to work as if there were a 
caregiver at home for their children.
118
 With the increased attention to marriage as 
personal fulfillment or free choice, people also feel less obliged to enter into or remain in 
marriage. New Testament tradition can teach modern society about the community-
building power of sexual ethics, and it can also provide insights for an egalitarian but 
fragmented, isolated nuclear family.
119
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Embodiment and Medical Ethics 
To be clear, embodiment themes are not relegated solely to Cahill‘s 
considerations in medical ethics. In fact, in the essays on sexual ethics discussed in the 
previous section, Cahill utilizes anthropologist Mary Douglas‘ idea of the body as symbol 
of social organization to demonstrate the social implications of sexual behavior. Citing 
Douglas, Cahill claims that the more strongly embedded the social hierarchy is, the more 
controlled the bodily movements (including sex) of individuals are likely to be.
120
 Cahill 
returns to the work of Douglas and other contemporary thinkers in her work on 
embodiment as it relates to medical ethics, and for many of the same reasons. Whether 
one is talking about legalizing prostitution or marketing organs, both refer to a 
commodification of the body. In medical and sexual ethics, set within a contemporary 
context that prizes autonomy over and above other considerations, there is a tendency to 
separate the ―body‖ from the ―self.‖ If the Christian view of the body as a unity of unruly 
members in need of control has been historically negative, then today‘s medical view of 
the body as ―a site for technical intervention‖ is similarly problematic. 
 Cahill‘s appreciation for embodiment is implied in her 1991 review of the ethical 
dimensions of end-of-life care.
121
 In the wake of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Cruzan 
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Catholic distinction between ordinary 
and extraordinary means of life support arose again to prominence in moral debate. Cahill 
notes that one of the guiding questions during that period concerns the meaning and 
function of ―personhood‖ in decisions for incompetent patients. While some thinkers at 
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the time may interpret the removal of nutrition/hydration from comatose patients as 
―deliberate starvation,‖ others may see it the intentional ―avoidance of a dehumanizing 
existence.‖122 Even though she insists that few Catholic authors would argue that quality 
of life determines personhood or respect, she admits that it is exceedingly difficult to 
describe how these obligations are met in comatose patients. At the same time, there is a 
social justice context that bears upon the deliberation surrounding life-prolonging 
measures.
123
 Here, her review turns to age-sensitive treatment policies. Liberal theories of 
justice (like those of Rawls and Nozick) have advanced the idea that mutual self-interest 
can provide near-limitless access to health care.
124
 But at the end of life, limited resources 
are easily stretched beyond their just distribution. Cahill closes with a clear concern about 
the increased medicalization and institutionalization of aging and death that subtly 
underscores her growing attention to care for human persons within their community. 
  In the last two years of this period, she makes an explicit appeal to embodiment as 
a means of moral critique. Since ethics is at some level about the body, embodiment 
contrasts these dualistic views by integrating the physical nature of the body into the 
other non-material aspects of the persons, including the spiritual and the social.
125
 
Philosophical and theological inquiry into the body seems to fall into two camps: 
                                                     
122
 Ibid., 110, 113. 
123
 Ibid., 115: ―Our quandary about how to articulate our moral obligations to 
PVS patients arises in part because they belong to a species of a rational nature, but have 
irrecoverably lost any capacity to realize that nature in their own individuality.‖ 
124
 Ibid., 126.  
125
 Cahill, ―‘Embodiment‘ and Moral Critique,‖ 204. She reiterates this claim in 
Sex, Gender, and Christian Ethics, 73. 
293 
 
affirmation of the body as constitutive of personhood and deconstruction of the body as 
produced by social discourse.
126
  
In medicine, the concept embodiment attempts to overcome this dualism by 
recognizing both the physical and social nature of the body.
127
 Offering what she calls a 
―Christian social perspective,‖ Cahill points out two distinct biblical contributions that 
advance an embodied vision of the human person in the context of medical intervention. 
A third may be discerned in the classical Thomistic tradition as well. First, the 
incarnation provides a path to understanding compassionate care within the patterns of 
God‘s self-communication. 
One finds, if anything, an anti-dualism about the body in the Gospels. God‘s reign 
is realized in the life and ministry of a man formed bodily in the womb of a 
woman, a man who in his very walking, sleeping, eating, drinking, talking, 
touching, fasting, night-watching, pain and death makes present the compassion 
of God for human suffering.
128
 
 
Jesus, as embodied redeemer, is the centrum of a new community that channels his vision 
of the kingdom at least partly in terms of bodily experience. Second, the previous section 
and Chapter One highlight Cahill‘s claim that Pauline writings about the body disclose a 
reaction against the Roman hierarchy. Even though Paul‘s preference for celibacy may 
reflect a hint of dualism, there is a kind of ―egalitarian solidarity of discipleship‖ found in 
marriage, where believers ―rule over one another‘s bodies‖ (1 Cor 7:4). There are also 
―seeds of alienation‖ for the Christian community as Roman domination is eventually 
replaced by ecclesial power. For example, Paul discounts the ―bodily mark of 
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circumcision,‖ because the practice was used to categorize believers into higher and 
lower social statuses within the believing community (Gal 6:12-15).
129
 In Aquinas‘ 
perspective, moreover, there are further social considerations insofar as the ―complex 
array of needs and capacities innate to our embodied existence‖ roots one‘s moral 
perspective and orders one‘s moral obligations.130 In principle, these concerns could be a 
matter for deliberation about the just distribution of resources. 
 Cahill‘s constructive proposal claims that a positive Christian view of the body 
offers three valuable recommendations to medical practice.
131
  The first is a ―stance of 
compassion‖ toward those who are suffering. Using the metaphor of the Good Samaritan, 
Cahill roots this empathy in ―neighborliness‖ over pity (Luke 10:25-37). The second 
point is a call to realize one‘s own future suffering and ultimate mortality. It correlates to 
the first in that it requires recognition of human vulnerability. As part of this universal 
phenomenon, Cahill points out elsewhere that embodiment is a starting point for 
intercultural reflection on shared experiences, values, and norms.
132
 As Margaret Farley 
notes, pain and death are universal experiences.
133
 In this context, the caregiver and 
patient are ―only provisionally set apart‖ by the latter‘s suffering. Finally, a holistic 
practice must appreciate the social and spiritual goods of bodily life. In her attempt to 
counterbalance the competing goods of autonomy and justice, Cahill sees human 
vulnerability as a value rather than defilement. 
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All persons in such a community might learn to take their own bodily 
vulnerability as an occasion for self-transcendence through compassion for the 
vulnerability of others and in openness to the sustaining communion of being 
which Christians symbolize as ―resurrection life.‖ 134 
 
This solidarity allows for compassionate care not only in avoiding death when possible 
but also in embracing death when it is not. 
 Two points can be made about Cahill‘s attention to embodiment during this 
transitional period. One, there is a conspicuous absence of explicit references to Catholic 
Social Teaching as part of her ―social‖ perspective. Outside of a few citations in her 
review of end-of-life issues, there are no direct citations of the social tradition. The 
opening chapter also pointed out this missing part in her early work on aging.
135
 This 
trend stands in stark contrast to her later writings, which firmly endorse CST. It is 
significant because it seems to imply that Cahill ―discovered‖ fruitful research in CST at 
some point during this transitional period. As the next portion of this section 
demonstrates, it becomes apparent that Cahill is attempting to integrate the social 
tradition into various aspects of her work. Two, it is interesting to note that Cahill‘s 
consideration of embodiment seems to dissipate after this period. It is not just the case 
that she does not write about ―embodiment‖ as such or that the concept is once again 
implicit in her work. The word simply ceases to appear in her essays after this period.
136
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With its potential value for public bioethical discourse, as the discussion of Farley‘s work 
points out, it is surprising that the concept has departed altogether from her lexicon. 
 At least two reasons can be offered for its disappearance. The first is a practical 
consideration. As noted several times in this dissertation, Cahill‘s early writings are 
timely reflections of the trends in moral theology. Her range of topics often focuses upon 
what is lacking in the current moral discourse. This essay anchors an ongoing discussion 
in a text about embodiment and its relationship to medicine. As feminist theologians 
continued to write about embodiment, it could be said that Cahill simply began to look 
for other ways to express her theological views.
137
  
The second speaks more directly to her methodological shifts during this period. 
The previous chapter mentioned the reluctance in this dissertation to label Cahill‘s work 
as strictly ―feminist.‖138 Perhaps this hesitance is related to deeper issues of defining 
feminism, which is a task far afield of the scope this dissertation. Nonetheless, Cahill has 
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described a ―nagging relativism‖ within feminist thought that vexes many thinkers. Her 
term refers to the increasing reliance on the unique perspective of women and the 
deconstruction of essentialist (and male-focused) worldviews.
139
 Since she wrote those 
words, feminism has been divided into categories like ―woman-centered‖ and ―inclusive‖ 
(or ―revolutionary‖ and ―recovery‖), and been refined into even more precise 
classifications like womanist and mujerista. These terms reflect the narrowing 
particularity of feminist thought. Some scholars are even referred to as ―new‖ Catholic 
feminists, though their theological methods seem quite traditional.
140
 
This discussion is not meant to criticize feminist theology in general, nor should it 
be inferred that Cahill does not employ feminist methods in her essays, especially since 
the previous section highlighted her feminist critique of moral theology. Instead, it might 
be better stated that Cahill‘s methods shift in her later writings to synthesize what she has 
deconstructed in her previous work, and does not despair (as some feminists do) of 
finding an objectively-knowable moral order. For instance, ethicist Cristina Traina 
describes Cahill as an exemplar of ―natural law feminism.‖141 She founds this claim on 
Cahill‘s argument that Roman Catholicism‘s natural law values are reasoned inductively, 
through ―a communal model of reasoned moral insight.‖142 Traina notes elsewhere that 
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experience is both the ―most-cited factor and wildest variable‖ in moral debate.143 
Reliance upon a relational, embodied appeal to universal moral norms is an essential 
element to promote public discourse in an epistemologically fractured world, and, ―to 
save feminism from morally debilitating relativism.‖144 If this is the case, then both 
natural law and feminism are Cahill‘s constructive tools with which she build her 
arguments in later essays. Perhaps, then, a concept of embodiment in Cahill‘s work may 
have been ―homogenized‖ by her integration of these two methods. 
Furthermore, this shift may be accounted for by her use of other contemporary 
philosophical methods. As argued in Chapter One, Cahill‘s work (up to this transitional 
point) has been influenced by the philosophical contributions of Mary Midgley, and 
Stephen Toulmin and Albert Jonsen; she synthesizes their respective contributions in 
order to aid her in articulating the objective order of which she writes. Following 
Midgley, Cahill‘s natural law claims are ―modest,‖ insofar as they are derived from 
induction, rooted in experience, and subject to revision.
145
 At the same time, she utilizes 
the refined casuistry of Jonsen and Toulmin, who approach a moral situation by analogy 
through paradigm cases. Prudent, dialogical interaction with each case is required. Cahill 
also expands this discussion beyond act-centered morality to cover the practices of social 
groups. Instead of providing ready-made solutions to complex public issues, her method 
encourages a ―social and intellectual milieu in which the social priorities of religious 
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communities can be recognized sympathetically.‖146 This critical, contextualized 
engagement with the Catholic tradition has also given Cahill some cause for optimism. 
She sees signs of a gradual opening of the institutional hierarchy toward greater gender 
equality, though other scholars do not share her sanguinity.
147
  
Additionally, through the course of this period, Cahill has yet to interface fully 
with the Catholic social tradition, which in its earliest form is derived almost exclusively 
from natural law and in its later forms is also argued from Sacred Scripture. But it is 
during this time when social justice comes to the surface in some of her writings and 
remains a constitutive part of her methodology. Now the dissertation turns to see this 
burgeoning assimilation of CST in Cahill‘s writings in social and political thought. 
 
Justice and Social Ethics 
Chapter One analyzed Cahill‘s arguments in support of increased participation by 
theological voices in the public forum. These writings appear during this transitional 
point. In 1990, she begins to make arguments for public involvement, and in 1992, she 
outlines the content of that contribution as editor of a volume of Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy. In this interim period, she also applies this participation in various ways. For 
instance, in the initial debate regarding stem-cell research, Cahill points out that discord 
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over ―higher principles‖ does not discourage substantial consensus on practical 
solutions.
148
 Citing again the work of Jonsen and Toulmin, she takes the position that a 
―locus of certitude‖ is not found in universal, general norms, but in ―a shared perception 
of what was specifically at stake in particular kinds of human situations.‖149 She claims 
that committees engaged in such ―prudent deliberation‖ must be not only diverse in their 
makeup, but also serious about self-criticism in achieving consensus. Implied in this 
discussion is a sense of equity, which overcomes the ―spectre (sic) of interests‖ which 
obstructs resolution of public dilemmas.
150
 As Cahill‘s theological inquiries begin to 
branch out into other particular issues, this implicit idea of social justice becomes 
apparent. Unlike embodiment, justice remains an undergirding concept throughout the 
remainder of her essays, as the final section of this chapter demonstrates. This portion of 
the chapter describes Cahill‘s growing commitment to social justice in two areas: war and 
family. Because of the shifting context for both situations, CST makes a vital 
contribution to these complex realms of her moral analysis. 
 
Justice, Pacifism, and Just War 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the political landscape of the 1980s was shaped 
largely by the polarization engendered from the half-century-long Cold War. The 
promotion of democratic capitalism on the one side and socialist communism on the 
other defined the strategic and political aims of opposing nations during the period. With 
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the collapse of communism, this polarization quickly subsided, but just war issues did 
not. Immediately after the Cold War, the United States and its NATO allies found 
themselves in yet another conflict in the Persian Gulf. Ethicist J. Bryan Hehir believes 
that this new war changed the face of military intervention in two ways. It first of all 
highlighted the erosion of national sovereignty for some nations to pursue their own 
interests within international society. Conversely, it magnified the interdependence and 
cooperation among other nations in military, economic, and political matters.
151
  
Cahill‘s published work on the subject of war began in the mid-1980s, with a 
series of articles in the biblical theology journal Interpretation, where she considers both 
the historical and biblical foundations for Christian pacifism and just war.
152
 This 
groundbreaking work for Cahill lays a foundation for this transitional period of her 
essays, and also offers a few insights into the adaptation of her work to new 
circumstances. This section considers two of Cahill‘s positive contributions to ethical 
discourse about war and pacifism. The first is her appropriation of the magisterial 
documents related to justice and peace. The second is the continuation of her theme of 
community-building. Cahill‘s initial inquiries into war and pacifism entail a broad 
historical approach, which includes Sacred Scripture, select Patristic authors (especially 
Augustine), Thomas Aquinas‘ philosophy, and the reflections of Christian Reformers.153 
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Her research distinguishes those thinkers who understand the Christian community in 
eschatological terms from those who envision it in political terms. Each camp has 
difficulty dealing with counterexamples found in the bible, and in turn must resort to 
justifying their positions with a contrasting interpretation of the troublesome texts. With 
this diversity of philosophical and biblical views, Cahill concludes her early study with a 
dividing question: ―whether the Kingdom‘s peace can characterize history, or whether 
peace waits upon establishment of justice, even if by coercion and even if by 
violence.‖154 
During the transitional period of her work, Cahill employs social teachings from 
the United States‘ Bishops, who side with the latter part of the issue when they claim that 
justice is prior to peace.
155
 Following the sources of CST, they insist that coercion has its 
limits and proscriptions in the prosecution of war. For example, the Bishops‘ document 
echoes the condemnation of nuclear warfare, especially when aimed at civilian 
populations.
156
 They also realize that just war involves more than a moral evaluation of 
weaponry or military strategy, but instead must attend to moral choices that reflect 
Kingdom living.
157
 Their pastoral is set not only within a pluralistic context of the 
American political community, but also within diverse views about Christian ethics. They 
                                                     
154
 Ibid., 397. 
155
 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: God‟s 
Promise and our Response (Washington: United States Catholic Conference, 1983), 
paragraph 60: ―In the kingdom of God, peace and justice will be fully realized. Justice is 
always the foundation of peace. In history, efforts to pursue both peace and justice are at 
times in tension, and the struggle for justice may threaten certain forms of peace‖ 
(emphasis added). 
156
 Ibid., 147; cf. Gaudium et Spes, 80. 
157
 Ibid., 67. 
303 
 
attempt to appeal to the common good, which they understand in the context of Vatican 
II‘s Pastoral Constitution as a universal, transnational norm.158 
With this pastoral foundation, Cahill picks up the theme of the universal common 
good in her essays on war and peace during this time. She notes that social teachings 
have become less explicit in their support for unlimited national sovereignty and ―more 
interested in joining nations together in the common cause of peace under the leadership 
of a world government.‖159 Justice is another important component. Cahill claims that 
Aquinas influenced the Catholic tradition regarding justice and peace.
160
 Much of his 
theological reflection is derived from Aristotle‘s naturalism, and calls for a moral order 
that is, in principle, knowable to all reasonable agents. But in the Aristotelian tradition, 
justice was reserved for the members of the community (i.e., of the city-state), while 
provisional hospitality was afforded to strangers. In envisioning a global, interdependent 
community, even one that includes a nation‘s enemies, justice must remain an 
overarching concern. 
In terms of their respective interpretations of Aquinas‘ thought on justice, there is 
a clear distinction between Cahill and Jean Porter, whose work was discussed in the 
previous chapter. As Porter notes, justice can produce conflict because of the attempt to 
achieve finite human values and ends, and must therefore be supplemented by the virtue 
of charity.
161
 By contrast, Cahill sees a Thomistic sense of justice as privileging the 
common good over individual good. She points to a series of questions from the Summa 
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which suggest that that justice must rule over individual concerns. For example, Aquinas 
suggests that public officials, motivated by charity, must seek the public good over that of 
individuals.
162
 Related to this example, Cahill notes that in Aquinas, a judge who issues 
the death penalty may prefer the common good to that of the individual, but allows that 
conversion and expiation may also be effected in the criminal by this sentence.
163
 
What is more important here is the drastic effect of pacifism upon Cahill‘s critical 
appropriation of the natural moral law. She notes that Aquinas wrestled with many of 
―radical implications‖ of Jesus‘ teachings on nonviolence and nonresistance, but did not 
let them challenge his ―essentially philosophical moral perspective.‖ However, Cahill is 
challenged by the idea of pacifism and nonresistance. She demonstrates that Christian 
pacifism and just war theory are not simply two moral options, but two ―fundamentally 
contrasting evolutions of Christian identity.‖164 While both entail a presupposition against 
violence, she claims that pacifism alone is a ―way of life.‖ In other words, only pacifism 
can be called a ―communal practice‖ in Christian life. She highlights that this shared 
practice is not monolithic, and discerns two types of pacifism: compassionate and 
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obediential.
165
 In fact, it is just this type of discourse that makes pacifism a ―practice‖ in 
MacIntyre‘s use of the term in that it has complexity, internal goods, and standards of 
excellence.
 166
 Moreover, it is part of an ongoing debate within the community about the 
overriding importance of imitating Christ‘s actions and teachings. 
Just war theory clearly has its roots in the natural moral law. As such it seems 
reasonable to suppose that a plausible account of the theory could be adapted to the 
Christian community. However, Cahill makes the startling claim that 
Just war theory is not communal in any specific sense (other than that it emerges 
from Western cultural and moral traditions), precisely because its purpose is to 
unite different and even antagonistic religious, moral, and cultural communities 
around a set of excluding or negative and minimal criteria of mutual association 
in exceptional circumstances. The presupposition of these limiting criteria is 
positive – peace is a value and is to be sought – but while the just war theory 
deters infractions against peace, its so functioning does not depend on agreement 
about a positive, substantive view of peace or justice or even war.
167
 
 
Cahill‘s strong reluctance about just war considerations can be explained in large part by 
her suspicions about religious coercion. She notes that the U.S. Bishops‘ pastoral letter 
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did not question whether a genuine peace can be established coercively.
168
 She also 
highlights the historical use of compulsion in the Catholic and Reformed traditions.
169
  
In her future essays, though, Cahill is generally less wary of coercive policies. For 
instance, she envisions appeals to enlightened self-interest as an ―indirect and 
anticipatory form of coercion, in which an agent rationally considers future or potential 
negative consequences of a certain course of action. Bad press, trade sanctions, and 
punitive taxation are three examples of these forcible practices.  In fact, within a decade, 
she also seems to reverse her earlier criticism of just war theory.
170
 Due to human 
sinfulness and structural injustices, force is sometimes needed.  
Thus, an element to be accentuated in social teaching of the future is the 
occasional, but still very definite, need for coercion to secure justice in social 
relations. Still needed is a principle of forceful intervention that is similar to the 
principle that undergirded the traditional just war theory. Once again, though, the 
structures of social agency have changed in the age of globalization; coercive 
authority is not limited to the nation-state, a comprehensive public authority, or 
international institutions. Activist networks and non-governmental organizations, 
along with dissenting national governments, can challenge and even coerce some 
aspects of global systems, at least some of the time.
171
 
 
As Cahill‘s work more fully integrated CST, she seems to come to terms with the 
tradition that coercion is sometimes needed in the face of dehumanizing injustice.
172
 CST 
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also evolved during this time of change in Cahill‘s thought. Since Vatican II, CST, which 
in its earlier form is grounded in natural law, began to lean more heavily upon Sacred 
Scripture in order to generate timely, practical solutions to pressing social problems.
173
 
Critical interaction with social teachings will become foundational of her later ethical 
writings, especially bioethics. 
 Her deeper consideration of CST has even further implications for her ongoing 
work in sexuality and the family. During this transitional time in her writings, she 
continues to draw in the social tradition into her essays. Building upon Chapter One‘s 
analysis of her use of CST, the next section analyzes Cahill‘s understanding of justice 
within the family context. 
 
Justice, Family, and Sexual Ethics 
The opening chapter of this dissertation described the importance of the family in 
CST. For instance, Leo XIII insisted that compensation for labor should provide 
sufficiently for a worker‘s family, which is the first natural society.174 The family is also 
the narrowest demonstration of the sociality of human beings, one of the three basic 
affirmations of CST. But the family is more than a basic economic unit, and the family 
structure is not beyond ethical critique. Even though Cahill‘s early work in sexual and 
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family ethics underscores the communal dimension of both, it did not include any 
references to CST. Instead, she attempts an inductive and contextualized appropriation of 
the natural law that moved beyond emphases upon individual acts.
175
 
 In her later work in family ethics, natural law is still a prominent element, as it 
was in her early work, but she also fully integrates CST into her mature project. At the 
same time, Cahill‘s notion of justice evolves beyond the natural law‘s basic definition as 
―giving others what is due to them.‖ This commutative and distributive principle remains 
a part of her work, but it also becomes idealized in concert with the social tradition‘s 
understanding of social justice. This section analyzes her work in family and sexual 
ethics during this transitional period by placing it within the stream of her research, past 
and future. It includes a brief comparison both to her previous essays, while the next 
section considers her later thought related to family ethics. 
 As described in Chapter One, Cahill founds her claims about the family on the 
biological aspect of human sex. It is vital for the continuation of the species, and thereby 
is constitutive of the natural order. Family and gender organize reproduction 
―cooperatively and socially‖ toward this end. By the same token, justice is a uniquely 
human notion in the created order, promoting the life of the species beyond mere 
survival. In order to orient human sexual activity in a proper manner, the common good 
provides content for justice in its interpersonal and social dimensions. Thus, in humans, 
the family is the primary conduit through which sex and gender relate to the common 
good.
176
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 During this period of Cahill‘s scholarship, her notion of justice moves beyond the 
egalitarian and personalist tendencies of her previous work toward a solidaristic and 
interdependent framework for justice.
177
 This conception of justice deemphasizes the 
moral sense of responsibility away from principles and stresses it toward persons, 
especially to those in need. For example, in her discussion of Aquinas‘ views on marriage 
and family, she considers the justice aspects of these institutions which are highlighted in 
his work. She sees his insistence on monogamy as ―more naturally just‖ than polygamous 
marriage or non-marital childbearing.
178
 Monogamy places a clear restraint on men from 
―indiscriminate insemination,‖ and the responsibility for men to provide material 
protection to expectant mothers and their children.
179
 Moreover, it protects older women 
who have lost either beauty, fecundity, or both.
180
 Cahill‘s discussion of justice in 
Aquinas‘ thought is a new development from Between the Sexes, where she looks to the 
interpersonal dimension of couples in his work.
181
 In this classical sense, justice is still 
intrinsically concerned with giving to others what is due to them, and this theme is 
likewise prominent in Cahill‘s discussion of honoring parents. However, Christian roots 
of justice are far deeper than liberal notions of parenthood. 
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Aquinas attributes greater love of humans for their parents to the ―honor‖ and 
―reverence‖ they owe them (as contrasted to the ―care‖ owed children). Honor for 
one‘s parents depends both on the memory and foresight necessary to recognize 
intergenerational relationships, to experience gratitude for past benefits, and to 
maintain a moral sense of indebtedness for such benefits, even when their 
prospective utility is past.
182
 
 
This intergenerational portrayal of justice demonstrates her constant rejection of 
utilitarian and social contract bases for justice, but it also underscores the ―interactive 
reason‖ which is constitutive of the dialogic nature of Cahill‘s developing notion of 
justice.
183
 
 The common good gives content to her notions of justice, with solidarity and 
responsibility as two guiding virtues that help to contribute toward the common good. 
One example during this period is found in an essay on suffering. While keeping the 
essential equality of persons intact, Cahill begins to shift the focus away from 
egalitarianism as such to ―solidarity and mutual care.‖ This ―Christian resocialization‖ 
penetrated the early community to its core, and disrupted the effects of economic, gender, 
social and other differences. 
184
 Contemporary Christian ethics must not only address the 
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suffering of others but also determine their responsibility for it.
185
 On this basis, Cahill 
claims that CST brings together freedom and responsibility together under the theme of 
participation in the common good.
186
 Family relates to this aspect of CST in two 
reciprocal ways. 
Christian families should not turn inward, nurturing only their own interior 
relations and spirituality. The family also has social responsibilities, and families, 
in turn, need social support so that they can participation in the common good and 
fulfill their responsibilities. My main point is that, taken together, both kinds of 
responsibility mean that more-advantaged families have an obligation to less-
advantaged families, including broken, single-parent, impoverished families and 
families suffering from racial or ethnic discrimination.
187
 
 
On the one hand, the social responsibilities of families are universal, in that they must 
refrain from turning inward on themselves. Implicit here is that families are both free and 
dependent at the same time, because they need help to participate fully in society. On the 
other hand, these social responsibilities often have a particular dimension to them, 
especially when families are confronted with the suffering of another family. The virtue 
of solidarity is thereby given a context that concretizes the universal principle of social 
justice. 
 Justice considerations also have an influence on sexual and family ethics within a 
global social context. Contraception as a population-reducing strategy is a very different 
question from a couple‘s family planning scheme. Cahill grants that the welfare of a 
community (local or global) might require limitations on family size, but it must be 
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considered in relation to economic and political justice, including justice for women. It 
must also be assessed according to distributive schemes and other justice factors within 
an interdependent community, with a focus on disadvantaged or vulnerable 
populations.
188
  
 
Conclusion to the Analysis of the ―Transitional‖ Period in Cahill‘s Work 
This section has attempted to navigate the complex, circuitous development in 
Cahill‘s conception of justice during a transitional period in her scholarship. On the one 
hand, personal justice as a Thomistic virtue is an enduring component of her work. To 
call it ―personal‖ does not mean that justice is an isolated or private matter. In her work, 
―justice for individuals‖ always implies individuals within a community. At this point, 
Cahill‘s notion of personal justice has to do with equality, especially in her sexual and 
gender ethics. On the other hand, the community as such becomes the locus for her 
considerations of justice. Like the twisting of a kaleidoscope, the perspective shifts while 
the constitutive elements of justice remain the same. Her concept of embodiment gives a 
social and historical context to the agent, and in turn offers a turn to the social dimensions 
of justice. This social perspective, which recognizes the universality of mortality and 
sickness, allows for compassionate care and resurrection hope. However, embodiment 
disappears as a fundamental concept in her later work. This early social perspective also 
seems to exclude explicit references to Catholic Social Teaching, but as the third segment 
of this section demonstrated, she begins to incorporate CST into her scholarship during 
this time. The affirmations of human dignity, sociality, and the common good – which, 
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taken together, perhaps imply embodiment – become an indispensable part of these and 
future essays. 
 In terms of just war and pacifism, it is clear during this part of her career that 
Cahill privileges the latter. Against the general view of the social tradition, she sees 
nonviolence as the only practice that can be emblematic of an authentic Christian 
community. She later modifies and eventually reverses this position, as she comes to 
understand that coercion can and at times must be used to thwart deeply entrenched 
injustices. This shift can be explained by a more complete integration of CST, which 
demands that Christians maintain responsibility for their part in the evolution of historical 
events that impact upon the common good.
189
 Her growing attention to the common good 
has enormous influence upon her ethical writings on family. The common good supplies 
a concrete measure for justice in all human relations, and participation is the first 
indicator of justice. Participation implies an egalitarian aspect of justice with regard to 
equal respect and social power. It also requires contribution from all toward the common 
good, and generates responsibility on the part of society to ensure that all can fully 
participate. While the family can help to secure the goods required for human flourishing, 
society must be able to afford their widest possible distribution.  
 The final section will demonstrate that the social dimensions of Cahill‘s writings 
take on a fully global perspective, and it is indeed a rare essay that does not include some 
ethical import for worldwide society. It analyzes her continuing work on the family and 
bioethics as she increasingly assimilates CST into her method. Her strategies to achieve 
both personal and social justice in both of these areas of her research reach out across an 
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array of religious, political, governmental and non-governmental entities. In short, the 
next section addresses the considerations of Cahill‘s ―collaborative justice.‖  
 
Collaborative Justice and the Common Good in Global Perspective: 1997 - Present 
Cahill‘s growing attention to justice in the universal church and global society 
become the overwhelming focus in her later writings, and this theme persists to the 
present day. Her notion of justice attempts to cover nearly every area of ecclesial and 
public life. She accomplishes this goal by fully integrating the Catholic social tradition 
into her work. At the same time, she understands that justice cannot be achieved at local 
levels as a result of top-down interventions. Outsiders can serve a vital role through 
public advocacy, material and technological support, and advisory personal, but the 
responsibility of local improvement must belong to the local polity. Her insistence upon 
homegrown or grassroots empowerment is an application of the principle of subsidiarity, 
which is also a component of CST. 
 This final section analyzes Cahill‘s application of collaborative justice in family 
and social ethics, which remains a major part of her scholarship up to the present. In this 
context, she amplifies many of CST‘s concepts to buttress the foundation of her earlier 
work in sexual and family ethics. She also calls for greater participation of the laity, and 
especially women, in the governance of the Catholic Church. Her critical understanding 
of CST becomes apparent in her analysis of several challenges to the social tradition. 
Nonetheless, she remains optimistic that CST is the best way to express Catholic identity 
in the public forum. The dissertation also summarizes the structure of collaborative 
justice, and compares Cahill‘s vision of justice with the philosophical and theological 
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accounts of justice offered in Chapters Two and Three. The dissertation‘s conclusion will 
discuss the possibility of applying Cahill‘s collaborative justice to future public discourse 
about genetic enhancement, an issue which she has also considered extensively. 
 
Collaborative Justice in Family and Social Ethics 
This section explores Cahill‘s growing tendency to utilize collaborative strategies 
in achieving justice throughout her theological project. In doing so, she refines her earlier 
work in sexual and family ethics, and recommends ways in which diverse family types 
can serve the common good of society. She also encourages greater participation 
especially for women in all areas of social life, including the church. She argues that 
complementarity undermines the church‘s mission by marginalizing a large number of its 
members. With regard to social ethics, Cahill continues to insist that religious voices 
should maintain a leading role in public debate. This persistence is driven by her firm 
commitment to collaborative justice, which transcends liberal and communitarian 
approaches to justice.     
The first chapter summarized CST‘s vital influence on Cahill‘s later work on sex, 
gender, and family. Cahill‘s writings on the family have moved from its significance for 
sustaining today‘s Christian community to the transformative values of solidarity and 
responsibility for the larger society in which Christians live. This trend begins in essays 
during the transitional period of her career, and further evidence is found in her 2000 
book, which analyzes the Christian family through the lens of CST. There, she defines 
family as ―an organized network of socioeconomic and reproductive interdependence and 
support grounded in biological kinship and marriage.‖ Historically, marriage and the 
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family have been the primary ways in which economic and social structures are 
managed.
190
 Michael Walzer also described marriage as one of the predetermined social 
arrangements in which humans find themselves.
191
 Employing John Paul‘s metaphor of 
the family as domestic church, Cahill confirms the interdependence of the family and 
society.
192
 She calls on society to provide support for the well-being of families, so that 
they might thereby contribute effectively toward the common good. 
However, Cahill is also concerned that the Christian community has not yet 
achieved complete participation of its own membership. For example, social encyclicals 
on the family still insist on a paradigm of complementarity which assigns women to 
domestic (i.e., private) roles in society. In other later essays, Cahill points out that, even 
though most non-ordained ministerial positions in local parishes are held by women, 
there is still no role for women in the Roman Curia, which preserves and perpetuates 
Catholic teaching.
193
  At the same time, theological perspectives that tend to idealize the 
nuclear family actually undermine Catholic teaching on the common good.
194
 
Consequently, Cahill‘s commitment to justice for all within the community engenders a 
certain hesitation in her other later essays to utilize fully the metaphor of family as 
―domestic church.‖ 
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Cahill makes three arguments which attempt to rehabilitate this domestic church 
imagery by transforming the participatory nature and diverse structures of the family 
itself. First, she claims that Christian families‘ internal structure should be based on 
reciprocity (elsewhere called mutuality) and spirituality rather than complementarity. 
Moreover, families should turn outward in order to transform society in a manner 
consistent with CST. Finally, a diverse church should be able to tolerate varied family 
structures in their struggle.
195
 In short, Cahill calls on families to be just, to work toward 
justice, and to be supported by just institutions, including the church itself. 
Furthermore, she offers five recommendations which she believes will give rise to 
a justice-seeking domestic church.
 196
 First, the family‘s internal relationships should 
embody justice insofar as it is rooted in mutuality, dignity, and respect. In another essay, 
she employs the concepts mutuality and reciprocity as a ―guiding vision‖ for the church, 
in hopes that ―justice and love can be more fully realized in society and in the church.‖ 
She also calls for a reinvigoration of the church‘s teaching on human createdness in order 
to ―preclude any idea that men can imitate Christ more than women.‖197 Next, familial 
roles should promote participation in the common good. Third, kinship should not be 
placed above discipleship as a ―family in Christ,‖ Fourth, the domestic church, like the 
universal church, should seek justice with a preferential option for the poor. Fifth, the 
family‘s internal moral commitments must be contextualized by its relationship with God 
in all aspects of life – religious and secular. Cahill‘s five-fold emphases on human 
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dignity, common good, firm discipleship, preferential option, and holistic lifestyle all 
reflect the complete integration of CST into her theological reflections on the family. 
Cahill‘s collaborative justice in family ethics continues to insist on gender 
equality as its point of departure. Equality within the family ―teaches an important lesson 
for the way we approach those outside our families.‖198 To this point, she praises John 
Paul II‘s refusal to limit women‘s roles to the domestic realm in his social encyclicals. 199  
Despite the central place the pontiff gives motherhood for women, a position that Cahill 
believes creates an imbalance in his social thought, she also believes that gender equality 
can be realized by locating it under the aegis of the Preferential Option for the Poor. The 
Preferential Option affirms justice through its call for social justice and inclusive 
participation in the common good. The historic and ongoing exclusion of women from 
roles in public life warrants their categorization among the world‘s poor. 200 
Moving to Cahill‘s work in social ethics in general, one finds aspects of 
collaborative justice in nearly all of her essays. Each account of justice presented in 
Chapter Two clearly proposes certain consequences for participation in the public sphere. 
It is apparent from the breadth of Cahill‘s most recent writings that she generally rejects 
liberal strategies which prefer market forces and autonomous choice as the guiding values 
for moral deliberation. It is equally clear that she does not intend to call for the church to 
isolate itself by withdrawing from the public forum. Even though she consistently accepts 
that CST is the unsurpassed method for Catholics participating in public ethical 
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discourse, she is also fully aware of the challenges for CST in an age of globalization. 
This dissertation makes the case that Cahill‘s notion of collaborative justice, expressed in 
CST‘s concepts of solidarity and subsidiarity, effectively answers these troubling 
questions about CST. The remainder of this chapter section on social ethics summarizes 
Cahill‘s response to various challenges to a Catholic understanding of the common good, 
and the conclusion will demonstrate how she applies collaborative justice to the area of 
genetics. 
Cahill sees that one nagging obstacle for a common good approach to social 
issues in an age of globalization has to do with world governance. The social encyclicals 
look hopefully toward the United Nations to become the final arbiter of international 
conflicts and problems. Even Benedict XVI still seeks a world political entity with the 
authority to implement proposed solutions to international development.
201
 In the absence 
of such an entity, Cahill claims that powerful organizations like the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank have moved 
into this vacuum. The WTO‘s objective is to ―guarantee a safe and stable political and 
financial environment for first world producers and investors.‖202 Part of this problem is 
tied directly to CST, especially the social encyclicals, which envision layers of authority 
in a top-down fashion. While the social tradition accounts for these layers through the 
principle of subsidiarity, which allows these levels to operate within their respective 
spheres of operation, it remains committed to a worldwide authority at the top. 
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By contrast, Cahill perceives in the principle of subsidiarity an implicit notion: 
there is acceptance of a plurality of social organizations, with overlapping and reciprocal 
areas of competence. Globalization challenges CST‘s hierarchical paradigm to include 
this pluralism which imagines an authority that is ―multifaceted, dialogical, flexible, and 
open-ended.‖ As an alternative, Cahill calls attention to organizations that she refers to as 
―transnational advocacy networks,‖ groups of activists who share a practical consensus 
about a certain value or injustice (e.g., the environment, HIV/AIDS, global debt, etc.). 
Using the same communications and transportation technology that brought about 
globalization, these networks can work on behalf of the marginalized or against the 
interests of the powerful.
203
 
Cahill makes analogous claims in the area of moral theology in general. Utilizing 
Australian feminist legal scholar Hilary Charlesworth‘s model of ―transversalism,‖ 
understood as a cross-cultural and empathetic process reaching moral consensus, Cahill 
insists that there is very little cultural pluralism with regard to the most basic needs of 
persons and societies. Transversalism has potential ―to invigorate our quest for 
justice.‖204 
Where cultural pluralism makes a huge often negative moral difference is in 
defining the systems of access by which individuals and group either do or do not 
obtain the goods their welfare and flourishing require. Access to goods is 
typically restricted. Every culture and institution known to humanity systematizes 
types of discrimination. Modern terms such as ―human dignity,‖ ―full humanity,‖ 
―democracy,‖ ―human rights,‖ ―equality,‖ ―solidarity,‖ and ―equal opportunity‖ 
are ways of challenging inequitable access patterns.  Such language represents a 
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social, political, and legal ethos in which participation in the common good and 
access to basic goods of society is universally shared, even though on man 
possible cultural models. This is the modern definition of social justice, and social 
justice is an indispensable constituent of contemporary moral theology.
205
 
 
The natural law tradition, which grounds CST, also offers the warrant for religious voices 
to dialogue about these and other public moral problems. It is built on the premise that 
shared humanity will resolve practical threats to the common good.
206
 
 In some ways, Cahill‘s conception of collaborative justice resembles Margaret 
Farley‘s notion of ―compassionate respect.‖ As described in Chapter Three, Farley 
envisions the content for justice being provided by compassionate respect, whereas the 
common good offers meaning for just social relations. In Cahill‘s work, the common 
good provides the content, while solidarity and equality help to define justice‘s meaning. 
But in both cases aid is not rendered in a top-down, paternalistic manner. The action and 
activism required to ameliorate an unjust situation is accomplished in a way that respects 
persons within their particular contexts. 
 Collaborative justice also demonstrates Cahill‘s commitment to participation in 
the political process. In a 2012 essay, she asserts that political participation is one of the 
most significant activities in which humans can fulfill their human dignity, and it is 
crucial for sustaining a healthy democracy and justice. But she is also concerned that 
Catholic citizens, especially in the American context, too often become ―single-issue 
voters.‖ 207 She cites the 2008 U.S. Presidential election as evidence of Catholic voters 
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moving away from a tendency to focus myopically on a candidate‘s stance on abortion 
while ignoring virtually all other social issues.
208
 Cahill calls for a further distancing of 
Catholic voters from what she refers to as the ―culture wars,‖ and instead move toward 
―forging a dynamic vision from constructive debate, respectful criticism, practical 
commitment, and a hermeneutic of generosity toward others‘ value priorities.‖ 209  
In a bipolar world, where twenty percent of the world‘s developed nations tend 
toward overconsumption while many in the developing world suffer from 
malnourishment, 
 
greater attention to global justice helps to achieve these urgent political 
goals.
210
 She is encouraged to see Benedict‘s Caritas in Veritate call for global social 
reform, which requires a ―global solidarity,‖ a public place for religion, and a love which 
leads to ―engagement in the field of justice and peace.‖211 He also insists on a world 
political authority to oversee such policies, a task Cahill believes is no longer a viable 
solution.
212
 
It warrants repeating here that although Cahill generally rejects the notion of an 
overarching authority with regard to international development that she does not reject a 
universally expressible morality. In fact, on this point Cahill differs with Jean Porter, who 
takes the position that theological ethical norms cannot be expressed to those outside the 
community. Moreover, Porter claims that a global ethic is neither necessary nor possible. 
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A universal ethic could only be described at the highest levels of abstraction, emptying 
them of any actual universal meaning.
213
 Instead, Cahill has consistently claimed that 
Catholic ethics is intelligible to larger society to the degree that Catholic theologians can 
resist proceeding deductively from first principles.
214
 Cahill has maintained this position 
for over a decade. 
Global ethics does not stand or fall with a universal set of specific moral 
prescriptions, which few today would defend, but with the idea that there are after 
all some moral nonnegotiables and some clearly identifiable injustices to which 
all cultures and religions should be responsive for humanistic reasons.
215
 
 
The unprecedented rise of globalization now requires global patterns of morality. Mass 
communications and rapid transportation technologies have already shaped relationships 
among human persons and communities across national and cultural lines.
216
 Cahill‘s 
attention to unjust situations and structures in global society has oriented her search for a 
suitable common morality, and collaborative justice seems to be its comprehending 
principle. 
 
The Elements of Collaborative Justice and Comparison with Other Accounts 
 What are the contours of Cahill‘s notion of collaborative justice, then? Four 
observations can be made. First of all, it is rooted in the Thomistic definition of giving to 
others what is due to them. This classical understanding has been pronounced in writings 
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which span her entire career. What is most interesting here is how the subject of justice 
has developed during this time. In Cahill‘s early writings, justice was subtly and 
strategically placed within select writings in order to resolve particular issues within a 
communal context. Individual persons inside the Body of Christ were the subject of 
justice. Issues like occasional contraception, committed homosexuality, and remarriage 
after divorce are deeply personal, yet they can also affect others within the larger 
community.
217
 Her later work tends to portray this communal dimension in broadly-
inclusive shades, a perspective that moves beyond Aquinas‘ conception of ―community,‖ 
as discussed in Chapter Three. 
 Next, the common good gives content to collaborative justice. Participation in 
striving for the common good is essential to living out one‘s human dignity. Justice 
requires that persons contribute to their fullest capacity. It also demands that society 
provide each family with what they lack, so that they can fulfill this responsibility to 
justice. Cahill has noted that the latter part of this mutual arrangement is the ―flip side‖ of 
social justice.
218
 Thus, there is an interdependent, reciprocal relationship between the 
individual and society. The final part of this section also describes her ―bioethics of the 
common good,‖ which gives substance to bioethical applications of justice.  
 Third, Cahill‘s writings describe collaborative justice as a universal principle. 
This principle is not logically deduced, but experientially inducted. Induction is also not 
an isolated intellectual process, but an engaging dialogical one. Occasionally, she has 
referred to this common morality by way of David Hollenbach‘s idea of ―dialogic 
universalism,‖ which Cahill describes as premised upon human dignity but articulated in 
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a ―pluralistic but interdependent world.‖ Practices of solidarity are vital to the universal 
scope of collaborative justice, so that the common good may be achieved appropriately 
and differentially within the ―network of crisscrossing communities.‖ 219 
 Finally, as this dissertation concludes with a consideration of Cahill‘s writings on 
genetic enhancement, it is important to preface that analysis with her lengthy description 
of justice, what this dissertation calls ―collaborative justice,‖ as it applies to germline 
modification. 
The definition of justice upon which I rely, and which I will apply in the area of 
germline modification, is procedural, substantive, social, and global. Justice 
requires procedures by which all social members can participate in establishing 
practices and institutions that affect their welfare and that of their communities. 
Justice requires access to the basic human goods necessary for human life, well-
being, and society. Justice refers to and includes patterns of social relationships 
and institutions that allow individuals and groups to be related to one another 
consistently at distances of time and space. Justice as participation, as sharing in 
basic goods, and as social or political is a global norm or ideal, applying to all 
peoples or cultures.
220
 
 
Cahill‘s depiction of justice here includes the three major aspects of collaborative justice 
that were described in the preceding paragraphs. It consists in giving to others their due. 
Justice‘s demands are determined by reference to the common good. Likewise, 
participation is a constitutive element of the common good and, by extension, justice. 
Furthermore, her definition is global in scope. Further still, Cahill‘s definition resonates 
and contrasts in significant ways with the accounts of justice analyzed in the Chapters 
Two and Three. 
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Collaborative Justice and the Philosophical Accounts of Justice 
 For example, Cahill and John Rawls both construe justice in procedural terms. 
Both express egalitarian tendencies, with regard to respect for individual persons. They 
are also concerned with the welfare of society‘s least-favored citizens. Rawls expresses 
this responsibility in the Difference Principle, while Cahill looks to solidarity as the 
primary, guiding virtue. The two concepts are similar insofar as both attend to the least 
well-off in society, but they are quite far apart in practice. On the one hand, Cahill claims 
that solidarity gives content to the larger practices of justice. Rawls, on the other hand, 
envisions the Difference Principle qua principle, and lexically follows the primacy of 
liberty. Cahill might reasonably be able to practice solidarity in a manner that resonates 
with the Difference Principle, but it is only incidentally so. Cahill‘s solidarity is an 
application of Rawls‘ Difference Principle only because Cahill has a foundational sense 
of the good prior to Rawls‘ two-fold conception of justice. This good is equality rooted in 
human dignity, which is related to, but quite distinct from, liberty. As the Epilogue will 
bear out, solidarity requires that liberty sometimes be constrained, even coercively. 
Furthermore, their respective notions of justice imply both cooperation and 
competition among its constituents, while trying to subtract power from its original 
position to avoid unfair exploitation of initial advantages. Rawls accomplishes this task 
intellectually through the veil of ignorance. In reality, however, power differentials are 
often found in policy debates. By contrast, Cahill employs a participatory bioethics that 
includes action and activism.
221
  Several examples were offered in the present chapter as 
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well as the first, like Cahill‘s description of transnational advocacy networks.222 Cahill‘s 
collaborative strategies thereby diffuse these power gradients more effectively than the 
constant government intervention required by Rawls‘ Difference Principle. 
Ultimately, Cahill rejects Rawls‘ two-fold political conception of justice, which 
privileges liberty above all else in its serial ordering. Rawls rules out substantive 
discussion about the good life for liberty‘s sake, thereby allowing citizens to pursue their 
own life plans. Cahill takes the position that, lacking a fuller notion of the good, public 
discourse becomes ruled by ―the values of individualism, science, technology, the 
market, and profits.‖ Instead, she calls upon theologians to recover its prophetic voice, 
and join the public forum as ―an energetic adversary of the liberal consensus.‖ 223 Cahill 
also critiques Rawlsian approaches to genetic medicine on the grounds that unjust 
patterns of health care access, which already exist, will continue to exclude the 
marginalized with regard to genetic interventions. Ordinarily worthy values like free 
choice and tolerance tend to short-circuit serious considerations of the common good.
224
 
This issue is also addressed further in the conclusion. 
As described in Chapter Two, Cahill does not share MacIntyre‘s pessimism 
regarding the state of moral discourse. To the contrary, she depends upon cooperation 
from diverse elements of the community to achieve a higher standard of justice. 
However, when it comes to justice as such, Cahill and MacIntyre both ground their 
respective understanding in a Thomistic account of justice. They also agree that there is 
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no concept of a neutral, tradition-free rationality that can give rise to an adequate account 
of justice.
225
  
Cahill and MacIntyre both critique globally-significant state activity, though they 
describe them in different terms. MacIntyre states that particular public cases are 
adjudicated by employing the concepts of utility and rights through government entities 
like the courts and legislatures.
226
 But in contemporary society, as MacIntyre has shown, 
the government is not neutral in deciding among competing claims. Powerful interests 
appoint judges to the courts, and equally formidable lobbies have the ear of legislators. 
Further still, since governmental power to enforce decisions endangers the stability of 
local communities, agencies of the state should not be the ones to exclude participation in 
public discourse. By contrast, Cahill sees some value in collaborating with the 
government on policy. Lacking such controls, she believes that powerful interests can 
monopolize the debate, effectively short-circuiting any action that subtracts from their 
profits.
227
 
Moving to a comparative analysis with Michael Walzer‘s conception of justice, 
one can find many points of similarity. For instance, both critique a conception of public 
discourse that is couched in terms of strictly-deliberative practices. In deliberative 
processes, disagreements are negotiated through discourse which is qualified by 
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reciprocity, transparency, and accountability.
228
 Deliberation seeks a practical consensus 
on individual issues, but it must also have recourse to a ―macro level‖ theory of justice.229  
While Cahill applauds this vision of discourse, she also calls it ―ideal.‖ She also 
sees such theories of deliberative democracy as illuminating examples of participatory 
theological bioethics.
230
 But in many ways, public discourse is not neutral, and in this 
sense, she shares a strong connection to Walzer‘s view on egalitarian justice. Justice is 
not a principle, but an end-product. It is also achieved through non-deliberative strategies, 
including coercion, as the conclusion to this dissertation will demonstrate. As both 
MacIntyre and Walzer have pointed out in their own ways, public discourse can easily 
mask the deep-seated powers at work within the debate. Powerful interests can limit the 
scope of the debate or can extinguish all effective opposition to a proposed course of 
action. But this is only true if the discourse takes place at the level of deliberation, where 
activist strategies cannot be accounted for. At the same time, deliberative democracy can 
lack the tools to question the deeper values at stake in public discourse, like issues which 
affect notions about the common good. Despite Cahill‘s fairly positive appraisal to the 
theory of deliberative democracy, she tends to reject it in the realm of public discourse 
about biotechnology, as the Epilogue will make apparent. 
Cahill and Walzer also attempt in their respective projects to overcome the 
dominance of particular social goods like political power or wealth. In Walzer‘s view, 
respectful toleration for religious groups is only good as long as those with beliefs 
                                                     
228
 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 349-350. 
229
 Cahill, Theological Bioethics, 49; see Gutmann and Thompson, 4-5. 
230
 Cahill, Theological Bioethics, 50. 
330 
 
requiring such consideration remain at the margins of the political community. But Cahill 
goes another step further than Walzer with her call for wider inclusive participation. 
Those groups must be brought into the conversation, even if they remain politically 
disengaged to some extent. 
Both Walzer and Cahill have multifaceted understandings of justice in practical 
contexts. Because justice is determined by context, Walzer claims that substantive 
accounts of justice are necessarily local in scope.
231
 The willingness to debate and 
negotiate implies that all complicated issues are potentially resolvable. Similarly, Cahill‘s 
later work makes deep connections to the complex of social relationships, from which 
free choice is no mere abstraction.
232
 Especially in bioethical applications, Cahill‘s claims 
resonate with Walzer‘s in that justice itself is contextualized.233 This is not to say that 
Cahill has abandoned an attempt at a universal principle. But Rawlsian bioethical 
principles fall short because they ratify market-based approaches to genetic medicine.
234
 
As technology drives on, absent a moral or even political compass, it becomes imperative 
to find a method of engagement that slows its relentless march, or at least steers it toward 
its least harmful conclusion. As Walzer notes in Politics and Passion, activism frequently 
arouses the negative passions of envy and resentment. But if theological voices engaged 
in this future public debate are successful, then the inevitable achievement of human 
germline enhancement still leaves open a possibility of forgiveness and reconciliation. 
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Collaborative Justice and the Theological Accounts of Justice 
 Compared with her early writings, the Catholic social tradition clearly influences 
Cahill‘s later work. CST has enhanced her theological inquiries into family, sexuality, 
and bioethics. In her earliest writing, Cahill struggles to negotiate the personalist 
tendencies of Catholic sexual ethics within a larger communal setting. As CST is brought 
to bear in her later writings, she urges Catholic teaching to become more inclusive in its 
own understanding of community. She almost always draws from social teaching, 
especially with regard to participation in the common good. Guided by the virtue of 
solidarity and practices of subsidiarity, CST has had a telling effect on her conception of 
justice. 
 She also maintains CST‘s roots in the natural law tradition. She perceives natural 
law ethics as the most coherent language with which to join in public discourse from her 
Catholic standpoint. However, she also attempts to transform the participants‘ value 
systems beyond CST‘s appeals to human rights. The social tradition tends to avoid 
suggesting specific solutions to social problems in favor of a more modest appeal to 
rights language, which is grounded in natural law. CST expresses special concern for the 
vulnerable members of the world‘s communities. Cahill upholds these rights, but also 
suggests concrete ways to increase the participation of the poor and marginalized. She 
offers many examples of solidaristic activism in cases where powerful elites are reluctant 
to include others in public discourse. 
 At the same time, Cahill is also aware of CST‘s tendency toward idealism and 
naiveté in at least two ways. As Chapter Three demonstrated, the social encyclical 
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tradition is often characterized by its search for a global governing authority.
235
 They 
have frequently looked to the United Nations to fill that role, but the U.N.‘s legitimacy is 
not recognized by all of its member states‘ governments. Instead, Cahill uses CST‘s own 
principle of subsidiarity to demonstrate that political power can be multilateral and 
pluralist in nature. Grassroots activism can be even more effective than a U.N. mandate. 
The second way is related to the first in her understanding of coercion. Informed by the 
social writings of Reinhold Niebuhr and others, Cahill understands that good 
argumentation alone will not bring about substantive social change. Some situations are 
so unjust and dire that immediate, forcible action is required beyond public deliberation. 
Cahill reserves her sharpest criticism for the objectifying dangers of biotechnology and 
against those who exclude the marginalized from any social benefits which it might 
bring. In a global context which lacks comprehensive oversight, transnational advocacy 
networks must attempt to secure ―equilibrium of power and reciprocal relationships that 
constitute social justice.‖236 
 Moving to virtue ethics, it is interesting to note at the outset that James Keenan 
dedicated one of his recent books to Cahill.
237
 Like Cahill‘s methodology, virtue ethics 
tends to move beyond act-based decision making. Consistent with Keenan‘s work, Cahill 
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shares an inherently relational anthropology. Both also see justice as the overarching 
virtue of all human action, though they apply them differently in the case of genetic 
enhancement. Keenan‘s classification of justice as the operational virtue humanity‘s 
general relationships fits well with Cahill‘s firm adherence to equal personal dignity. 
Cahill looks more to the social context and worries for the exclusion of marginalized 
citizens or the dangers of genetic stratification. By contrast, Keenan‘s relational and 
teleological anthropology tends toward openness to the ―distant horizon of genetic 
research,‖ and is less pessimistic about the prospects of germline modification. But, like 
Cahill, Keenan acknowledges that there must also be a negotiation of the short- and long-
term conflicts among goods when utilizing enhancement technology.
 238
 
 There are also other significant differences between Cahill and Porter on method. 
First, Cahill does not often use the vocabulary of virtue. Instead, she tends to employ 
CST‘s discourse of rights. While Porter‘s view of justice is hesitant to move beyond the 
Catholic context, Cahill attempts to recover a sense of dialogic universality in moral 
reasoning. Just as Cahill‘s work contrasts with MacIntyre‘s on public discourse, Cahill 
differs with Porter in that the former believes that substantive universal consensus about 
justice can be achieved through public dialogue and collaborative action. Cahill‘s faith 
commitment gives rise to this participatory strategy, and shapes the contours of her 
contribution to such involvement. 
 Turning to justice in bioethics, the most significant contrasts between Cahill and 
Margaret Farley have already been noted in Chapter Three. Farley seems to emphasize 
more the internal ecclesial debates with regard to justice, while Cahill tends to focus upon 
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the valuable external contribution of theological voices toward public discourse. Cahill 
envisions the debate within the church as part of a self-critical and self-limiting practice 
for the community which participates in the discourse. Both Cahill and Farley emphasize 
the prophetic aspect to the church‘s participation in the public sphere. They also differ on 
location of the meaning and content in their respective accounts of the common good. 
Farley‘s concept of compassionate respect finds content for justice in the particularity of 
one‘s context. The common good illuminates a general meaning for justice in social 
relations. Cahill‘s collaborative justice receives its content from a notion of the common 
good. Solidarity, subsidiarity, and equality help to define justice‘s meaning in different 
contexts. Cahill differentiates between respect and compassion within the context of 
CST. Respect corresponds to the dignity of the person, while compassion corresponds to 
the solidarity of all in pursuit of the common good.
239
  
Finally, Shannon and Cahill originally developed similar notions of justice during 
the early part of Cahill‘s career. In fact, they co-authored a commentary on the Vatican‘s 
1987 Instruction: Donum Vitae. Their attempt to demonstrate the interrelated issues of 
parenthood and sexuality in a contemporary, pluralistic society represents one of Cahill‘s 
first attempts at a sustained application of CST in her writings. However, Shannon tends 
to deny that there is a teleological thrust to ―human nature,‖ which is a point of contrast 
with Cahill.
240
 Moreover, Shannon‘s later attempt to ―update‖ the Vatican‘s Instruction 
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on family ethics during the transitional period of her work. Shannon rejects Thomistic 
notions of nature, except perhaps in a ―purely physicalist way.‖ Shannon claims that 
because nature is evolving it tends toward open-endedness and non-directionality. See 
Shannon, ―Response to Lisa Sowle Cahill, ‗Sex, Gender, and the Common Good: 
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focuses on issues that illumine the context for personal decision making, while 
developing a position that is defendable in the public forum.
241
 By contrast, Cahill insists 
upon the primacy of the social context in the area of assisted procreation. This difference 
is significant because it demonstrates a shift away from personalist ethics when 
technological aids enter the discussion. To expand on this difference, the dissertation‘s 
exploration of Cahill‘s later essays now turns to its conclusion, which analyzes her 
theological inquiry into assisted procreation technologies aimed at cloning and 
enhancement. 
                                                                                                                                                              
Family,‘‖ in James Donahue and M. Theresa Moser ed., Religion, Ethics, and the 
Common Good (Mystic: Twenty-Third Publications, 1996), 169. 
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 Shannon and Allan B. Wolter, ―Reflections on the Moral Status of the Pre-
Embryo,‖ in Shannon ed., Bioethics, 55. 
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EPILOGUE  
 
COLLABORATIVE JUSTICE AND FUTURE PUBLIC MORAL DISCOURSE 
ABOUT GERMLINE GENETIC ENHANCEMENT 
This conclusion to the dissertation explores the possibility of utilizing Cahill‘s conception 
of justice – what has been described as ―collaborative justice – in future public discourse 
about human genetic engineering and especially germline enhancement. Since 1998, 
Cahill has written or edited numerous works related to biotechnology and particularly 
genetics.
1
 Taken together, these writings demonstrate three further aspects regarding 
                                                     
1
 Cahill, ―Germline Genetics, Human Nature, and Social Ethics,‖ in Ronald Cole-
Turner ed., Design and Destiny: Jewish and Christian Perspectives on Human Germline 
Modification (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2008), 145-166; ―Aging, Genetics, and Social 
Justice,‖ in Catherine Y. Read, Robert C. Green, and Michael A. Smyer ed., Aging, 
Biotechnology, and the Future (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 216-
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Casey, ed. Is Human Nature Obsolete? Genetics, Bioengineering, and the Future of the 
Human Condition (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005), 339-366; Theological Bioethics 
(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 235-239; ―Bioethics, Theology, and 
Social Change,‖ Journal of Religious Ethics 31, no.3 (Winter 2003), 363-398; ―Biotech 
and Justice: Catching Up with the Real World Order,‖ Hastings Center Report 33, no.4 
(September-October 2003), 34-44; ―Genetics, Ethics, and Feminist Theology: Some 
Recent Directions,‖ Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 18, no.2 (Fall 2002), 53-77; 
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121-142; ―Genetics, Commodification, and Social Justice in the Globalization Era,‖ 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 11, no.3 (2001), 221-238; and ―Genetics, Ethics, and 
Social Policy: The State of the Question,‖ in Maureen Junker-Kenney and Lisa Sowle 
Cahill ed., The Ethics of Genetic Engineering (London: SCM Press, 1998), vii-xiii. 
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Cahill‘s application of collaborative justice to contemporary bioethics. First, she 
continues to resist reducing ethical discussion to a consideration of individual acts. This 
countercultural, ―prophetic‖ facet of her project has been prominent since at least the 
transitional period of her writing career. Second, she consistently encourages the 
presence of theological voices in public bioethical discourse about genetic interventions. 
She claims that the theologians‘ strongest contribution is their focus on the common 
good.  Third, she perceives several participatory strategies for this participation. Some of 
these modes of involvement are aimed at policy discussion, others look to social 
activism, and still others strive for greater inclusion of the marginalized. 
 This conclusion is constructed in three sections, with each part corresponding to 
the aforementioned features of Cahill‘s collaborative justice. It opens with a summary of 
her analysis on the probable wrongness of the act of germline enhancement. Her 
emphasis on the common good is an especially powerful component to her argument 
against human engineering, since human dignity can be used by both sides in the debate. 
Next, the discussion turns to public discourse about genetic technology. In this context, 
her prophetic mode of public discourse challenges the participants to imagine the concept 
of justice at the service of the poor. Finally, the dissertation closes with a consideration of 
Cahill‘s approbation for the utilization of transnational activist networks in order to 
maintain pressure on the governments and corporations who may choose to pursue 
genetic enhancement technology. Since policy debate ultimately aims toward deliberative 
consensus, it is vital that opponents of these genetic interventions employ some of the 
non-deliberative strategies described in Chapters Two and Four of this dissertation. 
Cahill‘s examples of coercive tactics drawn from other bioethical issues serve as 
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analogous illustrations of the shape of future public discourse about germline 
enhancement. 
 
Germline Enhancement as “Contingently Wrong” 
 To begin, theological and philosophical arguments about the act of germline 
genetic enhancement tend to break down due to conflicting views with no rational 
discriminant for resolving them. There is even plurality within Christian assumptions that 
ground respective arguments for and against enhancement. For example, human 
createdness is a foundational point for Catholic anthropology. Chapter One discussed 
creation as the basis for CST‘s affirmation of human dignity. Grounding teaching in 
human dignity can lead to wide, substantive agreement on many issues. But Cahill points 
out that theological reflection on creation can lead to diverging views about the limits of 
human action. One view holds that humans are ―co-creators‖ with God. In procreation, 
biological kinship is secondary to the inclusive love that is part and parcel with the idea 
of human dignity.
2
 The other view expresses a worry that autonomous freedom is the 
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 One representative of this view is Lutheran theologian Ted Peters, For the Love 
of Children: Genetic Technology and the Future of the Family (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 1996), 180. Peters praises Cahill‘s work as ―the most penetrating and 
edifying analysis of the Christian tradition regarding the relation between baby making 
and companionship in marriage,‖ 165. He also offers an extensive critique of her early 
essays in sexual and family ethics (ibid., 171-177). There, he criticizes her insistence that 
biological kinship take priority over analogous adoption schemes. He writes, ―The 
Christian social message that Cahill wants to deliver is this: Full reciprocity between 
women and men in loving marital bonds will create families that will be genuine schools 
of transforming values for the whole of society. In this school of transforming values, she 
adds, the Christian family should teach inclusive love for the outsider, for the 
marginalized, for those beyond our kin connection‖ (ibid., 177). It is clear that Peters is 
addressing an era of Cahill‘s work that has not incorporated CST, which insists (rather 
than ―adds‖) that the family is a ―domestic church‖ which turns outward to strive for the 
common good. 
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guiding moral factor in contemporary American culture. It is wary of ―playing God‖ 
through rash, uncritical, and disproportionate approaches to science. This view balances 
the dignity that comes from creation with the finitude that arises from sin. Since sin is a 
―nearly universal religious metaphor,‖ it has limited value for those outside of the 
tradition. 
3
 
 Furthermore, supporters and detractors of genetic interventions tend to focus – too 
narrowly, in Cahill‘s estimation – on the demonstration of the act‘s moral goodness or 
badness. For instance, in the case of cloning, she claims that this possibility is a ―virtually 
unquestioned assumption‖ 
Either because every instance will demonstrably violate the freedom of 
individuals; or because it involves specific physical or psychological harm or 
great risk of harm. If neither of these outcomes can be shown beyond reasonable 
doubt, the cloning should not be prohibited. Individual purveyors and clients 
should be free to perfect, provide, and purchase cloning. Approaches to values 
and to society that are more inductive, more affective, more long-range, and less 
conclusive have much less persuasive power in a culture that values clear 
evidence and immediate outcomes over gradual consensus-building and 
incremental social results.
4
 
 
Physical heritability is the distinctive moral feature in both human cloning and germline 
modification. In both cases, offspring are born with intentionally predetermined traits 
which can be passed to subsequent generations. At the same time, there is wide 
disagreement on the issue of whether or not this hereditary factor constitutes harm to 
potential descendants. Harm which arises from unrefined techniques can be ameliorated 
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  Cahill, ―Introduction to the Project: Genetics, Theology, and Ethics,‖ In Cahill 
ed., Genetics, Theology, and Ethics: An Interdisciplinary Conversation (New York: 
Crossroads, 2005, 2-3). 
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 Cahill, ―Cloning and Sin: A Niebuhrian Analysis and a Catholic, Liberationist 
Response,‖ 98-99. 
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as these interventions become perfected. Moreover, commodification is overcome by 
informed consent.
5
 
 Cahill concludes that there are no ―lock-down‖ arguments against genetic 
manipulation. With regard to reproductive cloning, she admits that it is difficult to locate 
its immorality on intrinsicist grounds; it is not ―just wrong.‖ Instead, it is significant to 
point out that cloning generates offspring with only a single genetic parent, who is the 
―later-born twin‖ of the parent. If there is anything intrinsic to the argument, it is derived 
from cloning‘s effects on understandings about the family.6 
 Moving to the issue of germline intervention, Cahill admits that she does not 
believe it is possible to conclude that it is intrinsically immoral. Instead, she insists that 
germline modification is ―contingently wrong.‖ Personalist concerns like potential harm 
or commodification are not primary issues, though. On the one hand, if safety and 
efficacy could be assured, then germline therapy could be considered morally permissible 
and perhaps even obligatory.  On the other hand, enhancement is far more troubling for 
two reasons: the definitional problem of ―enhancement‖ and the social control of its 
benefits.
7
 The former concerns philosophical issues about normal physiological function, 
and it has implications for understanding the idea of human nature. The latter describes 
inequalities that can arise from genetic technologies, and it demonstrates the wider social 
import of Cahill‘s analysis of genomic ethics. 
 Consistent with other examples of Cahill‘s later work, justice is at the root of her 
inquiries into germline enhancement and cloning. Additionally, her criticism is unusually 
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 Cahill, ―Genetics, Ethics, and Social Policy,‖ xi. 
6
 Cahill, ―Nature, Sin, and Society,‖ 345. 
7
 Cahill, ―Germline Genetics, Human Nature, and Social Ethics,‖ 146. 
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sharp in these areas as it relates to justice. In the case of cloning, Cahill implies that 
therapeutic or reproductive cloning is likely to be used strictly by the affluent. To add 
cloning to the myriad modes of assisted procreation is simply to continue to sidestep 
questions of how such techniques are part of an ―ethically worthy society governed by the 
norms of justice.‖ The dividing question is whether or not justice is ―concerned 
exclusively or primarily with individual freedom‖ or if it refers ―to responsibility to the 
common good.‖ Cahill sees adequate health care access as one of life‘s basic necessities.8 
 Regarding germline enhancement, Cahill claims that it is ―obvious‖ that such 
interventions will be made available only to those who can afford them. She envisions a 
dire social situation in which the poor will be forced into eugenic abortion in order to 
compete with wealthy, or risk their children becoming part of a ―genetic underclass.‖ 9 
She uses the pharmaceutical industry as an illustrative warrant for her urgent worry.  
Facing an actual downturn in innovation and in the development of new products, 
pharmaceutical companies are desperate to maintain their incredible profits. They 
achieve this by maintaining monopolies on drugs, by introducing new drugs that 
are little more than copies of old ones, by promoting new drugs that may be less 
effective than old ones, and by spending a huge proportion of their budgets hiring 
researchers they can control, brining doctors, and marketing directly to 
consumers. In the race to the bank these companies abandon unprofitable products 
with little regard for the consequences for individual or public health.
10
 
 
For Cahill, the current behavior of drug manufactures, set within a consumerist society‘s 
social context, provides a bellwether for the prospects of just use of futurist genetic 
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 Cahill, ―Cloning and Sin: A Niebuhrian Analysis and a Catholic, Liberationist 
Response,‖ 102-103 (emphasis added). 
9
 Cahill, ―Germline Genetics, Human Nature, and Social Ethics,‖ 159. 
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 Ibid., 159. Here, Cahill cites the investigative reporting of Marcia Angell, 
former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine. See The Truth about Drug 
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technologies like germline enhancement and cloning. Citing the work of bioethicist Mark 
Frankel, Cahill envisions a genetic future where eugenics policies will not be forced upon 
people. Instead, they will be marketed ―as something we cannot live without.‖11 
 Cahill‘s harsh indictment of biotechnology in the case of germline enhancement is 
highly unusual when compared to her many other writings represented in this 
dissertation. Throughout her career, her work has consistently been collegial in their tone, 
even when it is clear that she is completely at odds with her dialogue partners. For 
example, she diffused MacIntyre‘s rather caustic critique of her 1979 essay in an almost 
playful manner.
12
 In fact, when negotiating her differences of opinion with other scholars, 
she often affirms the positive aspects or recognizes the similarities before firmly 
describing their points of disagreement. Moreover, Cahill‘s substantive critiques of 
church teachings and social practices do not reflect the accusatory quality as they do in 
the case of biotechnology. 
 This dissertation claims that Cahill‘s participatory bioethics accounts for the 
contrast between the tone of these writings about genetic enhancement and those of other 
essays. Chapter One described Cahill‘s five modes of public discourse: ethical, policy, 
prophetic, narrative, and participatory.
13
 The first four are drawn from the work of James 
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 Cahill, Theological Bioethics, 35-40. 
343 
 
Gustafson, who was influential to Cahill‘s later essays.14 Cahill‘s ―participatory 
discourse‖ emphasizes the public nature of the moral discourse by attempting to 
determine the moral and political contours in which public debate situated. At times, it is 
also necessary to shift those lines which demarcate the limits of public debate. Prophetic 
engagement does not attempt to dictate policy in the public forum. Rather, it seeks to 
expand participants‘ moral vision. 
Like the prophets of the Hebrew Bible, theological prophets today often forward a 
critique of economic systems that exclude the poor from basic goods such as 
health care. They combat an overly pragmatic and individualist approach to 
biomedical decision making and insist that not all human problems can be 
resolved by more technology. Though their utopia is ultimately eschatological, 
they hold up a vision of a more equitable society characterized by the virtues of 
solidarity and compassion and of justice inspired by love of God and neighbor.
15
 
 
Also like the prophets of Israel, Cahill‘s biting words attempt to turn society away from a 
destructive path. Systematic injustice toward the poor is one of the clearest signposts 
along this route. Throughout later essays, Cahill documents a litany of inequities in health 
care access which undermine both the aims of health care and the common good. With a 
strong prophetic voice, she hopes to deter adding this extreme mode of intervention to 
that list. 
 Cahill‘s tendency to contextualize moral acts beyond individual decision making 
is an element of her later essays in bioethics. The social context thereby becomes the 
locus for her entry into public moral discourse. It is also where her notion of collaborative 
justice develops into one of the most valuable contributions that theologians can make to 
that discussion. The dissertation now considers Cahill‘s work in policy discourse about 
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assisted procreation and especially germline enhancement. In this context, her prophetic 
mode of public discourse challenges the participants to imagine the concept of justice at 
the service of the poor. 
 
Public Moral Discourse and Human Genetic Engineering 
 In assessing the morality of the various forms of assisted procreation, Cahill 
moves beyond an awareness of the dangers of commodification, that is, the potential for 
perceiving one‘s children as a manufactured product. By treating infertility as a disease, 
for instance, she looks to issues of economic justice. Here, she continues the prophetic 
aspect of policymaking discussed in the previous section. Participants with strong 
religious commitments are richly nourished by their narratives, symbols, and communal 
practices, but it is difficult to express those constitutive elements of their faith in a public 
forum. Alternatively, a prophetic dimension of her participatory bioethics challenges a 
worldview that allows special-interest politics to threaten ―to pull policies out of 
alignment with the common good.‖ 16  
As with Cahill‘s treatment of aging discussed in Chapter One, she makes the case 
that public policy about assisted reproduction technology (ART) should avoid 
medicalizing social problems. Citing the work of feminist ethicist Maura Ryan, Cahill 
sees three issues at stake in pursing ART. 
17
 First, there ought to be a bias toward 
utilizing scarce medical resources to address needs which are ―truly medical‖ in scope. 
Assisted procreation must treat the disease of infertility. Next, there must be serious 
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345 
 
consideration of success rates of ART in light of its considerable expense and dubious 
efficacy. Finally, social justice must be at the center of policy discussion. ART is not 
simply a ―private‖ matter between patient and caregiver. Discussion must also attend to 
the clear reality that wealthy consumers utilize ART far more than less affluent people. 
One can question whether it is the case that infertility afflicts primarily the economically 
privileged, or that only the well-off can be treated. 
Correlatively, policy discourse aimed at modes of genetic manipulation like 
reproductive cloning and germline enhancement help to elucidate a more productive 
analysis than discussions about their intrinsic moral goodness. In her analysis of cloning, 
Cahill notes three serious shortcomings that warrant its severe regulation or even 
permanent prohibition. 
Commercialized, technology-driven reproduction affects the social institution of 
the family and parenthood in deleterious ways because it makes basic, intimate 
human relations and communities subject to individualism, commodification, and 
exploitation.
18
 
 
Cloning ignores ethical and religious resources about family structures in favor of 
uncritical and ―triumphalist‖ views of biotechnology. At the same time, it uses this know-
how to ―make profits with little consideration for the common good.‖ Most importantly, 
it ignores huge inequalities between the wealthy individuals who would utilize this 
biomedical technology and many poor who cannot even access basic health care.  
This social context for justice has been a constant feature in Cahill‘s later work, 
but it is especially evident in her ethics of genetic technology.
19
 As mentioned several 
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greatest obstacle to justice in global practices of genetics research and therapy will 
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times in this dissertation, solidarity is a preeminent virtue that guides action toward 
justice. In a global, interdependent society, solidarity is essential. John Paul II writes that 
solidarity is a ―firm and preserving determination to commit oneself to the common 
good.‖20 Cahill applies this view to bioethics by demonstrating that solidarity facilitates 
action toward distant communities.
21
 Echoing John Paul‘s view of the communal nature 
of property from Chapter Three, Cahill argues that there is a ―social mortgage‖ on all 
private property that requires it to be placed at the service of the common good. Like 
John Paul, she includes intellectual property and medical technology in this view.
22
 Thus, 
solidarity demands that the issue of sharing the benefits of genetic research by wealthy 
industrialized nations with developing countries must be a focal point of social justice in 
policy discussions. 
Inclusive participation is also a vital component to Cahill‘s collaborative justice in 
its application to genetic technologies. Throughout Cahill‘s later work, she is consistently 
sensitive to the marginalized in the community and around the world. In the context of 
genetic therapies for the elderly, she argues that the principle of participation requires that 
allocation for such resources must be reconciled with ―basic care needed to maximize 
social participation.‖ Like genetic techniques used for assisted procreation, Cahill places 
such interventions for the elderly within the wider context of the family and local 
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community, who are charged with their care. Older citizens‘ participation has been 
severely limited by what Cahill calls the ―privatization and mobility‖ of the nuclear 
family.
 
This reality creates an obligation on the part of communities with elderly 
populations to improve access to health care, income security, adequate housing, and 
proper nutrition.
23
 
In the context of genetic enhancement, the question can be raised: who are the 
marginalized? Cahill claims that the poor in developing nations are those excluded from 
participation. She sees two ways that marginalization can occur. The first has to do with 
the vague policies which regulate the development of this technology. Regulation 
generally permits germline genetic intervention for ―therapeutic‖ reasons but restricts it 
for ―enhancement‖ purposes. Many of these regulatory entities focus primarily on human 
cloning, and their actions usually restrict the creation/destruction of embryos for ―purely‖ 
research purposes.  
Since the 1990s, policy-making bodies in North Atlantic nations have endorsed 
such restraining measures.
24
 However, many nations have not ratified these policies.
25
 In 
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Germany‘s Embryo Protection Act has banned embryonic research and strictly regulates 
IVF protocols. Similarly, Great Britain has tightly regulated fertility clinics since 1990. In 
December 2001, British Parliament enacted the Human Reproductive Cloning Act ―to 
prohibit the placing in a woman of a human embryo which has been created otherwise 
than by fertilization.‖ Additionally, Article 3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, which was adopted in 2000, bans reproductive cloning and ―eugenic 
practices.‖ The Charter is fully binding to all EU nations as of December 2009.  
25
 In 1997, The European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
amended its protocols to prohibit human reproductive cloning, but the change was not 
ratified by all nations, including the United Kingdom and Russia. See Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine 
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light of this situation, Cahill worries that the United States and European nations will 
refine their genetic protocols in their home countries, and then move their project to a 
poor nation, where genetic technology is less-regulated.
26
 Exploitation arises when these 
researchers ―help‖ infertile women there with reproductive cloning or genetic 
enhancement interventions. Injurious or pernicious outcomes can be corrected before the 
techniques are marketed to ―paying customers.‖ For example, attempts to develop 
HIV/AIDS vaccines in Africa have left many in the local community to suspect that 
Western researchers come there with ―dirty hands,‖ as they conduct unsupervised 
investigations of their drugs.
27
 
The second instance of exploitation has to do with exclusion. Even if the first kind 
of exploitation is unlikely to result, Cahill is certain that the poor will be shut out from 
benefits gained from germline interventions or human cloning.
28
 Her assertion in the 
genetic sphere can be understood based on similar practices in the pharmaceutical 
industry, like their HIV/AIDS clinical trials in Africa. After concluding a trial, many 
researches simply close their laboratories in the study‘s host nation. Equity for human 
subjects does not extend far beyond informed consent. There is little or no compensation 
after the study‘s conclusion. Subjects are also expected to pay full price for the 
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antiretroviral medication regimen.
29
 Moreover, other reports indicate that few primary 
investigators are in-country during the trial. In reality, there are very few HIV/AIDS trials 
compared with the pandemic nature of the disease in Africa.
30
 There is little reason to 
believe that researchers and biotech companies will behave any differently than drug 
manufacturers. 
In her advocacy for the marginalized, Cahill is once again expressing the 
prophetic dimension of participatory bioethics. She attempts to convert the majority of 
interlocutors from a worldview that is rooted in self-interested individualism to one built 
upon the virtues of social justice, like ―compassion, altruism, and solidarity.‖31 From 
CST, John Paul II has argued that market capitalism is not likely to secure the rights of 
the poor, and that the participation of all is required for a truly just society. In neither case 
is the market or society the final purpose of humans.
32
 With a globalization scheme 
dominated by corporate investment and other exclusive practices, it is difficult to give 
guiding virtues like solidarity and altruism a ―functional priority‖ when power interests 
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are threatened. 
33
 In another work on the common good in global context, she cites moral 
theologian James Hanigan on the problem of finding the moral and political will to work 
toward justice. ―The human problem is not that we do not know what to do, but that we 
do not want to know and we do not want to do it.‖ With a narrow moral vision which 
considers only short-term benefits expressed in military and economic strength, altruism 
seems somewhat naïve in the face of realpolitik. 
34
 
 This ―realism‖ challenges Cahill as she integrates CST into her work in two 
ways. The first is the ―top-down‖ conception of social change envisioned in papal 
encyclicals, which have been discussed at different points in this chapter. Cahill calls this 
approach an ―endemic shortcoming,‖ since its calls for change are primarily for the 
powerful.
35
 Religious voices can prioritize solidarity by pointing out that the common 
good requires participation from all. In laying this claim, they can also present the 
tangible needs of the poor at the local level, and present a realistic, achievable plan to 
meet needs and increase participation. In other words, subsidiarity overcomes this 
challenge to CST.
36
 The second challenge relates to the first insofar as it engages 
established hierarchies of power. As the previous section discussed, applications of 
Cahill‘s collaborative justice to bioethical discourse is similar to Michael Walzer‘s 
position, which recognizes that parties can hold contrasting, strongly-held beliefs. 
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Disagreement can be resolved passionately but reasonably settings.
37
 Cahill takes the 
position that platitudes about justice will not be compelling unless they can rouse a 
community‘s sensibilities to imagine themselves ―at the side of the poor.‖ 38  
Cahill contends that there are two entrenched interests which militate against her 
claim. The first one comes from biotech companies and their investors, and is more 
readily apparent.
39
 For example, fertility clinics have often been reported to implant 
several embryos in order to increase pregnancy rates.
40
 The previous paragraphs also 
noted various behaviors of pharmaceutical corporations, who serve largely the same 
interests in a related industry. One could add to this list: transnational agricultural 
enterprises which have been introducing genetically-modified foods, clothing 
manufacturers who have been exploiting poorly-paid workers, and retail stores which 
have been patronizing those manufacturers. Their primary responsibilities lie with their 
investors and executives. Thus, their behavior can be explained by their desire to 
maximize profits. It can also be regulated by government oversight, provided one can 
form a lobby powerful enough to overcome each industry‘s own political action group. 
The second is a bit more subtle, but it is also a sedimented authority in the West. It is the 
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power of the individual in liberal society, who is told to seek his or her own best interests 
in a world of choices. CST tries to balance rights and obligations on behalf of the poor, 
but its actions are often framed in terms of curtailing individual (liberal) freedoms. 
Persons can choose to become citizens of the world, so long as it does not conflict with 
the rights of those who do not choose to do so. In turn, it becomes impractical for the 
―citizen of the world‖ to achieve the goods internal to that kind of membership if one 
lives in a neighborhood of ―foreigners to the world.‖ A ―realist‖ understanding of the 
individual becomes analogous to the short-sighted vision of state politics, which is 
concerned with one‘s social status and economic status. Consequently, it undermines an 
individual‘s efforts toward solidarity in the same way that national interests resist 
attempts at international cooperation in ways that are not beneficial to the nation.
41
 
In closing, in the case of genetic engineering, Cahill insists that the common good 
and inclusive participation are better achieved through cooperative strategies rather than 
technological solutions. At this point, the prophetic aspect of Cahill‘s participatory 
bioethics is the strongest contribution in public discourse about germline modification. 
Solidarity with the marginalized remains a constant virtue that helps the practice of 
collaborative justice. To a lesser degree, government mandates can be helpful insofar as 
they resist being driven by economic interests and moral individualism. But both of these 
realities are firmly embedded in many contemporary interpretations of society and the 
individual. At times, coercion is necessary to break the hold of both types of power. This 
dissertation now concludes with a consideration Cahill‘s assessment of activist strategies 
which are part of her application of collaborative justice in germline enhancement.  
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Collaborative Justice, Coercion, and Activism 
 Finally, in order to demonstrate how Cahill‘s conception of collaborative justice 
may function in practice, it is necessary to investigate the role of non-deliberative 
strategies in her work. This closing part analyzes the formation of unjust power structures 
that stem from the absence of a global authority. At the same time, it describes Cahill‘s 
scholarship on appropriate, forceful responses to unjust behavior by those powerful 
entities. These strategies are applications of her participatory moral discourse, which has 
been informed by her notion of collaborative justice. This final section has three parts. 
First, it continues the discussion from previous sections about the problems related to a 
lack of a global authority to ascertain best policy and to enforce them. Next, Cahill points 
out that various transnational groups, especially the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
have moved into the power vacuum. Thus, the second part describes the dominating and 
at times dehumanizing tendencies that come from this situation. Third, the analysis turns 
to Cahill‘s understanding of coercion through social action aimed at justice.  
 As mentioned previously, the United Nations remains a hopeful center of global 
governance for CST, especially in the papal encyclicals. UNESCO‘s 1997 Universal 
Declaration on Human Genome and Human Rights calls for genetic knowledge to benefit 
all humanity as a whole.
42
 Article 1 pronounces that the genome undergirds ―the 
fundamental unity of all members of the human family,‖ and also grounds human dignity 
as well as diversity.
43
 Cahill‘s research into the Declaration leads her to a five-fold 
understanding of the genome as ―property:‖ ―non-appropriation, common management, 
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equitable sharing of benefits, peaceful use, and protection and preservation for future 
generations.‖44 However, this dissertation has also addressed the lack of authority with 
regard to myriad problems which CST addresses. Cahill sees as untenable the social 
encyclical tradition‘s longing for a centralized, top-down authority.45 Instead, she 
perceives some value in governments‘ attempts to regulate genomic inquiry. She employs 
the analogy of just war to illustrate the limits of competent authority to control 
biotechnology. 
Justifying a war requires the engagement and consent of a legitimate authority. 
Who is that authority in the case of genetics research? Federal and state 
governments are involved; so are national advisory bodies. Research done with 
federal funds must also pass the scrutiny of institutional review boards in the host 
institutions.
46
 
 
While there is some degree of oversight with regard to publicly-funded research, there is 
virtually no restraint on privately- or corporately-sponsored genetic research. Like the 
situation with drug companies, profitability will drive allocation decisions in the genomic 
sphere.
47
 The only accountability is to investors and executives. 
 Moreover, the legislative and executive branches must stand periodically for 
election. It is reasonable to expect that the ideological aims of the political parties will 
view genetic technologies in different ways. For example, in 2001 President George W. 
Bush permitted federal funding for embryonic stem cell research, but limited backing to 
cell lines already in development. Many critics on both sides of the issue saw this 
compromise as unsatisfactory. Those who seek to protect all early human life, including 
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embryos, saw this move as a capitulation to those who want to further a ―culture of 
death.‖ But those who support stem cell research envisioned this settlement as far too 
narrow, especially after discovering only a small number of usable cell lines. Still others 
applauded the policy change as a suitable ―middle way‖ that took the convictions both 
sides into account.
48
 But almost eight years later, newly-inaugurated President Barak 
Obama promised to ―restore science to its rightful place‖ for an array of scientific fields 
from the environment to stem cell research.
49
 Less than two months after his inauguration 
speech, President Obama signed an executive order which effectively allows genetic 
research to use federal funds to develop new stem cell lines. The order has been contested 
in federal courts, but in August 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals unanimously upheld 
previous rulings that permit the President‘s policy.50 With these ebbs and flows, it seems 
that biotechnology regulation, depending on the branch of government in question, is 
liable for seismic shifts every two to four years. 
 But powerful economic groups do not wait for a President who is more favorable 
to their endeavors to enter office. Cahill takes particular aim at the WTO, which provides 
a forum for nations to negotiate trade agreements. Their stated purpose is  
To help trade flow as freely as possible – so long as there are no undesirable side 
effects – because this is important for economic development and well-being. 
That partly means removing obstacles. It also means ensuring that individuals, 
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companies and governments know what the trade rules are around the world, and 
giving them the confidence that there will be no sudden changes of policy. In 
other words, the rules have to be ―transparent‖ and predictable.51 
 
―Fairness‖ is noticeably absent from this description, though it can be inferred by the 
WTO‘s other two constitutive requirements for trade rules. Cahill is particularly wary of 
the WTO‘s 1995 standardization of property rights called the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which she calls ―undemocratic‖ in character and 
neglectful of the poor. 
52
 TRIPS especially concerns pharmaceutical and genomic patent 
laws. Cahill calls TRIPS ―part of the price of entry into the global economic market.‖ 
Non-compliance with TRIPS‘ strict policies can cause trade sanctions and discourage 
capital investment.
53
 Cahill asserts that the WTO‘s objective is to ―guarantee a safe and 
stable political and financial environment for first world producers and investors.‖54 It 
does so by protecting drug, food, and genetic patents in a way that privileges 
corporations. Not only does the agreement tend to privatize scientific knowledge, it also 
excludes the poor from full social participation ―in helping to determine issues that affect 
their lives.‖ 55 While it also allows nations to suspend parts of the agreement during times 
of national emergency, Cahill claims that few countries are willing to forego TRIPS ―out 
of fear of retaliation by trading partners.‖56 
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 Finally, government has sometimes stepped in to check the power of industry, and 
these instances are clearly example of coercion. However, force does not necessarily have 
to be applied by government regulation alone. In fact, Cahill states that the solution to 
effective public policy will ―clearly not‖ be found in establishing a world oversight 
body.
57
 Here, the dissertation alludes to solidaristic activism, another important aspect of 
Cahill‘s participatory bioethics. She writes that ―if concepts like the human person and 
the common good are to be relevant today, they must be advanced in the public forum in 
more innovative ways.‖58 Just as there are current models which can predict social 
consequences for germline enhancement based on other industries‘ behavior, Cahill finds 
corresponding models of activism in light of various efforts at combating the influence 
and power of those companies. 
 One of Cahill‘s favorite examples is the International Cooperation for 
Development and Solidarity (CIDSE), which she describes as ―a network of fifteen 
nongovernmental development organizations from Europe and North America.‖ With 
overtones of CST in its public statements, CIDSE asserts that there is no ―absolute right‖ 
of property ownership, and looks to patent issues within a larger framework of 
―responsibility and the common good.‖59 
In addition to their solidaristic practices that aim toward advancing the common good, 
CIDSE and other activists can compete against larger and more powerful interests by 
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using the same communications and transportation technologies that brought 
transnational corporations to global power.  
In Cahill‘s estimation, these strategies represent the new face of CST‘s principle 
of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is a basic practice for collaborative justice, which, in turn, 
has the common good as its object. Cahill claims that the common good ―has always 
begun from the experienced needs and goods of human beings, and from insights into the 
sorts of social relationships that promote human welfare.‖60 Collaborative justice is 
ultimately about an individual‘s – or, in parts of Cahill‘s project, a family‘s – capacity for 
participation in the common good. In local and global contexts, Cahill describes four 
aspects of the common good.
61
 One, it is substantive in that it must actually enumerate 
concrete human goods which are necessary to secure participation. As with Gaudium et 
Spes and the social encyclical tradition, there must be a workable schema of positive 
rights to those goods. Two, the common good is also procedural to the degree that it 
involves an inclusive decision-making process. This kind of practice is distinctly Western 
in that participatory democracy is brought into conversation with a consensus-building 
deliberative process.
62
 Three, there are also necessary virtues that lend themselves to the 
practices of subsidiarity and the common good. The dissertation has already identified 
solidarity as a primary virtue, but at times Cahill has also described hope as another 
important virtue to seeking the common good. The two are connected temporally: 
solidarity refers to the present, while hope looks largely toward the future. 
63
 In fact, a 
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case can be made that Cahill‘s pessimism about the future of germline enhancement is 
brought about by a lack of hope, since the present reality is that solidarity is sorely 
lacking. Four, there must be efficacy with regard to practices that serve the common 
good. It must engage with diverse intellectual positions, religious and cultural traditions, 
and political movements in a way that respects their values and needs. 
Transnational advocacy networks begin with a ―practical consensus‖ about an 
injustice, that is, a policy or practice that excludes individual persons or social classes 
from participation in the common good.
64
 Cahill depicts as watershed moments in 
participatory discourse, events like disruptive protests of the 1999 WTO summit in 
Seattle by anti-globalization organizations and public denunciations of a 2001 lawsuits 
brought by South Africa drug manufacturers, who claimed royalties were not paid under 
the TRIPS agreement.
65
 Using press briefings, social media and rapid transportation, 
these groups can protest a powerful organization‘s exclusionary practices in the public 
sphere. Their tactics are significant because these tools and technologies are the same 
ones that larger, more politically-connected and economically-empowered companies and 
organizations utilize each day in their drive toward profits.  
In a participatory schema, coercion can take many forms. It can simply be a 
matter of bad press, which many companies often want to avoid in an age of 24-hour 
news access. It can also encourage a boycott of an individual company‘s products, which 
civil- and labor-rights groups have proven an effective tactic in the twentieth century. 
Most importantly, when private funding is at stake, as it is in the case of genetic research, 
                                                     
64
 Cahill, ―The Global Common Good in the Twenty-First Century,‖ 244. 
65
 Cahill, Theological Bioethics, 64. The latter court dispute was denounced by 
prominent humanitarian organizations like Oxfam and Doctors without Borders. See 
Cahill, ―The Global Common Good in the Twenty-First Century,‖ 245-246. 
360 
 
coercion can target the primary investors and parent companies of genetic enterprises. 
Activists can plead with and denounce capital investors and fund managers to withdraw 
their financial support for such industries. They can also use similar tactics to convince 
large corporate conglomerations to divest themselves of their unjust subsidiaries. In short, 
activism can ―have teeth‖ in the public sphere of a well-functioning democracy in ways 
that national and global governments cannot. 
In closing, Cahill‘s collaborative justice, as it has been described in this 
dissertation, relies heavily upon a fully-formed integration of the Catholic social 
tradition, and grounds future public discourse about human germline genetic 
enhancement. Its balanced attention to personal and social concerns is accomplished by 
way of the CST‘s insistence on inviolable dignity and human sociality. But especially 
coloring every essay in Cahill‘s later body of work, which was analyzed in Chapter Four, 
is an overriding concern for the common good. To participate in its advancement is the 
mark of human dignity and the call to contributory justice, as described in Chapter One. 
To possess the tools which facilitate participation is the ―flip side‖ of that same justice. In 
public debate about the modification of the human genome, the guiding virtues of 
solidarity, subsidiarity, and equality of all will help to shape the structure of this future 
technological achievement. Many of these concerns are also located in the other 
philosophical and theological accounts of justice as they were described in Chapters Two 
and Three. Surely, others can be identified as well. But Cahill‘s collaborative justice also 
includes the possibility of forgiveness and reconciliation, which are often seen as beyond 
the ordinary norms of justice. Restorative justice can make a person whole; collaborative 
justice can repair a fractured community.
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